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The fourth chapter of the 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 is known as the 础濒腻迟补艣腻苍迟颈 笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺 (Quenching of the Firebrand) . The purpose of this chapter as stated by 艢补峁卥补谤补, is the establishment of the system of advaita by pointing out the contradictions in the schools that are opposed to it. 艢补峁卥补谤补, in the beginning of this chapter points out the relation or 蝉补峁単补迟颈 of the earlier three chapters culminating into this fourth chapter. He observes that the 腻驳补尘补 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺 by determining of meaning of 补耻峁僰腻谤补 becomes the premiss (辫谤补迟颈箩帽腻), for establishing the non-dual reality (advaita). The advaita was established using logic in the second (vaitathya) chapter on the ground that the external world of phenomena/objects is illusory. Again in the third chapter this (same) non-duality was ascertained /established on the authority of the both the scriptures and reasoning. It was conclusively established at the end of the third chapter, that 鈥楴on Duality alone is the Ultimate Truth鈥�. At the end of third chapter it was indicated that 鈥楾he dualists and the nihilists are those who oppose this philosophy of advaita, which is the true import of the scriptures. The dualists and the Nihilists mutually oppose one another and their philosophies are false because they give rise to emotions and passions like attachment and aversion. The meaning is that, they mutually contradict one another and their philosophies are affected by such factors arising out of their attachment to their own views and their aversion towards others view. On account of this it has been indicated that the philosophies of those opponents are false. In the context of non duality there can be no play of aversion or hatred for what exists is the one non dual principle, there is no possibility of a second. The Advaita philosophy is eulogized as the true philosophy for it is free from any of those (viz. passions, aversion) vitiating features.

艢补峁卥补谤补 begins the study of 础濒腻迟补艣腻苍迟颈 笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺 to show in detail the falsity of those views which are opposed to one another. The mutual falsification of these views will automatically establish the truth of non-duality with the help of the method of (腻惫墨迟补-苍测腻测补)^[1] difference/negative reasoning. By adopting the method of 腻惫墨迟补 (vyatireka) inference i.e. by pointing out the contrast and difference/disagreement, the non-dualism is ultimately established as the final conclusion.

The chapter entitled al膩ta艣膩nti 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺 contains one hundred 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 and I have critically examined the quintessence of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 Advaita philosophy. This chapter begins with an invocation to 鈥榯he best among bipeds鈥� (诲惫颈辫补诲腻峁� vara) who has perfectly understood the dharmas which are comparable to 腻办腻艣补 through knowledge which is also the 腻办腻艣补 and is non-different from the object known.

碍腻谤颈办腻 1 reads:

鈥業 bow to that best among men who by means of knowledge, which is like 膧办腻艣补 and non-different from the object of knowledge (i.e., the Dharma), realised the nature of Dharmas (i.e., the 闯墨惫补蝉) which are, again, like the 膧办腻艣补鈥�.

艢补峁卥补谤补, in his commentary on this 办腻谤颈办腻 suggests that 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 makes obeisance to 狈腻谤腻测补峁嘺, often described as 鈥�笔耻谤耻峁�o迟迟补尘补鈥�, who is the best of human beings. In the first 办腻谤颈办腻 of this chapter there is a salutation to the proclaimer of the tradition of Advaita philosophy by identifying him with the nature of Advaita Reality itself. Obeisance is made to the teacher at the commencement of a scripture to bring this undertaking to a successful end.

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 the term 鈥�腻办腻艣补kalpa鈥� in the 办腻谤颈办腻 is somewhat similar to 腻办腻艣补 (space) and also marginally different from 腻办腻艣补. When knowledge is compared to 腻办腻艣补, it means that it is all pervasive like space. The term dharma in the 办腻谤颈办腻 refers to the 箩墨惫补 which is also non different from the Supreme. The knowledge, the Self and the supreme are all one and non dual. What is the purpose of such knowledge? The 箩墨惫补 is compared to gagana or the sky. The supreme knowledge is non different (jneya-abhinna) from the object of knowledge. This knowledge is non-different from its object known, as fire is non-different from heat and the sun from light.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 pays homage to Him who has realised (厂补峁僢耻诲诲丑补) this all pervasive knowledge. 艢补峁卥补谤补 says, he is the best of men (辫耻谤耻峁�a蝉) and is therefore called 笔耻谤耻峁�o迟迟补尘补 or 狈腻谤腻测补峁嘺. It could be a reference to 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 guru/腻肠腻谤测补 who taught 痴别诲腻苍迟补 to him which is mentioned in this 办腻谤颈办腻 as the greatest of men (dvipad膩m vara).^[2]

膧苍补苍诲补驳颈谤颈 in his comment on the 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 commentary on 办腻谤颈办腻 1, says that 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 had practiced penance at the 叠补诲补谤颈办腻艣谤补尘补 to propitiate 狈腻谤腻测补峁嘺 who, pleased with the penance, gave him as a boon the philosophical knowledge and thus 狈腻谤腻测补峁嘺 could be regarded as 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 teacher. 膧nand膩giri regards 鈥�Dvipad膩峁� vara鈥� as 狈腻谤腻测补峁嘺.^[3]

Bhattacharya points out that, although 鈥�诲惫颈辫补诲腻峁� vara鈥� is found in the 惭补丑腻产丑腻谤补迟补 (vanaparvan 54.45, 膧诲颈辫补谤惫补苍 220.36), it is a very common epithet for Buddha in the Buddhist literature, and he gives a long list of references.^[4] He quotes several parallels in Buddhist literature for the teaching that 箩帽腻苍补 and dharmas (knowledge and its objects) are like space. In the 叠辞诲丑颈肠补谤测补惫补迟腻谤补, 艢antidev writes: 鈥�Sarvam腻办腻艣补sa峁卥膩艣a峁� parig峁沨峁嘺ntu madvidh膩岣�鈥�; 鈥榣et those who are like me accept the doctrine that all is like space鈥�; or, in the 础峁ａ弓补-蝉腻丑补蝉谤颈办腻辫谤补箩帽腻-辫腻谤补尘颈迟腻, we find the phrase 鈥�sarvadharmah腻办腻艣补sama岣�鈥�; 鈥榓ll dharmas are the same as space鈥�; the 尝补峁卥腻惫补迟腻谤补蝉奴迟谤补 (X.172) speaks of dharmas as 鈥�aniruddh膩岣� anutpann膩岣� pr补办峁泃y膩驳补驳补苍辞辫补尘腻岣�鈥�; using the same term, 鈥�驳补驳补苍辞辫补尘腻岣�鈥� which occurs here in 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补办腻谤颈办腻^[5].

The term dharma in its Buddhist philosophical meaning as a thing or object, 鈥榚ntity鈥�, 鈥榥ature鈥�, or 鈥榓n element of existence鈥� or 鈥榮tructure鈥� appears some twenty-two times in the fourth 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺. The meaning of the word dharma in II.25 and III.1 of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补办腻谤颈办腻 are different.

艢补峁卥补谤补 takes the meaning of the term 鈥�dharma鈥� in the fourth 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺 as either 箩墨惫补 or 腻迟尘补苍. He does not explain here as to how 箩帽腻苍补 is 腻办腻艣补kalpa and dharmas are gaganopama. He would, however, explain the non-difference of 箩帽腻苍补 and 箩帽别测补 saying that 箩帽别测补 refers to 腻迟尘补苍 (or strictly 腻迟尘补苍s), and 箩帽腻苍补 is not different from 腻迟尘补苍.^[6]

According to Bhattacharya, in 办腻谤颈办腻 1 the salutation is offered to the greatest amongst gods and men who is referred to as Buddha. ^[7] He gives two reasons for this. First, the 办腻谤颈办腻 1 compares 箩帽腻苍补 to the 腻办腻艣补 and says that it is not different from the 箩帽别测补. Secondly, the dharmas or elements of existence are also stated to be like the 腻办腻艣补. Both these conceptions are from Buddhists philosophy which is taught by Buddha Himself.

