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An attribute (guna) is defined as that which exists in a substance and has no quality or activity in it.' A substance exists by itself and is the constituent (samavayi) cause of things. An attribute depends for its existence on some substance and is never constitutive of things. It is a non-constituent (asamavayi) cause of things in so far as it determines their nature and character, but not their existence. All attributes must be owned by substances. So there cannot be an attribute of attributes. An attribute is itself attributeless (nirguna). An attribute is a static property of things. It hangs on the thing as something passive and inactive (niskriya). So it is different from both substance and action. There are altogether twenty-four kinds of attributes. These are: colour (rupa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparsa), sound (sabda), number (sankhya), magnitude (parimana), differentia (prthaktva), conjunction (samyoga), disjunction (vibhaga), remoteness (paratva), nearness (aparatva), 1 Dravyasrita jneya nirguna niskriya gunah, Bhasapariccheda, 86.

fluidity (dravatva), viscidity (sneha), knowledge (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duhkha), desire (iccha), aversion (dvesa), effort (prayatna), heaviness (gurutva), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma) and faculty (samskara).¹ All attributes do not admit of sense perception. Hence we are to exclude the imperceptible attributes from the objects of perception. Faculty (samskara) is of three different kinds: velocity (vega), which keeps a thing in motion; mental disposition (bhavana), which enables us to remember and recognise things; and elasticity (sthitisthapaka), by which a thing tends towards equilibrium when disturbed. Of these, mental disposition and elasticity are regarded as imperceptible attributes. So also merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) are considered to be supersensible attributes of the soul." With regard to effort (prayatna) some Naiyayikas make a distinction between three different kinds of it, namely, vital effort (jivanayoni) which maintains the flow of life (pranasamcarahetu), and positive and negative volitions (pravrtty and nivrtti). According to them, vital effort (jivanayoni prayatna) is an attribute which is not perceived, but inferred as the cause of vital functions. Modern Naiyayikas, however, do not recognise the attribute of vital effort. Almost all the Indian systems agree in holding that heaviness or weight (gurutva) is a quality which cannot be perceived, but must be inferred.' The reason why these qualities are treated as imperceptible is that they cannot be perceived by any of the senses recognised in Indian philosophy. They are supersensible entities and hence there cannot be any kind of contact between these and our senses. In the Jaina system, however, light and heavy are treated as touch-sensations.5 3 The remaining attributes arc regarded as capable of being perceived by the senses. But those belonging to the soul, such 1 Bhasapariccheda, 3-5. 2 Bhasapariccheda, 93-94- 3 Siddhanta-muktavali & Dinakari, 149-52. 4 Bhasapariccheda, 153. 5 Cf. Pancastikayasara, Ch. II.

as knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition, are the objects of internal perception which we shall afterwards consider. These apart, the attributes that are left are the objects of external perception. Some of them are perceived only by one sense, and some by two senses. Thus colour (rupa) is perceived only by the eye. Taste (rasa) is a quality of substances that is perceived only by the gustatory sense (rasana). Smell (gandha) can be perceived only by the olfactory sense (ghrana), and touch only by the cutaneous sense (tvak). The perception of these four attributes has two conditions, namely, that they must be manifest (udbhuta) and that they must belong to substances possessing a limited dimension (mahadvrttitva)." In the perception of these attributes the second form of senseobject contact (viz. samyukla-samavaya) obtains. The attributes come in contact with their respective senses through their inherence (samavaya) in the things that are conjoined (samyukta) to the senses. Conjunction or direct contact is possible only between two substances. Hence there cannot be any direct contact of the attributes with their special senses. But the attributes of colour, etc., inhere in certain things or substances, such as a jar, an orange, a table, etc. When these things come in actual contact (i.e. are conjoined) with the eye, etc., there is a perception of the qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch as inhering (samaveta) in them. Sound is an attribute of akasa, and is perceived only by the auditory sense (srotra). In the perception of sound the fourth kind of sense-object contact (viz. samavaya) holds good. Sound is perceived when it comes in contact with the auditory This contact cannot be a relation of conjunction (samyoga), since one of the terms is an attribute. The sense of hearing is a portion of akasa, in which sound inheres as an attribute. Hence the contact of sound with the auditory organ 21 (O.P. 103) 1 Bhasapariccheda, 53-56, 92-93.

