A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 2
by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1932 | 241,887 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081
This page describes the philosophy of padmapada (a.d. 820): a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the eleventh part in the series called the “the shankara school of vedanta (continued)�, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Part 11 - Padmapāda (a.d. 820)
Padmapāda is universally reputed to be a direct disciple of Śṅk峦ⲹ, and, since the manner of his own salutation to Śṅk峦ⲹ confirms this tradition, and since no facts are known that can contradict such a view, it may safely be assumed that he was a younger contemporary of Śṅk峦ⲹ. There are many traditional stories about him and his relations with Śṅk峦ⲹ; but, since their truth cannot be attested by reliable evidence, it is not possible to pronounce any judgment on them. Only two works are attributed to him, viz. the ʲñ-徱 , which is a commentary on Śṅk’s commentary on the first four ūٰ of the -ūٰ and Śṅk’s introduction to his commentary known as th and the 屹-ṣy , and the Āٳ-bodha-Բ , called also ձԳٲ-.
This ʲñ-徱 is one of the most important of the ձԳٲ works known to us. It was commented on by ʰśٳ (a.d. i 200) in his ʲñ-徱-ṇa[1].
The ʲñ-徱-ṇa was further commented on by Akhaṇḍānanda (a.d. 1350), a pupil of Anandagiri, in his Tattva-ī貹Բ.
ĀԲԻ岹-ūṇa (A.D. 1600), who wrote his վ-岵ī commentary on Śīṣa’s ṇḍԲ-پḍa-ⲹ and also a commentary on the Ѳ--ḍaԲ, wrote a commentary on the ʲñ-徱.[2]
ṛsṃhś also wrote a commentary on the ʲñ-徱-ṇa, called the ʲñ-徱-ṇa-prakāśikā, and Śrīkṛṣṇa also wrote one on the ʲñ-徱-ṇa.
Aufrecht refers to another commentary by ԲԻ岹 as ʲñ-徱-śٰ-岹貹ṇa ; but this is undoubtedly a mistake for his Śāstra-岹貹ṇa, which is noticed below.
ԲԻ岹 was a follower of the 峦貹پ line and not of the line of Padmapāda and ʰśٳ. Rāmānanda ī, a pupil of Govindānanda, the author of the 鲹ٲԲ- commentary on the Śṅk-ṣy, wrote his վṇo貹Բ (a summary of the main theses of the վṇa) as a commentary on Śṅk’s ṣy ; but this was strictly on the lines of the ʲñ-徱-ṇa, though it was not a direct commentary thereon.
վraṇya also wrote a separate monograph, called վṇa-prameya-ṃg, in which he interpreted the Vedāntic doctrines on the lines of the ʲñ-徱-ṇa.
Of all these the վṇo貹Բ of Rāmānanda ī was probably the last important work on the վṇa line; for Rāmānanda’s teacher Govindānanda, the pupil of ҴDZ ī and the pupil’s pupil of Śivarāma, refers in his Ratna- commentary to Jagannāthāśrama’s commentary on the Śṅk-ṣy, called the ṣy-ī辱, and also to ĀԲԻ岹giri’s commentary as �ṛd,� p. 5 (ṇaⲹ-岵 Press, 1904). Բٳ was the teacher of ṛsṃhś; Govindānanda must therefore have lived towards the end of the sixteenth century. Rāmānanda may therefore be placed in the early part of the seventeenth century. Govindānanda himself also in his 鲹ٲԲ- commentary followed the վṇa line of interpretation, and he refers to ʰśٳ with great respect as ʰśٳ-śī-ṇa� (. 鲹ٲԲ- , p. 3).
Padmapāda’s method of treatment, as interpreted by ʰśٳ, has been taken in the first and the second volumes of the present work as the guide to the exposition of the ձԳٲ. It is not therefore necessary that much should be said in separate sections regarding the Vedāntic doctrines of these two great teachers. But still a few words on Padmapāda’s philosophy may with advantage be read separately. Padmapāda says that , avyākṛta, ṛt, agrahaṇa, avyakta, ٲ�, ṇa, laya, śپ, mahāsupti, Ծ, kṣara and ś are the terms which are used in older literature as synonymous with . It is this entity that obstructs the pure and independently self-revealing nature of Brahman, and thus, standing as the painted canvas (citra-bhitti) of ignorance (), deeds (karma) and past impressions of knowledge (ū-ñ-ṃs) produce the individual persons (īٱ徱).
Undergoing its peculiar transformations with God as its support, it manifests itself as the two powers of knowledge and activity (ñԲ--śپ-dvayśⲹ) and functions as the doer of all actions and the enjoyer of all experiences (첹ṛt-ǰṛt-�). In association with the pure unchangeable light of Brahman it is the complex of these transformations which appears as the immediate ego (). It is through the association with this ego that the pure self is falsely regarded as the enjoyer of experiences.