In order to strengthen the teachings of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 and 艢补峁卥补谤补, T.M.P. Mahadevan^[8] gives a position which is against Bhattacharya鈥檚 opinion on this issue. According to Mahadevan the space-analogy is not particularly a Buddhistic one. In the Advaita 笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 uses this analogy to establish the all pervasiveness and nonduality of the Self/ 别办腻迟尘补惫腻诲补. The knowledge that is 箩帽别测腻产丑颈苍苍补, non-different from the objects of knowledge is the doctrine also advocated by the Advatins, though not in the similar manner as the Vi箩帽腻苍补v腻诲颈ns hold it. Mahadevan remarks that the Advaitin may compare the dharmas to 腻办腻艣补/ether, not to prove their 苍颈岣�s惫产丑腻惫补 or 艢奴苍测补迟补 as in Buddhism but to indicate their real nature of the Self as being non-dual. Therefore the meaning of the 办腻谤颈办腻, is not incompatible with the teaching of the 痴别诲腻苍迟补.^[9]

The traditional, Brahminical Advaitins maintain that the 办腻谤颈办腻 1 offers an obeisance to 狈腻谤腻测补峁嘺, the instructor of the 艣腻蝉迟谤补蝉. Even though there is no evidence given for the phrase 诲惫颈辫补诲腻峁� vara as referring to 狈腻谤腻测补峁嘺, scholars like Bhatttacharya after a painful study of the Buddhist text conclude that it is Lord Buddha who is denoted by 诲惫颈辫补诲腻峁� vara. The interpretation also varies in the second 办腻谤颈办腻 in the sense that Bhattacharya believes that the 办腻谤颈办腻 addresses again to Lord Buddha. While the 艢补峁卥补谤补 and others hold the other view that it is in praise of 艣腻蝉迟谤补蝉/scriptures that describes the Yoga of non-contact (补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补). I have elucidated here both the positions as found in Bhattacharya and 厂补峁卥补谤补.

In 办腻谤颈办补 1, there is obeisance to 狈腻谤腻测补峁嘺/guru. In 办腻谤颈办腻 2 there is obeisance made to the 艣腻蝉迟谤补 which teaches the yoga called 鈥�础蝉辫补谤艣补-Yoga鈥�. This 办腻谤颈办腻 is also intended to show the merits of non-duality.

Non-duality is described here as a yoga and is given the name 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补. 碍腻谤颈办腻 2 reads:

鈥業 salute this Yoga known as the 础蝉辫补谤艣补 (i.e., free from all touch which implies duality), taught through the scriptures-the Yoga which promotes the happiness of all beings and conduces to the well-being of all and which is free from strife and contradictions鈥�.

艢补峁卥补谤补, the commentator says that: 础蝉辫补谤艣补yoga is that yoga which has no contact (蝉辫补谤艣补) or relationship with anything at any time. It is the very nature of Brahman. Thus, it is 鈥榠ndeed so named鈥� (vai 苍腻尘补) as 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补, it is well known to the knowers of Brahman. It brings happiness to all beings (sarva-sattva-蝉耻办丑补岣�). There are forms of yoga like austerity (tapas) etc. which though brings relative happiness is also largely associated with pain/misery. But 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 prescribed here is not similar to it. The 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 promotes harmony and happiness to all beings. 础蝉辫补谤艣补 means a total absence of 鈥渢ouch鈥�. In other words it refers to the absence of any relation to any object. The non-dual Brahman cannot have a contact with any 鈥渙bject鈥� for there exists nothing other than It. According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 it is the 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 with this merit is saluted in 办腻谤颈办腻 2.

The most important aspect of 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 is that it is free from all disputes and thereby opinion, (补惫颈惫腻诲补). It has been already stated in 办腻谤颈办腻 III.18 earlier that nonduality (advaita) is the ultimate reality and this position does not contest with the dualists position. The dualists have every reason to quarrel/oppose with one another but not with the (蝉补谤惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补办补) advaita. It does not contradict or oppose (补惫颈谤耻诲诲丑补岣�). What exists is the self effulgent 腻迟尘补苍 which cannot contradict any one or any position; one cannot contradict one鈥檚 own 腻迟尘补苍. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 pays obeisance to such a Supreme Yoga taught by the scriptures.

According to Bhattacharya the real instructor of the a蝉辫补谤艣补 yoga, who is saluted in 办腻谤颈办腻 2 by the author, is no other than the Buddha. He says that the word 鈥�补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补鈥� does not occur in the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉, though 艢补峁卥补谤补 remarks on 办腻谤颈办腻 3:39, where the term also occurs, that it is well-known in the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉 (Prasiddham Upani峁�atsu).

In any case, Bhattacharya quotes the Ka峁環a 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 (II.3.10) as a source text for this teaching of 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补:

yad膩pa帽c膩vati峁ａ弓hante j帽膩n膩ni manas膩saha,
buddhi艣ca na vice峁ａ弓ate 迟腻m膩hu岣� 辫补谤补尘腻峁� gatim.

鈥榃hen the five (instruments of) knowledge along with the mind cease from activity and the intellect does not stir, they call that the highest state鈥�.^[10]

Bhattacharya says that, such 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲颈肠 passage(s) do not appear to resemble, in any profound way, the philosophical teachings of Buddhist non-dualism which describe the nature of all dharmas as resembling 腻办腻艣补. It is to this doctrine of emptiness or non-origination which the term 补艣辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 refers, because there is nothing to contact or touch when one knows that nothing has come into being.

Bhattacharya makes what seems to be an inappropriate connection between 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 and 蝉补尘腻诲丑颈 (yogic trance states), mentioning the 补蝉补峁� praj帽膩ta 蝉补尘腻诲丑颈 of 驰辞驳补蝉奴迟谤补 (I, 2, 18, 51), the nirvikalpa 蝉补尘腻诲丑颈 of the 笔补帽肠补诲补蝉颈 (II.28), and the last of the nine Buddhist Sampattis called 蝉补峁僯帽腻惫别诲颈迟补苍颈谤辞诲丑补, 鈥榯he cessation of consciousness and sensation.^[11] 础艣辫补谤艣补 refers to the ninth or last of the nine 诲丑测腻苍补蝉 or meditations called 补苍耻辫奴谤惫补惫颈丑腻谤补. The ninth 诲丑测腻苍补 is 蝉补峁僯帽腻惫别诲颈迟补苍颈谤辞诲丑补.

Bhattacharya says that a蝉辫补谤艣补 yoga is 鈥�asukha yoga鈥� as it cannot be attained with ease as 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 says it as 鈥�诲耻谤诲补谤艣补鈥�. He admits that 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 interpretation of 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 in both the 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 (IV:2 and III.39) cannot be rejected. Bhattacharya also justifies the use of the word 蝉辫补谤艣补 in the Bhagavadgita, viz. (i) 惭腻迟谤腻蝉辫补谤艣腻蝉迟耻 Kaunteya 艢墨迟辞峁ａ箛补蝉耻办丑补诲耻办丑补诲腻岣� (Gita 2-14), (ii) spar艣膩n k峁泃v膩bahir b膩hy膩n (Gita 5-27).

Bhattacharya argues that in the ninth or last stage of yoga or meditation, all the mental properties or mentals (caitta or caitasika dharmas) headed by 蝉辫补谤艣补 (contact) are suppressed with the citta or mind itself, it is called 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补. The cessation of 惫别诲补苍腻 is possible only when 蝉辫补谤艣补 ceases (Sa峁儁utta 狈颈办腻测补, IV, p.220, XXXVI. 15.4). 厂辫补谤艣补 is the cause of 惫别诲补苍腻, so when there 蝉辫补谤艣补 there is 惫别诲补苍腻, and when there is no 蝉辫补谤艣补 there is no 惫别诲补苍腻.

Bhattacharya further says in Buddhist Sanskrit works, there is the use of such words as 蝉辫补谤艣补vih膩ra, 蝉辫补谤艣补vih膩ra迟腻, and a蝉辫补谤艣补vih膩ra. 厂辫补谤艣补vih膩ra is translated in Tibetan to mean Sukhastithi or Sukhaavasthiti; so 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 is nothing but asukhayoga and this fact is referred by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 3:39 i.e. 鈥榊oga is not that which can be attained with ease鈥� (础艣辫补谤艣补yoga vai 苍腻尘补 诲耻谤诲补谤蝉补岣� 蝉补谤惫补测辞驳颈产丑颈岣�).

In the yoga called 苍颈谤辞诲丑补蝉补尘腻辫补迟迟颈, there is no 蝉辫补谤艣补 of anything, so it is rightly named 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补, says Bhattacharya.

