Sahitya-kaumudi by Baladeva Vidyabhushana
by Gaurapada Dāsa | 2015 | 234,703 words
Baladeva Vidyabhusana’s Sahitya-kaumudi covers all aspects of poetical theory except the topic of dramaturgy. All the definitions of poetical concepts are taken from Mammata’s Kavya-prakasha, the most authoritative work on Sanskrit poetical rhetoric. Baladeva Vidyabhushana added the eleventh chapter, where he expounds additional ornaments from Visv...
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Chapter 3b - Appendix on ٱ貹ⲹ (the Purport)
The concept of ⲹ-śṣṭⲹ (the specialty of the real statement) is a subtle and charming aspect of poetical theory. It is based on Ѳṭa’s ٱ貹ⲹ-ṛtپ (the Purport). It is not the same as the ٱ貹ⲹ-ṛtپ (the Drift) expounded in the previous chapter (2.3).
Ѳṭa’s elaboration on his ūٰ about ٱ貹ⲹ in the previous chapter is simply this:
ṅkṣ�-Dzⲹ-sannidhi-vaśād vakṣyamāṇasvarūpāṇāṃ padārthānā� samanvaye tātparyārtho śṣa-vapur apadārtho’pi ٳ� samullasatīty abhihitānvaya-vādinā� matam. 峦ⲹ eva ٳ ity anvitābhidhāna-vādina�,
“The opinion of the Աⲹ-ī is as follows: Although it is not the expressed meaning of the words, ٱ貹ⲹ artha, whose form is a particularity, is the sense of the statement and is apparent in the syntactical connection of the meanings of the words, whose essential natures are going to be described,[1] by the force of ṅkṣ� (mutual requirement), Dzⲹ (congruity), and sannidhi (mutual proximity) (ٱ貹ⲹ artha = ⲹ artha = 貹ٳ). The Anvitābhidhāna-ī, however, say the expressed meanings of the words are the sense of the statement (峦ⲹ artha = ⲹ artha)� (屹ⲹ-ś 2.6).
According to ĀԲԻ岹Բ, however, the ٱ貹ⲹ (Drift) of the Աⲹ-ī is 峦ⲹ (literally expressed). He paraphrases the īṃs첹:
tasmāt ٱ貹ⲹ-viṣayo yo’rtha� sa tāvan-mukhyatayā 峦ⲹ�,
“Therefore, the meaning that is the object of the ٱ貹ⲹ is 峦ⲹ, due to being primary to that extent� (ٳԲǰ첹 3.33).[2]
Ѳṭa’s interpretation of the Աⲹ-ī� ٳ (the sense of the sentence) as 貹ٳ (not exactly the expressed meaning of the words) might be a twist on the grammarians� opinion that the first perception of the meanings of the words of a sentence is unreal: padārtha-pratītir asatyaiveti kaiścid vidvadbhir āsthitam (ٳԲǰ첹 3.33); kaiścid iti vaiyākaraṇai� (Locana 3.33).
Ѳṭa’s explanation of the Աⲹ-ī� ٱ貹ⲹ refers to the definition of a sentence stated in ⲹ philosophy:
ṅkṣ� Dzⲹ sannidhiś ca ٳ-ñԲ-ٳ� padasya padāntara-vyatireka-prayuktānvayānanu屹katvam ṅkṣ�. arthābādho Dzⲹ. padānām avilambenoccāraṇa� ԲԾ�.
“Mutual requirement (ṅkṣ�), congruity (Dzⲹ) and mutual proximity (sannidhi) are the causes of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. Āṅkṣ� is the fact that a word does not bring about the perception of the syntactical connection that is being used without another word.[3] ۴Dzⲹ means the meaning is not incongruent. Sannidhi means the words, which are grammatically declined, are uttered without delay� (Tarka-ṅg 7.2).
