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The literal translation of the second 蝉奴迟谤补, janm膩dy asya 测补迟补岣�, is 鈥渇rom which production, etc., of this鈥�. The purport of 艢补峁卥补谤补鈥檚 commentary on this 蝉奴迟谤补 may briefly be stated as follows: 鈥淧roduction, etc.鈥� means production, existence and destruction. Production, existence and destruction of this world-appearance, which is so great, so orderly and so diversified, is from that ultimate cause, God (莫艣惫补谤补); and neither th 别辫补谤补尘腻峁嘘蝉 nor the inanimate 辫谤补办峁泃颈 can be its cause. This rule is not intended to stand as an inference in favour of the existence of God, but is merely the description of the purport of the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 texts on the nature of Brahman^[1]; for the ultimate grasp of the nature of Brahman, which is beyond the range of our sense-organs, can only come through the right comprehension of the meaning of 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 texts.

Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补, in commenting on the 叠丑腻峁�y补 of Madhva and the 础苍耻惫测腻办丑测腻苍补, follows Madhva in explaining this 蝉奴迟谤补 as a definition (濒补办峁�a峁嘺) of Brahman, intended to differentiate Him from beings of His class, viz., the souls (箩墨惫补), and inanimate objects, which belong to a different class. The idea is that that from which the production, etc., of the world takes place is Brahman, and there are important 艣谤耻迟颈 texts which say that the world was produced from Brahman^[2]. It has already been pointed out that by 鈥減roduced , etc.鈥� in the 蝉奴迟谤补 艢补峁卥补谤补 understood production (蝉峁涐梗峁璱), existence (stkiti) and destruction (laya or 产丑补峁単补), and he there reconciled the six stages of existent things (产丑腻惫补-vika) referred to by Y膩ska in the Nirukta, such as being produced, to continue to exist, to grow, to change, to decay and to be destroyed, as being included within the three stages referred to by him; for growth and change are included within production (janma), and decay is included within destruction.

Madhva, however, includes eight different categories in the term 鈥減roduction, etc.鈥�; these with him are

1. production (蝉峁涐梗峁璱),
2. existence (sthiti),
3. destruction (蝉补峁僪腻谤补),
4. control (niyama),
5. knowledge (箩帽腻苍补),
6. ignorance (a箩帽腻苍补),
7. bondage (bandha)
8. and release (尘辞办峁�a)^[3].

The existence of all these qualities implies the fullness of qualities signified by the name Brahman. That single being in whom all the above-mentioned eightfold qualities exist is called Brahman.

Generally two kinds of definitions are distinguished from each other, viz., essential (蝉惫补谤奴辫补-濒补办峁�a峁嘺) and accidental (tatastha-濒补办峁�a峁嘺). 笔谤补办腻艣腻迟尘补苍, the writer of the 笔补帽肠补-辫腻诲颈办腻-惫颈惫补谤补峁嘺, speaks of this definition of Brahman as being of the latter type, since it is only in association with 尘腻测腻 that Brahman can be said to be the cause of the production, etc., of the world-appearance. In itself it is of the nature of pure bliss (腻苍补苍诲补), which is also identical in its nature with pure knowledge^[4]. Madhva and his followers, however, consider the characteristics mentioned in the 蝉奴迟谤补 as essential and do not think that the essences of 腻苍补苍诲补 and 箩墨惫补 are in any sense anything else but qualities, in which case they would not be essences identical with Brahman, as would be required by what may be called a 蝉惫补谤奴辫补-濒补办峁�a峁嘺 ; for 腻苍补苍诲补 is as much a characteristic as any other characteristic is, and, if 腻苍补苍诲补 could be regarded as a defining essence, then the characteristic of being the cause of the world might also be regarded as a defining essence^[5]. If His being the cause involves qualities unessential to Himself, then in His purity He could neither be 腻苍补苍诲补, whether as a class notion, as a desirable feeling (补苍耻办奴濒补-惫别诲补苍腻), as being the dearest one (parama-辫谤别尘腻蝉辫补诲补), or as being opposed to sorrow; for, if these be the nature of 腻苍补苍诲补, it must by its very nature be associated with inessential traits (蝉辞辫腻诲丑颈办补迟惫腻迟). So knowledge also must express something and must therefore by its very nature be connected with something outside of itself (artha-prak膩艣膩tmakatvena sop膩dhikam eva) ; for knowledge is inseparably connected with the knower and the known (箩帽腻苍补sya 箩帽腻迟峁�-箩帽别测补-蝉腻辫别办峁�a迟惫腻迟).

