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It is very difficult to say anything definitely about abstract things. Time is one such thing. In the West, philosopher after philosopher and the physicist after physicist has worked on it to know it, yet it seems to be far too elusive. According to Bergson time is made to a stuff which is called reality. Time is reality itself. According to Alexander it is the soul of space and space-time is the soul of all reality. As for Einstein's conception of time we may quote the words of Wildon Carr: "The principle of relativity declares that there is no absolute magnitude, that there exists whatever which can claim to be great.or small in its own nature, also there is no absolute duration, nothing whatever which in its own nature is short or long. I co-ordinate my universe from my own standpoint of rest in a system of reference in relation to which all else is moving....Space and Time are not containers nor are they contents but variants.' Such is the line along which the philosophy of time has been developed in the West. Philosopher after philosopher there has studied the concepts of Time and Space. Kant, Alexander, Bergson, Whitehead, Bradley, Taylor, Spinoza-all have tried to analyse the time-concept in their own way. So much of energy has been expended on it and so much of thinking has gone in for

its clear exposition that it is difficult to present it in a short compass. We, therefore, desist from it and devote ourselves to the exposition of the Time Philosophy in the religious and secular literature of Sanskrit only which is presented in the following pages. The Smrtis Of all the Smrtis only the Manusmrti gives us some idea of time and its various divisions. It reads: kalam kalavibhaktis ca naksatrani grahans tatha.? The singular in kalam in the verse implies time as a principle while plural in kalavibhaktih implies the empirical divisions of it. It is interesting to note here that the above passage has been interpreted differently by different commentators. Medhatithi, Kulluka, Raghavananda and Nandana accept the aggregate of the motions of the sun, stars etc. as time. They, therefore, seem to accept the view of the astronomers on time sa eva grahataradiparispandah kala ity ucyate³. Sarvajna Narayana, however, differs from this view. He accepts time as Purusa (Spirit) who is sentient. The word kalavibhaktih in the verse in .. the Manusmrti refers, according to him, to the presiding deities (abhimanidevatah) of moments, days, months, years, and epochs. The commentator Ramacandra differs from both of these views. He accepts time as Samvatsara and the divisions of time as the six seasons; purvam kalam kalatmakasamvatsararupam kalam asrjat kalasya vibhagams ca sadrtun ayanadims ca. This is clearly the view of the Rgveda too. We see here as to how the commentators expound one and the same passage in the Manusmrti according to their own set views and notions. The Puranas From Manusmrti we pass on to the Puranas. These offer quite CC-8 variety of views on Time. Taking the Visnu purana first of all, a Satya Vrat

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 9 we find that Brahma is described there as existing in the form of Vyakta, Avyakta, Purusa and Kala. tad eva sarvam evaitad vyaktavyaktasvarupavati tatha purusarupena kalarupena ca sthitam if "All this, whether manifest or unmanifest, is nothing, but that (Intelligence), it appears as Purusa and as Kala." Sridhara explains the above passage as: vyaktam mahadadi, avyaktam pradhanam. The Visnu-purana declares ; kalasvarupam rupam tad visnor maitreya vartate I "O Maitreya! Visnu is of the form of Kala." Here the passage explicitly says that Visnu is Kala. The Visnu-purana accepts time to be eternal. It existed even before creation came into being, and it will exist even after it is dissolved. As a matter of fact, all this creation and dissolution, etc. do not exist at all. It says: anadir bhagavan kalo nanto sya dvija vidyate I avyucchinnas tatas tv ete srstisthityantasamyamahif "O Brahmana, the all-powerful Kala is eternal (beginningless) and endless; hence creation, stasis and dissolution are all ever-recurrent".7 It is because Kala is equated here with Visnu that He is spoken of as Anadi and Ananta. The idea of continuous flow that the passage above conveys, makes it also the basis of the theory of momentariness (ksanikavada) which we find so elaborated in the Yogasutra and its Bhasya where it is said that a moment (ksana) is the ultimate minimum of time and cannot be further divided up...and the continuous flow of such moments is their 'course' (krama)...their uninturrupted course is what is called 'time'.8 Now we come to the Bhagavata-purana. In the beginning, this Purana describes the process of creation." A special power, sakti, of the Lord, Kala by name, remains in a dormant and latent state at the time of Dissolution. The sakti named Kala impelled

by God awakens when the new creation is contemplated. This very idea is conveyed by the Bhagavata-purana in the following words: so'ntah sarire'rpitabhutasutasuksmah kalatmikam saktim uvasa tasmin salile pade sve yathanalo daruni udirayanah ruddhaviryahn 10 "He (Visnu), withdrawing all beings into (making all beings recede into) His (all encompassing) Body, and bringing into play his sakti known as Kala dwelt in his home of water, like fire latent in wood." Sridharasvamin, the commentator, very correctly interprets kalatmikam saktim udirayanah in the verse quoted above as kalasakteh preranam punah srstyavasare prabodhanartham or "to bring into play (to impel) Kalasakti means to awaken it again at the beginning of the creation." Those who subscribe to the views of Madhava, however, interpret udirayanah in the sense of creating and thereby conclude that time according to the Bhagavata-purana is created by God and is hence anitya , not eternal. This view does not, however, appeal to reason, for it is doubtful if 鈭歩r ever means 'to create'. Be that as it may , there can be no doubt, at least on this point, that Kalasakti associated with Lord Visnu whether it is identical with Him or is created by Him, we are not concerned with at present. The associate of Kalasakti is very clearly brought out in the following verse of the Bhagavata-purana: visvam vai brahma-tanmatram samsthitam visnumayaya 1 isvarena paricchinnam kalenavyaktamurtinan" "The universe is verily Brahma-tanmatra, in essence Brahman, and is withdrawn by the maya of Visnu. It is put forward as something distinct by the Lord with the help of the formless Kala." The epithet avyaktamurti in the verse above purports to mean that the Lord is by Himself unqualified. This is how the commentator Sridharasvamin construes this verse. In our opinion cthe Lord is here identified with Kala, Kalena is in apposition with Isvarena and not the instrumental case signifying nimitta. The Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri Collection, New Delhi. Digitized by $3.Foundation USA

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 11 epithet avyaktamurtina is also in construction with Kalena and not with the intercepted Isvarena. The Bhagavata-purana accepts two kinds of time, gross and subtle, both knowable by inference only. It is time that determines all the actions that are termed manifest, vyakta. It reads: evam kalo 'py anumitah sauksmye sthaulye ca sattama I samsthanabhuktya bhagavan avyakto vyaktabhug vibhuhu¹² "Thus time is inferred to be both gross and subtle. O best of men, the Lord, by reason of His pervasion of paramanus, though Himself unmanifest, enjoys (pervades, determines) the manifest." Samsthana in the verse, says the commentator, is in forms such as paramanu and bhukti is its pervasion. Bhagavan means the sakti (for there is the identity of sakti and the possessor of sakti). This very idea is elaborated in the next verse sa kalah paramanur vai yo bhunkte paramanutam ! svato' visesabhug yas tu sa kalah paramo mahan 1113 which says that, that much is termed the Paramanukala which enjoys atomicity (paramanuta), by nature pervades everything. He is the great Kala. On this the commentator Sridharasvamin says: graharksataracakrastha (Bhagavata, 3.11.4) ityadina yat suryaparyatanam vaksyate tatra suryo yavata paramanudesam atikramati tavan kalah paramanuh, yavata ca dvadasarasyatmakam bhuvanakosam atikramati sa paramamahan samvatsaratmakah kalah, tasyaivavrttya yugamanvantaradikramena dviparardham tattvam iti. tatha ca pancame (Adhyaya 21) suryagatyaiva kaladivibhagam vaksyati. "The verse graharksataracakrastha (Bhagavata, 3.11.13.) speaks of the motion of the sun. That much is termed the Paramanukala, which the sun takes to traverse an atom, and that which it takes to traverse all the twelve signs (the zodiac) in the year is parama mahan kala. By its rotation we have a development beginning with yuga (cycle), manyantara (period) and ending with parardha. Accordingly the Digitized by

author does well to treat of the division of time as effected by the motion of the Sun." The long and short of the whole discussion is that along with the Kalasakti there is also recognised the empirical time which form the Kalasakti assumes on account of the limiting condition, the motion of the Sun. Of all the Puranas (with the full knowledge of the limitation of our study) we can say that it is only the Visnu and the Bhagavata which present the time-concept with a philosophical and somewhat mystical tint. In other Puranas Kala is explicitly recognized as a Deity, all-powerful, and all-pervasive. It is described there as follows: anadir esa bhagavan kalo 'nanto 'jarah parah sarvagatvat svatantratvat sarvatmatvan mahesvarah 11 brahmano bahavo rudra anye narayanadayah eko hi bhagavan isah kalah kavir iti smrtah || brahmanaraynesanam trayanam prakaroti yah procyate kalayogena punar eva ca sambhavah 11 kalenaiva hi srjyante sa eva grasate punah 1 tasmat kalatmakam visvam sa eva paramesvarah 14 anadinidhanah kalo rudrah sankarsanah smrtah 1 karsanat sarvabhutanam sa tu sankarsanah smrtahi sarvabhutasamitvac ca sa rudrah parikirtitah 1 anadinidhanatvena sa mahan paramesvarah s "The great is Lord, beginningless and endless (anadiranantah). He is said to have created even gods like Vasudeva, Svyambhu and Sankara. There are many gods like many Rudras and Narayana etc. Of all these he is the great Lord. He is the great Lord as he is all-pervasive, independent and the soul of all." It is this conception of Kala as a Deity, all-powerful and allpervasive, that seems to find an echo in the work of the great grammarian Bhartrhari when he, while mentioning the three different views on Time, picks up the concept of Time as a Deity casoonamyarat Shastri Collection, New Delhi Digitized by $3 Foundation USA them. Says he saktyatmadevtapaksair bhinnam kalasya darsanam.16 About its devatapaksa Helaraja's comment

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 13 is significant ; kecit tu mahaprabhavam devatam kalatvenabhyupapannah, which means that some regard time to be an allpowerful Deity . Agama Literature Now, from the Puranas, we pass on to the Agamas. There are different Agamas from which we have traced here a lot of references to time. We shall take up these Agamas one by one and deal with them briefly. Pratyabhijnadarsana A school of Kasmira Saivism, the Pratyabhijnadarsana recognizes Kala. We read: sarvakarah sarvajnah purno nityo'sankucams ca viparita iva maheso yabhis ta bhavanti panca saktayah 17 Out of the five saktis referred to here, one is which the Parimala, the commentary, explains as bhavanam avabhasa nanavabhasanatma kramah. According to this Darsana, the five saktis are in no way different from Isvareccha or the will of God and this again is not different from kriya. About Kala it is said that it has no existence outside the cognizer (experient). It comes to be related to the objects of cognition through the cognizer. This is what Acarya Abhinavagupta says in the following words: kalah kramam asutrayan pramatari vijrmbhamanah tadanusarena prameye 'pi prasarati 118 Mrgendragama According to the Mrgendragama, kala is perishable, nonpervasive and manifold. It is non-sentient. The view of the Naiyayikas that kala is not kriya is acceptable to this school. The nature of kala is discussed in a beautiful passage in the Mrgendragamavrttidipika which bears reproduction: astu tarhi naiyayikadyabhyupagata evatra kriyavyatiriktah kalah. satyam, na tu nityo vyapako va. tasya

vividhatvenanekatvat acetanatvac ca. ekarupatve hi kalasya sarvada padarthanam ekakalata syat, drsyante ca kecid vartamanah kecid atita bhavinas ca kecid bhavah. tatah kalasyanekatvam. kala eva triprakarah19 "Let us accept the view of the Naiyayikas that kala is something other than kriya (action). But that cannot be eternal and ubiquitous, it being diverse and composite (manifold) and nonsentient. If the time be a uniform entity, all things would be contemporaneous. But things are perceived to be either present or past or future. It, therefore, follows that kala is manifold. Time is of three kinds." Saktas The Saktas believe that this world is a product of reflection of Citi and is, therefore, unreal. They say: ...ekarupapi citih svatantryahetutah svantar vibhasayed bahyam adarse gaganam yathall nasti cetyam citer anyad darpane pratibimbavat 20 Kala is also an assumption, it has no existence in fact. The assumed kala too is free from such variations as subtlety (suksmatva) and elongation (dirghatva). It is only our thinking that differentiates one and the same thing. This is declared in so many words in the Tripurarahasya: desah kalo 'thava kincid yatha 'nena vibhavitam 1 tatha tat tatra bhaseta dirghasuksmatvabhedatah.121 Nakulisapasupatas The Nakulisapasupata school, otherwise known as Pancarthasastra on account of the five categories in which it believes, does not seem to accept Kala as an independent entity. The five Padarthas that the followers of the school enumerate do not include Kala. Nor is Kala acceptable to another branch of this school which accepts only three Padarthas, Tattva, Guna, and Bhava. The first branch of the Nakulisapasupata school believes Cthat isvara, the sone cause of all, is Kala, the Destroyeron USA