Bhattacharya thinks that the fear of the yogins referred to in 办腻谤颈办腻 3:39 by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补, is illustrated by Buddha鈥檚 own case. 鈥淪o when the Blessed One entered that state, i.e. 蝉补峁僯帽腻惫别诲补测颈迟补苍颈谤辞诲丑补 before his 辫补谤颈苍颈谤惫腻峁嘺, 膧苍补苍诲补 took him to be dead. But the venerable Anuruddha said to him that was not the case, the Blessed One only having entered the stage of the 诲丑测腻苍补 called 蝉补帽帽腻惫别诲补测颈迟补苍颈谤辞诲丑补. After a short time, however, He passed away鈥�.^[12] It is therefore quite natural that an untrained yogin should be afraid of it, as of death.

Bhattacharya further says 鈥渢hat Buddha鈥檚 two teachers 膧濒腻谤补 碍腻濒腻尘补 and Uddaka R膩maputta knew the seventh and eighth of the 诲丑测腻苍补蝉 respectively. The Buddha was, however, not satisfied with what he had from his teachers, and he started to seek after a still higher state and succeeded in realising it鈥�.^[13] It is this state which is called 蝉补帽帽腻惫别诲补测颈迟补苍颈谤辞诲丑补 or briefly nirodha.

Bhattacharya draws a conclusion that the 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 was not originally taught in the Brahmanic system of yoga. He says that the use of the two words 鈥�补惫颈惫腻诲补鈥� and 鈥�aviruddha in this (IV:2) 办腻谤颈办腻 shows that in the acceptance of 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 by the Ved膩ntins, among whom the author himself (骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补) is included, there cannot be raised any dispute or opposition, for there is nothing to be opposed even from their own point of view.^[14]

The passages in question simply mean that when 补箩腻迟颈 is admitted, only advaita remains and this non-dualism does not bother itself with the different contradictory views involved in the acceptance of the origination (箩腻迟颈). One who knows that the barren woman鈥檚 child (惫补苍诲丑测腻辫耻迟谤补) does not exist would hardly trouble oneself with carrying on dispute with theorists who indulge in controversies about the date and place of birth of the 惫补苍诲丑测腻辫耻迟谤补 and so on. There being only advaita, there cannot possibly be any internal or external opposition or contradiction about it.

There appears to be some possible meanings of the term 鈥�补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补鈥� in the 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补办腻谤颈办腻 by different scholars. They are:

(1) A technical term for the practice of yoga. Mahadevan (1960) notes:

鈥�补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 is the yoga of transcendence, whereby one realises the suprarelational reality.... The purpose for which this yoga is to be resorted to is the same as that which is set forth in the 笔腻迟补帽箩补濒补蝉奴迟谤补 as the goal of yoga, viz., to stem the tide of the surging psychoses of mind and gradually attain thereby a state of mindlessness.^[15]

(2) Stephen Kaplan^[16] agrees that,

鈥�补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 denotes a type of meditative path. Kaplan does, however, acknowledge the link with a specific theory of perception鈥�.

(3) Bhattacharya^[17] suggests that,

鈥�补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 is a description of the highest form of 蝉补尘腻诲丑颈. The word 补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 literally means the yoga in which there is no contact, or the faculty of perception by touch or connection with anything. The author himself says in 办腻谤颈办腻 3:.37, it is a 蝉补尘腻诲丑颈 鈥榩rofound or abstract concentration鈥�, and very difficult to realise. It points to what is Asamp鈥� raj帽膩ta 蝉补尘腻诲丑颈 (驰辞驳补蝉奴迟谤补, 1, 2, 18, 51) with the scholiast 痴测腻蝉补, or nirvikalpa 蝉补尘腻诲丑颈 (笔补帽肠补诲补艣墨 II.28) of yogins鈥�.

(4) 础蝉辫补谤艣补yoga as a reference to the 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补办腻谤颈办腻鈥� s perceptual theory of no contact. Hixon^[18] maintains that:

鈥�补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补 is a path of insight which does not involve trance-states at all, or at least does not regard the highest realisation as a trance-state. We propose that a蝉辫补谤艣补 is synonymous with 补蝉补峁単补 and 苍颈岣�s补峁単补 as the terms are used in 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补办腻谤颈办腻 4:72 and 4:79, to refer to the absence of an object... this understanding of the mind does not apply only to trance-states but to the nature of mind and its objects in any and all states of consciousness鈥�.

Colin Cole^[19] suggests that there are two meanings of the term 鈥�础蝉辫补谤艣补 Yoga鈥�. On the philosophical level, the term implies the realisation of non-duality, i.e., of 罢耻谤墨测补 or Brahman. In this sense it could be called the 鈥淣on-dual Yoga鈥� or the 鈥�Yoga of the non-dual鈥�. On the level of religious practice, the term refers to discipline, path, method or process whereby the 蝉腻诲丑补办补 attains this condition of being one with Ultimate Reality.

These views are not mutually exclusive. Given the emphasis placed upon meditative technique in the 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补办腻谤颈办腻, it seems likely that 鈥�补蝉辫补谤艣补测辞驳补鈥� is a technical term which defines the nature of the practice of yoga in terms of its final goal, the realisation that the mind never comes into contact with the external world.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 has stated in 办腻谤颈办腻 2 that the Advaita-诲补谤艣补苍补 is 补惫颈惫腻诲补. The nondisputable (补惫颈惫腻诲补) and non-contradiction (aviruddha) of this 办腻谤颈办腻 links up to the discussion in 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 17 and 18 of the Advaita 笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺, concerning the fact that the dvaitin contradicts one another, whereas the advaitin finds no contradiction with them. Because the views of dualists are on the level of relative truth, yet the relative has no fundamental existence over and above the absolute which could contradict the absolute. The development of this subject/theme in the 础濒腻迟补艣腻苍迟颈 笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺 is more extensive, and introduces a dialectical refutation of causality.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 3 establishes the dialectical conflict between disputing doctrines of causality based on the philosophical problem of the existent (产丑奴迟补) and the nonexistent (a产丑奴迟补). It is to be noted that 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 3:27-28 has already dealt with this problem using the terms sat and asat by rejecting both alternatives. To establish this, he, again, illustrates the mutual conflicts among the dualists.

He says in this 办腻谤颈办腻:

鈥楽ome disputants (followers of 厂腻峁卥丑测补) consider that there is the origination of a thing that already exists. Other intelligent people (the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉) maintain there is origination of what is non-existent. Thus they dispute with each other鈥�.

It is a well-known fact that the 厂腻峁卥丑测补s and the Ny膩ya 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉 stand on two opposite views regarding the doctrine of causation in Indian philosophy.

艢补峁卥补谤补 explains the two opposite theories of causation in order to understand 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 statement about them.

(i) Bh奴tasya 箩腻迟颈micchanti鈥揟丑别 厂腻峁卥丑测补 theory of causation is technically called as sat-办腻谤测补-惫腻诲补 or pari峁嚹乵a惫腻诲补 though 艢补峁卥补谤补 does not use these words. They hold the view that the effect pre-exists in its material cause before manifestation. Thus, the pot (the jar) is not something new produced from the earth (尘峁泃迟颈办腻), the pot already exists (sat) in the earth/clay as its potential. They say if the effect does not contain/exist in the cause potentially, it would not come out of it. The cause contains the effect in its subtle form. According to these theorists there is an actual transformation (pari苍腻尘补) of the cause. For example, when we say the pot/jar is produced what happens is the clay has transformed in the form of pot (尘峁泃迟颈办腻ghatar奴pe峁嘺 pari峁嘺mate).

According to Bhattach膩rya, this is also the view of 痴补颈产丑腻峁�i办补蝉 among the Buddhists.

(ii) A产丑奴迟补sy膩pare 箩腻迟颈micchanti鈥揟丑别 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补, Sau迟腻ntrika among the Buddhists believe in the asat办腻谤测补惫腻诲补 or 膩rambha惫腻诲补. For them, the effect is a new creation, a real beginning. The effect does not pre-exist in its cause. They say, if the effect already exists in the cause, there is no need for its production/origination. According to the Ny膩ya-Vai艣esika the jar/pot is a new (asat) object produced from clay, but there is intimate relation (蝉补尘惫腻测补蝉补尘产补苍诲丑补) between them. The effect is non-existent (asat) before its origination.