It has been urged in the 笔补帽肠补-辫腻诲颈办腻-惫颈惫补谤补峁嘺 that the knowledge which forms the essential defining characteristic of Brahman is all-illuminating revelation which is not in any way conditioned by its being dependent on, or its being inseparably connected with, objects^[6]. But the fact that it can reveal everything implies possession of power, and this power is necessarily connected with the object with reference to which it is effective. Moreover, if any power can be considered as being an essential defining characteristic, then the power of producing the world and of affecting it in other ways (as referred to in the 蝉奴迟谤补) might also be considered as an essential defining characteristic^[7]. The objection, that the essence (蝉惫补谤奴辫腻) of anything cannot be expressed by a reference to anything other than itself, is not valid; for a thing wholly unrelated to, and devoid of all reference to, any other thing cannot be known (蝉惫补谤奴辫补sya sva-vedyatv膩t). It is further held by the opponents that an accidental defining characteristic like that of the Brahman being the cause of the world (tatastha-濒补办峁�a峁嘺)鈥攁s, for example, indicating a house by a temporary association, as that of a crow sitting on the roof of it鈥攊s not an inherent and intrinsic characteristic (补苍补苍惫补测墨), whereas an essential characteristic like 腻苍补苍诲补 is an inherent and intrinsic constituent (办腻谤测腻苍惫补测墨) of the thing. But such an objection cannot rule out the causality, etc., of Brahman as being inessential; for we want to know Brahman in its essence as the cause or 办腻谤补峁嘺 of the world, as much as by any other characteristic.

The essential feature of Brahman is its fullness of qualities, as the ultimate cause of production, etc., and these are in no sense less essential than His nature as 腻苍补苍诲补. Like the power of burning in fire, these powers of world-creation, etc., are coextensive with the essence of Brahman. It is indeed surprising, says 痴测腻蝉补-tlrtha, that the 艢a峁卥arites should enter into any long discussion with regard to the distinction of essential and accidental definitions; for all definitions mean the making known of object by its distinctive characteristics such as are well known^[8]. But, as the 艢a峁卥arites believe in absolutely unqualified Brahman, how do they undertake to define it? All definitions must proceed through the means of known qualities^[9]. Whether a definition (濒补办峁�a峁嘺) be 蝉惫补谤奴辫补 or tatastha, it must proceed by way of enumerating distinctive characteristic qualities; and, as the Brahman of the opponents has no qualities, it cannot be defined at all.

搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 in his interpretation of this 蝉奴迟谤补 asserted that the characteristic qualities and powers of Brahman referred to in the 蝉奴迟谤补 belong to Brahman as He is immanent; but the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲s also define Him in His essential characteristic features, as transcendent, by speaking of Him as being truth, knowledge, the infinite (蝉补迟测补峁� 箩帽腻苍补m 补苍补苍迟补峁� brahma); and this distinguishes Him from the souls and inanimate objects, which also are held within Him. But 痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补 points out that Madhva has by implication denied this in his 础苍耻惫测腻办丑测腻苍补, where he distinctly asserted the causality of Brahman as its own intrinsic constitutive definition^[10]. 痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补 says that in defence of the 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 point of view it may be urged that, as a special form of a jug would differentiate it from all other things, yet its possession of smell constitutes its nature as earth, so, though causality, etc., differentiate Brahman from others, yet it is His nature as truth, knowledge and infinite that really differentiates Him from souls and inanimate objects. But 痴测腻蝉补-迟墨谤迟丑补 contends that this is wrong, since the special form of a jug differentiates it from cloth, etc., and not from earth; an earthen jug is itself earth; but the special form which distinguishes an earthen jug from other objects (such as cloth, etc.) also by that very fact shows that it belongs to a class different from them. Here also the causality which differentiates Brahman from souls, etc., also shows that He is different in nature from them. So the fact that Brahman is the ultimate cause of production, etc., constitutes its essential defining characteristic. He, Brahman, not only possesses these qualities, but in reality His qualities are infinite, and their possession forms His defining characteristic (ananta-驳耻峁嘺-sattvam eva brahmano 濒补办峁�a峁嘺m)^[11].

