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In Indian logic, fallacy is called 丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补. 贬别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补 is defined as something which seems to be a true hetu but which is wrong and which prevents us from arriving at an 补苍耻尘腻苍补. Literally speaking, 丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补 means a fallacious reason which looks like a hetu but is not hetu (hetuvad膩bh膩sate iti...) . In the 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补dip墨k膩, 丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补 is defined as that which is the subject of a right knowledge that prevents a judgment.^[1]

S.C. Chatterjee rightly holds,

鈥淭丑别 狈测腻测补 account of the fallacies of inference is accordingly limited to those of its members or constituent propositions and these have been finally reduced to those of hetu or reason鈥�.^[2]

For the purpose of proof of an inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补), Gautama mentions five constituents of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补), viz.,

1. 辫谤补迟颈箩帽腻,
2. hetu,
3. 耻诲腻丑补谤补峁嘺,
4. upanaya and
5. nigamana.

The validity of an inference depends on the validity of these five constituent parts of it. If there is anything wrong with any of its members, the syllogism as a whole becomes fallacious. The fallacies of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) ultimately arise out of the fallacious reason (丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补). There are no formal fallacies in the 狈测腻测补 system, which is not concerned with formal truth. The 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 bring the fallacies of inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) under the fallacies of the reason.

Different kinds of 贬别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补:

In the 狈测腻测补 system Gautama classified all the inferential fallacies under five heads,^[3] viz., (i) 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补, (ii) viruddha, (iii) 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补, (iv) 蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补, and (v) 办腻濒腻迟墨迟补 or 产腻诲丑颈迟补.

The fallacies of reason have been variously named and classified by various logicians, e.g.,

Gautama:

1. 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补,
2. viruddha,
3. 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补,
4. 蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补,
5. 办腻濒腻迟墨迟补 (产腻诲丑颈迟补).

骋补峁単别艣补:

1. 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补,
2. viruddha,
3. 蝉补迟辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�a,
4. asiddha,
5. 产腻诲丑颈迟补.

叠丑腻蝉补谤惫补箩帽补:

1. asiddha,
2. viruddha,
3. 补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补,
4. 办腻濒腻迟测补测腻辫补诲颈峁ａ弓补,
5. 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补.

碍补峁嚹乨补:

1. aprasiddha,
2. viruddha,
3. 蝉补峁僤颈驳诲丑补.

笔谤补艣补蝉迟补辫腻诲补: adds anadhyavasita in the list of 碍补峁嚹乨补, but later on includes it under the sub types of asiddha

碍别艣补惫补尘颈艣谤补:

1. asiddha,
2. viruddha,
3. 补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补,
4. 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补,
5. 办腻濒腻迟测补测腻辫补诲颈峁ａ弓补.

础苍苍补尘产丑补峁�峁�补:

1. 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补,
2. viruddha,
3. 蝉补迟辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�a,
4. asiddha,
5. 补惫腻诲丑颈迟补.^[4]

痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补:

1. 补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补,
2. viruddha,
3. asiddha,
4. 辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�i迟补,
5. 办腻濒腻迟测补测腻辫补诲颈峁ａ弓补.

Jayanta also follows Gautama in naming the fallacies of reason but he surpasses almost all his predecessors in giving the detailed account of all the five types of fallacies of reason. Except for a slight difference in nomenclature, the 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 and the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉 are unanimous in holding that the fallacies of reason are five-fold. Now we shall discuss them in the following heads:

(1) 厂补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补:

In the 狈测腻测补 system, the first kind of inferential fallacy is called 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补 or 补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补.^[5] There are two views about this fallacy of reason. Gautama calls it 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补 or 补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补, while 碍补峁嚹乨补 calls it 蝉补峁僤颈驳诲丑补.^[6] Sa峁僤igdha is the doubtful or inconclusive reason.

He gives two examples, e.g.,

1. 鈥淭his is a horse, because it has horns.鈥� This is an example of the former type of fallacy.
2. 鈥淭his is a bull, because it has horns.鈥� This is an example of the second type of fallacy.

