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[Full title: Communication between a Speaker and a Listener as the Seeing of a Double Moon鈥擨n Light of the Apoha Theory of 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 by Kensho Okada]

Editor鈥檚 note: This contribution contains changes that the author has left to the editor鈥檚 discretion.

Introduction

We experience the practical use of words in our everyday activities 1) when a person under-stands/grasps an object through a word, and 2) when one person tells another something. The latter case is a person-to-person interaction in which a speaker intends to make a listener understand something by speaking word(s), while the listener infers the speaker鈥檚 intention by hearing and interpreting them. Communication is said to be established between the speaker and listener only when they are both present. People are, however, quite distinct from one another. Hence, even if the speaker and listener are present in the same time and space, they perceive altogether different things/images respectively. How can they communicate with each other under such circumstances? Also, what is the way in which they engage in conversation with one another?

艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 (ca. 725鈥�788) and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 (ca. 740鈥�795) present an explanation of this issue in the 艢abd膩rthapar墨k峁Ｄ� chapter of their 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 (TS) and its 辫补帽箩颈办腻 (TSP). This paper aims to examine their view to clarify how they answer the question at hand.

As is well known, 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 offers a threefold classification of the theory of the 鈥渆xclusion of others鈥� (补苍测腻辫辞丑补):

1. Nominally bound negation/Implicative negation (辫补谤测耻诲腻蝉补)

(a) Exclusion having cognition as its essence (产耻诲诲丑测腻迟尘腻辫辞丑补)

(b) Exclusion having a referent as its essence (补谤迟丑腻迟尘腻辫辞丑补)

2. Verbally bound negation/Non-affirmative negation (辫谤补蝉补箩测补辫谤补迟颈峁�e诲丑补)^[1]

Of these three exclusions, two of the 辫补谤测耻诲腻蝉补 variety and one 辫谤补蝉补箩测补辫谤补迟颈峁�e诲丑补, 艢腻苍迟补-rak峁�ita asserts that the exclusion having cognition as its essence (= reflection, pratibimba) is the principal referent denoted by a word, and that the other two are understood by implica-tion. In this way, when reflection is admitted to be the principal referent, the aforementioned question regarding communication arises, for reflections manifest entirely differently in the cognition of individuals. How do 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 resolve this issue?

1. Impossibility of verbal convention-setting

First, let us examine 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补鈥檚 statement, which is the origin of the question we seek to answer. In TS 870, he asserts that the 5 categories of particulars, genus, connection to genus, particulars qualified by genus, and the form of cognition are, ultimately, not suitable as the referent denoted by a word.^[2]

To begin with, arguing over particulars 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 state the following:

tatra 蝉惫补濒补办峁�a峁嘺峁� t膩van na 艣abdai岣� 辫谤补迟颈辫腻诲测补te /
蝉补峁僰别迟补惫测补惫补丑腻谤腻辫迟补办腻濒补惫测腻辫迟颈惫颈测辞驳补迟补岣� // TS 871 //

Of these, first of all, particulars cannot be understood by words. Because [particulars are] devoid of the pervasion of the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity, [convention cannot be set with regard to particu-lars].^[3] (871)^[4]

TSP 341, 14鈥�17 ad TS 871:

etad 耻办迟补峁� bhavati 鈥�samayo hi vyavah膩r膩rtha峁� kriyate, na vyasanitay膩 / tena yasyaiva 蝉补峁僰别迟补vyavah膩r膩ptak膩lavy膩pakatvam asti, tatraiva samayo vyavahart峁濁箛膩峁� 测耻办迟补岣�, 苍腻苍测补迟谤补 / na ca svalak峁�a峁嘺sya 蝉补峁僰别迟补vyavah膩r膩-ptak膩lavy膩pakatvam asti / ta蝉尘腻苍 na tatra samaya iti /

[By this,] the [following] is said: Indeed, verbal convention is made for [use at the time of] verbal activity,^[5] not through [mere] desire for [it]. Therefore, it is suitable to [set] verbal convention only with regard to that which pervades the time pervaded by verbal convention and verbal activity for [people] living daily [with use of language], not on anything else. And particulars do not pervade the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity. Therefore, verbal convention [can]not be [set] with regard to them [i.e., particulars].

Here, from the viewpoint of verbal convention (蝉补峁僰别迟补) and verbal activity (惫测补惫补丑腻谤补), 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 examine whether particulars are suitable to be the referent denoted by a word and indicate that particulars cannot be the target of verbal convention. In the following verses, 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 asserts that (1) convention-setting with regard to particulars is useless for verbal activity^[6] and that (2) it is impossible to make verbal convention in regard to particulars.^[7] In both cases, on the grounds that particulars cannot be something on which verbal convention is established, 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 criticizes the view that particulars are the referent denoted by a word. In the same way, genus, connection to genus, particulars qualified by genus,^[8] and the form of cognition are not accepted as the word-referent due to the impossibility of convention-setting.^[9]

2. Opponent鈥檚 criticism

In the final part of the 艢abd膩rthapar墨k峁Ｄ� chapter of TS/TSP, the impossibility of setting verbal convention and the uselessness of it are discussed once again.^[10]

As previously mentioned, 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 admit that the principal referent denoted by a word is the reflection manifesting in cognition. Therefore, for them, the very reflection is the referent which sets with regard to verbal convention. Criticizing their view, an opponent indicates that the impossibility of setting verbal convention and the uselessness of it are also applied to the reflection that they accept as the object of convention.