means its inherence (samavaya) in the latter.' Sound is first produced by the conjunction or disjunction of things. But this sound cannot be perceived unless it reaches the passage of the ear. So the first sound produces other sounds which either undulate towards the ear or move in straight lines in all directions (vicitaranganyayena kadambamukulanyayena va). In this way the series of sounds meets the ear. The last number of the series which strikes upon the ear-drum is perceived, while the first and the intermediate ones are not perceived. So it is not correct to say that we perceive sound at a distance.² The Vedantist, however, thinks that in the perception of sound it is the car that meets sound and not vice versa. We are not wrong when we say that we hear the sound of the distant drum. For there is nothing to contradict the obvious experience of disant sounds." The attributes that admit of perception by both the senses of sight and touch are number, magnitude, differentia, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, fluidity, viscidity and velocity. These are perceived by the eye when connected with light and manifest colour, and by the tactual sense when connected with manifest touch." Of visible and tangible things there may be respectively a visual and tactual perception of their number, etc. In the perception of these qualities we have the second kind of sense-object contact, viz. samyuktasamavaya. The objects (i.e. number and the rest) come in contact with the senses through their inherence (samavaya) in certain things that are conjoined (samyukta) to the senses. In the perception of magnitude (parimana) we are to admit a further fourfold contact between sense and the things concerned. By magnitude is here meant a limited dimension that belongs to ordinary things like tables and jars, and neither the unlimited dimension of the all-pervading substances, nor the minute dimension of atoms and dyads, for these are impercepBP., 53, 60. 2 Bhasapariccheda, & Siddhanta-muktavali, 165-66. 3 Vedanta-paribhasa, Chap. 1. 4 Bhasapariccheda & Siddhanta-muktavali, 93. 5 Ibid., 54-56.

tible. The magnitude of ordinary sensible things is due to the number and magnitude of their component parts. Hence to perceive the magnitude of a thing we are to perceive the coexistence and relative position of the constituent parts. This is rendered possible by four kinds of contact (catustayasannikarsa) that between the different parts of an extended sense organ and the different parts of the thing, that between the different parts of the sense organ and the whole of the thing, that between parts of the thing and the whole of the sense organ and that between the whole of the sense organ and the whole of the thing. It is by virtue of such contacts between sense and things that we can perceive their magnitude from a distance. The Naiyayika has to take the help of so many kinds of senseobject contact because he believes in the direct visual perception of the magnitude of distant things. The muscular sensation of movement is not admitted by him as a factor in the perception of magnitude or limited extension. Differentia (prthaktva) is a positive character of things. That one thing is different from another, e.g. a cow and a horse, does not simply mean that the one is not the other. Difference does not consist in the mutual negation (anyonyabhava) of two things. One thing is different from other things, not simply because it excludes or negates them, but because it has a distinctive character of its own whereby it is differentiated from them. This distinctive character constitutes its differentia from other things. Differentia is thus an objective character or attribute of things and is perceived in things that are perceptible.² The Vedanta, however, takes difference to be a case of mutual non-existence and holds that it is known not by perception, but by non-perception (anupalabdhi).3 Modern Naiyayikas also do not treat difference as a separate quality, but reduce it to mutual non-existence.* 1 Tarkabhasa, p. 6. 2 Siddhanta-muktavali, 114. *Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. VI. 鈻� Dinakari, 114.

onjunction (samyoga) is a relation (sambandha) that is perceived as an attribute of the things related by it. Disjunction or separation (vibhaga) is not a relation (sambandha). Rather, it is the negation of the relation of conjunction between two things. It is also perceived as an attribute of the things which are disjoined. Space and time as infinite wholes are imperceptible substances. But the remoteness or nearness of things in time and space is a perceptible quality of the things. Things are far or near in space according as they are separated from our body by a larger or smaller number of contacts with space-points. Similarly, things are near or remote in time according as they have a smaller or larger number of contacts with time-instants. Such position in time and space becomes an attribute of things and is perceived by the senses of sight and touch.' Fluidity, viscidity and velocity are the qualities of certain things and are perceived by the senses of sight and touch like other perceptible qualities. Here, again, the modern Naiyayikas do not recognise remoteness and nearness separate qualities, since these are due to varied contacts of an object with points of time and space.² as Action (karma) is physical movement. Like an attribute, it inheres only in substance." It is different from both substance and attribute. Substance is the support of both action and attribute. An attribute is a static character of things, but actions are dynamic. While an attribute is a passive property that does not take us beyond the thing it belongs to, an action is a transitive process by which one thing reaches another. So it is regarded as the independent cause of the conjunction and disjunction of things. An action has no attribute because the latter belongs only to substance. All actions or movements must subsist in limited corporeal substances (murtadravyavrtti). Hence there can be no action or motion in the all-pervading substances. There are five kinds of action such as throwing 1 Bhasapariccheda, 54-56, 121-24. 2 Dinakari, 124. * Calanatmakam karma, guna iva dravyamatravrtti, Tarkabhasa, p. 28.

upward, throwing downward, contraction, expansion and locomotion (ulksepanapaksepanakuncanaprasaranagamana). These actions belong to such substances as earth, water, air, light or fire and the mind. Those inhering in the mind are imperceptible, since the mind is so. The action or motion of the perceptible substances can be perceived by the senses of sight and touch. In the perception of movement the second kind of sense-object contact, viz. samyukta-samavaya is operative. The senses come in contact with movement through their conjunction with the things in which it inheres."