This transformation is called Գٲḥkṇa, manas, buddhi and the ego or the ego-feeler (�-ٲⲹ⾱) on the side of its cognitive activity, while on the vibratory side of its activity (貹Ի岹-śٲ), it is called ṇa or biomotor functions. The association of the ego with the pure ٳ , like the association of the redness of a Ჹ flower with a crystal, is a complex (granthi) which manifests the dual characteristics of activity of the stuff and the consciousness of the pure self (ṃbԲԴDzⲹ-ū貹ٱ).
On the question as to whether has for both support (śⲹ) and object (ṣaⲹ) Brahman Padmapāda’s own attitude does not seem to be very clear. He only says that manifests itself in the individual person (ī) by obstructing the real nature of the Brahman as pure self-luminosity and that the Brahman by its limitation (avaccheda) through beginningless is the cause of the appearance of infinite individual persons. But ʰśٳ introduces a long discussion, trying to prove that Brahman is both the support and the object of as against the view of 峦貹پ Miśra that has the Brahman as its object and the ī as its support (śⲹ). This is thus one of the fundamental points of difference between the վṇa line of interpretation and the interpretation of the 峦貹پ line. In this ʰśٳ agrees with the view of ܰś and his pupil Sarvajñٳ, though, as will be noticed, Sarvajñٳ draws some nice distinctions which are not noticed by ܰś.
Padmapāda draws a distinction between two meanings of falsehood (ٳ), viz. falsehood as simple negation (apahnava-vacana) and falsehood as the unspeakable and indescribable (ԾԾ-ⲹ-Բ). It is probably he who of all the interpreters first described ñԲ or as being of a material nature (Ჹḍāt) and of the nature of a power (Ჹḍāt -śپ), and interpreted Śṅk’s phrase �ٳ-ñԲ-Ծٳٲ�� as meaning that it is this material power of ñԲ that is the constitutive or the material cause of the world-appearance. ʰśٳ, however, elaborates the conception further in his attempts to give proofs in support of the view that is something positive (屹-ū貹). These proofs have been repeatedly given by many other later writers, and have already been dealt with in the first volume of the present work.
Padmapāda is also probably the first to attempt an explanation of the process of Vedāntic perception which was later on elaborated by ʰśٳ and later writers, and his views were all collected and systematized in the exposition of the ձԳٲ-paribhāṣ� of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in the sixteenth century. Describing this process, Padmapāda says that, as a result of the cognitive activity of the ego, the objects with which that is concerned become connected with it, and, as a result of that, certain changes are produced in it, and it is these changes that constitute the subject-object relation of knowledge (ñٳܰñⲹ-Ի�).
The Գٲḥkṇa, or psychical frame of mind, can lead to the limited expression of the pure consciousness only so far as it is associated with its object. The perceptual experience of immediacy (貹ǰṣa) of objects means nothing more than the expression of the pure consciousness through the changing states of the Գٲḥkṇa. The ego thus becomes a perceiver (�) through its connection with the underlying consciousness.
ʰśٳ, however, elaborates it by supposing that the Գٲḥkṇa goes out to the objective spatial positions, and assumes the spatial form of the objects perceived. Hence what Padmapāda conceived merely as the change of the Գٲḥkṇa states through the varying relation of the Գٲḥkṇa with its objects, is interpreted in the definite meaning of this relation as being nothing more than spatial superposition of the Գٲḥkṇa on its objects. In inference, however, there is no immediate knowledge, as this is mediated through relations with the reason (li�ga). Knowledge however would mean both mediate and immediate knowledge; for it is defined as being the manifestation of the object (artha-ś).
On the subject of the causality of Brahman Padmapāda says that that on which the world-appearance is manifested, the Brahman, is the cause of the world.
On this point ʰśٳ offers three alternative views, viz.
- that, like two twisted threads in a rope, and Brahman are together the joint cause of the world,
- that that which has as its power is the cause,
- and that the Brahman which has supported on it is the cause of the world, but in all these the ultimate causality rests with Brahman, since is dependent thereon.
Brahman is sarva-ñ (omniscient) in the sense that it manifests all that is associated with it, and it is the Brahman that through its appears as the world of experience. The doctrines of avaccheda-岹 and pratibimba-岹 explained in the first volume of the present work are also at least as old as Padmapāda’s ʲñ-徱 , and both Padmapāda and ʰśٳ seem to support the reflection theory (pratibimba-岹), the theory that the ī is but a reflected image of Brahman[3].
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
ʰśٳ also wrote a metrical summary of Śṅk’s ṣy and a work called Ś岹-Ծṇaⲹ, in which he tried to prove the claims of scriptural testimony as valid cognition.
[2]:
As Mr Telang points out in his introduction to the Ѳ--ḍaԲ, it seems that ĀԲԻ岹pūrna lived after Śṅk Miśra (a.d. 1529), as is seen from his criticism of his reading of a passage of the ṇḍԲ-khaṇḍa-khādya, p. 586 (Chowkhambā).
[3]:
See volume I, pp. 475, 476. These two doctrines were probably present in germinal forms as early as the ninth century. But gradually more and more attention seems to have been paid to them. Appaya Dīkṣita gives a fairly good summary of these two doctrines in the Parimala, pp. 335-343, śri Vāni Vilāsa Press, Srirangam, without committing either himself or 峦貹پ to any one of these views.