The opponent says the following:

nanu 肠腻辫辞丑补辫补办峁�e鈥檖颈 办补迟丑补峁� 蝉补峁僰别迟补sa峁僢hava岣� /
s膩phalya峁� ca 办补迟丑补峁� tasya na dvayo岣� sa hi siddhyati // TS 1207 //
惫补办迟峁浥况辞迟谤辞谤 na hi 箩帽腻苍补峁� vedyate tat parasparam /
sa峁僰ete na ca tad 诲峁涐梗峁璦峁� vyavah膩re sam墨k峁�yate // TS 1208 //

[Objection:] Even in the apoha theory, (1) how can convention[-setting] be possible? (2) How can it be useful, either? (1) For it [i.e., the apoha as reflection] cannot be established between two [persons, i.e.,] a speaker and listener [in the same way]. It is because [they can]not mutually cognize [one another鈥檚] cognition. (2) And, that [reflection] which was perceived at the time of [setting the] verbal convention is not seen [any longer] at the time of verbal activity.

Here, adopting the same method as 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补, the opponent indicates that it can be neither possible nor useful to set verbal convention with regard to a reflection.

As far as the impossibility of the setting of verbal convention with regard to a reflection is concerned, according to the opponent, the speaker never cognizes the reflection manifesting in the listener鈥檚 cognition, nor does the listener cognize the reflection manifesting in the speaker鈥檚 cognition. Therefore, it cannot be established that their reflections are one and the same. This is the reason for the impossibility of the setting of verbal convention with regard to such reflections.

Regarding the uselessness of verbal convention-setting, the opponent asserts that, because the reflection perceived at the time of verbal convention and the one perceived at the time of verbal activity are totally different, it follows that setting verbal convention with regard to a reflection is not useful for ordinary verbal usage.^[11]

With regard to the former question, 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 explains as follows:

TSP 447,1鈥�7 ad TS 1208鈥檃b:

kasm膩d ity 膩ha 鈥�na hi j帽膩nam 颈迟测腻诲颈 / praty膩tmasa峁僾edan墨yam ev膩rv膩gda-r艣a苍腻苍腻峁� j帽膩nam / na hy anyad墨yaj帽膩nam aparo鈥檖aradar艣ana岣� sa峁僾edaya-te / j帽膩苍腻d avyatirikta艣 ca param膩rthata岣� pratibimb膩tmakalak峁�a峁嚹乸oha岣� /

tata艣 ca 惫补办迟峁浥况辞迟谤辞谤 dvayor api kasyacid ekasya 蝉补峁僰别迟补vi峁�ayasy膩rthasy膩-siddhe岣� kutra 蝉补峁僰别迟补岣� kriyate g峁沨yate v膩 / na hy asiddhe vastuni vakt膩 蝉补峁僰别迟补峁� kartum 墨艣a岣�, 苍腻辫颈12 艣谤辞迟腻 驳峁沨墨迟耻尘, 补迟颈辫谤补蝉补峁単腻迟 / 迟补迟丑腻 hi 鈥�艣谤辞迟谤腻13 yat pratipadyate svavij帽膩苍腻r奴岣峢am arthapratibimbaka峁� na tad 惫补办迟谤腻 蝉补峁僾别-诲测补迟别 / yac ca 惫补办迟谤腻 sa峁僾edyate na tac chrotr膩, svasya svasyaiv腻惫补产丑腻蝉补蝉测补 veda苍腻t /

[Reply:] Why? [Objection:] 鈥淸They can]not [cognize one another鈥檚] cogni-tion鈥� and so on. Ordinary persons can only cognize something to be cognized by themselves, for, being an ordinary person, no one knows the cognition [represented in] another鈥檚 [mind]. Moreover, the exclusion, having a reflection as its own nature, is ultimately not different from the cognition. Therefore, [the following question arises:] With regard to what [object] can the convention be set [by a speaker]? In what [object] can the convention be comprehended [by a listener]? It is because the same object is not established as the target of verbal convention at all between the two persons鈥搕hat is, the speaker and listener. Indeed, if nothing real is established, the speaker cannot make any convention; nor can the listener comprehend it. This is because [if such a thing were possible,] an absurd consequence would follow. Namely, the lis-tener would comprehend the reflection of an object manifesting in his own cognition; but the speaker would be unable to cognize it. The listener cannot comprehend what the speaker cognizes. This is because [each] cognizes only his own manifestation.

Here, the argument encounters difficulty when a reflection is regarded as the object with regard to which verbal convention is set. Reflections are different for each individual. An ordinary person can only cognize the reflection manifesting in his own cognition. It is impossible for a reflection to move from one person鈥檚 cognition to another鈥檚. Therefore, in reality, one can neither tell the content of his cognition to another, nor perceive that of another鈥檚 cognition. As a result, it may follow that there is not any object of verbal convention that a speaker and listener share at the time of verbal convention, and thus, the verbal convention itself cannot be established.

3. 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补鈥檚 reply

艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 sought to address this issue. How do they explain the manner of establishing verbal convention? 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 says the following:

svasya svasy膩bh膩sasya vedane鈥檖i sa vartate /
产腻丑测腻谤迟丑腻诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测辞^[12] yo^[13] dvayor api samo 测补迟补岣� // 1209 //
timiropahat膩k峁�o hi 测补迟丑腻 pr膩ha 艣a艣idvayam /

svasam膩ya 迟补迟丑腻 sarv膩 艣膩bd墨 vyavah峁泃ir 尘补迟腻 // 1210 //
vy膩pakatva峁� ca tasyedam i峁ａ弓am 膩dhyavas膩yikam /
mithy膩vabh膩sino hy ete pratyay膩岣� 艣abdanirmit膩岣� // 1211 //

It is because, although [a speaker and listener] cognize their respective man-ifestations, they both equally determine [their respective manifestations] to be an external object. Just as one [person] whose eyes are affected by eye disease says to [another person] like himself 鈥渢here is a double moon,鈥� all verbal activities are thought to be the same. That [i.e., reflection] is accepted as being such a pervader, [i.e., being that which pervades the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity,]^[14] on the basis of [persons] determining [so]. In actuality, these notions brought about by word(s) are [nothing more than] something manifesting erroneously.