In the poetical theory itself, the concept of Dzⲹ is the same as ܳī (congruity), one of the factors that restrict several possible literal meanings down to one (2.36). Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (2.36) and ʲṇḍٲ-Ჹ Բٳ explain ܳī as Dzⲹ.[4]
Աⲹ-岹 and Anvitābhidhāna-岹 are the two schools of ū-īṃs. They were founded by Kumārila ṭṭ and ʰ첹 respectively. In ū-īṃs, there is yet another ٱ貹ⲹ (the Purport). This ٱ貹ⲹ is applied all the time, even after the other ٱ貹ⲹ (the Drift). Moreover, according to ī ҴDz峾ī, the universal ٱ貹ⲹ (the Purport) must be applied even in the classic example: 峾 Բⲹ (bring a cow) (2.8).[5]
The ٱ貹ⲹ which Mammaṭa propounded, in the fifth chapter of 屹ⲹ-ś, is the well-known “purport� of the īṃs첹. Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa does not mention this ٱ貹ⲹ at all. Mammaṭa wrote ṣu (according to some persons) (2.3),[6] implying that he does not acknowledge it. P.V. Kāṇe explains: “But it does not appear that Mammaṭa entirely approved of this view. Otherwise he would not have said �ṣu�, but would have simply declared that ٱ貹ⲹ is one of the functions. Our author also appears to hold views similar to Mammaṭa.�[7]
In that regard, Kavikarṇapūra eliminated ⲹ-śṣṭⲹ from poetical theory. Sometimes an implied sense seems to be the purport, thus on occasion the difference between the two is unclear. Still, Ѳṭa’s legacy should be preserved.
Mammaṭa himself does not accept the Աⲹ-ī� ٱ貹ⲹ (the Drift) because he follows the Anvitābhidhāna-ī� viewpoint that the literal meaning of a sentence is 峦ⲹ (literally expressed). All the poetical theorists after Mammaṭa followed him in this respect.
Ѳṭa’s ٱ貹ⲹ is the purport, which is not literally stated (a峦ⲹ). Mammaṭa explains:
yad eva vidheya� tatraiva ٱ貹ⲹm ity upāttasyaiva ś岹syārthe ٱ貹ⲹm,
“The Purport occurs only in what is actually being ordained, thus the Purport relates to the meaning of a word which is obtained as an addition� (屹ⲹ-ś 5.47).
He gives this example:
havanasyānyata� siddhe� “dadhnā juhoti� ity-ādau dadhy-āde� karaṇatva-ٰ� vidheyam,
“In the sentence “One should offer oblations with yogurt,� since the injunction “One should offer oblations� is already obtained from another source, what is really being stated is this injunction: “Yogurt is a means to offer an oblation”� (屹ⲹ-ś 5.47).
According to Mammaṭa, in that sentence the phrase “with yogurt� is literally expressed (峦ⲹ), but the notion of its specificity is not, because there is no assignation of the meaning of ‘yogurt� as “a means to offer an oblation�, therefore as the purport it is a峦ⲹ (not literally expressed). This is Ѳṭa’s opinion in the scope of Anvitābhidhāna-岹, but as regards Աⲹ-岹 he simply says that the specificity of the meaning is not inherently syntactically connected, thus it is automatically in the sphere of the Purport; the Purport is not in the scope of the actual words.[8]
վśٳ Ჹ shows this verse to illustrate ⲹ-śṣṭⲹ (the specialty of the real statement), among other specialties:
lo madhu� kupita eṣa ca puṣpadhanvā dhīrā vahanti rati-kheda-harā� samīrā� |
ī-īyam api ñܱ-ñᲹ-mañjur dūre pati� kathaya ki� karaṇīyam adya ||“The time is spring, and Cupid, whose arrows are flowers, is incensed: Gentle breezes that dispel the fatigue of lovemaking are blowing; this pleasure grove is lovely with an arbor of śǰ첹 trees; and my husband is far away. Tell me: What should I do now?� (ٲⲹ- darpaṇa 2.16)
վśٳ Ჹ elaborates:
ٰٲ� ś� prati śī� pracchanna-mukas tvayā preṣyatām iti ī� prati kayācid vyajyate,
“The speaker, a woman, implies this to her confidante: �Quickly send my secret lover to this place”� (ٲⲹ-岹貹ṇa).[9]
Śeṣarāja Śarmā explains:
atra vaktryā� mukatvasya ramaṇecchā-bodhakasya ⲹsya, rati-kheda-haratvena samīra-vahanasya pati-ū-sthiti-ū貹sya prastāvasya, ñܱ-ñᲹ-ñ� ī-ī-ū貹-śsya, vasantartu-ū貹sya lasya ca vaiśiṣṭyāt.