Thus the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 system (satk膩ryv腻诲颈ns) deny the origination of a non-existent (asat) object, and the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 system (asat办腻谤测补vidins) deny the origination of a existent (sat) object. According 艢补峁卥补谤补 the idea is that they (the disputants) quarrel among themselves with a desire to establish their victory over their opponents.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 4 states that as there can be only two sets of objects: existent (sat) and non-existent (asat), it follows that the disputants destroy each other鈥檚 doctrine of creation (箩腻迟颈惫腻诲补). This in turn establishes the doctrine of non-origination (补箩腻迟颈惫腻诲补). This 办腻谤颈办腻 concurs in this rejection of both alternatives (产丑奴迟补峁僴a 箩腻测补迟别 kincid a产丑奴迟补m naiva 箩腻测补迟别) i.e. neither the existent nor the non-existent comes into being. This is representing as the argument used by the followers of Advaya who teach the doctrine of non-origination (vivadanta岣� advay膩h hi evam 补箩腻迟颈m khyapayanti te).

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 if the effect is already existent (sat), it cannot be newly originated, for it is already there making the entire causal process redundant. It is meaningless to say that what is existent is born鈥搇ike 腻迟尘补苍. Similarly, if the effect is non-existent (asat), it can not be originated. It will remain non-existent forever. What is non-existent like the barren woman鈥檚 son (惫补苍诲丑测腻辫耻迟谤补) or a hare鈥檚 horn are not at any time born. Thus the dualists contradicting each other about the passing into birth of an existing or non-existing entity establish the doctrine of non-origination (补箩腻迟颈惫腻诲补). The meaning is that the dualists by disputing each other re-enforce indirectly the truth of 补箩腻迟颈 (补箩腻迟颈mkhy膩payanti te).

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 5 says:

鈥榃e approve the 补箩腻迟颈 or non-creation declared by them. We do not quarrel with them. Now, hear from us the Ultimate Reality which is free from all disputations鈥�.

艢补峁卥补谤补 suggests that through disputation the dualists (the followers of the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 and 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补) tend to support the advaita view by cancelling out each others鈥� view. They have established in this way the doctrine of non-origination (补箩腻迟颈) and we approve (补苍耻尘辞诲腻尘补丑别) that by stating 鈥淟et it be so鈥�. We do not quarrel with them, by taking any side for or against, as they dispute among themselves by taking sides. The philosophy of the ultimate reality is free from dispute. 艢补峁卥补谤补 says that we have given our approval to the seeker for understanding the absolute non-manifestation of the Self/ 腻迟尘补苍. Bhattacharya says that 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in this 办腻谤颈办腻 accepts the doctrine of non-origination of the Advayav腻诲颈ns or Buddhists expressing his approval.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 restates in the next three 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 (6-8) what he had described earlier (3:2022) namely the idea: 鈥淚n no way will an intrinsic nature change鈥� (4:7, 3:2)] and the view that 鈥渢he disputants only contradict each other鈥�^[20].

The main subject matter of this chapter is the doctrine of non-origination (补箩腻迟颈惫腻诲补). 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 now proceeds in the following 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 to offer his arguments as to how the doctrine of 箩腻迟颈 cannot be justified.

In 办腻谤颈办腻 6 he says:

鈥楾he disputants (i.e. the dualists) contend that the ever unborn (changeless) entity (腻迟尘补苍) undergoes a change. How does an entity which is changeless and immortal partake of the nature of the mortal鈥�?

It follows that the followers of 厂腻峁卥丑测补 and Ny膩ya 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 system as discussed in 办腻谤颈办腻 3 are agree upon the point that origination (箩腻迟颈) is possible of what is unborn; for what is already born does not take birth again. According to both 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 and 艢补峁卥补谤补 the birth of an unborn cannot be justified. They say it is experienced by everybody that what has no birth (补箩腻迟补) has also no death (补尘峁泃补) (aj膩to hi am峁泃o dharmo martyatam katham esyati).

An unborn entity by its very nature is immortal. It is equally illogical and absurd to talk about the death of the unborn. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 7 continues in support of this proposition and regards that, 鈥楾he immortal cannot become mortal, nor can the mortal ever become immortal. For, it is never possible for a thing to change its nature鈥�.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 8 explains that the nature of Brahman is constant and unchanging. Brahman who is immortal can never become mortal. The inherent nature can never change under any circumstances. If an entity because of its nature being unborn (补箩腻迟补) and regarded (补尘峁泃补) immortal ever comes into being (箩腻测别迟别) then we arrive at an absurd position of immortal becoming mortal and changing.

The argument from 辫谤补办峁泃颈 and 补苍测补迟岣ツ乥丑腻惫补 used in the second line of 办腻谤颈办腻 7 (which repeated in 4:29) is modeled on Nagarjuna鈥檚 Madhymika办腻谤颈办腻 XV.8:

yady astivampr补办峁泃ya syan na bhaved asya nastita pr补办峁泃er anyath膩bh膩vo na hi j膩tupapadyate.^[21]

But here (惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 XV: 8) what they really mean is that 产丑腻惫补蝉 (entities) have no such positive 辫谤补办峁泃颈i. e., they are essenceless. In 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲-诲补谤艣补苍, 产丑腻惫补 (箩墨惫补) is of the nature of (sva产丑腻惫补) of aja and 补尘峁泃补.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 9 explains the meaning of the word 辫谤补办峁泃颈 or sva产丑腻惫补. As origination (箩腻迟颈) necessarily involves some change in the nature of the object concerned, he first explains how the 鈥榥atural condition鈥� or 鈥榓n intrinsic nature鈥� of 辫谤补办峁泃颈 cannot change.

According to 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 this inherent nature is of four kinds. They are as follows:

The first kind of accomplishment posited by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 is 蝉腻峁僺颈诲诲丑颈岣�. The word 蝉颈诲诲丑颈岣� here means an accomplishment that is achieved through an effor峁�. Such an accomplishment when completed is called 蝉腻尘蝉颈诲诲丑颈丑. Whatever is derived from this s膩m蝉颈诲诲丑颈岣� is called 蝉腻尘蝉颈诲诲丑颈办颈. Certain attainments when accomplished in full form cannot change or deviate from its nature. 厂补峁卥补谤补 gives the example of the 蝉颈诲诲丑颈岣�s acquired by the yogis after a prolonged austerity etc. These yogis possess superhuman powers who transform themselves atomic size/enlarge themselves as mountains etc. With the acquisition of these 蝉颈诲诲丑颈岣�s there is no loss of it. Not changing or undergoing no change is its inherent nature.

The second kind of inherent nature enlisted by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 is called 蝉惫腻产丑腻惫颈办墨, which is the natural propensity of the object to possess their essential nature. This cannot be vitiated at any point in any time or space. It is natural for the fire to illuminate the surrounding and generate heat. One cannot separate the heat/ the illuminating capacity from fire. They reside inseparably in their substratum in this case called fire. The pot never gives up ghatatva and cloth its patatva. The intrinsic nature of an object is never lost. 厂惫腻产丑腻惫颈办墨 therefore refers to this non-deviating, intrinsic nature of an object viz. its essential qualities.

The third kind of sva产丑腻惫补 postulated by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 is the inborn and unlearnt and unacquired nature of living beings like for the birds to fly or the fish to swim. This is called 蝉补丑补箩腻 because it is spontaneous, inborn, natural capacity for certain living beings to behave in a particular way.

The fourth kind of sva产丑腻惫补 is 补办峁�迟腻. Any other thing/anything else not artificially super induced/not produced by any other cause as the nature of water to flow down, is the nature of a thing. The meaning is that which does not depend upon anything extraneous for its origin is also called 辫谤补办峁泃颈.

Further anything which never ceases to be other than itself, in any condition, is also the nature of a thing. Everybody acknowledges the fact that 鈥榯o be the nature of a thing鈥�, when it does not cease to be itself. 艢补峁卥补谤补 says that even in worldly experience (惫测补惫补丑腻谤补), the nature of a thing is not known to change, e.g., potness of pot and clothness of cloth.

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补, the main import of this 办腻谤颈办腻 is that if in the case of all objects of empirical experience, which are merely imaginary or superimposed on Brahman, nature/ Pr补办峁泃i means that something which never changes, then what should it mean when referring to the unchanging nature of Ultimate Reality? In other word, the nature of absolute reality viz., absolute immortality, can never be subject to change.