Commenting on TS 1209, 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 states the following: TSP 447,12鈥�448,3 ad TS 1209:

na hi param膩rthato j帽膩苍腻k膩ro鈥檖i 艣abd膩苍腻峁� v膩cyatay膩鈥檅h墨峁ａ弓a岣�, yena tatra sa峁僰et膩sambhava艣 codyate / 测补迟补岣� sarva ev膩ya峁� 艣膩bdo 惫测补惫补丑腻谤补岣� svapra-tibh膩s膩nurodhena taimirikadvayadvicandradar艣anavad 产丑谤腻苍迟补 颈峁�y补迟别 / ke-valam artha艣奴ny膩bhijalpav膩sa苍腻prabodh膩c chabdebhyo鈥檙th膩dhyavas膩yivi-kalpam膩trotp膩d膩t17 tat pratibimbaka峁� 艣abd膩苍腻峁� v膩cyam ity abhidh墨yate jana苍腻t, na tv abhidheyatay膩 / tatra yady api svasya svasyaiv腻惫补产丑腻蝉补蝉测补 vakt峁浥況ot峁沚hy膩峁� param膩rthata岣� 蝉补峁僾别诲补苍补尘, 迟补迟丑腻pi taimirikadvayasyeva bhr膩ntib墨jasya tulyatv膩d dvayor api 惫补办迟峁浥况辞迟谤辞谤 产腻丑测腻谤迟丑腻诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测补蝉 tulya eva / 迟补迟丑腻pi vaktur ayam abhim膩no vartate 鈥�yam ev膩ham 补谤迟丑补峁� pratip膩dye tam ev膩ya峁� pratipadyata iti / 别惫补峁� 艣rotur api yojyam /

别办腻谤迟丑腻诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测颈迟惫补峁� katham anayor vakt峁浥況otro岣� paraspara峁� viditam iti cet, yadi 苍腻尘补 param膩rthato na viditam, 迟补迟丑腻pi bhr膩ntib墨jasya tulyatv膩d asty eva param膩rthata岣� svapratibh膩s膩nurodhena taimirikadvayavad 产丑谤腻苍迟补 ev膩ya峁� 惫测补惫补丑腻谤补 iti niveditam etat / tenaik膩rth膩dhyavas膩yava艣膩t 蝉补峁僰别迟补-kara峁嘺m upapadyata eva /

Indeed, ultimately, the form of cognition is also not admitted to be the referent denoted by words, so that the impossibility of [setting] convention with regard to it [i.e., the form of cognition] would be criticized. It is because all verbal activities are admitted to be something erroneous, just as in the case of two persons affected by eye disease [both] seeing double moons in accordance with their respective manifestations. Merely by awakening of the latent disposition which [is deposited] through objectless discourse, only conceptual [cognitions], by which [a manifestation] is determined as being an object, are produced by words. [Hence,] on the grounds that [conceptual cognition is] produced [by a word], that reflection [of conceptual cognition] is said to be the referent denoted by words; not on the grounds that [the reflection is, in reality, the referent denoted by a word]. That being the case, although a speaker and listener ultimately only cognize their respective manifestations, they still both equally determine [their respective manifestations] to be external objects, because [they] share the cause of the error, just as in the case of two persons affected by eye disease [both seeing a double moon]. Even so, the speaker thinks, 鈥淗e [i.e., the listener] also understands the object that I understand.鈥� So does the listener.^[15]

[Question:] How can the speaker and the listener know that they are determin-ing the same object?

[Reply:] Although they ultimately cannot know [it], such a verbal activity, which is nothing but erroneous, [is still established between them] in accor-dance with their respective manifestations, because [they] share the cause of the error, just as the case of the two persons affected by eye disease. It has already been explained. Therefore, it is quite possible that verbal convention is made by the force of [people] determining [their respective manifestations] to be the same.

艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 accept that, in reality, a speaker and listener cognize only their own respective manifestations. According to them, however, a speaker and listener determine their own manifestations as external things in the same way. This same determi-nation is the reason for the establishment of verbal convention. That is to say, a convention is established on the basis of the thinking that 鈥渨e perceive the same thing.鈥� Based on this erroneous determination, two persons can communicate.

Moreover, there would appear to be no difference between the verbal activity of persons affected by eye disease and that of ordinary persons, given that all people cognize only their own respective manifestations. 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 therefore assert that all verbal activity is erroneous.

4. Causal relation between word and intention

It is found that 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 uses this example of 鈥渢wo persons affected by eye disease seeing a double moon in the same way鈥� also in the 艢腻产诲补vic膩ra section of the Pram膩峁嚹乶tarapar墨k峁Ｄ� chapter and 艢谤耻迟颈par墨k峁Ｄ� chapter of the TSP. There, 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 denies that there is an invariable connection between a word and an external thing, and suggests that a causal relation is established between a word and speaker鈥檚 intention.^[16] While commenting on such statements by 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补, 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 gives explanations with use of the example of 鈥渢wo persons affected by eye disease.鈥�^[17]

Here, let us consider the views of 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 as presented in the 艢腻产诲补vic膩ra section of the TS/TSP.

There, as mentioned above, rejecting an invariable connection between a word and an external thing, 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 explains the manner in which verbal cognition is meant to be included in the inference.

vacobhyo nikhilebhyo鈥檖i vivak峁�ai峁Ｄ乶um墨yate /
pratyak峁Ｄ乶upalambh膩bhy膩峁� taddhetu岣� s膩 hi ni艣cit膩 // TS 1514 //

From all words it follows that [speaker鈥檚] intention is inferred. For it [i.e., intention] is ascertained to be the cause of a word through perception and non-perception.