“That implied sense is made to be perceived from the specialty of the speaker; from the specialty of the actual statement (ⲹ-śṣṭⲹ), which lets one know that she wants to make love, which means that she is lusty; from the specialty of the context, i.e. firstly the breeze is blowing in terms of being a dispeller of the fatigue of lovemaking and secondly the husband is far away; from the specialty of the place, a pleasure grove which is a lovely arbor of śǰ첹 trees; and from the specialty of the time, spring� (䲹Ի-첹 2.16).
The purport of the sentence “Gentle breezes that dispel the fatigue of lovemaking are blowing� is that she wants to meet her lover. That is the 貹ǰٲ ornament (circumlocution). It is not really an implied sense because that idea is more than obvious. Here the 貹ǰٲ ornament, the Purport, is suggestive (Quickly send my secret lover to this place). Since the Purport is suggestive, the Purport is called ⲹ-śṣṭⲹ (the specialty of the real statement). Commenting on this verse, Ѳś ṭṭ says that ⲹ-śṣṭⲹ occurs here insofar as it involves a poetic expression that is being perceived and that is not the way it is (there is no actual fatigue of lovemaking).[10]
The Աⲹ-ī� ٱ貹ⲹ
Kumārila ṭṭ wrote Tantra-ٳپ첹 and Śǰ첹-ٳپ첹. The latter is a metrical paraphrase of Ś 峾ī’s commentary on Jaiminī’s ū-īṃs-ūٰ.
Commenting on: arthasya tan-nimittatvāt, “because a meaning is the cause of it� (ū-īṃsūٰ 1.1.25), Ś 峾ī writes:
amūni padāni sva� svam artham ya Ծṛtٲ-vyāpārāṇi, athedānī� padārthā abhihitā� santo ٳm avabodhayanti,
“After the words of a sentence have denoted their respective meanings, their function ceases. Thereafter the words� meanings, having finished with at this time, make one understand the sense of the sentence (by the function called ٱ貹ⲹ)� (ū-īṃs-ūٰ-bhāṣya 1.1.25).[11]
Abhinavagupta states that ٱ貹ⲹ is the power which brings about the syntactical connection between the words of the sentence.[12]
According to Dr. Satyavrata Siṅgh, the Աⲹ-ī, the followers of Kumārila ṭṭ, say Denotation ceases after it conveys both the possible main meanings of one word and the meaning of its case ending in a general way, and then ٱ貹ⲹ-ṛtپ is the function by means of which the syntactical connection of that word with another is done, so that by ٱ貹ⲹ’s aspects of ṅkṣ� (the mutual need of words) and Dzⲹ (congruity) the actual meaning of each word is understood. Thereafter the syntactical connection of words one by one automatically makes the overall sense of the sentence.[13] This is similar to Jayaratha’s opinion: �ٱ貹ⲹ is the power that makes one perceive the particular meaning, when the words are mutually syntactically connected in a general way.�[14]
However, Śeṣarāja Śarmā says that according to the Աⲹ-ī, Denotation ceases after denoting the actual meaning of the word and after making known the usage of its case ending.[15] Āⲹ Viśveśvara holds a similar opinion about Աⲹ-岹.[16]
In that regard, Śrīvidyā 䲹ī, another commentator on Ruyyaka’s ṅk-sarvasva, writes:
ٱ貹ⲹ� 峾 貹ٳ-ԲԳٲ-屹ī samanvaya-śپ�,
�ٱ貹ⲹ is the power which occurs after the meanings of the words are understood and by means of which the connection between the words is made� (Sañjīī commentary on the introduction in ṅk-sarvasva).
The followers of ʰ첹, the Anvitābhidhāna-ī, say the meaning of a word is already syntactically connected with another word in the sentence because that is the scheme of assignation, along the model of 峾 Բⲹ (bring a cow) (2.8).
Nonetheless, words do not always occur in a set phrase: Assignation takes place from a dictionary and so on. Therefore the followers of Kumārila ṭṭ say that the meaning of a word is not automatically syntactically connected with another word in the sentence, consequently ٱ貹ⲹ-ṛtپ is needed to achieve the syntactical connection of the words, which is equal to the literal meaning of the sentence.