In 办腻谤颈办腻 10 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 describes the inherent nature of the 箩墨惫补. He says:

鈥楢ll the 闯墨惫补蝉 are, by their very nature, free from senility and death. They think, as it were, that they are subject to these and thus by this very thought they appear to deviate from their very nature鈥�.

艢腻峁卥补谤补 in his commentary says the word 诲丑补谤尘腻蝉 in the 办腻谤颈办腻 should mean 箩墨惫补s or 腻迟尘补苍s. The word 鈥�惫颈峁�a测补鈥� means 鈥�腻艣谤补测补鈥� (substratum). But what is the substratum (腻艣谤补测补) of that 辫谤补办峁泃颈 whose change is imagined by the disputants? What is the defect/error in such imagination? This is being stated as follows:

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 all the 箩墨惫补s (dharmas), whose nature is that of 腻迟尘补苍, are on account of that very nature free from all physical changes i.e. free from old age and death (箩补谤腻-尘补谤补峁嘺-nirmuk迟腻岣�). Though the 箩墨惫补s are such by their very nature, yet they think (颈肠肠丑补苍迟补岣�), imagine, as though, that they are subject to old age and death. This is like imagining a rope as a snake. They appear to deviate from their real nature by this error of superimposition in that kind of thought i.e. the thought of old-age and death. Hence, the immortal Self is free from all changes. It knows no decay and death. If a disputant erroneously imagines any modification /change in 腻迟尘补苍 due to old age and death, then he deviates from the real nature of 腻迟尘补苍.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 continues his critique of sat办腻谤测补惫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 11. Beginning from 办腻谤颈办腻 11 and running through 办腻谤颈办腻 23, he brings out a dialectical critique of the notion of causality.

碍腻谤颈办腻 11 reads as follows:

鈥楾he disputant, according to him the cause itself is the effect, maintains that the cause itself is born as the effect. How is it possible for the cause to be unborn if it be said to be born (as the effect)? How, again, is it said to be eternal if it be subject to modification (i.e. birth)鈥�?

The 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 shows how the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 theory of an existing thing being born as the world is self contradictory. According to 厂腻峁卥丑测补, 笔谤补诲丑腻苍补 (Primordial Nature), the material cause is 鈥榰nborn鈥� (aja) and permanent (nitya). It is also held to be the first or original cause (尘奴濒补 办腻谤补峁嘺). The creation of the world means that 辫谤补办峁泃颈 is transformed into Mahat etc. and other effects. The meaning is according to 厂腻峁卥丑测补 view the 笔谤补诲丑腻苍补/pr补办峁沬ti (办腻谤补峁嘺) itself becomes Mahat (办腻谤测补). In other words, mahat is originated but mahat and 笔谤补诲丑腻苍补 are one and the same. The clay, according them, gets transformed into pots etc. Therefore we ought to say that 笔谤补诲丑腻苍补 is originated but 笔谤补诲丑腻苍补 is also said to be unborn (aja), by which they mean it is without origin. If this is the case, then it is the unborn that is born as the effect.

But how can an unoriginated (aja) and so immutable thing undergo origination or change? If it undergoes a change, how can it be eternal? The point is that there must be some difference between that which is originated and that which is unoriginated (箩腻测补尘腻苍补 and aja).

The non-difference (or identity) of cause and effect may be regarded from two different points of view viz. the cause is not other than the effect (k膩ra峁嚹乥hinnam 办腻谤测补m) or the effect is not other than the cause (办腻谤测腻产丑颈苍苍补峁� 办腻谤补峁嘺峁�). But in neither case the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 system can be defended. The first alternative is shown in 办腻谤颈办腻 11 which says: If the cause and effect are identical, then it is to be admitted that it is the cause and not the effect that 鈥榯akes birth鈥� (箩腻测补迟别). Again, if we accept it, the cause (辫谤补诲丑腻苍补) cannot be regarded as unborn (aja), as according to the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 system 辫谤补诲丑腻苍补 is eternal and unborn. This involves a self-contradiction.

According to 厂腻峁卥丑测补, the beginingless 笔谤补诲丑腻苍补 is eternal. How can it be eternal if it is bhinnam, split up (in the series of its evolution), disintegrated (transformed), partially? 艢补峁卥补谤补 explains the word 鈥�bhinna鈥� to mean 鈥榬ent asunders鈥�, 鈥榙ivided into parts鈥� or 鈥榦pened鈥� (惫颈诲墨谤苍补, 蝉辫丑耻峁璱迟补) which implies 鈥榮ubject to some change鈥�, and that which admits of any kind of change cannot be eternal (anitya). Things composed of parts, a jar for instance which is subject to division into parts, is not seen to be eternal in this world. It involves a contradiction on their part to say that of a part of a thing disintegrating and at the same time it is unborn and eternal.

To avoid this difficulty the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 might accept the other alternative viz., that the effect is identical with the cause or the effect (办腻谤测补) is non-different (ananya) from cause (办腻谤补峁嘺). Now, the effect is also unborn (aja) as the cause which is unborn. Thus the contingency of the cause ceasing to be unborn (aja) will not arise.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in the next 办腻谤颈办腻 12 says that this argument also cannot be accepted.

鈥業f (according to 厂腻峁卥丑测补) the effect is non-different from the cause, then the effect also must be unborn (aja). In that case, how can the cause remain eternal when it is non-different from the effect which is born鈥�?

艢补峁卥补谤补 explains this 办腻谤颈办腻 by saying that if the effect is non-different from the unborn cause, then one can avoid the conclusion/inference that the effect too is unborn. But it is certainly a contradiction to say that a thing is an effect and at the same time unborn. If the effect is unborn, then it is not produced. Again, if it is not what is produced, it cannot be called the effect. This is a sheer contradiction.

Besides this there is an additional contradiction: if the effect and the cause are nodifferent, then the cause too will share the nature of the effect i.e. it is also subject to origination like this effect. It cannot, therefore, remain permanent and immutable. 艢补峁卥补谤补 says, to maintain that the cause is non-different from the effect which is born and yet itself remains unborn is analogous to the procedure of the man who cooked one half of a hen and reserved the other half for laying eggs (na hi kukkuty膩别办补诲别艣补岣� pacyate 别办补诲别艣补岣� prasav膩ya kalpyate).

No example is seen in this world which lends assistance to understand the view that the effect arises out of a cause which is aja meaning unborn. If we were to look for a cause that itself created for an effect, then there will be a fallacy of infinite regress (补苍补惫补蝉迟丑腻).

A material cause is not the ultimate first cause. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 13 says:

鈥楾here is no illustration to support the view of him who says that the effect is born from the unborn cause. Again, if it be said that the effect is produced from a cause which is itself born then it leads to an infinite regress鈥�.

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补, the followers of 厂腻峁卥丑测补 can give no illustration of an unorginated material cause giving rise to an effect. It is, indeed, in the absence of illustration, no inference is possible. On the other hand, if it is maintained that the effect is born from a born cause, then it leads to an endless series of causes (补苍补惫补蝉迟丑腻).^[22]

There are some disputants^[23] who say that the effect is the origin of the cause and the cause is the origin of the effect. How can they say that the cause and the effect are without a beginning?

When the 艢谤耻迟颈 says, 鈥�... But when to the knower of Brahman, everything has become the Self, what will he know and through what....?鈥� (B峁沨ad膩ra峁噛aka 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 II.4.14)^[24], it is meant to establish that in reality, there is absence of duality from the absolute standpoint. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 on the basis of this 艢谤耻迟颈 text explains the 办腻谤颈办腻 14.

艢补峁卥补谤补 says that, from dharma etc., (merit and demerit) as causes, the aggregate of elements known as the body (诲别丑腻诲颈蝉补峁単丑腻迟补) is produced. From this body again are produced merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma). They attribute to the causes in the form of merit and demerit and to effects in the form of bodies, as interdependence and mutual origin. How can such people predicate non-origination either to cause or effects? In other words, this is self-contradictory. According to 厂补峁卥补谤补 it is a contradiction in terms to speak of begininglessness (补苍腻诲颈迟惫补) and being the cause and effect of each other (hetuphala 产丑腻惫补tva). How can beginningless (补苍腻诲颈) thing have any cause (办腻谤补峁嘺)? How can beginningless thing have any result/effect (phala) which is necessarily associated with change in the cause? Therefore, the eternal (nitya) and unchanging (办奴峁璦蝉迟丑补) 腻迟尘补苍 can never become either an effect or a cause.