Here, 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 states that an invariable connection having causality as its character is established between a word and an intention, and suggests that a word is a valid cognition with regard to intention. In some cases, however, an intention and an uttered word are known to be different. That is to say, it is just as in the case of some speaker uttering the word 鈥淵鈥� erroneously while intending to speak about 鈥淴.鈥� In this case, it is assumed that the fallacy lies not in the word but in the erroneous speaker.^[18]

Furthermore, with respect to a word鈥檚 deviation from a particular intention, 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 gives explanatory statements as follows:

TSP 541, 5鈥�11 ad TS 1517鈥�1518:

api ca, 测补诲腻 sarva ev膩ya峁� 艣膩bdo 惫测补惫补丑腻谤补s taimirikadvayadvicandradar艣a-navat svapratibh膩s膩nurodhena 产丑谤腻苍迟补 eve峁�yate, 迟补诲腻 办补迟丑补峁� vivak峁Ｄ乿i艣e峁�e vyabhic膩rodbh膩va苍腻d apr膩m膩峁噛aprasa帽jana峁� sy膩t, tatra vivak峁Ｄ乿i艣e峁�e p膩-ram膩rthikasya pr膩m膩峁噛asy膩nabhyupagam膩t / 迟补迟丑腻 c膩ha 鈥�sa峁僰et膩pe办峁�a测腻 tasya h峁沝i k峁泃v膩 prak膩艣anam / anum膩natvam uddi峁ａ弓a峁� na tu tattvavyape-办峁�a测腻 // iti /

Furthermore, when all verbal activity is accepted to be erroneous due to dependence on [respective] manifestations of one鈥檚 own, just as two persons affected by eye disease see a double moon [in the same way], how can [a word/ verbal cognition] be invalid on the basis of pointing out the deviation from a particular intention [of speaker]. For it is not accepted that [a word/verbal cognition has] ultimate validity with regard to a particular intention of speaker. The same thing is stated as follows: A word (/verbal cognition) is said to be an inference just when it is taken into consideration that a word makes manifest [an object] with dependence on verbal convention, not when with dependence on real truth.^[19]

Here, from the standpoint that all verbal activity is erroneous, 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 implicitly indi-cates that the validity of words/verbal knowledge is not ultimate but conventional. Thus, as long as the erroneousness of verbal knowledge is considered, it follows that the validity of a word/verbal knowledge depends only on verbal convention, and has nothing to do with real truth.

For example, when one taimirika (person affected by eye disease) says to another taimirika 鈥渢here is a double moon in the sky鈥� and the latter agrees with the former, it follows that based on this agreement, verbal convention is established between them. In this case, in reality, the so-called 鈥渄ouble moon鈥� does not exist, and the word 鈥渄ouble moon鈥� would be nonsense. However, to the two taimirika the word 鈥渄ouble moon鈥� is thought to be useful.

Conclusion

To conclude, when reflection is admitted to be the referent denoted by a word, a speaker and listener cannot share the same real object, because they only cognize different reflections manifesting in their respective cognitions. They, however, think/believe that they perceive the same thing by the force of determination. Based on this same determination, the setting of convention is established. Therefore, according to 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补, all verbal activity is erroneous, as it is the same as when two persons affected by eye disease both see a double moon.

Supplemental remarks

As discussed above, bearing in mind that a person cognizes only his own representation, 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 and 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 suggest that all verbal activity is established in the same ways as two persons with eye disease equally see a double moon. Interestingly enough, similar views have been presented by 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 in his 厂补苍迟腻苍腻苍迟补谤补蝉颈诲诲丑颈 (SS) and by Vin墨tadeva in his 厂补苍迟腻苍腻苍迟补谤补蝉颈诲诲丑颈峁�墨k膩 (厂厂峁�).^[20] 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 and Vin墨tadeva state the following:

SS 65 48,5鈥�10:

bdag dang gzhan la rang rang gi snang ba nyams su myong mod kyi / rab rib can gnyis kyis zla ba gnyis mthong ba bzhin du rnam par shes pa de lta bu鈥檌 rgyu鈥檌 bag chags skye ba鈥檌 rang bzhin gyi khyad par thog ma med pa鈥檌 dus las don gcig鈥檇zin par nges pa鈥檌 phyir ro //

[A representation is called a manifest action (惫颈箩帽补辫迟颈).] It is because although each person [i.e., a speaker and listener,]^[21] experiences his own representations, just as two persons with eye-disease perceive a double moon [in the same way], it is determined that the same thing is grasped by a special nature, which has as its nature the arising of the latent disposition [produced by] the cause of such cognition, from beginningless time.

厂厂峁� 49,17鈥�50,18 ad SS 65:

鈥�di ltar smra ba po yang鈥檇i snyam du bdag gis smras pa gang yin pa鈥檇i nyan pa pos rtogs par鈥檊yur ro snyam du sems pa la / nyan pa po yang鈥檇i snyam du鈥檇is smras pa gang yin pa de ni bdag gis rtogs so snyam du sems par鈥檊yur te / 鈥� 鈥� 鈥�di skad du smra ba po dang nyan pa po dag rang rang gi snang ba nyams su myong mod kyi / 鈥�on kyang de gnyis kyi bya ba dang tshig gi rnam pa can gyi shes pa rgyu gcig las鈥檅yung ba gang dag yin pa de dag don gcig tu shes par nges pa鈥檌 phyir rnam par rig byed du tha snyad鈥檇ogs par byed do // don gcig tu鈥檇zin par nges pa ni rnam par shes pa de lta bu鈥檌 rgyu鈥檌 bag chags skye ba鈥檌 rang bzhin gyi khyad par thog ma med pa las byung ba鈥檌 phyir ro // 鈥�dir dpe ni rab rib can gnyis kyis zla ba gnyis su mthong ba bzhin te / rab rib can gcig gis rab rib can gnyis la ltos zhes zla ba gzhan zhig ston pa las des mthong ngo zhes smras pa na / de la ni ston pa po yang鈥檇i snyam du bdag gis鈥檇i la bstan to snyam du nga rgyal byed par鈥檊yur la nyan pa po yang鈥檇i snyam du鈥檇is bdag la bstan to snyam du sems mod kyi / 鈥�on kyang de gnyis ni rang rang gi snang ba so sor nyams su myong bar zad do //

That is to say, the speaker thinks 鈥渢he listener will understand what I say.鈥� The listener, in his turn, thinks 鈥淚 have understood what he said.鈥� 鈥� Although the speaker and the listener both experience their respective representations, cognitions having the form of action and speech appear in both from the same cause, and these [cognitions] determinately grasp the same thing. Therefore, it is called manifest action (惫颈箩帽补辫迟颈) metaphorically. Because there exists a special nature, which has as its nature the arising of the latent disposition [produced by] the cause of such cognition, from beginningless time, the same thing is determinately grasped. 鈥�Just as in the case that two persons see a double moon鈥� is the example [demonstrating] this. If a person affected by eye disease (A) indicates another moon and says to another person affected by eye disease (B) 鈥淟ook!鈥� and he (B) says 鈥淚 see [it],鈥� then, the speaker thinks 鈥淚 have indicated it to him,鈥� and the listener thinks 鈥渉e indicated it to me.鈥� Even so, they both only cognize their respective representations.