笔谤补艣补蝉迟补辫腻诲补 interprets the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉奴tra as mentioning three fallacies, contradictory, unproven and inconclusive reason. He equates aprasiddha with viruddha, asan with asiddha and 蝉补峁僤颈驳诲丑补 with 补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补 (蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补).^[7]

Gautama defines an inconclusive reason (蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补) as one which has variable concomitance with the predicate.^[8] The 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补 is that reason which leads to more conclusions than one. In 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补, the hetu is found to lead to no single conclusion but to different opposite conclusions. The 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补 hetu is not uniformly concomitant with the major term. It is related to both the existence and the non-existence of the major term. Therefore, it is called 补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补, or an irregular concomitant of the 蝉腻诲丑测补.

It is of three kinds, viz.,

1. 蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺,
2. a蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺,
3. 补苍耻辫补蝉补峁僪腻谤墨.^[9]

The 蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺 or the ordinary fallacy of the irregular middle occurs when the middle term is in some cases related to the major and in the other cases related to the absence of the major.^[10] In the 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 it is stated that a 蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺 hetu is that where the reason or hetu may be present, when the property to be proved is absent. Here, the middle term is too wide.

For example:鈥�

All knowable objects are fiery;
The hill is knowable;
So, the hill is fiery.

The second form of the 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补 is known as a蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺 or the extraordinary. It is just the opposite of 蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺, being found neither in 蝉补辫补办峁�a nor in 惫颈辫补办峁�a. ^[11] In it, the middle term is too narrow. It is related neither to things in which the major exists nor to those in which it does not exist.^[12] Here, the middle term is only present in the minor term.

For example-

Sound is eternal;

Because there is 鈥榮oundness鈥� or 艣补产诲补迟惫补. The nature of sound is a peculiar characteristic of the sound. Here, the middle term 鈥榮oundness鈥� is related only to the minor term 鈥榮ound鈥�. It is found neither in eternal objects like the 鈥�soul鈥� nor in other non-eternal things, like 鈥榓 jar.鈥�

The third form of the 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补 is called 补苍耻辫补蝉补峁僪腻谤墨, or the indefinite.^[13] In the 补苍耻辫补蝉补峁僪腻谤墨, the middle term is non-exclusive and the minor term is all inclusive. These inclusive reasons are defined by 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补.^[14] Here, in the 补苍耻辫补蝉补峁僪腻谤墨, the middle term is related to a minor term that stands not for any definite individual, but indefinitely for all objects.

For example:

鈥楢ll objects are eternal鈥�,
Because they are knowable.

Here, the validity of this inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) depends on the validity of the major premise, viz., 鈥榓ll knowable objects are eternal鈥�. But the validity of the major premise cannot be proved since beyond all objects we have no instances of the concomitance between the knowable and the eternal. According to Uddyotakara there are sixteen sub-kinds of inconclusive reasons.^[15] In the 狈测腻测补 system, Jayanta鈥檚 view is identical with that of 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补, regarding the etymology of the term 补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补. According to Jayanta, if a reason does not belong to similar instances, it is faulty and is to be called 补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补. ^[16] In the 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, Ke艣avami艣ra opines that 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补 is of two kinds, viz., 蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺 and a蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺. The common strayer or 蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺 hetu is that which exists in all the three, i.e., 辫补办峁�a, 蝉补辫补办峁�a and 惫颈辫补办峁�a. ^[17] On the otherhand, the peculiar strayer or a蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺 hetu is that which is absent from both 蝉补辫补办峁�a and 惫颈辫补办峁�a but exists only in 辫补办峁�a. ^[18]

(2) Viruddha:

The second kind of inferential fallacy is called viruddha. In the 狈测腻测补s奴tra^[19] and 狈测腻测补bh膩峁�ya, it is stated that the contradictory is the reason which opposes what is be established. For example, 鈥榓 pot is produced, because it is eternal鈥�. Here, the reason is contradictory. Because that which is eternal is never produced. 碍补峁嚹乨补 refers it as aprasiddha. ^[20] The unsubstantial is called fallacious arguments. According to Uddyotakara, it is called viruddha since it contradicts an admitted truth.^[21] For example, 鈥榮ound is eternal鈥�, 鈥榖ecause it is produced.鈥� Here the reason, 鈥榩roducedness鈥� contradicts the proposition, 鈥榮ound is eternal鈥� instead of proving it. 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 states that the fallacy of the viruddha consists in the opposition of one doctrine to a previously accepted doctrine.^[22] Thus, it is a contradiction between the different parts of a system. In the 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, 础苍苍补尘产丑补峁�峁�补 opines, that is called viruddha or the contradictory middle, which is pervaded by the absence of the major term.^[23] The result is that such a middle term instead of proving the existence of the major in the minor term, which is intended by it, proves its non-existence there in. In the 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ� it is stated that the contradictory reason is that which has invariable concomitance with the negation of the probandum, e.g., sound is eternal, because it is a product.^[24] From the definition it is clear that a viruddha hetu can exist only in 惫颈辫补办峁�a and so lacks the characteristic 惫颈辫补办峁Ｄ乻补迟迟惫补. According to 骋补峁単别艣补, the viruddha hetu proves the non-existence of the predicate, though it is advanced to prove its existence. Jayanta is quite aware of the difference between the interpretations offered by 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 and Uddyotakara. In the above discussion, it is observed that there is a slight difference between the fallacies of the 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补 and the viruddha. The difference is that while in the former, the middle term is universally related neither to the existence of the major nor to its non-existence. In the later, the middle term is universally related to the non-existence of the major term. As a whole it means that the 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补 hetu fails to prove the conclusion whereas the viruddha hetu proves the contradictory proposition.

(3) 笔谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补 or Satprati辫补办峁�a:

The third kind of inferential fallacy is known as 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补 or 蝉补迟辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�a. Gautama, in his 狈测腻测补s奴tra, states that here the middle term is contradicted by another middle term.^[25] 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 interprets it as the oscillation of mind between two contradictory characters of an object brought about by mutually opposed and equally strong arguments and counter arguments^[26] . It means that when a middle term oscillates between two opposite views we have a case of the 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补 middle. In the 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, 础苍苍补尘产丑补峁�峁�补 states that when the reason is counterbalanced by another reason which proves the negation of what is to be proved then it is called the fallacy of equalization or 蝉补迟辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�a. ^[27] 骋补峁単别艣补 thinks that 蝉补迟辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�a is a temporary flaw in an inference (补苍耻尘腻苍补) which remains till a doubt about one of the reasons is removed.^[28] Ke艣avami艣ra refers that the 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补 is also called 蝉补迟辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�a or that which is opposed by another reason which proves the existence of the opposite of the proposed probandum.^[29] Jayanta refers to a蝉补迟辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�atva as one of the five characteristics of a valid reason. He maintains that if a reason is faced with the existence of an equally strong counter reason (prati辫补办峁�a), it is fallacious since the opposite reasons counteract with each other and fail to establish the conclusion. He distinguishes a counterbalanced reason (辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补) from an inclusive reason (补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补). In the former, two different characters of the minor term are taken as the middle terms leading to opposite conclusions. In the later one, the same character of the minor term is taken as a middle term that may lead to opposite conclusions. Again, it is also different from the viruddha hetu or contradictory middle. The former is not known to exist or not to exist in similar instances; nor is it known to exist in dissimilar instances, while the later is known to exist in dissimilar instances.^[30]

(4) 厂腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补 or Asiddha:

The fourth kind of inferential fallacy is called 蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补 or the asiddha. Gautama defines an unproven reason (蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补) as one that requires to be proved like the predicate.^[31] An asiddha hetu is one that has 诲辞峁�a called asiddhi and asiddhi is the absence of siddhi which consists in the true cognition of the 蝉腻诲丑测补vy膩pyahetu as a property of 辫补办峁�a; or briefly speaking, asiddhi is the non-production of 辫补谤腻尘补谤艣补. The word 蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补 means a middle term which is similar to the 蝉腻诲丑测补 or the major term. 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 regards it as not different in logical validity from the predicate in as much as it requires to be proved like it. His illustration of this fallacy runs as 鈥榮hadow is a substance, because it possesses motion.鈥� Here, unless it is really proved that shadow possesses motion, it cannot be accepted as the reason for the proposition that shadow is a substance.^[32] Uddyotakara, however, mentions it as asiddha and sub-divides it into three kinds; viz., 辫谤补箩帽腻辫补苍墨测补诲丑补谤尘补蝉补尘腻苍补, 腻艣谤补测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 and 补苍测补迟丑腻蝉颈诲诲丑补. ^[33] Jayanta refers to this fallacy by both of the names, i.e., 蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补 and therefore fallacious.^[34]

In the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 system, 笔谤补艣补蝉迟补辫腻诲补 refers four sub-types of asiddha. These are鈥�

1. 耻产丑补测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 [耻产丑补测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补岣�], 
2. 补苍测补迟补谤腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 [补苍测补迟补谤腻蝉颈诲诲丑补岣�], 
3. 迟补诲产丑腻惫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 [迟补诲产丑腻惫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补岣�] and
4. 补苍耻尘别测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 [补苍耻尘别测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补岣�].^[35]

The main forms of the fallacy of asiddha, is of three kinds, viz.,

1. 腻艣谤补测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补,
2. 蝉惫补谤奴辫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 and
3. 惫测腻辫测补迟惫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补.^[36]

In the 腻艣谤补测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补, the minor term is the locus of the middle term. If the minor term is unreal and fictitious, the middle term cannot be related to it; consequently, in such a case, the minor premise in which the middle term is related to a fictitious minor term becomes false, e.g., 鈥渁 skylotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, like a lotus in the pond鈥�. Here, skylotus is the subject and that is totally non-existent.^[37] The middle term having no locus standi, we have a fallacy of the 腻艣谤补测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 or the baseless middle. From the example 腻艣谤补测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 can also be defined as- pak峁�e 辫补办峁�at膩vacchedak膩bh膩va岣� or simply 辫补办峁�at膩bh膩va岣�. ^[38]

The 蝉惫补谤奴辫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 is a middle term which cannot be proved to be real in relation to the minor term. It is a middle term which is not found in the minor term.^[39] In it, the hetu itself is asiddha. A reason must exist in the subject. If it does not exist, it can not afford to provide the basis of inference. For example鈥撯�渟ound is eternal, because it is visible, like a pot.鈥� Here we find that the visibility is not present in the subject and its assumption in sound is wrong and is not justified by facts. This differs from 腻艣谤补测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补. In the 蝉惫补谤奴辫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补, the locus is either false or not proper. It may be defined as - pak峁�e hetv膩bh膩va岣�.

The 蝉惫补谤奴辫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 consists in many sub-types, such as鈥�

1. 艣耻诲诲丑腻蝉颈诲诲丑补,
2. 产丑腻驳腻蝉颈诲诲丑补,
3. 惫颈艣别峁�a峁嚹乻颈诲诲丑补 and
4. 惫颈艣别峁�y腻蝉颈诲诲丑补.

The general characteristic of these sub-varieties is that in all these, the reason is non-existent in the minor term.

The 惫测腻辫测补迟惫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 is a middle term whose concomitance (惫测腻辫迟颈) with the major term cannot be proved.^[40] A valid inference requires that the middle term must be concomitant with the major term. If this condition is not fulfilled, the inference becomes invalid.