The contradiction is further explained by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 15. He says that, 鈥榯he case of those who would trace the source of the cause to the effect and of the effect to the cause is like the case of those who would find the birth of the father from the son. (辫耻迟谤腻箩 janma pittur gath膩)鈥�.

That 鈥渢he effect is the beginning (腻诲颈) of the cause and the cause the beginning of the effect is like the birth of father from the son鈥�, which is logically absurd. The same illustration of absurdity, the birth of father from son, is used in the 痴颈驳谤补丑补惫测腻惫补谤迟补苍墨 of 狈腻驳腻谤箩耻苍补, and this same illustration, Bhattacharya points out, is used in the Bodhicary膩va迟腻ra-IX.114.^[25]

In 办腻谤颈办腻 16, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 says the order (krama) of cause and effect must be stated. Yet this is impossible owing to the dialectical intertwining of cause and effect pointed out in preceding 办腻谤颈办腻蝉. If they are born simultaneously (yugapat), they have no relationship (a-sambandha) like animal horns. Therefore nothing rational can be stated about them.

Bhattacharya remarks on this line of reasoning: This argument is found in Buddhist works. It may be said that first there is the cause and then the effect (辫奴谤惫补-krama, prior order); or it may be said that first there is the effect and then the cause (aparakrama, posterior order); or again, it may be said that the cause and effect are simultaneous (saha-krama, order of simultaneity). But it is clearly shown that none of these can be justified. Nagarjuna, says in 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 XI.2, (鈥�tasm膩n n膩tropapadyante 辫奴谤惫补parasahakram膩岣�)^[26]

Bhattacharya also points out that this verse of the 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补办腻谤颈办腻 draws the very conclusion stated by Candrakirti with an essentially similar analogy: 鈥淏ut it is not seen that between two simultaneous things there is any relationship as between the producer (janaka) and the produced (janya), just like between the right and left hands or feet.鈥�^[27]

In 办腻谤颈办腻 17 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 says:

鈥榊our cause cannot be established if it be produced from the effect. How can the cause, which is itself not established, give birth to the effect鈥�?

艢补峁卥补谤补 in his commentary says: The cause being produced (utpadyam膩na岣� san) from the effect which itself is not yet definitely produced, will be non-existent like something produced from the horns of a hare. And the cause itself being a mere horn of the hare can never produce the effect. The cause which depends for its production upon its effect (phala, which is janya) cannot possibly be proved to exist. And a non-existent cause, like the horns of a hare, cannot produce anything. Nobody has seen any relation of cause and effect between two non-existing things like horns of a hare which are not dependent on each other for their existence. Nor is the relation of support/container and supported/contained possible between them (补诲丑腻谤补-腻诲丑别测补-产丑腻惫补).

In 办腻谤颈办腻 18 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 says:

鈥業f the cause comes into being from the effect and the effect from the cause, which of the two comes into being first depending on which the other may take birth鈥�?

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 any relationship between the cause and effect is impossible (补蝉补峁僢andha迟腻do峁�a). It is impossible to settle the order (krama) of cause and effect. It may be contended by the opponents that the cause and effect though not causally related depend upon each other for their mutual existence. Replying to this contention here, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 asks which of the two (the cause and the effect) comes to be prior so that the other that depends on and is posterior to it may come into being?

The order of cause and effect has been referred, again, by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 19 by the word kramakopa, meaning 鈥榠ncompatibility of order鈥�. He states that, 鈥楾he inability (to reply), the ignorance (about the matter) and the impossibility of establishing the order of succession (of the cause and the effect) clearly lead the wise to stick to their theory of absolute non-evolution (补箩腻迟颈)鈥�.

This inability (补艣补办迟颈岣�) of yours to point out the priority of the cause over the effect or of the effect over the cause shows your ignorance, complete and absolute. It shows your ignorance regarding the knowledge of Reality. Again, the order of succession, which you have stated viz. that the cause has its being from the effect and the effect from the cause, is making cause and effect mutually dependent. This is, in fact not consistent with logic and is against all reasons. Thus, from the fact that (the impossibility) of any causal relation between the cause and the effect; the absence of birth (补箩腻迟颈岣�), the non-origination of everything has been highlighted (parid墨pi迟腻) by the wise people (产耻诲诲丑补颈岣�), while the disputants speak of the contradiction of each other鈥檚 point of view.

The word 鈥�补艣补办迟颈鈥� and 鈥�apari箩帽腻苍补鈥�, in this 办腻谤颈办腻 have been differently interpreted by 艢补峁卥补谤补, Karmarkar and Bhattacharya.

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补, the word 鈥�补艣补办迟颈鈥� means inability to offer any satisfactory explanation of the relation between cause and effect pointed out by the 蝉颈诲诲丑腻苍迟颈苍. The word 鈥�apari箩帽腻苍补鈥� means want of knowledge of the truth of reality (迟补迟迟惫腻惫颈惫别办补).

According to Karmarkar, the first line of the 办腻谤颈办腻 19 is a critique of the asat办腻谤测补惫腻诲补 of the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉 i.e. the cause produces the effect.

He gives the following possible theories of 办腻谤测补办腻谤补峁嘺产丑腻惫补:^[28]

(1) The cause produces the effect.

(2) The effect produces the cause.

(3) Cause and effect mutually produce each other.

(4) Cause and effect produced simultaneously. This is obviously absurd. There cannot be 办腻谤测补办腻谤补峁嘺产丑腻惫补 between things which have a simultaneous origin.

(5) There is nothing, whatsoever is born.

(6) Cause and effect are one; effect is a mere appearance (vivarta).

Karmarkar says that 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 discusses proposition no. I (cause produces the effect) in the first line of 办腻谤颈办腻 19. According to him, this is the refutation of the asat办腻谤测补惫腻诲补 of Ny膩ya-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉.

This theory entails that:

(1) Cause and effect are two entirely different things. There is k膩ry膩产丑腻惫补 first before 办腻谤测补 is produced.

(2) Cause and effect are however intimately connected with each other by the (蝉补尘补惫腻测补) inherence relation.

(3) This 蝉补尘补惫腻测补 relation ensures that only a particular cause (the clay) produces a particular effect (pot), otherwise we might get even cloth from clay.

(4) Cause has thus a particular 艣补办迟颈 to produce the effect in question.

(5) If cause and effect are non-different (ananya), origination (utpatti) would be meaningless (苍颈谤腻谤迟丑颈办补) etc.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 refutes the above tenets of the theory of asat办腻谤测补惫腻诲补. He points out that the existence of potency (艣补办迟颈) in the cause to produce a particular effect cannot be proved.

Thus he remarks:

(a) Is this 艣补办迟颈 different from cause? or

(b) Is this 艣补蝉办迟颈, like kary膩产丑腻惫补, of a non-existent nature?

In either case, the 艣补办迟颈 would not help the cause to produce the effect; if the 艣补办迟颈 is existent and not different from cause, it is cause itself.

Karmarkar says 鈥�补艣补办迟颈岣�鈥� means 鈥榯he absence of any power in the cause to produce the particular effect鈥�. The term 鈥�apari箩帽腻苍补鈥� may mean 鈥�p奴rv膩par膩pari箩帽腻苍补鈥� which has discussed in 办腻谤颈办腻 21. That is the want of knowledge of the mutual relation of cause and effect.

According to Bhattacharya, the word 鈥�补艣补办迟颈鈥� means 鈥榓bsence of capability鈥�. It refers to 办腻谤颈办腻 3 where two types of disputants are mentioned one maintaining satk膩ry惫腻诲补 and the other asat办腻谤测补惫腻诲补. He says that 鈥�补艣补办迟颈鈥� and apari箩帽腻苍补 should be interpreted as in Buddhist works. A艣补办迟颈 means as explained by Candrakirti 鈥榠t cannot be said that the 艣补办迟颈/ power belongs to thing that has come into being, or to one that has not yet come into being (j膩te艣补办迟颈r na sambhavati, 补箩腻迟补svabh膩ve鈥� pi艣补办迟颈r 苍腻蝉迟颈).