References and abbreviations

AJP 础苍别办腻苍迟补箩补测补辫补迟腻办腻 (Haribhadra): 础苍别办腻苍迟补箩补测补辫补迟腻办腻 by Haribhadra 厂奴谤颈: with his own commentary and Municandra 厂奴谤颈鈥�s supercommentary, ed. H. R. K膩pad墨膩. Baroda 1940.

AVK 础苍测腻辫辞丑补惫颈肠腻谤补办腻谤颈办腻 (艢耻产丑补驳耻辫迟补): D4246, P5744.

McAllister 2011 P. McAllister, 搁补迟苍补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 Apohasiddhi: A Critical Edition, Annotated Translation and Study. Dissertation, Universit盲t Wien. Wien 2011.

Mikogami 1993 E. Mikogami, 艢耻产丑补驳耻辫迟补 no Komyunik膿shon Ron. In: Genshi Daij艒 Bukky艒 to Daij艒 Bukky艒, ed. E. Maeda. Ky艒to 1993 (in Japanese).

PV I Pram膩峁嘺v膩rttika, chapter I (顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈): See PVSV.

PVSV Pram膩峁嘺v膩rttikasvav峁泃ti (顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈): The Pram膩峁嘺v膩rttikam of 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈: The First Chapter with The Autocommentary, ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.

笔痴厂痴峁� Pram膩峁嘺v膩rttikav峁泃ti峁�墨k膩 (碍补谤峁嘺办补驳辞尘颈苍): 碍补谤峁嘺办补驳辞尘颈苍鈥檚 Commentary on the Pram膩峁嘺v膩rttikav峁泃ti of 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈, ed. R. S膩峁卥峁泃y膩yana. Repr. Kyoto 1982.

笔痴峁� 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫腻谤迟迟颈办补峁�墨k腻 (艢膩kyabuddhi): D4220, P5718.

SS Sa峁僼膩苍腻ntarasiddhi (顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈): 厂补苍迟腻苍腻苍迟补谤补蝉颈诲诲丑颈, ed. T. Stcherbatsky. Petrograd 1916.

厂厂峁� Sa峁僼膩苍腻ntarasiddhi峁�墨k膩 (Vin墨tadeva): See SS.

TS 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 (艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补): See TSP (G) and TSP (B). The verse-numbers follow TSP (B).

TS (D) 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 (艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补). Tibetan: D4266.

TS (P) 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 (艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补). Tibetan: P5764.

TSP 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补辫补帽箩颈办腻 (碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补): See TSP (G) and TSP (B). Page-and line-numbers are given in accordance with TSP (B).

TSP (B) 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补辫补帽箩颈办腻 (碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补): Tattvasa峁単raha of 膧肠腻谤测补 Sh膩ntarak峁�ita with the Commentary 鈥�笔补帽箩颈办腻鈥� of Shr墨 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补, ed. S. D. Shastri. Varanasi 1968. TSP (G) 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补辫补帽箩颈办腻 (碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补): Tattvasa峁単raha of 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补: With the Commentary of 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补, ed. E. Krishnamacharya. Baroda 1926.

TSP (D) 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补辫补帽箩颈办腻 (碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补). Tibetan: D4267.

TSP (P) 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补辫补帽箩颈办腻 (碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补). Tibetan: P5765.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Cf. TS 1003, 1010, and 1014cd.

[2]:

Cf. TS 870: 测补迟补岣� 蝉惫补濒补办峁�a峁嘺峁� 箩腻迟颈蝉 tadyogo j膩tim膩峁僺 迟补迟丑腻 / 产耻诲诲丑测腻办腻谤辞 na 艣abd膩rthe gha峁�膩m 补帽肠补迟颈 迟补迟迟惫补迟补岣� //; McAllister 2011: 181鈥�182.

[3]:

Cf. TSP 341,13鈥�14 ad TS 871: na tatra svalak峁�a峁噀 samaya iti 艣e峁�a岣� /

[4]:

Cf. PV I 92: 艣abd膩岣� sa峁僰etita峁� pr膩hur vyavah膩r膩ya sa sm峁泃a岣� / 迟补诲腻 蝉惫补濒补办峁�a峁嘺峁� 苍腻蝉迟颈 蝉补峁僰别迟补s tena tatra na // 鈥淲ords express something upon which verbal convention has been agreed and it [i.e., verbal convention] is recalled for the purpose of verbal activity. At the time [of verbal activity] the particular [with regard to which verbal convention is set] no longer exists. Therefore, verbal convention is not set with regard to the particular.鈥�

[5]:

According to 艢膩kyabuddhi鈥檚 commentary, 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 asserts that the purposes of verbal convention are 1) the understanding of form of cognition and 2) the apprehension of particulars. Cf. 笔痴峁� D127a7鈥揵5/ P151a3鈥揵2 ad PV I 110d and PVSV 57,15鈥�19.

