Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 182 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
182 (of 404)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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ORDINARY PERCEPTION AND ITS OBJECTS 163 tible. The magnitude of ordinary sensible things is due to the
number and magnitude of their component parts. Hence to
perceive the magnitude of a thing we are to perceive the co-
existence and relative position of the constituent parts. This is
rendered possible by four kinds of contact (catuá¹£á¹ayasanni-
kará¹£a) that between the different parts of an extended sense
organ and the different parts of the thing, that between the
different parts of the sense organ and the whole of the thing,
that between parts of the thing and the whole of the sense organ
and that between the whole of the sense organ and the whole of
the thing. It is by virtue of such contacts between sense and
things that we can perceive their magnitude from a distance.
The NaiyÄyika has to take the help of so many kinds of sense-
object contact because he believes in the direct visual perception
of the magnitude of distant things. The muscular sensation of
movement is not admitted by him as a factor in the perception
of magnitude or limited extension.
Differentia (pá¹›thaktva) is a positive character of things.
That one thing is different from another, e.g. a cow and a horse,
does not simply mean that the one is not the other. Difference
does not consist in the mutual negation (anyonyÄbhÄva) of two
things. One thing is different from other things, not simply
because it excludes or negates them, but because it has a dis-
tinctive character of its own whereby it is differentiated from
them. This distinctive character constitutes its differentia from
other things. Differentia is thus an objective character or attri-
bute of things and is perceived in things that are perceptible.²
The Vedanta, however, takes difference to be a case of mutual
non-existence and holds that it is known not by perception, but
by non-perception (anupalabdhi).3 Modern NaiyÄyikas also do
not treat difference as a separate quality, but reduce it to mutual
non-existence.*
1 TB.,
p. 6.
2 SM.,
114.
*VP., Ch. VI.
â–� Dinakari, 114.