The term 鈥�apari箩帽腻苍补鈥� has reference to 狈腻驳腻谤箩耻苍补鈥檚 鈥�辫奴谤惫腻辫补谤补办辞峁璱-辫补谤颈办峁Ｄ�鈥� in his Mulamadhyamaka 碍腻谤颈办腻 and means p奴rv膩par膩pari箩帽腻苍补 鈥榓bsolute ignorance of the first and last points鈥� in 办腻谤颈办腻 21. Bhattacharya says that this p奴rv膩par膩pari箩帽腻苍补 is in reality 辫奴谤惫腻辫补谤补办辞迟颈-补辫补谤颈箩帽奴苍补, that is, absolute ignorance of the first and last points, i.e., the beginning and the end of the world as well as anything in it^[29].

The word 鈥�叠耻诲诲丑补颈岣�鈥� in the 办腻谤颈办腻 19 is interpreted by Bhattacharya as 鈥榯he Buddhists鈥�. According to 艢补峁卥补谤补, it means 鈥�笔补峁嘾颈迟补颈岣�鈥�. According to Karmarkar^[30] it means 鈥�Tattva-诲补谤艣颈产丑颈岣�鈥� and 鈥�惭补苍墨峁�i峁嘺岣�鈥�. In 办腻谤颈办腻 42, we have 箩腻迟颈stu desi迟腻 产耻诲诲丑补颈岣� and in 办腻谤颈办腻 54, evam hetuphal膩箩腻迟颈 prabisanti manisi峁嘺岣�.

Karmarkar observes that 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 is concerned with establishing his famous doctrine of non-origination (补箩腻迟颈惫腻诲补) while 艢补峁卥补谤补c膩rya on the other hand emphasises vivarta and m膩y膩惫腻诲补- though he admits that both 鈥�补箩腻迟颈鈥� and 鈥�vivarta鈥� are different aspects of the same proposition. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 specifically describes vivarta in 办腻谤颈办腻 3:16, 鈥�箩墨惫补峁僰alpayate 辫奴谤惫补m etc.鈥� and specifically refers to m膩y膩惫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 3:24 鈥�aj膩yam膩no Bahudh膩m膩yay膩箩腻测补迟别 tu sa岣�鈥� and 4:57 鈥�samv峁泃y膩箩腻测补迟别 sarvam鈥�. In fact, there is no difference between 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 and 艢补峁卥补谤补 as 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 is described by 艢补峁卥补谤补 sa samprad膩yavid腻肠腻谤测补 (and his paramaguru).

The opponent says that there is no mutual interdependence of cause (hetu) and effect (phala) because of the illustration of seed and sprout. In 办腻谤颈办腻 20 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 gives reply to this contention. He says, 鈥榯he illustration of a seed and its sprout is always like a thing that is yet to be proved (蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补). And a reason (i.e. illustration, hetu) which is like one that is yet 鈥榯o be proved鈥� (蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补) cannot be used for establishing a proposition to be proved鈥�.

The objector says that we have maintained 鈥渢he relation of the cause and the effect, between the hetu (karma) and the phala (deha). But you have raised verbal difficulties (i.e. by merely catching those words) and tried to show that our argument tends to be as absurd as the birth of the father from the son and that there is a causal relation between the two horns of an animal. We have never maintained the coming into being of an effect from a cause not already existent or of the cause from effects not already established.鈥�

The Siddhantin asks 鈥渨hat is, then, your contention鈥�? The opponent says 鈥渢he relation between the cause and the effect is similar to the relation that obtains between a seed and a sprout鈥�. The seed produces the sprout and the sprout produces the seed. Everybody accepts the b墨j膩nkura苍测腻测补 as valid.

The Siddh膩ntin then proceeds: 鈥淪o you appear to hold that the illustration of the seed and the sprout and the thing you wish to prove, are alike. The illustration (诲峁涐梗峁�膩n迟补) is not 蝉颈诲诲丑补岣�, it is still 蝉腻诲丑测补.

The opponents ask whether the relation of cause and effect in the seed and sprout is really beginningless; the reply is that it is not so. The prior/antecedent among them is as much with a beginning as the posterior/the consequent one. Just as the latest born sprout has its beginning in the seed, that seed has its beginning from its earlier sprout and in this way seeds and sprouts have a beginning in their preceding order. Thus each prior sprout and prior seed is with a beginning. This principle applies to each and every one of them, the entire class of seed and sprout has a beginning (腻诲颈mat). Therefore, it is wrong to regard the relation between the seed and the sprout proving beginninglessness (补苍腻诲颈迟惫补). The same principle applies to cause and effect.

Again, the opponents maintain that the series of seeds and sprouts as a unit is without beginning. According to the Siddh膩ntin, it is not possible to take the series as a unit as beginninglessness. It is difficult to establish the continuous unity of any such series. Even those who maintain of the beginninglessness of such a series, do not certainly admit for a unitary entity called either a chain of seeds and sprouts or a procession of causes and effects. Therefore, it is justifiably stated in 办腻谤颈办腻 14, 鈥榟ow can beginninglessness (补苍腻诲惫颈迟补) be declared by them for cause and effect鈥�?

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 apart from individual seeds and sprouts, there can be no such independent thing as a series of seeds and sprouts without a beginning. Similarly a series of causes and effects cannot be maintained as apart from individual antecedent (causes) and subsequent (effects).

Hence we (the 蝉颈诲诲丑腻苍迟颈苍s) have well explained how the succession of causes and effects has no beginning. And we have not made use of any verbal (quibbles) difficulty in maintaining our point. Even expert logicians, do not make use of an illustration which itself requires a proof for its establishment, to prove a point which is like it in all respects. The word hetu (reason) in the 办腻谤颈办腻 is intended to mean 鈥渋llustration鈥� as the context requires illustration and not reason.

Karmarkar remarks 蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补 is a 丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补 mentioned by Gautama (the author of 狈测腻测补-蝉奴迟谤补蝉); it is the same as a蝉颈诲诲丑补岣� of other tarkikas.^[31] Bhattacharya says 蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补 hetu is one of the fallacies of a reason (丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补). It is an assertion identical with the point to be proved, petitio principii.^[32]

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 21 elucidates, how the learned disputants have established the doctrine of non-origination (补箩腻迟颈).

He says:

鈥楾he ignorance regarding the antecedence and the subsequence of the cause and the effect clearly establishes the absolute nonorigination. If the effect (Dharma, i.e., the 闯墨惫补) has really been produced from a cause, then why can you not point out the antecedent cause鈥�?

This 办腻谤颈办腻 states that the absence of knowledge of the first (prior) and the last (posterior) points of a thing (p奴rv膩par膩pari箩帽腻苍补m)^[33], i.e., the impossibility of describing causality as 辫奴谤惫补krama or apara-krama in which either the cause or effect is primary, is indicator of non-origination (aj膩te岣� paridipakam). According to one who knows origination as a fact should also know its antecedent cause as the relationship of the cause and the effect is inseparable. If the effect (办腻谤测补) is known, the cause (办腻谤补苍补) should also be known as their mutual relation is fixed. This fact of non-comprehension of knowledge of what is the effect and what is the cause establishes non-origination (补箩腻迟颈).

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 concludes his criticism of the theory of causation in 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 22-23. The 办腻谤颈办腻 22 probably refers to the followers of 厂腻峁卥丑测补 and Ny膩ya 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉. An effect cannot arise out of itself. If the effect already exists in its material cause then it implies that the effect is born from itself. If the effect is different from the material cause, then anything could originate from anything. There are difficulties with the explanation of sat办腻谤测补惫腻诲补. The effect is unmanifest in its cause, and there are even greater difficulties with the asat办腻谤测补惫腻诲补, that the effect is a new beginning, a real creation. If both these explanations are defective, a composite explanation, that the effect is both existent and non-existent in its material cause, will be contradictory.

Therefore the systems of the 厂腻峁卥丑测补 and the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 cannot explain how a real effect can arise from the material cause.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 states that,

鈥楴othing, whatsoever, is originated either from itself or from other than itself (from something else). Nothing is ever born whether it is existent, or non-existent or both existent and no-existent (satasat)鈥�.

艢补峁卥补谤补 in his commentary on this 办腻谤颈办腻 says for the following reason, nothing whatsoever is born. He says that, a thing is born neither of itself nor of others/another or of both. Nor can we say that the thing which is born exists (sat), does not exist (asat) or both exists and does not exist (satasat). The birth of anything cannot be established by any manner whatsoever.

Nothing is born (蝉惫补迟补岣�) out of itself i.e. from its own form which in itself has not yet come into existence. A jar does not come out of that very jar (a jar cannot be its own maker).