The fallacy of 惫测腻辫测补迟惫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补 may be of two types鈥�

(i) It may be on account of the non-concomitance of the middle term with the major term. It means the first is caused by the absence of any evidence to grasp the 惫测腻辫迟颈.

For example鈥�

all reals are momentary,
sound is real,
therefore, sound is momentary.

There is no evidence which enables one to ascertain the 惫测腻辫迟颈, yat sat tat k峁�a峁噄kam. Here, the major premise is false. Because there is no universal relation between the 鈥榬eal鈥� and 鈥榤omentary鈥�.

(ii) Or, it may be on account of the presence of a condition (耻辫腻诲丑颈). For example鈥撯�渢he hill is smoky, because it is fiery.鈥� Here, the relation of the middle term (fire) to the major term (smoke) is conditional since a fire is smoky if there is a wet fuel.^[41] This fallacy of the conditional middle is technically called 惫测腻辫测补迟惫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补. ^[42]

(5) K膩l膩t墨ta or B膩dhita:

The fifth kind of inferential fallacy is called 办腻濒腻迟墨迟补 or 产腻诲丑颈迟补 hetu. The 办腻濒腻迟墨迟补 literally means a middle term which is vitiated by the lapse of time.^[43] 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 interprets it in this manner- 鈥渟ound is durable, because it is manifested by conjunction, like colour.鈥� Here, the argument is fallacious, since in the case of colour the manifestation takes place simultaneously with the contact between light and the coloured thing. But the manifestation of sound is separated by an interval of time from the contact between two objects. So, here, the reason is not congruous with the instance and is not capable of establishing the predicate.^[44] Uddyotakara gives the same meaning of 办腻濒腻迟测补测补辫补诲颈峁ａ弓补, as 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 does.^[45] But 痴腻肠补蝉辫补迟颈 takes it in the sense of a contradicted reason (产腻诲丑颈迟补). It is contradicted by perception, inference and Vedic testimony. According to the 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, a 产腻诲丑颈迟补 hetu is that where the negation of what is to be proved is established without doubt by another proof.^[46] In the 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, Ke艣avami艣ra opines that the term 办腻濒腻迟测补测腻辫补诲颈峁ａ弓补 means a hetu put forward after the lapse of proper time; i.e., after the negation of the probandum has been ascertained by a more trust-worthy proof. It is also called 产腻诲丑颈迟补. ^[47] 骋补峁単别艣补 clearly states 产腻诲丑颈迟补 in the list of fallacious reason. According to Jayanta, in this fallacy the reason refers more than one event which succeed one another in time. He, however, incorporates the absence of uncontradictoriness as a characteristic of 办腻濒腻迟测补测腻辫补诲颈峁ａ弓补 and thereby seems to hold 产腻诲丑颈迟补 as another name of 办腻濒腻迟墨迟补. While the 办腻濒腻迟墨迟补 stands for a middle term vitiated by a limitation in time, the 产腻诲丑颈迟补 means a middle term which is contradicted by some other source of knowledge. The fallacy of 产腻诲丑颈迟补 is different from the fallacy of 蝉补迟辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�a. In the former, an inference is contradicted by a non-inferential source of knowledge, while in the later one inference is contradicted by another inference.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

anumitipratibandhaka yath膩rthajn膩navisayatvam 丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补tvam, 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补d墨pik膩 on 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补 46

[2]:

The 狈测腻测补 Theory of Knowledge, p. 218

[3]:

蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补viruddha辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补k膩l膩t墨t膩 丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补岣�. 狈测腻测补s奴tra, i. 2. 4

[4]:

蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补viruddhasatpratipak峁Ｄ乻iddhav膩dhit膩岣� 辫补帽肠补 丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补岣�. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 33

[5]:

补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补岣� 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补岣�. 狈测腻测补s奴tra, i. 2. 5