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature Dvaitasaktas 15 The Dvaita-saktas postulate four categories. They are named in the Paranandasutra as: anadyanantasadyanantanadisantasadisantah.22 To them Kala is beginningless and endless and is all-pervasive. Itself limited in the form of ksana (moment). nimesa (wink) it limits objects such as a jar. kalah paricchedakah paricchinnas ca. 23 Prapancasara According to the Prapancasara, attributed to Sankaracarya, three external Existences are admitted-matter, soul and time. The commentator Padmapadacarya explains: evam parakalasyapi svarupam abhidhayaparam kalam prastauti-laveti. Each one of these is twofold, being differentiated as para and apara. The Prayogakramadipika, however, explains that Kala is unreal. It says: devatatattvam cidrupam ekam eva, tasya svasaktikalpita evayam prakrtipurusakalatmakavikalpahi 24 and adds: atra ca prakrtivisayasarvajna na preranalaksanacidrupam kalasya svarupam ity api pratipaditami giving us a definition of time, stating precisely the nature of its function. The view of the Prapancasara briefly is: The Absolute Reality viewed as Prakrti is Pure Consciousness and is the origin of all things. It remains always what it is and yet when the latent karmans of jivas are matured for fructification it becomes, in a part as it were, alienated from itself, externalized and relatively dense. This part is called Prakrtitattva. When Kala acts on the lower Prakyti, the latter is split up into three forms, viz., Bindu, Nada and Bija. The cleavage of Prakrti under the influence of Time is the occasion for the origin of what for lack of more appropriate term is called sound (Sabda) which is equivalent to

what philosophers describe as Avyakta or Sabda Brahman. It is evident from the above that in this view Kala functions as the maturer of karma-seeds (karma-pacaka) and then as the energiser of Prakrti. Trika Literature In the Trika Literature Kala, viewed in the Absolute Parama Siva, represents His Supreme Freedom (Svatantryasakti) looked upon as Kriyasakti projecting the Universe till now unified with the Absolute and making it appear as external to it. The projection of the Universe is, therefore, only the apparent externalization of the Eternal Consciousness. The so-called creative process (Visvakalana) is only the outer aspect of the Kriyasakti, which inspite of its seeming eternality retains itself always. The truth is that the Absolute Consciousness first appears as Life or Prana, (i.e. Kriyasakti) on which, as a base is built up the entire fabric of Time and Space. Time in Secular Literature In all these pages we have been dealing with the concept of time in the Smrtis and the Puranas. Now we propose to deal with it in the secular literature. When we study it, we find in it sometimes striking references to time in its philosophical aspect. The older texts like the Mahabhasya and the Caraka Samhita very often present to us various views on time in a philosophical garb and, therefore, indicate that phase of the development of the secular literature when the word kala had not become restricted to the meaning of 'death' or the 'god of death,' the meaning which it developed in later kavya literature. Under this heading of "Time in Secular Literature' we propose to deal with six authors and commentators-Patanjali, Caraka, Dalhana, Vatsyayana, Yasodhara (commentator on the Kamasutra of Vatsyayana) and Bhartrhari, the author of the Vakyapadiya. We include the popular view and the views of the Yogavasistha and the astronomers too under this very heading ection, New Delhi. Digitized by S 3 Foundation USA Satya

Patanjali Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 17 Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, has attributed eternity not only to the Vedas but also to sky, heaven, space and time. According to the Naiyayikas, the earth, light,water and air are eternal in so far as their ultimate atoms are concerned while the sky, time, mind, the quarters and the soul are eternal in their entirety . Under the Panini rule IV. 2.3 Patanjali expressly states that both time and stars are permanent.25 He argues that even that thing where the essence is not destroyed is also permanent tad api nityam yasmins tattvam na vihanyate 26 Patanjali considers time to be the ultimate substratum of the universe: kalo hi jagadadharah. He regards it an indivisible, permanent, one and all-pervading. He defines time as that whereby the growth and decay of material objects are perceived.27 It is this which causes the quantitative changes in all objects. Kaiyata makes it clear when he says: Now we see development, now decay in things such as grass, creepers, trees; other causes remaining the same. What this change (parinama) is due to, is time. 28 The division of time into day, night, months, years and cycles, etc. is only an artifical process of calculation; it is by virtue of its conjunction with some action as the movement of the sun kaya kriyaya, adityagatya 29 that we say it is day, it is night. In other words it is the movement of the sun which is the basis of our conception of the so-called division of time. Time otherwise is one, eternal and all-pervading.30 Patanjali recognizes the three-fold division of time into present, past and future but sticking to his earlier enunciated view considers it empirical. According to Kaiyata the past, the present and the future are merely particular modes of existence.31 Hence the future changes into the present and the present changes into the past. By existence Kaiyata means not only real existence but also ideal. It is the tree conceived by the mind and existing in it that is affirmed, denied or produced. Things absolutely nonexistent such as the hare's horns are conceived by the mind and are referred to by their names. This ideal or conceptual existence . CC-0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastif Confection, New Delhi. Digitized by S 3 Foundation USA

appears externally as material existence. If words such as 'a tree' were to express only external existence then it would do to say 'a tree' and it would be redundant to say 'a tree is'. Again it would be a contradiction to say 'a tree is not', and it would not be reasonable to say as we do 'a sprout has sprung up', for what is cannot be said to be 'becoming'. But once we accept the interpretation of Kaiyata the use of asti and nasti has a purpose: it is there to denote the existence etc. of the thing outside the mind. But here Kaiyata raises an interesting question: Can we qualify existence. (satta) as future existence or past existence? Satta which is derived from the present participle of Vas 'to be' necessarily implies the present. The existent is necessarily the present in the absolute sense; hence it would be inconsistent to talk of future or past existence. But if it be urged here that the futurity or the pastness of the substrata in which existence resides could justify the use of such expressions as future existence; then we say even then existence (satta) would not be present. The Bhasyakara gives a very beautiful answer to all this. He explains the use of the future, past and present with regard to one and the same existent thing on the basis of its conjunction with the senses or absence of it. There are two different actions, one of the senses, the other of the mind. The action of the senses is approach, conjunction or contact. The action of the mind is conceiving. A person anxious to go to Pataliputra says: "On the way to Pataliputra which I am to traverse, there will be a well." When he has reached the well he says: "The well is." When he leaves it behind and proceeds further he says: "The well was." In all this, when we have action of the senses we have the past and the future tenses (with their varieties), when, however, we have the action of the mind, we have the present tense. 32 CCNow, an objection is raised here with regard to the present in respect of things that have been ever-existing, for there is no division of time in their case.33 For instance we should not say: "The mountains stand." But against this, it may be urged that the present which istnowness is an antithesis of the past and the

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 19 future. Since things which have been ever-existing have neither the past nor the future time, the present is there by its very nature and in its own right, and needs no support from any quarter. To this the critic's reply is: These appellations, the past, the future, the present, apply only to things that have an origin. These appellations are explainable only on the basis of origination having a definite limit. Thus things or events are called future, when the means are present and production is expected; they are present, when after origination they persist; and they are past, when after origination they have perished. The appellation present, therefore, stands between the past and the future. Where there are no past and future, there is no present either; for the present is antithetical to the past and the future. Since things which are constant have no past and future, there is no present, so far as they are concerned. Not only that. Since there is no time division in their case, there is no action conditioning time. Action is a process which determines time. To this Bhasyakara's reply is: Yes, there are time divisions even in their case. 34 The actions of the kings (the motion of the Sun etc.) past, future and present, are the substrata of the standing of the mountains. This explains such expressions as, the mountains will stand, the mountains stood. Again the objector points out that there is little justification for the use of the present tense when an action goes on because of the non-achievement of the principal purpose, but comes to an end and becomes a thing of the past, as the agent begins some other action or actions. It should not be reasonable to say 'we are living here', 'we are performing here a sacrifice for Pusyamitra'. The priest, even when he is busy otherwise and is not performing the sacrifice, speaks thus, as he is still intent on performing the sacrifice, for he has not achieved the purpose, viz., the sacrificial fee. The Bhasyakara replies that action is understood to be present, so long as the principal object is not achieved; it does not cease because some other actions which have their own distinct purpose, intervene. Hence the use of the present tense is perfectly justified. But if it be insisted on that there is

interruption by the intervening actions, hence, the action is no longer present, but is past, the Bhasyakara says that even if intervention is interruption, the action is present, not past. When we speak of Devadatta as: 'Devadatta eats', we know that while he is eating, he now smiles, now talks and now drinks water. Yet no denying the fact that the action of eating belongs to the present. If interruption does not affect the continuity of action in this case, why should it do in other cases? There is yet another way of showing how other actions coming in between, do not interfere with the continuity of the (principal) action such as eating which, therefore, goes on in the present. The various intervening actions, such as smiling are no more than parts of the same action, such as eating, since they are secondary and helpful like sipping, etc. And parts do not intercept the whole. Surely Devadatta is not intercepted by his own limbs.35 Now the objector turns a thorough sceptic and challenges the very existence of the present. He asserts that there is no such thing as the present time. He argues: Action that is finished is past, and that not yet finished (or undertaken) is future, but we cannot conceive of anything that is neither finished nor unfinished, there being no intermediate stage. Besides the past and the future, therefore, there is nothing else in between.36 In other words, action is the state of being effected. In the course of this process, the moment that is past, existed and action for that moment was accordingly past; the moment that does not exist, is yet to come and be effected, the action qualified by that moment is future. And there is no such moment as may be both existent and nonexistent, for that would be self-contradictory. Again, all action being imperceptible and only inferable from its outcome is necessarily past and could be denoted only by the past tense. Rightly an intelligent young thinker addresses a crow the question: 'How are we to define your flight? Surely patasi (flies) cannot be said of your flight in the past, for that is over, nor can it be spoken of your flight in the future, for that too does not exist. The use of patasi would be justified only if the flight cday in the presentas Were it so, weshalbhave to say that the whole

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 21 world moves likewise and that the Himalayas too move.37 That would be indeed absurd. Then there is a view of the ancients (which should also be honoured) that there is no movement in the world, hence no time including the present. The ancients declare: The wheel does not move, the arrow is not thrown, the rivers do not flow to the sea, the whole world is motionless and there is no active agent; he who views the state of things thus is also not blind.38 The idea is repeated in a slightly different way: In all the three divisions of time, there is no motion; how then do we say: "He goes. "39 If it be urged, says the objector, that action is present because it is there as it (action) is a state of being effected, a process, he would say that this too was untenable; for a single thing by itself incapable of differentiation is not possessed of succession, which is action. A thing is or is not. What is, is not to be effected and, therefore, does not possess succession. What is not, could not in that condition of non-being, be capable of being effected and, therefore, possessed of succession. Surely a non-existent thing, devoid as it is of all properties, could not have any succession. There being no third category of things, there is no one thing that may be characterized as a state of being effected and, therefore, possessed of succession. How could it be then present?40 Again, if it be assumed that moments possessed of sequence, some prior, others posterior, constitute action and that this action continuing till fruition must be admitted to be in the present, even this assumption would be wrong, points out the objector. For, the parts arising in succession are mutually unrelated; they, therefore, are not at all simultaneous. It is only one single moment that is perceived to be present, and that being by itself undifferentiated has no succession. Nor can it be urged that many such successive moments are remembered simultaneously, for that is not possible; because we remember as we perceive and not contrariwise; and the one moment has not been perceived to possess succession, how could then remembrance give one a notion of succession?41

Remembrance apart, the various moments could not constitute one single action; for then everything would be both existent and non-existent but that is not possible. Existence and non-existence are contradictory and exclusive to each other. To obviate this difficulty, we shall have to assume a common attribute of the different moments and this is that we assume that each one of the moments is able to effect action. But this would mean that there are a number of actions, not one. For what is assumed is that many moments have the common attribute, kriyadharma, and not that all of them make one action. Hence the question, how action is present remains still unanswered.42 To all this Bhartrhari gives the answer in Karika III. 9.89. Action consisting of a series of moments is assumed to be one. Moments having a definite succession and arising in pursuit of one definite object are termed action, which is one so long as the object is one. Although the moments are not simultaneous, when one is existent, another is not-existent, still they are present. For by 'present' we do not mean existent, but 'begun and not (yet) finished.' And that is true of that series of moments which continue to arise (and disappear) till fruition and which are unified conceptually. This series of moments alone is capable of producing action. And this is inferable from its outcome. When an aggregate of moments possessed of its characteristic succession is comprehended as existent, then this existence of it, is its presentness. The upshot of all this is: An aggregate of moments possesses succession. Though it is both existent and non-existent; each one of the moments conceived as mutually related by sequence and, therefore, existent is present. True, every movement by itself is not possessed of succession and is, therefore, not action, yet the sequence given rise to by other moments following it, is surely an object of our consciousness; hence there is nothing wrong with it. The Bhasyakara sums up the case for the present in the following words: The present does not exist. It is not perceived like the motion of the sun. Yet it is there. The five lotus-fibres inside a lotus-stalk, when being burnt are not noticed as being CC-burit. Similarly, subtle things are knowable only by thference. We