[6]:

Cf. TS 873: tasm膩t 蝉补峁僰别迟补d峁涐梗峁璷鈥檙tho vyavah膩re na d峁浥泍ate / na c膩g峁沨墨tasa峁僰eto 驳补尘测补迟别鈥档测补 (驳补尘测补迟别鈥档测补 G; (产辞诲丑测别迟腻)nya B) iva dhvane岣� // 鈥淭herefore, the thing perceived [at the time of] verbal convention is never perceived at [the time of] verbal activity. And, that which is not grasped by a verbal convention cannot be understood by a word. Just as with the fact that another thing [e.g. horse] cannot be [understood by the word 鈥榗ow鈥橾.鈥�

[7]:

Cf. TSP 344,1鈥�3 ad TS 875鈥�876: 别惫补峁� t膩vat svalak峁�a峁噀 vyavah膩r膩nupapatte岣� samayavaiyarthyaprasa峁単膩n na 蝉补尘补测补岣� sambhavat墨ti pratip膩ditam / s膩mpratam a艣akyakriyatv膩d eva na sambhavat墨ti pratip膩dayann 膩ha鈥摬古洸拱觳獠钩� 颈迟测腻诲颈 / 鈥淚n this way, because verbal action toward particulars is impossi-ble, it would follow that verbal convention is useless, [Therefore, the setting of] verbal convention with regard to particulars is impossible. This is, firstly, understood. Next, in order to explain that, because it is impossible to make [verbal convention], [the setting of verbal convention] is impossible, [艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补] states 鈥�补艣补办测补尘鈥� and so on.鈥�

[8]:

Cf. TS 882: 箩腻迟颈蝉ambandhayo岣� 辫奴谤惫补峁� vy膩sata岣� prati峁�edha苍腻t / 苍腻nantar膩岣� prakalpyante 艣abd膩rth膩s trividh膩岣� pare // 鈥淏ecause genus and connection have been already rejected in detail before, the other three [which are enumerated] immediately after [particulars] are not supposed to be the referent of a word.鈥� TSP 348,7鈥�8 ad TS 882: 别惫补峁� t膩vat svalak峁�a峁噀 sa尘补测腻sambhava峁� 辫谤补迟颈辫腻诲测补 j膩ty膩di峁�u tri峁�u sa尘补测腻sambhava峁� pratip膩dayann 膩ha鈥撀崮宄倬辈鮝mbandhayor 颈迟测腻诲颈 / 鈥淚n this way, to begin with, the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention with regard to particulars is explained. After this, in order to explain the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention with regard to three things鈥搕hat is, genus and so on [艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补] states 鈥�箩腻迟颈蝉ambandhayor鈥� and so on.鈥�

[9]:

Cf. TS 884: buddhy膩k膩ra艣 ca buddhistho 苍腻rthabuddhyantar膩nuga岣� / 苍腻bhipret膩rthak膩r墨 ca so鈥檖i v膩cyo na 迟补迟迟惫补迟补岣� // 鈥淢oreover, existing [only] in some cognition [as identical in nature], the form of cognition follows neither [external] things nor other cognitions, and does not accomplish desired purposes. Ultimately, that [i.e., the form of cognition] is also not the referent denoted [by a word].鈥� TSP 349,2鈥�4 ad TS 884: 产耻诲诲丑测腻办腻谤辞 hi t膩d膩tmyena 产耻诲诲丑腻惫 ev膩vasthita iti 苍腻sau tadbuddhisvar奴pavat 辫谤补迟颈辫腻诲测补m 补谤迟丑补峁� buddhyantara峁� v膩nugacchati / tata艣 ca 蝉补峁僰别迟补vyavah膩r膩ptak膩l膩vy膩pakatv膩t svalak峁�a峁嘺van na tatr膩pi 蝉补尘补测补岣� sambhavati / 鈥溾�� Therefore, [the setting of] verbal convention with regard to it [i.e., form of cognition] is also impossible, because it does not pervade the time extending from verbal convention to verbal activity, just as particulars.鈥�

[10]:

Cf. TS 1206ab: sa峁僰et膩sambhavo hy atra 产丑别诲腻诲补耻 蝉腻诲丑颈迟补岣� 辫耻谤腻 / 鈥淚ndeed, the impossibility of [the setting of] verbal convention with regard to particulars and so on has already been proved before.鈥� TSP 446,8鈥�10 ad TS 1206ab: a艣akyasamayatv膩d ananyabh膩ktv膩c ceti 辫奴谤惫补峁� svalak峁�a峁嚹乨au sa峁僰et膩sa-mbhavasya 蝉补峁僰别迟补vaiphalyasya ca pras膩dhitatv膩t / 鈥淚t is because the impossibility of [setting] verbal convention and the uselessness of it with regard to particulars and so on have already been proved in such ways as 鈥榖ecause [the setting of] verbal convention is impossible鈥� and 鈥榖ecause of having no connection with the others鈥�.鈥�

[11]:

Commenting on the opponent鈥檚 view, 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 explains the uselessness of the setting convention with regard to reflections as follows: Cf. TSP 447,7鈥�11 ad TS 1208cd: 膩narthakya峁� ca pratip膩dayann 膩ha鈥搒a峁僰ete na cety膩di / yat 蝉补峁僰别迟补k膩le pratibimbakam 补苍耻产丑奴迟补峁� 艣谤辞迟谤腻 惫补办迟谤腻 v膩, na tad 惫测补惫补丑腻谤补k膩le鈥檔ubh奴yate, tasya k峁�a峁嘺k峁�ayitvena ciraniruddhatv膩t / yac ca 惫测补惫补丑腻谤补k膩le鈥檔ubh奴yate na tat 蝉补峁僰别迟补-k膩le d峁涐梗峁璦m, anyasyaiva 迟补诲腻n墨m anubh奴yam膩natv膩t / na c膩nyatra sa峁僰et膩d anyatra vyavah膩ro 测耻办迟补岣�, atiprasa峁単膩d iti / 鈥淚n addition, in order to explain the uselessness [of setting convention with regard to reflection, the opponent] states 鈥�sa峁僰ete na ca鈥� and so on. Some reflection has been experienced by a listener or by a speaker at the time of the verbal convention. [However, ] that [reflection] cannot be experienced at the time of verbal activity. This is because that [reflection], being momentary, has ceased to existence long before [the time of the verbal activity]. Moreover, that which is experienced at the time of the verbal activity cannot be that which has been perceived at the time of verbal convention. This is because a very different [reflection] is experienced at that time (= at the time of verbal activity). And, it is untenable that verbal activity regarding Y is [established] on the basis of verbal convention [set with regard to] X. This is because [otherwise] an absurd consequence would follow.鈥�

[12]:

掳腻诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测辞 em. (cf. zhen pa D, P; 产腻丑测腻谤迟丑腻诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测补蝉 tulya eva TSP 477,18); 掳腻诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测别 G, B.

