Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 183 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
183 (of 404)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
Download the PDF file of the original publication
164
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
Conjunction (samyoga) is a relation (sambandha) that is
perceived as an attribute of the things related by it. Disjunc-
tion or separation (vibh膩ga) is not a relation (sambandha).
Rather, it is the negation of the relation of conjunction between
two things. It is also perceived as an attribute of the things
which are disjoined. Space and time as infinite wholes are
imperceptible substances. But the remoteness or nearness of
things in time and space is a perceptible quality of the things.
Things are far or near in space according as they are separated
from our body by a larger or smaller number of contacts with
space-points. Similarly, things are near or remote in time
according as they have a smaller or larger number of contacts
with time-instants. Such position in time and space becomes an
attribute of things and is perceived by the senses of sight and
touch.' Fluidity, viscidity and velocity are the qualities of
certain things and are perceived by the senses of sight and touch
like other perceptible qualities. Here, again, the modern
Naiy膩yikas do not recognise remoteness and nearness
separate qualities, since these are due to varied contacts of an
object with points of time and space.虏
as
Action (karma) is physical movement. Like an attribute,
it inheres only in substance." It is different from both substance
and attribute. Substance is the support of both action and
attribute. An attribute is a static character of things, but
actions are dynamic. While an attribute is a passive property
that does not take us beyond the thing it belongs to, an action
is a transitive process by which one thing reaches another. So
it is regarded as the independent cause of the conjunction and
disjunction of things. An action has no attribute because the
latter belongs only to substance. All actions or movements
must subsist in limited corporeal substances (m奴rtadravyav峁泃ti).
Hence there can be no action or motion in the all-pervading
substances. There are five kinds of action such as throwing
1 BP., 54-56, 121-24.
2 Dinakar墨, 124.
* Calan膩tmaka峁� karma, gu峁嘺 iva dravyam膩trav峁泃ti, TB., p. 28.