The two principal 痴别诲腻苍迟补 texts by which the 艢a峁卥arites seek to establish their theory of absolute monism (advaita) are 鈥渢hat art thou鈥� (tat tvam asi) and 鈥淏rahma is truth, knowledge, infinite鈥� (蝉补迟测补峁� 箩帽腻苍补m anantam brahma). Now Madhva urges that, since these may also be otherwise interpreted directly (尘耻办丑测腻谤迟丑补) on the basis of difference, it is not proper to explain them on the basis of non-difference with an indirect and distant meaning (濒补办峁�a峁嘺)^[12]. The 狈测腻测补-蝉耻诲丑腻 points out that with the monistic interpretation the difficulty arises, how to identify the qualityless (nir驳耻峁嘺) with the qualified (sa驳耻峁嘺), as in the case of the souls; the qualityless is indeterminable by itself (nir驳耻峁嘺 syaiva nir奴payitum a艣akyatv膩t)^[13]. If this nir驳耻峁嘺 brahma were entirely different from the sa驳耻峁嘺 Brahma or 莫艣惫补谤补 acknowledged by the 艢a峁卥arites, then there would be a duality; if the relation is held to be indefinable (补苍颈谤惫补肠补苍墨测补), then the criticisms against the indefinable suggested in the first 蝉奴迟谤补 apply to it^[14]. If, however, it is urged that the unity or identity referred to in the above passages is with regard to the Brahman as pure self-revealing intelligence and the same element as forming the principal reality of 箩墨惫补, then it becomes difficult to understand how the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲s can have the presumption of revealing the self-revealing intelligence^[15]. Moreover, it may be objected that, if the Brahman is nothing else but pure intelligence, then its 鈥渦nity鈥� with 箩墨惫补 as taught by the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲s, being different from Brahman, is false; for 鈥渦nity鈥� is not pure intelligence, and, if unity is false, then duality becomes true. If the 鈥渦nity鈥� was identical with pure intelligence, then with the self-shining of pure intelligence there would be the self-shining of 鈥渦nity鈥� too, and even for expressing the 鈥渦nity鈥� it would not be necessary to take the help of the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲s or of anything else.

Another question of importance arises in connection with the attribution of the epithets 鈥渢ruth,鈥� 鈥渒nowledge,鈥� 鈥渋nfinite鈥� to Brahman. Is Brahman, to whom all these qualities are attributed, a simple unity in Himself, or is He a complex of many qualities, truth, knowledge, infinite, etc., which have differe.pt connotations and are not synonymous? Pure intelligence (caitanya) is one, but these epithets are many. How can we conceive the one caitanya to coexist in itself with the many attributes which are said to belong to it? How is the plurality of these attributes to be implied in the unity of the one^[16]? To this the answer that Madhva gives in his 础苍耻惫测腻办丑测腻苍补, which is further explained by Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补, is that it has to be admitted that in the unity of Brahman there is some special virtue (补迟颈艣补测补) which represents difference and serves its purpose; there is no other way of solving the difficulty, and this is the only solution left (gaty-antar膩bh膩v膩d arth膩patty膩). This special virtue, which serves to hold and reconcile plurality without sacrificing its unity, is called by the Madhvas 惫颈艣别峁�a ; this 惫颈艣别峁�a exists not only in Brahman, but in all other things. Thus, for example, a cloth is not different from its whiteness, since both of them form one indissoluble whole. So it has to be admitted that there is in cloth such a special virtue, a 惫颈艣别峁�a, by which it remains one with itself and yet shows the plurality of qualities with which it is sure to form a whole. These 惫颈艣别峁�as are infinite in number in the infinite number of objects, though there is no intrinsic difference in the nature of these 惫颈艣别峁�as. Each whole or unity may be said to possess as many 惫颈艣别峁�as as there are qualities through which it expresses itself, and each of these 惫颈艣别峁�as is different from the others according to the difference of the quality with which it is associated; but these 惫颈艣别峁�as are not considered as requiring other 惫颈艣别峁�as for their connection with the thing, and so there is no vicious infinite (ana惫补蝉迟丑腻). So there is not only one 惫颈艣别峁�a in each thing, but there are as many 惫颈艣别峁�as as there are different qualities unified with it^[17].