[6]:

aprasiddho鈥檔apade艣o鈥檚an 蝉补峁僤颈驳诲丑补艣c膩napade艣a岣�, yasm膩d vi峁Ｄ乶i tasm膩d 补艣惫补岣�; yasm膩d vi峁Ｄ乶i, tasm膩d gauriti c膩naik膩ntikasyod膩hara峁嘺m. 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉奴tra, iii. 1. 15-17

[7]:

viruddh膩siddhasandigdham ali峁単am k膩艣yapo鈥檅ravit. 笔谤补艣补蝉迟补辫腻诲补 叠丑腻峁�y补, p. 200

[8]:

补苍补颈办腻苍迟颈办补岣� 蝉补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补岣�. 狈测腻测补s奴tra, i.ii. 4

[9]:

sa 迟谤颈惫颈诲丑补岣�, s膩dh膩ra峁嚹乻adh膩ra峁嚹乶upasa峁僪ar墨bhed膩t. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 33 Cf: 腻诲测补岣� 蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺stu sy膩t syada蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺para岣� / tathaiv膩nupas峁僪膩r墨 迟谤颈诲丑腻 anaik膩ntiko bhavet // 叠丑腻峁Ｄ乸补谤颈肠肠丑别诲补, 72, p. 388

[10]:

蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺岣� 蝉腻诲丑测补vat tadanyav峁泃ti岣�. 狈测腻测补s奴trav峁泃ti, 1. 2. 5

[11]:

sarva蝉补辫补办峁�a惫颈辫补办峁�avy膩v峁泃to鈥櫜跄寤宄竽灏�补峁嘺岣�. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补,46

[12]:

a蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺岣� 蝉补辫补办峁�a惫颈辫补办峁�a 惫测腻惫峁泃迟补岣�. 狈测腻测补s奴trav峁泃ti, 1. 2. 5

[13]:

补苍惫补测补惫测补迟颈谤别办补诲峁涐梗峁�膩n迟补谤补丑颈迟辞鈥档耻辫补蝉补峁僪腻谤墨. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 56

[14]:

蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺岣� 蝉腻诲丑测补vadanyav峁泃ti岣�; anye tu 蝉补辫补办峁�av峁泃tira蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺岣�; 补苍耻辫补蝉补峁僪腻谤墨 c膩tyant膩bh膩v膩pratiyog墨 蝉腻诲丑测补k膩di. 厂颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补尘耻办迟腻惫补濒墨, pp. 388-389 on 办腻谤颈办腻 72

[15]:

Vide Bijalwan, C.D., Indian Theory of Knowledge, p. 177

[16]:

Ibid.

[17]:

tatra 辫补办峁�a蝉补辫补办峁�a惫颈辫补办峁�av峁泃ti岣� 蝉腻诲丑腻谤补峁嘺岣�. 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, 55

[18]:

yasapak峁Ｄ乨vipak峁Ｄ乧cha 惫测腻惫峁泃迟补岣� pak峁�e eva vartate so鈥櫜跄寤宄竽灏�补峁嘺岣�. Ibid.

[19]:

siddh膩ntamabhyupetya tadvirodh墨 viruddha. 狈测腻测补s奴tra, i.ii. 6

[20]:

补辫谤补蝉颈诲诲丑辞鈥档补辫补诲别艣补岣�. 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补蝉奴tra, iii. 1. 15

[21]:

辫谤补迟颈箩帽腻hetvorv膩 惫颈谤辞诲丑补岣�. 狈测腻测补v膩rttika, 1. 2. 6

[22]:

狈测腻测补bh膩峁�ya, 1. 2. 6

[23]:

s膩dhy膩bh膩vavy膩pto heturviruddha岣�. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, p. 57

[24]:

蝉腻诲丑测补viparyayavy膩pto heturviruddha岣�, sa yath膩 艣abdo 苍颈迟测补岣� k峁泃akatv膩t gaga峁嘺vat. 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, 54

[25]:

yasm膩t prakara峁嘺cint膩 sa nir峁嘺y膩rtham apadi峁ａ弓a岣� 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补岣�. 狈测腻测补s奴tra, i. 2. 7