Nor is anything born (辫补谤补迟补岣�), from another, as something different from that another, just as a cloth is not born of a pot or a cloth from another cloth.

In the same way, two different things cannot together produce a new thing, as it is opposed to experience. In other words a thing is not born both out of itself and another, just as a jar or a cloth is not born out of a jar and a cloth, for this involves contradiction.

It may be urged here that we always see a jar is produced from clay/earth, and a son born of a father. According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 the ignorant have such notions and use such words as 鈥業t exits鈥�, 鈥業t takes birth鈥�. But these ideas and words are further examined by the discriminating people to determine whether they are real or unreal. When they examined, they found that the basis of concepts and words and the corresponding attributes of objects such as the jar and pot are nothing more than words. This is supported by the 艢谤耻迟颈 鈥楾he modification being only a name arising speech鈥� (Ch膩ndogya 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 VI.1.4)^[34], or 鈥淎ll effects are mere word and names鈥�.

If effects (like the jar and the son) are supposed to be pre-existing in clay, parents, etc. birth need not be predicated of them as they already exist. Effects cannot be said to be born from non-being (asat), as like the horns of a hare, they have no existence whatsoever. No effects can be produced from being and non-being (sadasat) as such a combination is contradictory in its very nature. Hence it is established that nothing whatsoever is born.

Again, those (Buddhists) who maintain that, an object is produced, by the unity of action, actor and the result, and that it is of momentary/transitory nature are far removed from reason and experience. This is so because according to this theory i.e. everything is momentary, a thing cannot be cognised as 鈥楾his is so and so鈥�. The cognition of 鈥榯his鈥� ceases to exist for the next moment immediately after being cognised. Thus memory of the thing is rendered as impossible and any kind of worldly activity (惫测补惫补丑腻谤补) also would be not possible.

This 办腻谤颈办腻 22 presents a slightly short-cut version of the four logical alternatives i.e. being, non-being, both being and non-being, and neither being nor non-being. The first line of 办腻谤颈办腻 22 presents a characteristic teaching of 狈腻驳腻谤箩耻苍补. The 办腻谤颈办腻 reads: nothing whatsoever is produced either from itself or from another (蝉惫补迟补岣� va 辫补谤补迟补岣� 惫腻辫颈 na 办颈帽肠颈诲 vastu 箩腻测补迟别).

The words of Nagarjuna in Madhyamka办腻谤颈办腻 XXI. 13 are as follows:

鈥�na svato 箩腻测补迟别 产丑腻惫补岣� parato, naiva 箩腻测补迟别/na 蝉惫补迟补岣� parata艣caiva 箩腻测补迟别 箩腻测补迟别 办耻迟补岣�鈥�,

Which Bhattacharya translates,

鈥楢 thing comes into being neither from itself, nor from another, nor form both itself and another; and that being the case, how can it come into being鈥�?^[35]

The second line of 办腻谤颈办腻 22 reads: 鈥榥o entity whatsoever is originated which is existent and non-existent (sad asat sadasad 惫腻辫颈 na 办颈帽肠颈诲 vastu 箩腻测补迟别)鈥�. The full set of logical alternative, called catuhkoti, are presented in 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补办腻谤颈办腻 83: asti (is), 苍腻蝉迟颈 (is not), asti-苍腻蝉迟颈ti (is and is not) and 苍腻蝉迟颈 苍腻蝉迟颈ti (neither is nor is not) are termed as the four 办辞峁璱蝉 (koty膩s catasra).

In 办腻谤颈办腻 23 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 specifies the meaning of the word 鈥渂eginningless鈥�. It means that which is without any origin. The meaning of the word 鈥渂eginningless鈥� should not be taken that something does have an origin, but that origin is indeterminate. He says that, 鈥榯he cause is not born of a beginningless effect; nor does an effect naturally come out of a beginningless cause. Of that which has no beginning (no cause) there can be no origin, no birth鈥�.

This 办腻谤颈办腻 concludes the dialectical reductio ad absurdum of the notion of causality with a rather straight forward line of reasoning. Being beginningless, neither the cause nor the effect, from the standpoint of their own essential nature, comes into being (hetur na 箩腻测补迟别鈥檔膩de岣� phalam c膩pi sva产丑腻惫补ta岣�). For that which has no beginning has no origination (腻诲颈r na vidyate yasya tasya hy腻诲颈r na vidyate).

If the cause and the effect are both without a beginning, then there is no effect and no cause. The effect, without a beginning, cannot produce a cause. Similarly, the cause, without a beginning, cannot produce an effect. If the cause and the effect are both without a beginning, then there is nothing whatsoever is born.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

腻惫墨迟补-苍测腻测补 is the logic which seeks to infer the existence of one thing on the basis of the nonexistence of another thing, as opposed to the 补苍惫补测墨-anumana, whereby the existence of one thing is inferred on the basis of the existence of another.

[2]:

鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲-brahma-yogin says that the 膧c膩rya/guru is 艢奴办补, an ava迟腻ra of 狈腻谤腻测补峁嘺.

[3]:

Sagau岣峚p膩d墨ya办腻谤颈办腻tharvaved墨ya M膩峁囜笉奴kyopani峁�at, (膧苍补苍诲补驳颈谤颈k峁泃a峁�墨k膩 samvalita 艢补峁卥补谤补bh膩峁�yasameta 艢补峁卥补谤补nandabhagavatkrta M膩峁囜笉奴kyopani峁�atdipika ca,( Poona: 膧anad膩艣rama Sanskrit Series, No. 10, 1984),157.

[4]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣腻蝉迟谤补, 84.

[5]:

Ibid., 87.

[6]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣腻蝉迟谤补, 88.

[7]:

Bhattacharya has suggested that the invocation is, in fact, paying homage to the Buddha. Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣腻蝉迟谤补, 83-4.

[8]:

T.M.P. Mahadevan, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补, 220.

[9]:

Ibid., 220-1.

[10]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣腻蝉迟谤补, 94.

[11]:

Ibid., 95-6.

[12]:

Ibid., 99.

[13]:

Ibid., 100.

[14]:

Ibid.

[15]:

Mahadevan, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补, 180-1.

[16]:

Stephen Kaplan, Hermeneutics, Holography and Indian Idealism, A Study of Projection and 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 碍腻谤颈办腻, (Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass, 1987), 99-100.

[17]:

Bhattacharya, 膧驳补尘补蝉腻蝉迟谤补, 95.

[18]:

Richard King, Op.cit; Early Advaita 痴别诲腻苍迟补 and Buddhism, 180.

[19]:

Colin A. Cole, 础蝉辫补谤艣补 yoga: A Study of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补鈥檚 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补 碍腻谤颈办腻, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 105-6.

[20]:

The 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 6, 7 and 8 of this chapter are identical with the 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 20, 21 and 22 of the third chapter (Advaita 笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺) respectively except only this that in 办腻谤颈办腻 3:20 and 22 there is the word 产丑腻惫补 while in 4:6 and 8 the word is dharma.

[21]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣腻蝉迟谤补, 109.

[22]:

Bhattacharya points out that the Madhyamika Philosopher, Candrakirti, uses the term 补苍补惫补蝉迟丑腻 for the 鈥�na 惫测补惫补蝉迟丑腻鈥� of 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补办腻谤颈办腻 IV.13, Bhattacharya, 膧gama艣腻蝉迟谤补, 114.

[23]:

The followers of 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 hold the view that the endless series of life and death, consisting of the cause and the effect is without beginning for instance of the hen and the egg. From the relative standpoint this view can be accepted.

[24]:

Som Raj Gupta, The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man, Vol-II, 408.

[25]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣腻蝉迟谤补, 116.

[26]:

Ibid., 117.

[27]:

Ibid., 118.

[28]:

Karmarkar, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 K膩rika, 115-6.

[29]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣腻蝉迟谤补, 123.

[30]:

Karmarkar, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 K膩rika, 118.

[31]:

Ibid., 119.

[32]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣腻蝉迟谤补, 126.

[33]:

This same technical philosophical issue is discussed by 狈腻驳腻谤箩耻苍补 in an entire section of Madhyamaka办腻谤颈办腻, the 鈥�P奴rv膩parakoti辫补谤颈办峁Ｄ�鈥�, 惭腻峁囜笉奴办测补办腻谤颈办腻 XI.

[34]:

S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉, 447

[35]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣腻蝉迟谤补 127.