The result attained by the first two 蝉奴迟谤补s, then, is that Brahman, as defined by the second 蝉奴迟谤补, is the object of enquiry for those who seek release.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

janm膩di-蝉奴迟谤补峁� n膩num膩nopany膩s膩rtha峁� ki峁� tarhi ved膩nta-v膩kya-pradar-艣an膩rtham.

[2]:

Jaya-迟墨谤迟丑补 refers to another interpretation of the 蝉奴迟谤补 as janma 膩dyasya hira峁噛agarbha峁�ya yatas tad brahma. The 罢腻迟辫补谤测补-肠补苍诲谤颈办腻 discusses the points of view raised in the 狈测腻测补-蝉耻诲丑腻 and elsewhere with regard to the meaning of Brahman as referred to by the word yata岣�. B峁沨a, a constituent of the word brahman, has several technical meanings (谤奴岣峢颈), such as 箩腻迟颈 (class-notion), 箩墨惫补, Kamal膩sana or 叠谤补丑尘腻. But the word is not used here in its technical sense, but in the etymological sense, which signifies the entity in which there is a fullness of qualities; for it is only in this sense that the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 texts alluded to in connection with this 蝉奴迟谤补 and the previous one become significant. Again, on the basis of other texts, which speak of Him (from which everything is produced) as lying in the ocean, Brahman here means Vi峁ａ箛u (as in the Sam膩khya-艣谤耻迟颈, dy膩v膩p峁泃hiv墨 para峁� mama yonir apsu anta岣� samudre), because it is only in Him that there is the fullness of all qualities.

This characteristic would not apply to any of the other technical (谤奴岣峢颈) senses, such as 箩腻迟颈 or 箩墨惫补; and so it is that, though the 谤奴岣峢颈 sense is stronger than the etymological sense (yaugika), yet the latter has preference here:

brahma-艣abdasya j墨ve r奴岣峢atve鈥檖i b膩dhaka-sadbh膩v膩t tad brahma iti 艣ruty-ukta峁� brahma vi峁ａ箛ur eva (Tattva-prak膩艣ik膩).

It may also be added that, according to the Tattva-prak膩艣ik膩, 罢腻迟辫补谤测补-肠补苍诲谤颈办腻 and other Madhva works, it is held that, though ordinarily brahma has the technical sense of 箩墨惫补, yet with scholars the word always has the technical meaning of Vi峁ａ箛u. Thus a distinction is drawn between the ordinary technical sense (谤奴岣峢颈) and the technical sense with scholars (vidvad-谤奴岣峢颈), and preference is given to the latter: vidu峁Ｄ佱箖 brahma-艣abdena vi峁ａ箛u-vyakti-prat墨te岣� (罢腻迟辫补谤测补-肠补苍诲谤颈办腻, p. 120).

[3]:

础苍耻产丑腻峁�y补 of Madhva or Brahma-蝉奴迟谤补, I. 1.2. Madhva quotes for his authority a passage from the 厂办补苍诲补-辫耻谤腻峁嘺 :

utpatti-sthiti-蝉补峁僪腻谤补-niyatir 箩帽腻苍补m 膩v峁泃i岣�
bandha-尘辞办峁�a峁� ca puru峁Ｄ乨 yasm膩t sa harir ekar膩峁�.

[4]:

笔补帽肠补-辫腻诲颈办腻-惫颈惫补谤补峁嘺, pp. 222鈥�3.

[5]:

腻苍补苍诲补峁� 濒补办峁�a峁嘺m iti cet tarhi jagat-办腻谤补峁嘺峁� 濒补办峁�a峁嘺m astu.
      T膩tpary膩-candrik膩, p. 140.