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 23 use gacchati (he goes), for there is action which is present. How? First, there is mental action, the desire to achieve something. This mental action leads to physical action. Both these actions, mental and physical, prior and posterior, ending with the production of the fruit are unified by the mind (which has the power of piecing things together) and presented as one action. The use of the present tense in gacchati is, therefore, perfectly justified.43 Caraka Caraka-samhita, even though it shows special favour for Samkhya views at the other places, enumerates in Sutrasthana, (towards the beginning of the Samhita) nine substances, khadiny atma manah kalo disas ca dravyasamgrahah+4 which are accepted by the Vaisesikas. The nine substances are earth, water, fire, air, sky, time, space (dik), soul and mind. These nine substances of the Vaisesikas include Kala and, as Caraka accepts these very nine substances, he shows that time is according to him, a substance. Further, Caraka divides substances into sentient (cetana) and non-sentient (acetana), sendriyam cetanam dravyam nirindriyam acetanam 45 of which the Soul only is sentient on account of its association with the sense-organs while all the rest of the substances including Kala, are non-sentient. While enumerating the nine substances Caraka says, kalo disas ca dravyasamgrahah.46 Caraka accepts Kala as one. It seems, therefore, that so far as the concept of time is concerned Caraka subscribes to the Vaisesika view. Dalhana Dalhana, the commentator of the Susruta-samhita, seems to subscribe to the view of the Samkhyas. To him, as to the teachers of Samkhya, Kala is a modification of rajoguna and is not different from Prakrti itself. Quotes Dalhana

mahabhutavisesams tu sitosnadravyabhedatah kala ity adhyavasyanti nyayamarganusarinah || kriyatvena rajogunaparinamatvan mahabhutaparinamavisesatvac ca na kalasya prakrter anyatvam A 7 Vatsyayana and Yasodhara In the Kamasutra of Vatsyayana, there is no reference to the nature of Kala. Only this much is said that Kala is the cause of good or bad, victory or defeat, happiness or sorrow, kala eva hi purusan arthanarthayor jayaparajayayoh sukhaduhkhayos ca sthapayati.48 But in the commentary Jayamangala by Yasodhara, time is said to be eternal and is called a substance, kalo nama dravyapadartho nityah.49 This view also seems to conform to the Vaisesika standpoint. Astronomers The astronomers believe that Kala is nothing but the movement of the planets, stars, etc. Jayantabhatta says in Nyayamanjari: na devadattadiparispandanibandhanah kramakramadipratyayah, kintu grahanaksatradiparispandanibandhanah; sa eva grahataradiparispandah kala ity ucyate I tatkrta evayam yamahoratramasadivyavaharah ... Kalavidas ca jyotirganakas ta evainam budhyante 150 The same idea is expressed in Mrgendravrttidipika in words: jyotihsastradrstya kriyavisesatmaka evabhyupagamyate. 51 In Astronomy it (Kala) is accepted as a special movement (of the stars, planets, etc). Then the Mrgendravrttidipika (10.15.) gives the following verse: adityagrahataradiparispandam athapare 1 bhinnam avrttibhedena kalam kalavido viduh 11$2

25 Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature "Other knowers of time know kala to be the movement of the Sun, the planets and the stars as differentiated by revolutions." Yogavasistha In the Yogavasistha is given a detailed description of the emergence of the Creation. There it is said that 'immediately after the creation of Jiva, the Kha (sky, ether) emerges which is almost a void, the germ of properties such as sound, and which gives significance to future names. Later Ahamkara follows along with Time: samanantaram evasyah khasattodeti sunyata i sabdadigunabijam sa bhavisyad abhidharthada 11 ahantodeti tadanu saha vai kalasattaya. 153 The Vasistha-tatparya-prakasa explains the text thus: Now, with a view to discussing the creation of Mahabhutas the writer begins with the creation of Kha. Immediately after the creation of Jiva, the Kha comes into being, itself almost a void, being the substratum of the remaining four elements. After the creation of the Sun etc., it gives significance to future names such as Akasa which literally means 'what shines all round'....This creation of Akasa, Ahamkara and Kala is not from Hiranyagarbha but from the Supreme Being limited by its particular forms.54 In the Sukropakhyana of the Yogavasistha while Bhrgu is about to pronounce a curse on Kala who has taken away the life of his son, Kala appears in human form and says: "Your curse would make no difference to me. For I am the manager of destiny (vayam niyatipalakah). Your curse would fail to burn me, for I am the eater and you are the food. I have consumed rows of universes, swallowed crores of Rudras. 55 The description of Kala, as it is given in the Sukropakhyana, is interesting from two points of view. Firstly, Kala is here an allegorical description of the empirical time divided into months and seasons. Secondly, it recognizes the all-powerful character of Kala. In other words it believes Kala to be a Supreme Force

as it is recognized by many other schools of Indian philosophy. The Yogavasistha is remarkable in that it sets forth views that agree strikingly with the latest theories on time and space. Time and space are relative to the observer. This is the Theory of Relativity of Einstein about time and space, which has revolutionised all the thinking about time and space. A day may appear much shorter to a man who is gay and cheerful, while it may appear much longer to one who is pensive and tired. The same can be said about distance. A man high in spirits will not mind walking a distance of ten miles in a hill station where he has gone for enjoyment and fun, while the same distance may appear never-ending to a hilly labourer who toils hard the whole day, wearied and broken and leaves for his home in the evening. According to this view, all the motion that appears in the Creation is due to the conscious passage of time in an observer. This fact leads us to the well-known drstisrstivada, the theory that there is no creation without an observer. The theory that time and space are relative to the observer is propounded in the Yogavasistha at a number of places. It is said that time and space are thoughts. It is upon thoughts that their existence depends. Just as the appearance of the world is a thought-appearance, so also is the appearance of the moments and ages. 56 A moment is doubtless experienced as a Kalpa, when consciousness of Kalpa is experienced in it; similarly, a Kalpa is experienced as a moment if the consciousness of a moment is present in it.57 The same period of a night is experienced as a Kalpa by the miserable, and a moment by the happy. In dream a moment is experienced as a Kalpa and a Kalpa is passed as a moment. Time-Space order is dependent on the mind. The mind can experience a moment as a Kalpa and vice-versa within itself. 58 What is a life-time to Manu is an hour to Brahma, what is a life-time to Visnu is a day to Siva. He, whose mind is lost in meditation, experiences neither day nor night.59 A day passes as a year for those who are separated from their beloveds.60 The whole world-process occurs within a millionth part of a moment of the consciousness of the Selfi The

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 27 extent of the same world-process may be a moment for some and a long age for others. As a person experiencing a dream has the experience of stability, so has the person experiencing the world process. According to Svami Madhavatirtha 62 the Yogavasistha is the only philosophical work in India in which the concept of time is made sufficiently clear. This agrees remarkably with the latest discoveries of the modern science. The Svami quotes three stories from the Yogavasistha and proves that these indicate the relative concept which is accepted to be the latest theory on time. Time in Popular View Kala in popular view has nothing to do with its philosophical abstruseness. As in old days so now the common man uses the word in the sense of time and fate. The senses of time and fate given to Kala include the notion of death, primarily as being the fate from which no living being can escape. Kala gradually becomes synonymous with death. The deity of time and a god of death form one heavenly being. Kala is the same as Yama. Siva is Mahakala, the Great Time and at the same time the Great Death. Mahakali is a form of Durga which she assumes to bring destruction. Though Kali originally means 'the blue-black', the similarity of sound with Kala must not be altogether neglected. Like Siva, Visnu has been, also associated with Kala, but time, the general destroyer and giver to life, seems on the whole, more appropriate to the character of Siva. Bhartrhari Bhartrhari has discussed time: What it is and how it functions, in section IX of Kanda III of his Vakyapadiya. This section, herein termed the Kala-samuddesa contains 114 Karikas. Of these the first 79 Karikas deal with the philosophical views held about time by the various schools of thought, and with the nature and function of time as understood by Bhartrhari himself, and the rest offer well-reasoned justification for the various uses of the tenses in Panini's Grammar, and serve to elucidate the pertinent passages

in the Bhasya. Before we reproduce here and discuss the various other theories about time recorded by Bhartrhari, we propose to put down what this great thinker has to say about time, what is his personal view of it, for that must have precedence over others. One thing that must strike a critical student of the Vakyapadiya, is that there is no perfect order in which Bhartrhari presents the various views about Kala. Usually a verse or two are read to enunciate a particular view. This is followed sometimes by some discussion on questions arising out of a clarification of it; sometimes it is left severely alone with a summary remark. Bhartrhari glides along in his own masterly way apparently unmindful of setting in complete order what he says. No link is sought to be established between the various views; they are not presented in a string; they lie scattered here and there. Sometimes it is his view, sometimes another's. But whosesoever it is, it is always supported and never refuted. Thus the Kala-samuddesa of his is a veritable repertory of the various theories and views that once held ground and still hold it. (cp. Karikas 57, 58 and 68). Bhartrhari's Own View In Karika 62 of this section, Bhartrhari sums up the three recognized views about time: 63 saktyatmadevatapaksair bhinnam kalasya darsanami Time is either a Sakti or an Atman or a Devata. Helaraja, the commentator tells us that 'time is Sakti' is the considered view of Bhartrhari himself. While commenting on III.9.14, he refers to the above Karika with the words; ihapi siddhantayisyati. He assimilates the other two views to the first, since, to him they seem to conform to the first in the ultimate analysis. We, however, differ. To us it appears that Bhartrhari acknowledges the other two views as independent notions of time, and not as subordinate to his own. The connecting link placed at the head of the Karika: 'Now he sums/upsdifferent views regarding they Realityat Time,'

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 29 also supports our contention. Besides, we find the echo of the view that Kala is a devata (a deity) in the Puranas. The Kurma Purana reads: anadir esa bhagavan kalo' nanto 'jarah parahi sarvagatvat svatantratvat sarvatmatvan mahesvarahii 64 Helaraja, too notes: anye tu vigrahavatim mahaprabhavam devatam Kalatvena pratipannah' This alludes to the view that Kala is jiva. True it is that to the author of the Vakyapadiya, Kala is a Sakti, and a Sakti of Brahman. While discussing the nature of Sabda-brahman in Kanda 1, Verse 3, he tells us what he thinks of time. In his lucid gloss on the said Karika, he declares it unequivocally that all other generated, dependent subject-forces are pervaded by Kala, which alone is independent and follow the operation of this Sakti in their working. How this Sakti of Brahman operates and with what results is, given in Karikas 3-8 of this section. We are here told that Kala is the instrumental cause in the creation, persistence and destruction of all things that have an origin, etc.... Kala seems to be itself diversified by the diversity of limiting adjuncts (upadhis) and then diversifies the things in conjunction with it. Hence (being the instrumental cause), Kala is the string-puller in the dumb show of this world. It is because of the powers of pratibandha and abhyanujna that this world comes to possess succession in action. What is the meaning of pratibandha and abhyanujna? Bhartrhari credits Kala with these two effective powers. The first means the preventive power and the second, the permissive power. What leads him to imagine that these two powers must belong to Kala? If there were no pratibandha, so argues he, there would be no order in this universe, no progression or regression; there would result perfect chaos, all action being simultaneous. Thus a seed, a sprout, a stem and a stalk-all would emerge and exist together. Therefore all objects having origination, though having peculiar

causes, must have Kala as an additional contributory cause for ordered progress. These two powers namely, pratibandha and abhyanujna correspond more or less to the two powers, viksepa and avarana ascribed to avidya or maya by the later writers on Advaita. Earlier Interpretation Refuted Helaraja refers to some earlier commentators who take Sakti in Karika 62 referred to above to mean the generating cause which they say is itself time. Their case may be briefly stated as follows: The power called seed, while it permits the appearance of the sprout, prevents the synchronous growth of the stalk. Similarly, the power called sprout permits the production of the next effect, while restraining the production of the subsequent effects. Hence the generating cause is itself time. This is a wrong interpretation and Helaraja convincingly refutes it. He points out that all this is tantamount to saying that particular effects proceed from particular causes, wherever these (causes) are present, and not otherwise. But since those effects take place at a particular time and not at any time, even when the generating causes are there, the additional regulating cause, namely time, must be acknowledged. The various phases of existence proceeding from a series of causes have a succession; and this succession is a power of Kala, the condition of all being. To Bhartrhari, Kala is one, it is unitary. It is because of its relation to motions such as of the sun, that Kala becomes many. The great thinker emphatically declares that things are in themselves neither diverse nor uniform.Time is one (indivisible), yet it appears to have so many divisions. How? The essential nature of a substance is, it has to be admitted, not the object of our parlance; it is inexpressible.65 When we conceive unity to inhere in it, we say it is one, when we conceive the white or the dark colour to inhere in it, we say it is white or dark; and when we conceive the universal 'cowness' to inhere in it, we say it is a cow; similarly, time comes to have the appellations such as the time of origination, the time of persistence, the time of destruction CC-0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri Collection,