[13]:

yo em.; yad G, B; yad om. D, P.

[14]:

Cf. TSP 448,6鈥�8 ad TS 1211: 蝉补峁僰别迟补vyavah膩r膩ptak膩lavy膩pakatva峁� ca vakt峁浥況ot峁沚hy膩m adhyava-sit膩rthapratibimbakasy膩vas膩yava艣膩d eve峁ａ弓a峁�, na param膩rthata岣� /

[15]:

碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 has already stated the same thing in the following portion. Cf. TSP 358,9鈥�12 ad TS 908: etad 耻办迟补峁� bhavati鈥損aram膩rthata岣� svapratibh膩s膩nubhave鈥檖i vaktur evam adhyavas膩yo bhavati鈥�尘补测腻鈥檚尘补颈 产腻丑测补 ev膩rtha岣� 辫谤补迟颈辫腻诲测补te / 艣rotur apy 别惫补峁� bhavati鈥搈am膩ya峁� 产腻丑测补m eva pratip膩dayat墨ti / atas taimirikadvayadvicandradar艣anavad 补测补峁� sarva岣� 艣膩bdo 惫测补惫补丑腻谤补 iti (cf. sgra las byung ba鈥檌 tha snyad鈥檇i thams cad de lta bu yin no D, P) /

[16]:

Cf. TS 1512 (艢腻产诲补): vacas膩峁� pratibandho v膩 ko b膩hye峁�v api vastu峁�u / pratip膩dayat膩峁� t膩ni yenai峁Ｄ佱箖 sy膩t pram膩峁嘺t膩 // 鈥淗ow can be there any invariable connection between words and external things? If [invariable connection were to be admitted], words expressing them [i.e., external things,] would be valid cognition.鈥� TS 2618 (艢谤耻迟颈): s膩k峁Ｄ乧 chabd膩 na b膩hy膩rthapratibandhavivekata岣� / gamayant墨ti ca prokta峁� vivak峁Ｄ乻奴cak膩s tv am墨 // 鈥淚t has already explained that words do not make [external things] known directly, because there is no invariable connection between external things [and words]. And, these [i.e., words,] are [nothing but] something indicating [the presence of the speaker鈥檚] intention.鈥� TSP 854,1鈥�3 ad TS 2618: vivak峁Ｄ乵 api na v膩cyatay膩 pratip膩dayanti, ki峁� tarhi, li峁単atay膩 s奴cayanti / ata eva s奴cak膩 ity uktam / 迟补迟丑腻 hi鈥撆沘bd膩d uccarit膩d arth膩dhyavas膩y墨 vikalpo j膩yate, na vivak峁Ｄ乨hyavas膩y墨 / 鈥淸Words] do not express [the speaker鈥檚] intention as something denoted [by words]. How then? [Words merely] indicate [the speaker鈥檚 intention] as a logical mark. Therefore, [words are] said to be something indicating. That is to say, [when] a word is uttered, there arises a conceptual cognition which judges an [external] thing, not [a conceptual cognition which] judges [the speaker鈥檚] intention.鈥�

[17]:

In his TS 2620, 艢腻苍迟补谤补办峁�i迟补 asserts that only when a person has already cognized a causal relation, can he know a speaker鈥檚 intention through words. Against this, the opponent objects that verbal convention cannot be a means for knowing a particular intention of a speaker. In response, 碍补尘补濒补艣墨濒补 criticizes the opponent鈥檚 view with use of the example of 鈥渢wo persons affected by eye disease seeing a double moon.鈥� Cf. TSP 854,12鈥�22 ad TS 2620.

[18]:

Cf. TS 1515鈥�1516: 产丑谤腻苍迟补sy膩nyavivak峁Ｄ亂膩峁� 惫腻办测补峁� ced anyad 墨k峁�yate / 测补迟丑腻vivak峁�am (测补迟丑腻vivak峁�am B; 迟补迟丑腻 vivak峁�am G) apy etat ta蝉尘腻苍 (etat ta蝉尘腻苍 B; etatta(k峁Ｄ乻膩m膩nye ta?)蝉尘腻苍 G [sic]) naiva pravartate // bhr膩nt膩产丑谤腻苍迟补prayukt膩苍腻峁� vailak峁�a峁噛a峁� parisphu峁璦m / vidagdh膩岣� prak峁泃膩dibhyo ni艣cinvanti gir膩m alam // vailak峁�a峁噛ena het奴苍腻峁� 惫颈艣别峁�a峁� t膩su ye na tu / avagacchanti do峁�o鈥檡a峁� te峁Ｄ佱箖 li峁単asya 苍腻蝉迟颈 tu // 鈥淸Objection:] It is found that as for an erroneous person, his statement and intention are different. Therefore, it [i.e., his statement] cannot be made in accordance with intention. [Reply:] There is clearly a difference between words used by an erroneous person and those used by a non-erroneous person. [However,] clever men [definitely] discern [this difference] through context and so son. The fallacy lies not in the logical mark, but in the persons who do not notice the difference among them [i.e., these words] due to difference of their causes.鈥�

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The source for this citation is uncertain.