ĀԲԻ岹Բ’s Usage of ٱ貹ⲹ
When վśٳ Ჹ mentioned the Աⲹ-ī,[17] he was also referring to ĀԲԻ岹Բ and Abhinavagupta. The ٱ貹ⲹ of the Աⲹ-ī is an inherent aspect of ĀԲԻ岹Բ’s system. According to Abhinavagupta, when an implied sense is based on , three functions are involved: , ٱ貹ⲹ, and ⲹñᲹ. And when an implied meaning is based on ṣaṇ�, all four functions are involved, since even then is somewhat taken in consideration insofar as the main meaning is judged incompatible, by means of ٱ貹ⲹ, before ṣaṇ� is applied.[18] վśٳ Ჹ agreed with him in principle,[19] but not in usage.
In poetics, ĀԲԻ岹Բ, the founder of the Dhvani theory, was the first to use the notion of ٱ貹ⲹ. The wording �ٱ貹ⲹ-�, now called ٱ貹ⲹ-ṛtپ, was formulated by Abhinavagupta, who also coined the term ٱ貹ⲹ-śپ (the power which is the Drift).[20]
ĀԲԻ岹Բ’s ٱ貹ⲹ is the Աⲹ-ī� ٱ貹ⲹ. For instance he explains the word ٱ貹ṇa in his as: -峾ٳ (ٳԲǰ첹 2.22). In a similar context, Abhinavagupta comments: -峾ٳⲹm ṅkṣ�-Dzⲹ-sannidhaya�, “The term -峾ٳⲹ means ṅkṣ� (mutual requirement of words), Dzⲹ (congruity) and sannidhi (proximity)� (Locana 1.11).
ĀԲԻ岹Բ invented the function called Suggestiveness: vyañjakatvaika-mūlasya dhvane�, “because a dhvani (implied sense) is only based on Suggestiveness� (ٳԲǰ첹 1.18). However, he included ٱ貹ⲹ in the procedure to arrive at an implied sense.
In ĀԲԻ岹Բ’s system, the rasa is also implied by means of the Drift (ٱ貹ⲹ):
yasmin raso vā bhāvo vā ٱ貹ṇa śte saṃvṛttyābhihitau vastu yatrālaṅra eva vā |
vyādhvani dhvanir vyaṅgya-prādhānyaika-nibandhana� sarvatra tatra viṣayī jñeya� sahṛdayair janai� ||“When on the path of poetry a rasa, or else a 屹, manifests by the Drift, or when either a vastu (an idea) or an ṅk (an ornament) manifests after covering over (but not eclipsing) the rasa or the 屹, then in all cases the category of poetry called Ծ-屹ⲹ (first-rate poetry), defined as a unique arrangement of words where what is predominant is an implied sense, is the object of attention which can be understood by the connoisseurs”� (ٳԲǰ첹 3.42).
On several occasions, ĀԲԻ岹Բ seemed to equate ٱ貹ⲹ with Suggestiveness:
峦ⲹ-vyatiriktasyārthasya 峦ⲹ-vācabhyā� ٱ貹ṇa śna� yatra vyaṅgya-prādhānye sa Ծ�,
“The manifestation, by the drift from the literal meaning and from the literally expressive words, of a sense that is entirely distinct from the literal meaning is a dhvani, in which the main aspect is the fact of being implied� (ٳԲǰ첹 1.14).[21]
Abhinavagupta specifies that in this passage only the function of Suggestiveness is meant to be stated, not ٱ貹ⲹ-śپ.[22]
Footnotes and references:
[2]:
Abhinavagupta comments: bhaṭṭa-mate hi, “ٳ�-mitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttau nāntarīyakam, pāke jvāleva ṣṭhānā� padārtha-pratipādanam (Śǰ첹-ٳپ첹)� iti śabdāvagatai� padārthais tatparyeṇa yo’rtha utthāpyate sa eva ٳ�, sa eva ca 峦ⲹ iti. prabhākara-darśane’pi ī-dīrgho vyāpāro nimittini vākyārthe, padārthānā� tu nimitta-屹� ٳ첹 eva, vaiyākaraṇānā� tu so’ٳ� iti śṣa� (Locana 3.33).