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 31 etc., on account of its conjunction with the action of origination etc. The movements of the sun, the planets and the stars which are in conjunction with time give it the appearance of divisibility; thus the time determined by the sunrise and the sunset is the day; so on and so forth. If Kala is one, how do we account for the various timedivisions such as the days, months, seasons and years? This question has been raised and discussed at a number of places in the Vakyapadiya. The author gives an answer to it in Karika III. 9.32. The answer is that they are there on account of the diversity of actions (kriya-bheda), in external things. These divisions are superimposed upon time and are not integral to it. They do not affect it at all, they make no change to it. Just as a man becomes a carpenter for the time he is chiselling a piece of wood, and a smith when he is forging a piece of iron, but does not cease to be man or get divided into two men; similarly, time is called spring when there appear symptoms like flowers, a kind of humidity in the atmosphere and the charming cooing of the cuckoo. When there appear other symptoms like the falling off of the leaves of the trees, a kind of forbidding chillness in the atmosphere a change in the direction of the sun, we say it is autumn. The spring and autumn are no part of the substance, time. It is a case of an adhyasa (superimposition): kriyabhedad yathaikasmins taksadyakhya pravartate I kriyabhedat tathaikasminn rtvadyakhyopapadyate 1166 And, if time is eternal and unchangeable, how is it that we hear of such judgments as: It is good time, it is bad time, the krtayuga is good and auspicious, the Kali is bad and inauspicious? We cannot change time and import external goodness or badness into it. Both goodness and badness are extrinsic to time; they are transferred to it. They originally belong to actions. When good actions are performed, we say it is good time, when bad, we say it is bad time. Time knows no change: kartrbhedat tadarthesu pracayapacayau gatah samatvam visamatvam va tad ekah pratipadyateif 7

To Bhartrhari, time, though itself unchangeable is the cause of all change, motion and order. Every object is governed by the power of Kala. Why the sun rises and sets at regular hours, why the moon shines for the night and not for the day; why the sun moves for six months along the southern path (daksinayana) and for another six months along the northern path (uttarayana), why the planets and stars move in a particular order-all these can only be explained as being due to the all-pervasive and allpowerful nature of Kala. The coming into existence and passing out of existence, the appearance and disappearance of all objects is caused by time alone. Other differentiations of time are also unreal, they are merely superimposed. A thing is not before it actually comes into being; it is, when it has been created. The mind, however, conceives it as one positive existence. When we set about putting together the competent means to the fulfilment of an act, we say it is Commencement-time, when the means thus put together start operating, we say it is Performance-time. And when a thing desired to be effected has been accomplished, we say it is Closingtime. But time remains unaltered by these ideal divisions, says the great thinker; the Commencement time, etc. in the case of a dvyanuka (dvad) is exactly the same as that of the Himalayan range. The nature of a thing can neither be altered nor augmented.68 The meaning is that objects are essentially indivisible (svarupena niramsa) wholes, they would indeed be divisible if they were no more than a conglomeration of parts; hence the Commencement time etc. does not differ. The component parts are quite defferent from the whole they make. A jar is verily different from the sherds which go to form it. Even the magnitude, a property, is different from the whole. With the difference therefore in magnitude, things need not differ, suffer augmentation or reduction. Hence all produced substances, all wholes being non-distinguishable, it is not because of them that the Commencement time of CC-0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri Collection, New Djects of small magnitude or

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 33 great, differs, but because of properties other than, additional to, the whole.69 How does the Commencement time etc. differ then? The question is answered by Bhartrhari in the next Karika: anyais tu bhavair anyesam pracayah parikalpyate sanair idam idam ksipram iti tena pratiyate 1170 It is the parts (different from the wholes) which, if many, account for the greatness of the magnitude of the wholes; if a few, the smallness of the magnitude of them. Accordingly a whole made up of many parts is accomplished slowly, and one made up of lesser parts quickly. Hence in either case, the Commencement -time etc. is recognized as different. Since the parts lose their identity in the whole, the whole is designated after the properties of the parts, and not that the time of whole does differ, as a matter of fact. It is further explained in Karika: asatas ca kramo nasti sa hi bhettum na sakyate I sato 'pi catmatattvam yat tat tathaivavatisthateni¹¹ an object does not exist before origination as already observed. Hence, previous to origination, it being non-existent, it could have no succession, there being no division into prior and posterior. And even when it has been produced and does exist, it cannot be differentiated, its nature persists; hence there is no succession. Succession, as explained by Helaraja, is based on difference, and difference cannot be there in each separate mode of an object which essentially consists of two modes, existent and non-existent while yet in the process of production. The two modes are pieced together by the intellect and differentiated as prior and posterior. There is first an idea of the non-existent and then of the existent, the succession is otherwise ideal. Hence even the sequence in the produced things is hypothetical; much more so the sequence in time, which is based upon that assumption. Bhartrhari repeats the idea at a number of places that Kala is Svatantrya-sakti, as for example in Karika 14.72 He explains how Kala which is vibhu is significantly so called, since it urges all

Kalas (Saktis) by its cycles such as the spring, which are comparable to the revolution of the water-wheel. The Advaitin's View as Given by Bhartrhari The question arises: Is this Kala-sakti identical with Brahman or different from it? The answer is that to the Advaitin (as Hari undoubtedly is), the Sakti and the possessor of Sakti is one entity, not two. The difference is only apparent. The properties (dharmas) are held to be non-distinct from the substance (dharmin). This Hari himself says in the Brahma-kanda. aprthaktve'pi saktibhyah prthaktveneva vartate 73 Abhinavagupta also subscribes to this view. In his Bodhapancadasika, he remarks that Sakti does not want to be differentiated from the Saktimat (the possessor of Sakti). They are eternally one, like fire and its consuming power. saktis ca saktimadrupad vyatirekam na vanchati iadatmyam anayor nityam vahnidahakayor ivall 74 To be precise the Kala-sakti can only be anirukta (undefined): ekasya hi brahmanas tattvanyatvabhyam sattvasatt vabhyam caniruktavirodhisaktyupagrahyasyasatyarupapravibhagasya svapnavijnanapurusavad abahistattvah parasparavilaksana bhoktrbhoktavyabhogagranthayo vivartante". "The conception of the one ultimate reality, be it Sabdabrahman, Atmabrahman, Sattabrahman, or Vijnanabrahman led the exponents of advaita philosophy to ascribe to it a power called Maya, Ajnana, Avidya or Kala-sakti, which is unique in its nature and which is capable of projecting this phenomenal world, the bahyaprapanca". Bhartrhari calls this power by the term Kalasakti and Avidya. This is set forth by Hari himself in his inimitable way in his Vrtti on 1.4. Says he: 'Of the one Brahman that must be assumed to possess Saktis which can neither be said to be identical with Brahman nor distinct from it, neither existent nor non-existent, which are free from mutual conflict (in so far as they subsist simultaneously in theDonee substratum), of the

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 35 Brahman which is only apparently partite; are the various unreal modifications such as the enjoyer, the thing enjoyed, the act of enjoyment-all of which do not exist externally like the in a dream-vision. Does Time Really Exist? person How do we know that there exists something that is called Kala (time)? There must be some evidence for it; mere belief in the tradition or scripture would not do. In Karika. nirbhasopagamo yo'yam kramavan iva laksyate 1 akramasyapi visvasya tat kalasya vicestitamis Hari observes: This universe which is really devoid of sequence (or succession) seems to have one is indeed due to the working of time. The all-pervasive time operating with its two powers pratibandha and abhyanujna is responsible for this notion. But for Kala all this krama would not be explainable. Then the notion of quickness and slowness too is explainable only on the admission that time exists. Just as this distance is long, this is short, is determined by the pace of the person walking and has nothing to do with the space walked over; for what is far for a slow-moving person is near for another of nimble foot. Similarly, though time never varies yet by virtue of an action which has a greater continuity, it comes to be called slow (cira) while another with a lesser continuity gives it the qualification (ksipra) quick. The idea is that the notions cira and ksipra must have an adhikarana in which they could reside and that adhikarana Kala. There is yet another evidence. The question how an action which is over (past) and, therefore, non-existent could give the appellation bhuta (past) to Kala is beautifully answered by Hari: kale nidhaya svam rupam prajnaya yan nigrhyatel bhavas tato nivartante tatra samkrantasaktayahi116

In plain English, the Karika means: Things effected by action are called atita (past), losing their identity (svarupa). Whatever notion the mind forms of them in the present, they deposit in their stable receptacle, time, and they vanish, since after being perceived, they become objects of recollection, with their saktis transferred to the past stage (vyavaharam svattam anupatanti). The principle of time is cognizable only through the upadhis of the various objects, and they when being recollected, transfer their own qualification (pastness) to time. Hence we say there was a jar. This indeed is the logical ground for the existence of Kala, for if it did not exist, there would be no such usage. Not only that. In the next Karika bhavanam caiva yad rupam tasya ca pratibimbakami sunirmrsta ivadarse kala evopapadyaten" Hari seeks to clarify the use of bhavisyat (future) with regard to things. The external form (drsyarupa) of things which are yet to be, viz., things whose 'becoming' is expected when the competent causes of them are present and the image of that external form formed in the mind (vikalpyarupa) are brought together and unified in the stable receptacle of time whereon futurity is superimposed by the transference of Saktis .It is because of the qualified time that things are called future or ensuing. But for time, it would not be possible to explain satisfactorily the use of future with regard to things. This is beautifully brought out by a simile: just as it is only after an image has been seen in a spotless mirror, that one becomes sure of the form outside, similarly, we see through Kala the real form of things. That time is an independent entity can also be inferred from the fact of dripping of water from a hole in a jar. This dripping is emphatically declared by Bhartrhari, pratibandhabhyanujnabhyam nalikavivarasrite! yad ambhasi praksaranam tat kalasyaiva cestitam 1178 to be due to the working of time, and hence constitutes the logical ground for its existence. Helaraja's following comments on this Karika are elucidating and bear reproduction, 'We observe that

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 37 only a part of the quantity of water contained in a jar drips at a time from a hole in it and the remaining part does not drip simultaneously with it. What could this be due to?' It is certainly due to the preventive and permissive forces that time possesses; for if it were otherwise, the whole, here the water, which permeates all its component parts, must drip all at once, under its own weight. Since there is graduation in the act of dripping, time, a separate entity must be admitted to be at work here and that dripping itself is time must be ruled out. The dripping is only a determination of time. This dripping, itself determined by such acts as winking, movement of the vital airs, the continuous flow of the moments, serves to determine the time which other than it. Winking etc., too, is determined by Kala in its subtle form of succession; hence the power Kala known as Krama (succession) is to be found interwoven with all things in a subtle way and cannot be denied. There is yet another equally cogent reason to believe that time is. How can two actions having a beginning and an end in common, and inhering in two different substrata be differentiated, the one as quick, the other as slow; unless there be an entity in relation to both the actions at the same time? Now all action is a collection of moments. Since the moments do not exist simultaneously all action is sakrama, possessed of succession, and this cannot but be due to the power of time. Succession is indeed a property of time. It is time that has a succession, and it is because of relation with time that actions appear to have it. Although action is one, yet it is here said to be two because of the two substrata. Hence the notion of cira (slow), ksipra (quick) is not because of the unity of action. Because even when the substrata differ, we have the same notion of the one as of the other; for we say: "The jar is formed late, the cloth is fashioned late." It should not have been possible, for there were two actions inhering in two different substrata, the jar and the cloth. Nor can it be due to the produced things (jar and cloth), for they being different cannot be the cause of the common notion. Nor again can it be due to the agent, for that too differs with different things.