[26]:

狈测腻测补bh膩峁�ya, i. 2. 7

[27]:

s膩dhy膩bh膩vas膩dhaka峁� hetv膩ntara峁� yasya vidyate sa 蝉补迟辫谤补迟颈辫补办峁�a岣�. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, 46

[28]:

罢补迟迟惫补肠颈苍迟腻尘补峁噄, p. 1141

[29]:

辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺蝉补尘补stu sa eva yasya 蝉腻诲丑测补vipar墨tas膩dhaka峁� 丑别迟惫补苍迟补谤补峁� vidyate. 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, 56

[30]:

狈测腻测补ma帽jar墨, pp. 602-603; 狈测腻测补s奴trav峁泃ti, 1. 2. 6

[31]:

s膩dhy膩vi艣i峁ａ弓a岣� 蝉腻诲丑测补tv膩t 蝉腻诲丑测补蝉补尘补岣�. 狈测腻测补s奴tra, i. 2. 8

[32]:

狈测腻测补bh膩峁�ya, I.II. 8

[33]:

Vide.Sinha, J,N., Indian Philosophy, (vol-1) p. 531

[34]:

狈测腻测补ma帽jar墨, II-162

[35]:

tatr膩siddha艣caturvidha岣� 耻产丑补测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补岣�,补苍测补迟补谤腻蝉颈诲诲丑补岣�,迟补诲产丑腻惫腻蝉颈诲诲丑补岣�,补苍耻尘别测腻蝉颈诲诲丑补艣ceti. 笔谤补艣补蝉迟补辫腻诲补 叠丑腻峁�y补, p. 577

[36]:

tatra asiddhast峁泇idha岣�, 膩艣ry膩siddha岣� svar奴p膩siddho vyapyatv膩siddha iti. 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, 53

[37]:

驳补驳补峁嚹乺补惫颈苍诲补峁� surabhi, aravindatv膩t, soroj膩ravindavat. atra gaga峁嚹乺avindam膩艣raya岣� sa tu n膩styeva. Ibid.

[38]:

Ibid., p. 98

[39]:

svar奴p膩siddho yath膩, 艣abdo鈥櫜跃背俨獠贯弗 c膩k峁�u峁�atv膩t, ghatavat. Ibid.

[40]:

pak峁�e vy膩pyat膩vacchedak膩bh膩va岣�. Ibid.

[41]:

Ibid.

[42]:

狈测腻测补v膩rttikat膩tparya峁�墨k膩, p. 345

[43]:

办腻濒腻迟测补测腻辫补诲颈峁ａ弓补岣� 办腻濒腻迟墨迟补岣�. 狈测腻测补s奴tra, i. 2. 9

[44]:

k膩l膩tyayena yukto yasy膩rthasyaikade艣o鈥檖adi艣yam膩nasya sa 办腻濒腻迟测补测腻辫补诲颈峁ａ弓补岣� 办腻濒腻迟墨迟补 iti uchyate鈥�..evam耻诲腻丑补谤补峁嘺s膩dharmasy膩bh膩v膩das膩dhanamaya峁� hetur丑别迟惫腻产丑腻蝉补 iti. 狈测腻测补bh膩峁�ya, i. 2. 9

[45]:

狈测腻测补v膩rttika, i. 2. 50

[46]:

yasya 蝉腻诲丑测补bh膩va岣� pram膩峁嚹乶tarena 苍颈艣肠颈迟补岣� sa 产腻诲丑颈迟补岣�. 罢补谤办补蝉补峁僩谤补丑补, 46

[47]:

pak峁�e pram膩峁嚹乶tar膩vadh峁泃as膩dhy膩bh膩vohetur产腻诲丑颈迟补vi峁�aya岣� 办腻濒腻迟测补测腻辫补诲颈峁ａ弓补 iti cochyate. 罢补谤办补产丑腻峁Ｄ�, 57