[3]:
[4]:
ܳī Dzⲹ (鲹-ṅg, KM p. 124).
[5]:
athaiva� sarveṣāṃ veda-vākyānā� prāmāṇya eva sthite kecid evam āhu�, ⲹ evārthe vedasya prāmāṇyam, na siddhe, tatraiva śپ-ٱ貹ⲹyor avadhāritatvāt. tatra śپr yathā, uttama-ṛdԲ madhyama-vṛddham uddiśya 峾 Բⲹ ity ukte ta� gavԲⲹna-pravṛttam upalabhya bālo’sya vacasa� sāsnādimat-piṇḍԲⲹnam artha iti pratipadyate. anantara� gā� cāraya, aśvam Բⲹ ity-ādāv āvāpodvāpābhyā� go-ś岹sya sāsnādimān ٳ�, Բⲹnaś岹sya ca āharaṇam ٳ� iti ṅkٲm avadhārayati. ٲٲ� prathamata eva ryānvita eva pravṛttes tatraiva śپ-�, tathā ca ٱ貹ⲹm api tatraiva bhavet. (-ṃv徱ī 11.41 of Tattva-sandarbha). The term śپ is a synonym of (Denotation).
[6]:
tātparyārtho’pi ṣu (屹ⲹ-ś 2.6).
[8]:
Mammaṭa writes: ity anvitābhidhāna-vādina�. teṣām api mate 峾Բⲹ-śṣa-ū貹� 貹ٳ� ṅkٲ-ṣaⲹ ity atiśṣa-bhūto vākyārthāntara-gato’saṅketitatvād a峦ⲹ eva yatra 貹ٳ� pratipadyate tatra dūre’rthāntara-ūٲsya niḥśeṣa-cyutety-ādau vidhy-ādeś carcā. ananvito’rtho’bhihitānvaye padārthāntara-mātreṇānvitas tv anvitābhidhāne anvita-śṣas tv a峦ⲹ eva ity ubhaya-naye’py 貹ٳ eva ٳ� (屹ⲹ-ś 5.47).
[9]:
In reality, վśٳ Ჹ, a ղṣṇ, is not implying that he promotes adultery. Rather, elsewhere he states his opinion that adultery is a form of (semblance of relishment): anaucitya-pravṛttatva ābhāso rasa-屹yo�, anaucitya� cātra rasānā� bharatādipraṇīta-ṣaṇānā� sāmagrī-rahitatve eka-ś-DzٱDZ貹ṣaṇa-貹� bodhyam. tac ca bāla-vyutpattaye eka-śto darśyate, ܱ貹ⲹ첹-ṃsٳ峾�, “When the meanings occur by inappropriateness, there is a semblance of a rasa or of a 屹. Inappropriateness is understood by a partial indication, when the characteristics that were propounded by Bharata and others lack the apparatus (such as a proper Բ). And to spell it out to simple-minded folks, the characteristics of inappropriateness in śṛṅ are shown in one place: ܱ貹ⲹ첹-ṃsٳ峾 (when there is the presence of a paramour), …� (ٲⲹ-岹貹ṇa 3.262).
[10]:
eṣa ity anena tat-lānubhūyamānonmādakatva� masya sūcitam. patir iti, patir bhartā na tu ⲹ�. atra vaktryā madana-vihvalatādinā vaiśiṣṭya� ⲹsya tathābhūtānubhūyamānavicchitti-yuktatvena prastāvasya pati-ū-sthity-ādinā, śsya ca krīḍ�-vana-ū貹sya bakula-kuñjādinā, lasya vasantavattvena, evam eṣāṃ vaiśiṣṭyena vakroktyā vyaṅgyārthaśna� sphuṭam eva (վñ--ṭīk 2.16).
[11]:
Kumārila ṭṭ comments: na vimuñcanti sāmarthya� vākyārthe’pi padāni na� |
vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti ca ٳپ� || sākṣād yadyapi kurvanti padārtha-pratipādanam |
ṇās tathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti niṣphale || ٳ-mitaye teṣāṃ pravṛttyā nāntarīyakam |
pāke jvāleva ṣṭhānā� padārtha-pratipādanam || (Śǰ첹-ٳپ첹) (cited by Nāgeśa ṭṭ, Uddyota 2.6).