Hence that something to which the notion is due is Kala. This Kala has to be one, in order that it may produce the common notion even when actions and things differ. Granted that time being one, could well determine two different actions and give us the common notion: the jar is produced late, the cloth is produced late, but how could it, being one, give us two distinct notions such as: it is done soon, it is done late? To this Bhartrhari's reply is recorded in Karika. anityasya yathotpade paratantryam tatha sthitau vinasayaiva tat srstam asvadhinasthitim viduhn⁹ This he explains on the analogy of a balance, which though one determines the varying weights of gold, silver, etc., similarly time, though one, comes to have manifoldness by virtue of the powers inherent in it and determines uninterrupted action diversified by such distinct operations as winking. Or time, the absolute time, determines action as soon or late, quick or slow, just as the hand of the practised adepts determines a particular weight. As the hand is competent to weigh by reason of the skill born of practice, time is capable of measuring the difference in actions by virtue of its own inherent power. The Vaisesika has his own way of inferring the existence of time This is set forth in a number of Karikas (III.9. 16.-22). The Karika 22 says that as objects depend upon causes, material, instrumental and others for their production, so they depend upon a cause for their existence. The meaning is that an object which is produced, is artificial, is from its very nature perishable and would perish as soon as it is produced, if it is not sustained by a cause. And that sustaining cause is time. The argument of the Vaisesika is: the whole is different from the parts of which it is composed. So it cannot be urged that a piece of cloth (the whole) is sustained by the hundreds of threads of which it is made. The Bhasyakara's View as given by Bhartrhari The Bhasyakara's view is embodied in Karika murinam tena bhinnanam acayapacayah prthaki CC-0. Prof. Salaksyante parinamena sarvasam bhedayonination USA

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 39 of the Kala-samuddesa. It says that it is time which causes the quantitative change in all objects. It is because of time that there is orderly development or decay noticed in youth or old age. It also tells us that time is one, though it comes to be differentiated by external objects in relation to it. By limiting the function of time of finite objects, Bhartrhari wants to say that eternal objects are not affected by time. The Bhasyakara has expressed himself similarly. Says he: 'That which causes development and decay in finite objects, is, they say, kala - yena murtinam upacayas capacayas ca laksyante tam kalam ahuh81 On this Kaiyata says: 'Now we see developments, now decay in things such as grass, creepers, trees; other causes remaining the same. What this change (parinama) is due to, is time: tarutrnalataprabhrtinam kadacid upacayo' nyada tv apacayah, sa pratyayantaravisese 'pi yatkrtah sa kalah. If time is one, how are we to account for the use of such terms as day, night. etc.? To this the Bhasyakara's answer is that it is due to the motion of the sun; tayaiva kayacit kriyaya yuktasyahar iti ca bhavati ratrir iti ca kaya kriyaya? Adityagatyal Elsewhere, ekatvenasya karyavaicitryaniyamakatvarupapattir iti bhasyalaksananupapattya ksanadhararupah kala iti yuktam 82 The Bhasyakara declares that time is eternal. It is interesting to observe here that Nagesabhatta, the grammarian-philosopher does not accept the view of the Bhasyakara. To him, time is neither one, nor eternal and allpervading. If time is one, argues he, it would not be possible to account for the diversity of effects produced; hence time must be held to be a stream of moments. Nor can time be maintained to be eternal, all-pervasive, etc., for time is said to be the cause of various objects in so far as it forms their substratum, of such notion as 'now there is jar,' and if a qualification of it is to be assumed, then we shall have to assume another determination for that qualification, and still another for this second; and so on ad infinitum.83

The Samkhya View as given by Bhartrhari In the section on the Buddhist's view, we will observe that the Samkhyas and the Buddhists deny that time has an objective reality. But Bhartrhari records a view recognizing the existence of time, which commentator ascribes to the Samkhya thinkers, and explains it accordingly. According to this view, three gunassattva, rajas and tamas are assumed to possess the three powerspast, future and present. These powers do not function at one and the same time. When they do function respectively, they give rise to such usage as 'a thing was', 'a thing is; and 'a thing will be'. These powers are inseparable and non-distinct from the three gunas. They are present everywhere and are ultimately of the form of succession. The past and future powers remove things away from our consciousness and make them invisible, while the power called present brings things into our consciousness. Things disappear because of the working of the past and future powers and never return. What reappears is a semblance of them; similar things recur but never the same. Yet what we conceive as non-existent has only disappeared and has never ceased to exist. Hence ultimately there is no difference between 'being', and 'non-being', although the modes of existence may differ. All this has been summed up beautifully by Bhartrhari in his Karikas.84 The Astronomers' View as given by Bhartrhari Others who claim to know what time is, understand by the term Kala, the movement of the sun, the planets and the stars, diversified by diverse revolution.85 That means the movement of the sun from dawn to dusk makes a day, from dusk to dawn makes a night, fifteen such cycles make a fortnight and thirty of them a month and so on. Similarly, when the moon has traversed all the 27 planets, it makes a month, and when Brhaspati completes its revolution round a single Rasi (asterism), it makes a year. it is the movement of the planets that leads to the division of time, cc-this movement sitself is looked upon its time by some of the Digitized by S Since

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 41 thinkers, the astronomers, whom Helaraja rightly dubs as having a short-range vision; ity arvagdarsanah kecin manyanter Though not falling in with this view, Bhartrhari does not refute it. On the contrary, he seeks to answer some of the objections raised against it, as we shall presently see. According to these thinkers, action that measures another action is also Kala, so far as that particular action is concerned. The movement of the sun etc., called the day and the like, and the milking of the cow, etc., having a well-defined duration is a measure for another action of unknown duration, such as sitting. It is, therefore, Kala kriyantaraparicchede pravrtta ya kriyam prati nirjnataparimana sa kala ityabhidhiyatel 87 An example will make it clear. We say: godoham aste, which means: 'he sits as long as the cows are milked.' Now, the milking of the cows limits the period of sitting. It does the function of time and is therefore recognized as time. Now if time is nothing but the movement of the sun, the planets, etc. we are faced with the question: How is it that a meditating Yogi shut up in his cell, with his senses drawn in, as the tortoise draws in its limbs, is aware of time? Certainly he does not perceive the movements of the sun, etc., or the dripping of water from a jar. How does he know then on leaving his samadhi or meditation that he had been meditating, some one approaches and disturbs him, the Yogi exclaims rather sadly: "It is soon that my samadhi has been interrupted." How does he measure time? How can he use the terms ciram (late) and ksipram (soon), which are meaningless without the awareness of time. To this, Bhartrhari's answer reads as follows: Action is reflected in the mind, and then the reflected (and uninterrupted) moments of action are fused into one concept. This fusing itself is the measure of the movement of breath; hence it is Kala, as it gives the notion of time that has elapsed even in the absence of external motion as that of the sun.

The Buddhist's View as given by Bhartrhari Now there are certain schools of thought which do not recognize Kala as an independent entity. Such are the Buddhists, the Samkhyas, and the Vendantins. They argue that since the indivisible, unitary time is never the object of our parlance, and since actions etc., which go to qualify time and diversify it, are really instrumental in human conduct there is little use in assuming the abstract invisible time which lacks all proof. If it be urged that because without the assumed Kala, vyavahara (all human activity) is not possible, then they say: Let us accept it as an intellectual construction or a conceptual fusion of the various acts which would account for the use of the language such as slow, quick, etc. This view is recorded by Bhartrhari in III. 9. 87. The plain meaning is that time is purely subjective. 88 It is an intellectual fiction. The human mind pieces together the series of actions and the result is such notions as moment, day, month, etc. and the corresponding conventional language. The Tattvasangraha by Santaraksita repudiates time in a couple of Karikas (629-630). According to the commentator, Kamalasila, they purport to mean that a particular impression (abhoga samskaravisesa) is created in the mind of the hearers when they are addressed with the suggestive words: this is prior, this is posterior with reference to things or events emerging in a sequence. This impression leads to the knowledge that the things thus referred to are prior or posterior. Thus temporal as well as positional priority and posteriority being otherwise conceivable, both Kala and Dik (space) are rejected by the Buddhists. Moreover, both time and space being originally (fundamentally)indivisible neither of them could be prior or posterior. If this priority or posteriority primarily belong to other objects such as a flame, a body, etc. and only secondarily it is there in time and space by transference, then too they are dispensable. Bhartrhari simply takes note of this view and does not refute cait, as indeed he does elsewhere. He accommodates dativariety of

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 43 philosophical views. In Karika III.9. 58. he says: whether time is merely jnananugatasakti viz., buddhyanusamhara, a conceptual fusion or something positive, the truth is that we cannot do without time. All our activities are simply impossible without reference to time; they take place in time. The Reality of the Present Time according to Bhartrhari. Following closely the Bhasyakara, Bhartrhari recognizes the three-fold division of time into the present, the past and the future. This division, he affirms, is empirical, yet he declares emphatically that there is no escape from it.89 All action is cast in the form of one or another of these time-divisions. Time as conditioned by action which began but which is finished is 'past'; when the means of production of an action are ready and the action is expected; we say it is future. When however an action has begun but has not concluded, we say it is present time. According to Kaiyata, the past, the present and the future are merely particular modes of existence.90 The view of the Bhasyakara as recorded in detail on pages 17-23 is beautifully summed up by Bhartrhari in a couple of Karikas (III. 9. 112, 113), and lucidly explained by Helaraja. The plain meaning of the first Karika is that existence is qualified by conjunction with the senses; for all linguistic usage is governed by the relation which a thing has with another in conjunction with it. As explained by Helaraja, a thing (Satta) becomes predicable only when we perceive it, for so long as it is not perceived, it is in no way different from non-existent. And, perception is possible only when there is conjunction with a sense. Hence when this conjunction is yet to be, in other words, when on the way, the well is yet to have conjunction with the sense of vision, we say: "a well will be". When this conjunction has already been there, we say: "The well was" When the conjunction takes place presently, we say: "The well is". the Now as the future and past times do not encroach upon sphere of the present, the present too should not encroach upon theirs, and when the conjunction with a sense has already been with.

effected or has yet to be effected, it should not be possible to say: "The well is". To this, Bhartrhari gives a reply in the next Karika. The mind conceives things as merely existent, and therefore there could be no bar to the use of the Present Tense, even when a conjunction has been or is yet to be, the proper spheres of the past and future tenses. Now the objector says that we cannot speak of the present with respect to things that have been ever-existing, for there is no division of time in their case.91 For instance, we should not say: "The mountains stand." But against this, it may be urged that the present which is nowness, is an antithesis of the past and the future. Since things which have been ever-existing have neither the past nor the future time, the present is there by its very nature and in its own right, and needs no support from any quarter. To this the critic's reply is that these appellations, the past, the future and the present, apply only to things which are influenced by time; and these are the things that have an origin. These appellations are explainable only on the basis of origination having a definite limit. Thus things or events are called future, when the means are present and production is expected; they are present, when after origination they persist; and they are past, when after origination they have perished. The appellation present, therefore, stands between the past and the future. Where there are no past and future, there is no present either; for the present is antithetical to the past and the future, as declared by the Bhasyakara.92 Since things which are constant have no past and future, there is no present, so far as they are concerned. Not only that. Since there is no time-division in their case, there is no action, conditioning time. Action is a process, which determines time. To this the Bhasyakara's reply is: Yes, there are timedivisions even in their case.93 How? The actions of the kings (the motions of the sun, etc.) past, future and present, are the substratum of the standing of the mountains. This explains such expression as the mountains will stand, the mountains stand; the mountains stood Shastri Collection, New Delhi. Digitized by S 3 Foundation USA Baty

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 45 Bhartrhari elucidates this reply in a couple of Karikas (III.9. 8. 81). Things come to be differentiated by relation with other kings, not by themselves. Hence the standing of the mountains, the flowing of the rivers, etc. is qualified by the existence of the other thing related to them. The actions of the kings etc. are said to be the substratum of the standing of the mountains etc.; for they qualify them. As the actions of the kings, etc. belong to three different periods, they possess succession and are of the nature of a process; the actions such as the standing of the mountains, by their relation with them, are assumed to possess the same characteristics; hence the secondary use of the three tenses stands justified and, therefore, there could be no objection to the use of the present tense. 94 Bhartrhari offers an alternative explanation in Karika 95 81. Actions such as cooking, splitting, etc. are known to have distinct parts-actions within them-and therefore have a sequence in time. Placing the pot on the earth and the like are the distinct parts of cooking, lifting (the implement etc.) of the action of splitting. But the actions of standing of the mountains and the like, which do have parts but which being similar (non-distinct) are difficult to cognize, are shown to have succession and, therefore, different periods by the actions of the kings etc. which consist of distinct parts and are known to belong to different periods. Hence the actions of the kings, etc. being determinations of the standing of the mountains, etc. are said to be their substrata and define their time. How the Parvata-sthiti is action, is explained by Bhartrhari himself in III.8. 26. The fact of even constant things being sustained by their substratum every moment, even when there is no sequence, is nothing different from origination (janma) which is doubtless action (kriya). Again the objector points out that there is little justification for the use of the Present Tense when an action goes on because of the non-achievement of the principal purpose, but which comes to an end and becomes a thing of the past, as the agent begins some other action or actions. It should not be reasonable to say 'we are living here', 'we are here performing a sacrifice for