[20]:

For your information, similar descriptions can also be found in 艢耻产丑补驳耻辫迟补鈥檚 础苍测腻辫辞丑补惫颈肠腻谤补办腻谤颈办腻 (AVK) and 碍补谤峁嘺办补驳辞尘颈苍鈥檚 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫腻谤迟迟颈办补蝉惫补惫峁泃迟颈峁�墨k腻 (笔痴厂痴峁�), as far as treatises on apoha theory are concerned. Cf. Mikogami 1993. Cf. AVK D198a1鈥�2: rang gi blo la snang ba ni // rig pa yin yang phyi rol dang // gcig par鈥檇zin pa鈥檌 nga rgyal skye // rab rib can du mtshungs blo bzhin // 鈥淎lthough [persons] cognize their own [respective] manifestations, they [erroneously] think 鈥榃e comprehend the same external thing,鈥� just as the cognitions of persons suffering from same eye disease.鈥� This verse is quoted in 础苍别办腻苍迟补箩补测补辫补迟腻办腻 (AJP 338,6鈥�7 svabuddhipratibh膩sasya sa峁僾itt膩v api j膩yate / bahi-rarthagrahe 尘腻苍补蝉 tulyataimirabuddhivat //); PVSV 60,26鈥�61,1: 鈥� pratipatt膩 pratipattim anus峁泃ya ete 惫峁沰峁Ｄ� iti svaparavikalpe峁�v ekapratibh膩s膩n 膩dar艣ya vikalpavij帽膩ne vyavasthitas tadvij帽膩nahet奴n bhedena pratipadyetety uktim ataddhetubhyo bhede niyu峁卥te. 鈥溾�� [One who makes the setting of a verbal convention] applies a word to what is excluded from those which are not its causes with the following hope: The cognizer [for whom the verbal convention is made such as 鈥�tree鈥橾 would be able to understand that these are trees [when he hears the word 鈥榯ree鈥橾 in accordance with his understanding [of the verbal convention], having referred to [the object] which equally appear in the cognitions of himself and others, although being dependent [solely on his own conceptual cognition], by differentiating the causes of this [cognition from others];鈥� 笔痴厂痴峁� 241,10鈥�21 ad PVSV 60,27: nanu vy膩v峁泃tasya svalak峁�a-峁嘺sya 惫测补惫补丑腻谤补k膩le鈥檔ugamo 苍腻蝉迟颈. 苍腻辫颈 vikalpapratibh膩sina岣� s膩m膩ny膩k膩rasya svaj帽膩苍腻bhinnatv膩d vikalp膩ntare鈥檔vayo鈥檚ti. 苍腻辫颈 vakt峁泂a峁僢andhinas tasya 艣rotu岣� 艣rot峁泂a峁僢andhino v膩 vaktu岣� prat墨ti岣�, anyacetodharmatve苍腻t墨ndriyatv膩t. na c膩pratipanne 蝉补尘补峁� 辫谤补迟颈辫腻诲测补pratip膩dak膩bhy膩峁� 蝉补峁僰别迟补岣� sa峁僢havat墨ty ata 膩ha鈥攕vaparety膩di. 鈥� etad 耻办迟补峁� bhavati鈥搚athaikas taimiriko dvicandra峁� d峁涐梗峁璿膩-nyataimirik膩yopadi艣an svad峁涐梗峁璦m evopadi艣ati, na parad峁涐梗峁璦m, 补辫谤补迟测补办峁�a迟惫腻迟 / atha ca tasyaiva峁� bhavati鈥揳yam eva 尘补测腻 parasmai pratip膩dita iti / paro鈥檖i ca svasa峁僼膩nabh膩vinam eva dvicandr膩k膩-ra峁� pratiyan ya eva pratip膩dakena mama pratip膩ditas sa eva 尘补测腻 pratipanna iti manyate / tadvat 辫谤补迟颈辫腻诲测补辫谤补迟颈辫腻诲补办补yor buddhy膩k膩rasy膩dhyavasita-产腻丑测补r奴pasya bhede鈥檖y 别办补迟惫腻诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测腻迟 蝉补峁僰别迟补kara峁嘺m / 惫测补惫补丑腻谤补k膩le ca tasyaiva prat墨ti岣�, 别办补迟惫腻诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测腻迟 / 鈥淸Objection:] An excluded particular does not continue to exist at the time of verbal activity. Also, since the form of the universal manifesting in one鈥檚 conceptual cognition is not different from this one鈥檚 own cognition, it does not occur in the other鈥檚 conceptual cognition. Neither one who listens to the speaker nor one who speaks to the listener cognize [the form of the universal manifesting in the others鈥� conceptual cognition], because it is not cognizable by sense organs. It is because it is the quality belonging to the other鈥檚 mind. When [the form of the universal appearing in the others鈥� conceptual cognition] is not cognized, the speaker (辫谤补迟颈辫腻诲补办补) and listener (辫谤补迟颈辫腻诲测补) cannot equally make verbal convention. [Reply:] [顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈] states 鈥�svapara鈥� and so on. 鈥� [By this,] the following is said: When some person affected by eye disease sees a double moon and tells this to another person affected by eye disease, he describes only that which is perceived by himself, not that which is perceived by anyone else. This is because [he] cannot perceive [what anyone else perceives]. And he thinks 鈥業 explain it to him.鈥� Also, another person, understanding the form of the double moon that belongs to his own mind, thinks 鈥業 understand what he has explained to me.鈥� In the same way, although the forms of cognition, which are determined to be an external thing, are different between someone explaining [i.e., speaker] and someone to be explained [i.e., listener], conventions are made [on the forms of cognition] by the force of the determination of [these forms] being the same. And, it [i.e., the form of cognition] is cognized at the time of verbal activity, because [the form of cognition at the time of verbal activity is] determined to be the same [as that at the time of verbal convention].鈥� (There is no corresponding description in 艢膩kyabuddhi鈥檚 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫腻谤迟迟颈办补峁�墨k腻.)

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Cf. 厂厂峁� 48,13鈥�14: bdag dang gzhan zhes bya ba ni smra ba po dang nyan pa po鈥檕 //