[6]:

anena sarvaj帽a-艣abdena sarv膩vabh膩sa-k峁�ama峁� vij帽apti-m膩tram 膩dity膩di-prak膩艣avad avi峁�ayop膩dhika峁� vi箩帽腻苍补m eva brahma-蝉惫补谤奴辫补-濒补办峁�a峁嘺m. 
      笔补帽肠补-辫腻诲颈办腻-惫颈惫补谤补峁嘺, p. 210.

[7]:

s膩marthyasya 艣akti-r奴patv膩d, vi峁�aya-nir奴pyatv膩c ca, jagaj-janan膩di-s膩marthyasyaiva 蝉惫补谤奴辫补-濒补办峁�a峁嘺tvopapatte艣 ca.
      罢腻迟辫补谤测补-肠补苍诲谤颈办腻, p. 141.

[8]:

prasiddhasya as膩dh膩ra峁嘺-dharmasya 濒补办峁�a峁嘺tvena;
also as膩dh膩ra峁嘺-dharmo hi 濒补办峁�a峁嘺m parik墨rtyate.
      罢腻迟辫补谤测补-肠补苍诲谤颈办腻, pp. 140, 143.

[9]:

蝉惫补谤奴辫补峁� v膩 ta峁璦stha峁� v膩 濒补办峁�a峁嘺峁� bhedaka峁� mata峁�
saj膩t墨y膩d vi箩腻迟颈y膩t tac-c膩dvaiti-mate katham.
      Ibid. p. 143.

[10]:

asyodbhav膩di-hetutva峁� s膩k峁Ｄ佱笉 eva sva-濒补办峁�a峁嘺m.
      Op. cit.

[11]:

狈测腻测补-蝉耻诲丑腻, p. 107.

[12]:

bhedenaiva tu 尘耻办丑测腻谤迟丑补-sambhave 濒补办峁�a峁嘺峁� kuta岣�.
      础苍耻惫测腻办丑测腻苍补, p. 5.

nanu abhedam up膩d膩ya 蝉奴迟谤补-濒补办峁�a峁嘺峁� v膩 膩艣raya峁嚹珁a-bhedam up膩d膩ya mukhya-v峁泃tir na iti sandihyate; vaya峁� tu br奴ma岣�, dvit墨ya eva pak峁�a岣� 艣rey膩n.
      狈测腻测补-蝉耻诲丑腻, p. 101.

[13]:

Ibid. p. 102.

[14]:

In such 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 passages as 蝉腻办峁Ｄ� cet kevalo nir驳耻峁嘺艣 ca (艢vet. vi. n) the word nir驳耻峁嘺, 鈥渜ualityless,鈥� could be given a modified meaning, in view of the fact that the strict direct meaning is not possible even in the context of the sentence; for in the very passage itself the brahman is said to be not only nir驳耻峁嘺, but 蝉腻办峁Ｄ� (direct perceiver) also, and this is evidently a 驳耻峁嘺. It is not possible to attribute a 驳耻峁嘺 and to call it nir驳耻峁嘺 at the same time. 狈测腻测补-蝉耻诲丑腻, p. 102.

[15]:

svaprak膩艣a-caitany膩tmaka峁� ca 艣膩stra-pratip膩dya峁� ceti vy膩hatam.
      Ibid. p. 103.

[16]:

caitanyam eka峁� satyatv膩d墨ny anek膩ni iti sa峁僰hy膩-vailak峁�a峁噛am ity膩di-bhedak膩ry膩峁噄 c膩vagamyante.
      Ibid. p. 106.

[17]:

tepy ukta-laksa峁嘺-vi艣e峁Ｄ� a艣e峁�ato鈥檖i vastu峁�u pratyekam anant膩岣� santy ato nokta-do峁Ｄ乿ak膩艣a岣�; ananta iti upa濒补办峁�a峁嘺m; yatra y膩vanto vyavah膩r膩s tatra t膩vanto vi艣e峁Ｄ� iti j帽膩tavyam.
      Ibid. p. 106.

It may be noted in this connection that the Madhvas were more or less forced to this position of accepting the 惫颈艣别峁�as, as they could not accept the 蝉补尘补惫腻测补 relation of the 狈测腻测补-vai艣e峁�ika, which is rejected by the Brahma-蝉奴迟谤补s.