Pusyamitra'. The priest, even when he is busy otherwise and is not performing the sacrifice, speaks thus, as he is still intent on performing the sacrifice, for he has not achieved the purpose, viz., the sacrificial fee. The Bhasyakara replies that action is understood to be present, so long as the principal object is not achieved, it does not cease because some other actions which have their own distinct purpose, intervene. Hence the use of the Present Time is perfectly justified. But if it be insisted on that there is interruption by the intervening actions hence, the action is no longer present, but is past, the Bhasyakara says that even if intervention is interruption the action is present, not past. This view of the present is explained by Bhartrhari in a couple of Karikas.%. As explained by Helaraja, eating etc. is not a single action, it consists of a number of parts which follow one another in succession. This action seems to break off because of the intervening actions such as smiling, talking, etc.; yet it does not, for, unless there is satisfaction, the continuity of eating has to be recognized. As a matter of fact, the whole is not interrupted but the moments, past and future. And, they alone do not make action. The interruption is only apparent, for, there could be no cessation unless the fruit was achieved. A collection (series) of moments ending with its fruit such as seeing, is action. Even when physical action has ceased, mental action such as the desire to see continues till the former bears fruit; hence there is, in fact, no cessation. The use of the Present Tense, therefore, has its justification. There is yet another way of showing how other actions coming in between, do not interfere with the continuity of the (principal) action such as eating which, therefore, goes on in the present. The various intervening actions, such as smiling are no more than parts of the same action, such as eating, since they are secondary and helpful like sipping, etc. And parts do not intercept the whole. Surely Devadatta is not intercepted by his own limbs.97 Now the objector turns a thorough sceptic and challenges the very existence of the present. He asserts that there is no such thing as the present time. He argues: Action that is finished is past, and CC-0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 47 that not yet finished (or undertaken) is future, but we cannot conceive of anything that is neither finished nor unfinished, there being no intermediate stage. Besides the past and the future, therefore, there is nothing else in between.98 In other words, action is the state of being effected. In the course of this process, the moment that is past, existed and action for that moment was accordingly past; the moment that does not exist, is yet to come and be effected, the action qualified by that moment is future. And there is no such moment as may be both existent and nonexistent, for that would be self-contradictory. Then there is a view of the ancients (which one should also honour) that there is no movement in the world; hence no time including the present. The ancients declare: The wheel does not move, the arrow is not thrown, the rivers do not flow to the sea, the whole world is motionless and there is no active agent: he who views the state of thing thus is also not blind. The idea is repeated in a slightly different way: In all the three division of time, there is no motion; how then do we say: "He goes." goes. "99 If it be urged, says the objector, that action is present because it is there as it (action) is a state of being effected, a process, he would say that this too was untenable; for a single thing by itself incapable of differentiation is not possessed of succession, which is action. And thing is or is not. What is, is not to be effected and, therefore, does not possess succession. What is not, could not in that condition of non-being, be capable of being effected and, therefore, possessed of succession. Surely a non-existent thing, devoid as it is of all properties, could not have any succession. There being no third category of things, there is no one thing that may be characterized as a state of being effected and, therefore, possessed of succession. How could it be then present 100? Again, if it be assumed that moments possessed of sequence, some prior; others posterior, constitute action and that this action continuing till fruition must be admitted to be in the present, even this assumption would be wrong, points out the objector. For, the parts arising in succession are mutually unrelated; they, therefore,

are not at all simultaneous. It is only one single moment that is perceived to be present, and that being by itself undifferentiated has no succession. Nor can it be urged that many such successive moments are remembered simultaneously, for that is not possible; because we remember as we perceive and not contrariwise; and the one moment has not been perceived to possess succession, how could then remembrance give you a notion of succession 101 Remembrance apart, the various moments could not constitute one single action; for then everything would be both existent and non-existent, but that is not possible. Existence and non-existence are contradictory and exclusive of each other. To obviate this difficulty, we shall have to assume a common attribute of the different moments and this is that we assume that each one of the moments is able to effect action. But this would mean that there are a number of actions, not one. For what is assumed is that many moments have the common attribute, kriyadharma, and not that all of them make one action. Hence the question, how action is present remains still unanswered. 102 To all this Bhartrhari gives the answer in Katika III.9.89. Action consisting of a series of moments is assumed to be one. Moments having a definite succession and arising in pursuit of one definite object are termed action, which is one so long as the object is one. Although the moments are not simultaneous, when one is existent, another is non-existent, still they are present. For by 'present' we do not mean existent, but 'begun and not (yet) finished.' And that is true of that series of moments which continue to arise (and disappear) till fruition and which are unified conceptually. This series of moments alone is capable of producing action. And this is inferable from its outcome. When an aggregate of moments possessed of its characteristic succession is comprehended as existent, then this existence of it, is its presentness. The upshot of all this is: An aggregate of moments possesses succession. Though it is both existent and non-existent; each one of the moments conceived as mutually related by sequence and, therefore, existent, is present. True, every moment by itself is not possessed of succession and is, therefore, CC -0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri Collection, New Dession and is, therefore, not

49 Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature action, yet the sequence given rise to by other moments following it, is surely an object of our consciousness; hence there is nothing wrong with it. That an aggregate of moments held together by the one common purpose is one action in the present has already been shown. Now, Bhartrhari proceeds to show that an aggregate of moments does make one action otherwise also. This oneness is possible, for the mind is by virtue of the permanence of the impression created by perception, capable of piecing together even such things as are perceived in succession. Hence when an aggregate of actions with loose-hung parts is transferred to the mind and made into one concept, it is understood as present and one, being identified with the one concept. 103 If this is not conceded, absence of knowledge of the parts constituting the whole would result. It is true that remembrance is invariably based upon perception; but it is not true that things perceived in succession cannot be remembered simultaneously; for if it be so, we should have no notion of a hundred, etc. The reflex in the mind being looked upon as a concept leads us to say that there is one present time outside the mind. Once the present time is established, the past and the future also exist beyond doubt, as they are relative to the present. Orthodox Philosophical Schools Barring the Vaisesika system, and the now extinct school of Kalavada, the concept of time has not been discussed in great details in any other system of Indian Philosophy. Not that it is barren in this respect; as a matter of fact, it is a blooming orchard wherein blossom forth many a problem of Metaphysics. Any scholar, therefore, who undertakes the study of the different schools of philosophy even with a narrow and limited perspective is sure to find himself amply rewarded provided he takes care not to get embroiled in a quagmire to endless discussion. We have studied a number of works belonging to these schools and traced a number of references to the concept of time. On these, we have based certain conclusions. They are given hereunder:

Samkhya" 104 According to the God-disbelieving Samkhyas Kala does not exist. This we learn from Ratnaprabha, a commentary on the Sarirakabhasya¹05 by Sankaracarya which towards the end of the first Sutra explicitly says; Samkhyaih kalasyanangikarat. Vacaspati Misra fully explains why the Samkhyas do not accept Kala. Says he: kalas ca vaisesikabhimata eko nanagatadibhedavyavaharam pravartayitum arhati | tasmad ayam yair upadhibhedair anagatadivyavaharabhedam pratipadyate, santu ta evopadhayo, nagatadivyavaharahetavah, krtam antargaduna kaleneti samkhyacaryahi tasman na kalarupatattvantarabhyupagama itil 106 Kala as conceived by the Vaisesikas cannot be the cause of such usage as anagata (not come, i.e. future). Therefore, let those limiting adjuncts by virtue of which Kala leads to variety of usage such as anagata be themselves regarded as the cause. There is, therefore, no use in assuming the superfluous Kala, say the teachers of Samkhya. Hence another substance Kala, is not to be accepted." There are several other views or theories about Kala in the God-disbelieving (nirisvara) Samkhya. One of these is that Kala is not altogether non-existent, and is an evolute of Prakyti. The Mrgendravrttidipika says: parinamah prthagbhavo vyavasthakramatah sada i bhutaisyadvartamanatma kalarupo vibhavyate 11107 That this view did not appeal to other Samkhya teachers is clear from the statement of the Mrgendravrttidipkla itself when it repudiates this. Says it: samkhyabhyupagatas tavat kalo na yuktahi yato bhoktur bhogadhikaranatvena sthitayas tanor vrddhitarunadyavasthaya'numiyate parinativyatiriktah kalah 1108 "Time as accepted by the Samkhyas cannot be maintained ccsince fone is to infer from the stages of growth; youth etcs of the

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 51 body which is the substratum of the experiences of the experiencing self, that Kala is the thing other than the modification of Prakrti." There is another view about Kala, viz., Kala is nothing but Prakrti, otherwise known as Pradhana. Thus says Madhvacarya, "Since the Pradhana theory recognizes only twenty-five principles, which do not cover the principle of Kala, the Pradhana itself has to be called Kala": pradhanavade pancavimsatitattvebhyo bahirbhutasya kalatattvasyabhavat pradhanam eva kalasabdena vyavahriyatami 109 Another view accepts Kala as merely action. The Yukidipika expressly says: There is no such thing as Kala: it is only the actions that get the designation of Kala.110 There is a Samkhya Sutra dikkalav akasadibhyah111. The Bhasyakara Vijnanabhiksu interprets this and the way he does it, shows that he accepts Kala as both nitya and anitya, eternal and non-eternal. Says he: dikkalav akasadibhyah I nityau yau dikkalau tav akasaprakrtibhutau prakrter gunavisesav eva i ato dikkalayor vibhutvopapattih yau tu khandadikkalau tau tattadupadhisamyogad akasad utpadyete ityarthahi adisabdenopadhigrahannad iti 1 yady api tattadupadhivisistakasam eva khandadikkalau tathapi visistasyatiriktatabhyupagamad eva vaisesikanaye srotrasya karyatavat tatkaryatvam atroktam | 112 The space and time which are eternal are the Prakrti (the primary cause) and ether (Akasa) and are no more than the gunas of Prakrti. Hence space and time are justifiably vibhu (allpervasive). The space and time which are parts, proceed, however, from Akasa on coming into contact with manifold limiting adjuncts. Although Akasa as conditioned by the various limiting adjuncts is the space and time in parts, still what is conditioned is looked upon as something distinct. They (khandadikkalau) are, therefore here, said to have been created as the ear is held as a creation by the Vaisesikas.

Aniruddhabhatta, however, does not accept twofold Kala. Says he: tattadupadhibhedad akasam eva dikkalasabdavacyami tasmad akase 'ntarbhutau 113 Because of the various limiting adjuncts Akasa itself is expressed by the words dik and kala, hence both time and space are contained in the Akasa. The great Vedantin Mahadeva, too, agrees with Aniruddhabhatta.114 There is another view expounded in the Vrttanta which will close the list of various views in the Nirisvara Samkhya. It is: kalas ca bhutam, bhavad, bhavisyad iti vyavhriyamanapadarthavyatirekena na svatantro stills Kala is nothing besides, and independent of, objects spoken of as past, present and future. So an object like a jar spoken of as past is the past time, the object spoken of as present is the present time and so on. Yoga The followers of Patanjali who belong to the God-believing Samkhya school accept only ksana or moment as time while saying that all times like the muhurtta, yama, day and night are mental constructions. Vijnanabhiksu says in his Yoga-varttika: 'Now there is no time besides ksana. Divisions of time beginning with muhurtta and ending with Mahakala simply do not exist. This is what he incidentally establishes as the settled proposition of his own Sastra. He further says: idanim ksanatiriktah kalo nasti muhurttadirupo mahakalaparyyanta iti prasangat svasastrasiddhantam avadharayati I muhurttahoradayo buddhikaIpitasamahara eva | 116 Comment of Vyasabhasya on Sutra ksanatatkramayoh samyamad vivekajam jnanam. (Patanjala Yogasutra, 3.52.) "The muhurttas, the days, the nights, etc. are only mental accumulation of ksanas". The Vyasabhasya here explains the CCsutra ksanatatkramayoh etc. in a lucid way! Says The ksana tief

