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TEXT-4a: na canumitijanikecchaiva¹ paksata. sa ca kvacit svanisthaiva 2 kvacid ³ Isvaranisthaiva sulabheti vacyam. 3 tasya nityatvena siddhau satyam api paksataprasahgat. VARIANTS: 1. TCD reads -iva for -eva. 2. Gadadhari and Paksata-prakarana read -iva for -eva. 3. TCD, Gadadhari, Jagadisi, Paksata-prakarana, and (Tattvacintamani-rahasya: 427, 5) read sarvatra- for kvacid. TRANSLATION: It is not the case that mere desire to produce an inferential cognition is the subjectness and that (desire (iccha)) exists sometimes in a person or sometimes in God easily, because in that case there will arise the contingency (of continuance) of subjectness since it (=God's desire) is a permanent entity even after the inferential cognition of probandum. NOTES: Jagadisa comments that this is Jayadeva's view i. e. ramatam asankya nisedhati na ceti" (Paksata-prakarana: 59). Jayadeva "misrama

states that svajanakasisadhayisa vacya, tasyas cesvarasadharanataya samsayavad visesano palaksanavikalpah samsayavisesanataya bhagavatapy anirvahyatvat, tasya tatrabhavat...., (Tattvacintamanyaloka: 173, 4-7). Jayadeva applies to the desire of God, i. e. God's desire (bhagavat-sisadhayisa or bhagavad-iccha). Vide (Tattvacintamanyaloka: 173, 5-14). Raghunatha says that if a desire is a producer and the desire is thought in God, subjectness will never stop again and again, because God's desire can exist every moment and everywhere. Mathuranatha states this view in more detail than Raghunatha. That is, it is not true that only a desire which is of particular person, particular probans, particular probandum, and particular subject is the subjectness of the person, The reason is that God's desire exists everywhere. The reason is that it will be a contingency of continuance of subjectness since God's desire is a permanent entity even after the inferential cognition of probandum. (na ca svaparasadharanatatpaksakatatsadhyakatallingakatatpurus Iyanumiticchamatram tatpurusiyatadrsanumitau paksata vacya, tatha ca bhagavadiccham adayaiva sarvatra sangatir iti vacyam, tatha sati bhagavadicchaya nityatvena siddhau satyam api paksataprasangat.) (Tattvacintamani-rahasya: 426, 19 to 427, 6). TEXT-4b: na ca tasyas tadanim na tajjanakatvam, tad dhi na tad 1-yogyata, anapayat. VARIANT: 1. Paksata-prakarana omits tad-.

TRANSLATION: It is not true that it' (=God's desire) is not a producer of it (=inferential cognition) at that time (=when a probandum is already established), because it (=the state of being the producer of inferential cognition) does not mean merely a compatibility, since that is not removed. NOTES: God's desire (Isvara-iccha) can be a producer of inferential cognition when there is a cognition of probandum. The that the producer of inferential cognition is not reason merely a compatibility. The reason is that God's desire is its own compatibility (svarupa-yogyata). But Raghunatha rejects the idea of God's desire in text-23. TEXT-4c: na ca tadupadhanam, anumiteh purvam tadabhavat. TRANSLATION: And (being a producer is) not its (=anumiti's) indicator (upadhana), because it (=anumitijanikeccha) disappears before an inferential cognition. NOTES: The desire to produce inferential cognition (anumitijanikeccha) does not qualify an does not qualify an inferential cognition. The reason is that the desire disappears before an inferential cognition. Jagad isa explains the indicator (upadhana) as state of being qualified (visistatva), i. e. tadupadhanam tadrsanumitivisistatvam, the (Paksata-prakarana: 60). And Gadadhara explains the indicator as qualificand (vaisistya), i.e. tadupadhanam tadvaisistyam, (Gadadhari: 1011). TEXT-4d: ca tatsamagrisamavadhanam, karanamatrasya paksatakuksiniksepaprasangac chesavaiyarthyat. tadanim

samagrivirahaprayojakavyatirekapratiyoginah karanasya vaktavyatvapatac ca. 1 VARIANT: 1. Paksata-prakarana adds iti didhitau paksatapurvapaksah. TRANSLATION: Nor the proximity (samavadhana) of the causal factors (samagri) of the inferential cognition (is also the state of being the producer), because there will arise the defect that cause in general (matra) will be included in the side of subjectness, and therefore, the remaining part will become redundant. And also because at that time (i. e. at the time of a cognition of probandum), it will be the contingency of saying that the counterpositive of an absence which causes the absence of causal factors is the cause. NOTES: Raghunatha says that the proximity of the causal factors of inferential cognition (anumitisamagrisamavadhana) also cannot be the state of being the producer of inferential cognition (anumitijanakatva). Raghunatha gives two reasons. One therefore, is that if it is so, all the causes will be included in the subjectness i. e. only the subjectness will be a cause, other causal factors of inferential cognition will be redundant. Vide Bhavananda's commentary, commentary, i.e. tatha ca paksatamatrasyaiva karanatvam syad ity ekakaranaparisesapattir iti bhavah. (Tattvacintamani-didhiti-prakasa: 881, 4 f.). anumitisamagrisamavahita iccha paksatety atra anumitisamagryatiriktasyecchabhagasya vaiyarthyad ity arthah. (Tattvacintamani-didhiti-prakasa: 881, 7 f.). And the other is that at the time of a cognition of probandum, when a cause of a form which has a confirmatory cognition etc. is the subjectness of a form which

has a permanent desire, the causal factors of inferential cognition do not exist, because the permanent desire alone operate as a cause in that case. _ ' (paramarsadirupakaranasya nityeccharupapaksatayas ca sattve 'numitisamagryabhavo yadabhavat, sa eva tatra hetur astu, kim uktapaksatayety arthah.) (Tattvacintamani-didhiti-prakasa: 881, 12-14).