[12]:
tata eva padārtham yānvⲹ� ca ٱ貹ⲹ-śaktyāvagamayyaiva bādhaka-vaśena tam apahatya (Locana 1.13).
[13]:
ٱ貹ⲹ-ṛtپ kī -ś hai jise ٳ kahate hai vah pṛthak-pṛthak padārtha nahi, api tu padārtho� paraspara sambandha athavā anvaya-ū貹 artha hai, vastuta� tātparyārtha hai. ܻṇa ke liye yadi “� Բⲹ� is ⲹ ko hī le to yah 貹ṣṭ hai ki yaha� go-pada artha “sāsnādimān padārtha� hai aur yah artha eka 峾Բⲹ-ū貹 artha hai na ki śṣa-ū貹. isī “a� pratyaya ⲹ 峾Բⲹ “karmatva� hai aur “nī� is -pada se gati-峾Բⲹ hī bodha 첹 hai. yaha� go-pada ke liye vakt�-vivakṣita “karmatva� ke śⲹ-ūٲ sāsnādimān prāṇi-ū貹 artha-śṣa pratipādana sambhava nahi. yah to ṅkṣ�, Dzⲹ aur āsatti kī hī mahimā hai jo yaha� eka pada ke artha ke sāth dūsre pada ke artha sambandha batāyā kartī hai, aur jab padārtho� pārasparika sambandha 貹 cal hai tabhī vah artha pratīta 첹 hai jise “tātparyārtha� kahā karte hai� jo ki padārtha-ū貹 nahi api tu ٳū貹 artha hai. (Siṅgh, Satyavrata (2007), ٲⲹ-岹貹ṇa, p. 96).
[14]:
sāmānyānā� parasparānvitatvena viśeṣārthāvabodhana-śپs ٱ貹ⲹm (ṅkvimarśinī, 屹ⲹ- edition of ṅk-sarvasva p. 9).
[15]:
ⲹ� 屹�, ṭa� karoti ity-ādi-vākye ṭa-padena kambu-grīvādimanta� padārtham am-vibhaktyā karmatvam ya viramati, ṛtپtā tu na kasyāpi iti apadārtho’pi ṛtپtā ٱ貹ⲹ-ṛtپ-vaśāt anayo� saṃsarga-vidhayā bhāsate. ittha� ٱ貹ⲹ-vṛttyaiva padārthānā� mitha� anvayo bhavatīty abhihitānvaya-vādina� (䲹Ի첹-ṭīk on ٲⲹ-岹貹ṇa 2.20).
[16]:
abhihitānvaya-岹 me� pahile padoṅse kevala ananvita padārtha upasthita hote hai�, uske bād padoṅkī ṅkṣ�, Dzⲹ tathā sannidhike balase ‘ٱ貹�-śپ� 屹 un padārthoṅke paraspara-sambandha-ū貹 vākyārthoṅke bodha hota hai. yah ‘abhihitānvaya-ī� kumārilabhaṭṭake mata sārāṃśa grantha-rane yahā� prastuta kiyā hai (Āⲹ Viśveśvara Śiromaṇi (2011), 屹ⲹ-ś, pp. 36-37).
[17]:
yā ekaika-padārtha-bodhana-viramād ٳ-ū貹sya padārthānvayasya bodhi ٱ貹ⲹ� 峾 ṛtپ�. tad-arthaś ca tātparyārtha�. tad-bodhaka� ca ⲹm iti abhihitānvaya-vādinā� matam (ٲⲹ-岹貹ṇa 2.20) (rendered by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa in text2.3).
[18]:
atra ca traya eva vyāpārā�, ٱ貹ⲹ� dhvanana� ceti, mukhyārtha-bādhādyabhāve madhyama-kakṣyāyā� ṣaṇāyās tṛtīyāyā abhāvāt. […] tena dvitīye’pi bhede catvāra eva vyāpārā� (Locana 1.13).
[19]:
[22]:
svatas tātparyeṇety --nirākaraṇa-param ida� 貹岹� dhvanana-m āha na tu ٱ貹ⲹ-śپm (Locana 2.22).