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 53 and its succession are not comprehended cumulatively in the object. Therefore, the muhurttas, the days, the nights etc. are comprehended in the mind. Indeed Kala has no factual existence, but is only a mental construction. It is only a vikalpa which appears to the common man in abstract meditation. The ksana is a realty". 103 Here we have further comment of Vyasa: apakarsaparyantam dravyam paramanuh .... tatpravahavicchedas tu kramah, ksanatatkramayor nasti vastusamahara iti...... tenaikena ksanena krisno lokah parinamam anubhavati 117 "A moment (ksana) is the ultimate minimum of time. It cannot be further divided up and the continuous flow of such moments is their course (krama)..... Their uninterrupted course is what is called time.... The whole world passes through a mutation in only one moment, so all the external qualities of the world are relative to this present moment." Mimamsa In Mimamsa the concept of Kala is treated according to its two schools of the Bhattas and the Prabhakaras. We first deal with the Bhatta school. The Bhattas The Bhatta school recognizes Kala as a substance. It is eternal and all-pervasive. Though one, it gets appellations of ksana (moment), masa(month) etc. on account of the limiting adjuncts. Again, in spite of its all-pervading character Kala appears to be limited on account of the limiting adjuncts. Thus fifteen winks (nimesas) make one kastha, thirty of them make one muhurtta, thirty of these make one day, thirty days make a month and twelve months make a year and so on. 118 Further, the Bhattas believe that Kala is perceptible by all the six senses. Thus says the Manameyodaya: sa ca kalah sadindriyagrahyah.119 Kala is perceptible by the six senses. Sastradipika, however, differs slightly from this view. It says:

kalo na svatantryenendriyair grhyate, atha ca visayesu svesu grhyamanesu sarvair apindriyair grhyate 1120 Kala is not perceived independently by the senses. But along with the perception of various objects Kala is also perceived as their qualification by all the senses. That according to this school Kala is perceptible, is also to be gathered from the statement of Madhusudana Sarasvati. Says he: kalasya ca rupadihinasya mimamsakadibhih sarvendriyagrahyatvabhyupagamat¹21| "The Mimamsakas etc. accept Kala as colourless and perceptible by all the senses." Prabhakaras In the Prabhakara school Kala is regarded as one, eternal and all-pervading as in the Vaisesika school. In the Tantra- rahasya of Ramanujacarya it is expressly stated: tatra cabhyupagamasiddhantanyayena kanadatantrasiddha eva prameyavargo' ngikriyate, tasya tatpratipadanartham pravrttatvat; na tu prthag atra vyutpadyate I tatrapy anabhimatamso 'pakriyate; visesamsas tu vyutpadyate 1122 "We adopt here the cognizable categories recognised by Kanada in the Vaisesika Darsana mainly devoted to their treatment. Whatever therein does not accord with our view is discarded, the rest is accepted." After this have been enumerated the very nine substances which the Vaisesikas accept. Among these one is Kala. Beyond this no mention is made of it in any of the texts of this school. We, therefore, presume, keeping in mind the statement of Ramanujacarya, that the Prabhakaras accept the Vaisesika concept of time in toto. Vedanta Now taking up the Vedanta, we find that the Brahmasutra ccor the Sankarabhasya thereon nowhere deal with Kala, though Collection New Digitized S 3 Foundation USA

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 55 in works of Vedanta such as the Vedanta-paribhasa we do have a treatment of the empirical objects such as Akasa. Hence the Siddhantabindu declares: Time and Space have not been noticed, for there is no evidence of their existence. 123 Yet the Vedantaparibhasa seems to recognize the empirical time. In order to show that the definition of Prama (correct knowledge) as anadhigatabadhitarthavisayajnanatvam 124 does not suffer from the defect of being too narrow, leading to the exclusion of dharavahikapratyaksa it reads: nirupasyapi kalasyendriyavedyatvabhyupagamena dharavahikabuddher api purvapurvajnanavisayatattatksanavisesavisistavisayakatvena na tatravyaptih.125 This means that the author believes in the existence of Kala and holds it as directly perceptible. According to the Vedantins Kala is merely avidya (nescience). Thus says Madhusudana Sarasvati while commenting on the eighth verse in the Siddhantabindu, Kala is merely avidya for that is the substratum of all. 126 Nyaya-Vaisesikas Time is conceived in the Nyaya-Vaisesika system as a unique, all-pervading and eternal substance. It is the static background against which events happened and from which they derive their chronological order. It possesses a specific physical quality like colour and thus cannot be an object of external perception. Neither is it perceived internally, for the mind has no jurisdiction over external or non-psychical objects independently of a physical sense-organ. The question naturally arises: What is the source of our knowledge that time exists? The Vaisesika answers that the knowledge of time is arrived at by a series of inferences. The notions of priority (aparatva) and posteriority (paratva), of simultaneity (yaugapadya) and succession (ayaugapadya) and of quickness (ksipratva) and slowness (ciratva) constitute the grounds (linga) of the inference of the existence of time. 127 The Nyaya Vaisesika gives a comprehensive treatment of Kala. Here we have merely touched on it in its barest outlines. We propose to take it up in fuller details later. 128

Sampradayas There have been, and still are, many sects in India whose founders have expounded, according to their light, many a new view on several metaphysical and mystical problems. These have been further elaborated by their followers with the result that here has grown a mass of literature dealing with sectional doctrines. After wading through it we have found a number of references to the philosophy of time which are highly interesting in the variety and richness of their content. Below we present a brief study of the time-concept as we found it in these Sampradayas. Ramanuja We take first the Ramanujasampradaya. Here we have three Realities, namely, Cit, Acit, and Isvara. The Acit is further divided into three parts-pure sattva, mixed sattva and void sattva (suddha sattvam, misrasattvam, sattvasunyam ceti). Out of these Kala is sattvasunya. It is the cause of the modification of Prakrti and its evolutes and is itself modified as kala, kastha etc. It is eternal. It is Lord's field of activity and His body." 129 In another work of this Sampradaya, the following definition of Kala is given: atitadivyavaharahetuh kalah | kalikena sarvadharatvam tallaksanam|| 130 "Kala is the basis for such parlance as past. Kala is so called because it is the substratum of everything in so far as everything is comprehended by it." Here Prakrti, Purusa and Kala are regarded as the playthings of the Lord (paramesituh kridaparikarah). Prakrti and Purusa become means with which the Lord effects His purpose, viz., the creation and the dissolution of the Universe. Kala does merely an assisting job. It is a mere aide as says the Yatindramatadipika: evambhutah kala isvarasya kridaparikaro bhavati Pilavibhutav isvarah kaladhina eva karyam karotin/131 CC Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri Collection, New Delhi Digitized by $3 Foundation USA "Thus defined Kala is the Lord's field of activity. In display of

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 57 His (painless) activity the Lord effects His purpose with the help of Kala." The implication of the above statement of the Dipika evidently is that it is only in Lord's playful activity (Lilavibhuti) that Kala is of any use, in eternal divine glory (Nityavibhuti), Kala is superfluous. 132 Time is one indivisible entity. As it is so, it is deemed to have undergone modifications such as ksana, lava and it is possible to carry on with the all-pervading (time). The modifications such as ksana are perceived in all objects. On this it has been said: kalasyaikasyaiva ksanenasya visvasyapi visesanat kalavat tatksananan ca vyapitvam avasisyatell 133 'kecit tu sadindriyavedyah kala ity apy ahuh'i 134 "As all this is qualified by the one moment (ksana) the moments of time are, like time itself, held to be pervasive." Some, however, affirm that Kala is comprehensible by the six senses. A pot is, for it is an object of ocular perception, as admitted by all. Being is here no more than being related to time. A few teachers of this school accept Kala as one and eternal in both the Vibhutis: Lilavibhuti and Nityavibhuti, of the Lord and believe that one, eternal, and all-pervading time gets appellations of moment (ksana) etc. on account of the limiting adjuncts, of solar motion, etc. They say: ayam ca kalah atindriyavedyah ghatah sann iti caksusadipratiteh sarvasiddhatvat, tatra sattvasya kalasambandhitvamatrarupatvati ayam ca kalo nityo vibhur eka eval ksanadivyavaharas tu ekasyapy upadhibhedad upapadyate 135, In essentials this view seems to be influenced by the Vaisesika system. Vallabha The Acaryas of the Vallabhasampradaya do not accept Kaala as a separate entity. According to them Kala is non-distinct from Brahman. It is Brahman itself. As the Vidvanmandana says:

yadi kalasyapi Brahmatvam eva manuse tada om iti brumah ata eva "kalo smi" iti (Srimadbhgavadgita, II.32.) bhagavadvakyam 'kalarupo 'vatirna"ityady api¹3611 "If you think Kala too is nothing but Brahman, then we say: 'We agree'. Hence the Lord says-"I am time". (Gita II. 32) and also that 'I have manifested myself as Kala,' etc." Just as the Vaisesikas accept Kala as one, eternal and independent substance and believe that the empirical divisions of it into moments, hours, days, etc. are caused by the limiting adjuncts of solar motion etc. so do the teachers of this school accept Brahman as the one entity with which they equate Kala and believe that the divisions of it into moments etc. are likewise, limitations (upadhibhedas) caused by solar motion. Madhya In the Madhvasampradaya Kala is believed to be a substance. The Padarthasangraha of Padmanabha enumerates ten substances (Dravyas) 137 of which one is Kala. The function of Kala is to limit the living period of beings, (ayurvyavasthapakah kalah). That is why God (Paramatma) and (muktas) have no limited period of existence (ayurmaryyada) for, their connection with time is nonexistent (kalasambandhabhavat). Time, the Acaryas of this school say, is not one but many, assuming different forms like ksana (moment), lava, etc. (ksana-lavadyanekarupah). According to a section of this school Kala is an entity created and destroyed and hence non-eternal. They say: kalopadanam prakrtir eva. Some others among them contradict them and affirm: kalopadanam na prakrtih purva-purvvakala evottarottarakalopadanam This view is repudiated in the Madhvasiddhantasara¹38 with clear and forceful arguments. Not only is Kala not destroyed, it is believed to be existent even at the time of the dissolution of the creation. The Bhagavata says: so'ntahsarire'rpitabhutasuksmah kalatmikam saktim udirayanabelhi. Digitized by S 3 Foundation USA CC-0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 59 59 Kala in this school is believed to be its own substratum and the proof for this is the notions like ' now it is morning, (idanim pratah). It is also the substratum of all and the proof for this is the notions like 'now there is a pitcher' (idanim ghatah). Although Kala is believed to be created by God (vide Bhagavata passage quoted above) it is eternal and ever-recurrent (continuum). In the Madhva school all Padarthas are believed to be perceivable. Soul, Mind and Time are directly perceived while Sound (Sabda) etc. are perceived with the help of the senseKala, therefore, according to the Madhvas, is a organs. perceptual datum. Nimbarka The Acaryas of the Nimbarka school accept three categories of Cit, Acit and Maya. Of these Acit is divided into Prakrta, Aprakrta and Kala. Kala is, therefore, defined as a non-sentient substance, different from Prakrta and Aprakrta. It is further described as eternal, all-pervasive and cause for such usage as past, present and future. We do not find any detailed references to time in this school which may deserve notice. We, therefore, leave it and pass on to our next topic of discussion: the concept of time in unorthodox philosophical schools. Unorthodox schools After having studied the concept of time in the orthodox Brahmanical systems of thought, we now turn our attention to how it is in three systems; Jainism, Buddhism and Carvaka . Jainism In the Jaina philosophy Kala is as much a real substance as the five others, viz., Jiva, Dharma, Adharma, Pudgala and Akasa. 140 It is described as the accompanying cause or condition (sahakarikarana) or asamavayikarana, as the Vaisesikas call it, of the modification of substances.

There was, however, a school among the Jainas which did not believe in the independent existence of time. Thus, for example, Kundakundacarya, the great, Jain thinker in his twentyfifth Gatha defines empirical time and then does not say whether time is included in the Pudgala Dravya or not. In the Tattvatraya too this view is presented as the first proposition which is sought to be rejected. 141 Although later on this is repudiated, yet it serves its purpose to show that there existed a school among the older Jainas which subscribed to the view that time as a substance exists. That some Jaina teachers do not accept time as a substance, is also shown by Gunaratna when he says: ye kecanacaryah kalam dravyam nabhyupayanti kintu dharmadidravyanam paryayam eva, tanmate dharmadharmakasapudgalajivakhyapancastikayatmako lokahi ye tu kalam dravyam icchanti tanmate saddravyatmako lokahi pancanam dharmadidravyanam kaladravyasya ca tatra sadbhavat 142, "Those of the teachers who do not recognize the substance Kala, but regard it as a dharma-like substance view this world as constituted of five astikayas of dharma, adharma, pudgala, jiva. Those who hold Kala as a substance look upon this world as made up of six substances." The two sects among the Jainas seem to be at variance on the acceptability of time. The Digambaras among them seem to accept it as they read the Sutra as kalas ca (Tattvarthasutra, 5.38) 'time is'; the Svetamabaras among them do not seem to agree with this for they read the Sutra with a variant kalas cety eke, 'some say time is'. Buddhism The Buddhists do not accept Kala. Varavaramuni clearly says "The Buddhists and others believe that there is no Kala". The same idea is expressed in Brahmavidyabharana in the following words: CC-0. Pro. Satya Vrat Shastri Collection, New Delhi. Digitized by S 3 Foundation USA

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature bauddhanam mate ksanapadena ghatadir eva padartho vyavahriyate, na tu tadatiriktah kascit ksano nama kalo 'sti... ksanikah padartha iti vyavaharas tu bhedakalpanaya 143 61 The Buddhists assert that ksana is no other than objects such as a jar. There is no time such as a ksana. 'A thing is momentary', is an expression based on the assumed differentiation. Sivarkamanidipika too does not accept time: bauddhanam mate vastutah kalo nastil udyann eva svarasabhanguro ghatadih ksanaparikalpanamatranimittam bhavati sa ca ghatadih svodayavinasaparikalpitaksanavattvat ksaniko 'pi bhavati, vapusmancchilaputraka itivat vastutah svavyatiriktaksanabhavat svayam eva ksano'pi bhavatiti tesam prakriya 144, "In the opinion of the Buddhists Kala does not exist. A jar etc. which is perishable by nature in the very act of emerging becomes the basis for the assumption of ksana." The Buddhists believe in the ksanabhangavada; that is, an object exists only for a moment after which it perishes and then in the next moment it becomes another object. That is why in Bhddhist texts the brevity of life is emphasised most. 'Brief is the life of human beings,' says Samyuttanikaya... 'none to whom death cometh not. 145 Even of Brahma, whose day is of a thousand years, it is said that 'his life is little 146, not for long 147.' This is how the Buddhist mind speculates on time. Carvaka or Lokayata Now, taking up the Carvaka or Lokayata system we may say that it accepts only four 'Bhutas', viz., earth, water, air, and fire. 148 The Carvakas do not include Kala which will have to be established by such usage as 'here is a jar' (idanim ghatah) which is based on direct perception, for, without the assumption of Kala such usage is not possible.

REFERENCES 1. The Principle of Relativity, p. 198 2. Manusmrti, 1.24 3. Nyayamanjari, 1.1.5 4. Visnu-purana, 1.2.14 5. ibid., 1.2.27 6. ibid., 1.2.26 7. avyucchinnah in the above passage means flowing continuously (pravaharupenaviratah - Sridharasvamivyakhya) 8. Yoga-sutra and Bhasya, 3.57 9. Bhagavata-purana, 3.8 10. ibid., 3.8.11 11. ibid., 3.10.22 12. ibid., 3.11.3 13. ibid., 3.11.4 14. Kurma-purana, quoted in Vacaspatyakosa, p. 198. 15. Visnudharmottara-purana quoted in Vacaspatyakosa, p. 1986 16. Vakyapadiya, III 9-62 17. Maharthamanjari, Gatha 18 18. Isvarapratyabhijnavimarsini, 3.1.9 19. Mrgendravrttidipika, 1.10.14 20. Tripurarahasya, Jnanakanda, 4-99 21. ibid., 14-83 22. Dvaitasaktas, 5.7.96 23. Paranandasutra, 5-6 24. Prayogakramadipika, 1.20-21 25. nitye hi kalanaksatre, Mahabhasya, on Panini IV. 2.3 26. Mahabhasya under Vartika: siddhe sabdarthasambandhe. 27. yena murinam upacayas capacayas ca laksyante tam kalam ahuh. tasyaiva kayacit kriyaya yuktasyahar iti bhavati ratrir iti ca, on Pan. II. 2.5. In this Bhartrhari closely follows Mahabhasyakara, vide his Karika, murtinam tena bhinnanam acayapacayah prthaki laksyante parinamena sarvasam bhedayonina. Kalasamuddesa, Karika 13. 28. tarutrnalataprabhrtinam kadacid upacayo' nyada tv apacayah sa pratyayantaravisese 'pi yatkrtah sa kalah. Pradipa on Mahabhasya on Panini II. 2.5.

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 63 29. Mahabhasya on Panini II. 2.5. Bharthari too accepts this view vide his Karikas: tasyatma bahudha bhinno bhedair dharmantarasrayaih! nahi bhinnam abhinnam va vastu kincana vidyatell naiko na capy aneko'sti na suklo napi casitahi dravyatma sa tu samsargad evamrupah prakasatell samsarginam tu ye bheda visesas tasya te matah! sambhinnas tair vyavasthanam kalo bhedaya kalpatell Kalasamuddesa, Karikas 6-8. 30. It is interesting to observe here that Nagesabhatta, the grammarian-philosopher does not accept this view of Bhasyakara. To him time is neither one, nor eternal and all pervading. If time is one, argues he, it would not be possible to account for the diversity of effects produced; hence time must be held to be a stream of moments. Nor can time be maintained to be eternal, all pervasive etc., for time is said to be the cause of various actions in so far as it forms their substratum, but unless it is qualified, it cannot be the substratum of such notion as 'now there is jar' and if a qualification of it is to be assumed, then we shall have to assume another determination for that qualification and still another for the second; and so on ad infinitum. Laghumanjusa, p. 848, Chowkhamba Ed.. 31. avasthavisesasyaivatitadisamjna, Pradipa on Mahabhasya. 32. Mahabhasya on Panini III. 3. 133. 33. nityapravrtte ca kalavibhagat, Varttika on Pan. III. 2. I 33. 34. Mahabhasya on Panini. III. 3. 133. 35. III. 9.84. 36. III. 9.85. 37. mimamsako manyamano yuva medhavisammatahi kakam snehenanuprcchati kim te patitalaksanamil anagato na patasi atikrante ca kaka nal yadi samprati patasi sarvo lokah pataty ayamil Himavan api calati...... Mahabhasya on 3.2.123. 38. na vartate cakram isur na patyate na syandante saritah sagarayal kutastho'yam loko na vicestitastil yo hy evam pasyati so'py anandhahll 39. anagatam atikrantam vartamanam iti trayam! sarvatra ca gatir nasti gacchatiti kim ucyatell 40. III. 9.86.

III. 9.87. 42. III. 9.89. 43. asti vartamanah kalah. adityagativan nopalabhyate. visasya vala iva dahyamana na laksyate vikrtih sannipate astiti tam vedayante tribhavah suksmo hi bhavo'numitena gamyah kriyapravrttau yo hetus tadartham yad vicestitam tatsamiksya prayunjita gacchatity avicarayan. 44. Caraka Samhita, 1-48 -Mahabhasya on 3.2.123. 45. Sutrasthana, 1-48 46. ibid. 47. Susrutatika, Sarirasthana, Adhyaya 1, Under V-II 48. Kamasutra, Sadharanadhikarana, Adhyaya 2. 49. Jayamangala, a commentary on the Kamasutra, Sadharanadhikarana, Adhyaya 2. under sutra. tatsarvam kalakaritam 50. Nyayamanjari, 1.15 51. Mrgendravrttidipika, 10.15 52. ibid. 53. Yogavasistha, 111.12.9-10 54. Vasistha-tatparya-prakasa. Under verse 11. 55. Yogavasistha, IV.10.17-27 56. ibid. 111.20.29 57. ibid. 111.60.21 58. ibid. 111.103.14 59. ibid. 111.60.25-26 60. ibid. 111.20.51 61. ibid. 111.60.171 62. Cf. The Concept of Time in Indian Philosophy. p. 85 63. Vakyapadiya, Kala Samuddesa, Karika. 62 64. Kurma-purana, as quoted in the Vacaspatya, p. 1986 65. Vakyapadiya 111.11.7 66. ibid. 111.9.32 67. ibid. 111.9.31 68. ibid. 111.9.34 69. All this is true only. If we share the view of the Vaisesika that the wholes are distinct from their parts. 70. Vakyapadiya, III. 9.35

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature 71. ibid, III. 9.36 72. ibid, III. 9.14 73. Brahma-kanda, 1.2 74. Bodhapancadasika. 3 75. Vakyapadiya. 111.9.46 76. ibid. 111.9.39 77. ibid. 111.9.40 78. ibid. 111.9.70 79. ibid. 111.9.28 80. ibid. Kalasamuddesa, 13 81. Mahabhasya, 11.2.5 82. Uddyota under 11.2.5 83. Laghumanjusa, p. 848 (Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series) 84. Vakyapadiya, 111.9.59-61 85. ibid. 111.9.76 86. ibid. 87. ibid. 111.9.77 88. Yogavasistha V.49.4; 111.60.21; 111.60.26 89. Vakyapadiya, 111.9.48 90. avasthavisesasyaivalitadisanjna, Pradipa on Mahabhasya, 5.2.49 91. nityapravrtte ca kalavibhagat, Vartika on 3.2.123 92. bhutabhavisyatpratidvandvo vartamanah on 3.2.123 93. santi ca kalavibhagah, Vartika on 3.2.123 94. 111.9.80 95. 111.9.81 96. 111.9.82-83 97. III.9.84 98. 111.9.85 99. na vartate cakram isur na patyate na syandante saritah sagaraya kutastho' yam loko na vicestitasti yo hy evam pasyati so' py anandhah anagatam atikrantam vartamanam iti trayami sarvatra ca gatir nasti gacchatiti kim ucyatell 100. 111.9.86 101. 111.9.87 102. 111.9.88 103. 111.9.90 55 65

There are two schools of the Samkhyas-God-believing and Goddisbelieving vide Sastradipika: "dvividham ca Samkhyam sesvaram nirisvaram ca 1.1.5 105. 2.2.1 106. Samkhyatattvakaumudi, under Karika 33 107. 10.14 108. 10.14 109. Parasarasamhitabhasya, 1.20 110. na kalo nama kascit padartho'sti, kin tarhi kriyasu kalasamjna, 50. 111. 2.12 112. Samkhyapravacanabhasya Ed. Kashi Sanskrit Series, Vol. 67. 1920. p. 128 113. Aniruddhavrtti on Samkhyasutra 2.12 114. yady apy upadhivisistakasa eva dikkalaul (Vedantimahadevavyakhya on Samkhyasutra, 2.12) 115. Vrttanta. Mansollasa on Stotra, verse. 41 116. Patanjala Yogasutra, Anandasrama series, Vol. 47.1932, pp. 170- 71. 117. ibid. 118. kalasyapi vibhutve' py aupadhiko bhedavyavaharo'sti sa yatha-pancadasa nimesah kastha tabhis trinsata muhurtah te trinsad ahoratrah tais tavadbhir masah tair dvadasabhih samvatsarah tais ca kramena yugadaya iti" Manameyodaya, Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, 1933. p. 191 119. ibid. p. 190 120. 1.1.5 121. Advaitasiddhi, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Edition 1917, p. 319 122. Gaekwad Oriental Series, No. XXIV, Baroda, 1956 p. 17. Prameyapariccheda. 123. dikkalau tv apramanikatvan noktau under verse 8. 124. Adyar Library Series 34, Adyar, 1942, p. 3 125. ibid. p. 4 126. Kalas tv avidyaiva, tasya eva sarvadharatvati 127. Kalah paraparavyatikarayaugapadyaciraksiprapratyayalingam-Prasastapadabhasya. Ed. Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, p. 332 128. The author proposes to publish shortly an independent study on Time Conception in Indian Thought.

Concept of Time in Post-Vedic Sanskrit Literature .67 129. Tattvatraya, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Nos. 22 and 26, p. 62 130. anantarya, Siddhantasiddhanjana (Jadapariccheda), 1899, p. 49 131. Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, Vol. 50. 1906. p. 50 132. "nityavibhutau tu kalasya vidyamanatve'pi tasya na svatantryam kecit tu tatra kalo nastiti vadanti", Yatindramatadipika, p. 50. 133. anantarya , Siddhantasiddhanjana (Jadapariccheda); 1899. p. 49 134. Yatindramatadipika. Ed. as noted earlier. p. 51. 135. Siddhantasiddhanjana, pp. 49 and 50. 136. Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series. p. 12 137. tatra dravyagunakarmasamanyavisistansisaktisadrsyabhava dasa padarthahi 138. Vide chapter on Kala (Kalaprakarana) in Madhvasiddhantasara. 139. Cf. atmamanahkaladayoh saksad eva saksino visayah,' sabdadayas tu bahir indriyadvara-Padarthasangraha, Indriyaprakarana. 140. The Jaina philosophers divide a substance into two categories. Jiva and Ajiva. Then the Ajiva substance is described as five-fold. "Pudgaladharmadharmakasakalabhedena pancadhal" Dravya Samgraha by Nemi Chandra, First chapter and Tattvarthasutra by Umasvamin, Fifth chapter. 141. kecit kalo nastity ahuhi -Tattvatraya, Ed. Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series. p. 66. Nos. 22 and 26. 142. Tarkarahasyadipika, a commentary on Saddarsanasamuccaya, Ed. by Luigi Suali, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905. pp. 162-63 143. 2.2.20 144. 2.2.19 145. 1.38 146. 1.143. For a detailed analysis of the time conception in Buddhist Philosophy see A.K. Coomaraswami, Time and Eternity, Berne. 147. -do- 148. atha catvari bhutani bhumivaryanilanalah (Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Chapt. on Lokayatadarsana and Tarkasamgraha, Bhaskarodaya. Chapt. on Mangalavada.)