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痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补 defines doubt as the appearance of two or more alternatives (which are in themselves incompatible) owing to the non-perception of their specific contradictory qualities and the perception of some general characteristics common to them both; e.g. when a tall thing only is seen, which may be either a man or a stump, both of which it could not be, they being entirely different from one another. So the two alternatives are not to be entirely different, and from what is seen of the object it cannot be known that it must be the one and not the other, and this causes the doubt. 痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补 tries to justify this analysis of doubt by referring to other earlier authorities who regarded doubt as an oscillating apprehension in which the mind goes from one alternative to another (诲辞濒腻-vegavad atra sphura峁嘺-办谤补尘补岣�), since it would be contradictory that the same object should be two different things at the same time. The author of the Atma-siddhi has therefore described it as the loose contact of the mind with two or more things in quick succession (bahubhir-yugapad a-d峁涐笉ha-蝉补峁儁辞驳补岣�). Doubt may arise either from the apprehension of common characteristics鈥攕uch as from tallness, whether the object perceived be a tree-stump or a man鈥攐r from not having been able to decide between the relative strength of the various opposite and different possibilities suggested by what is perceived or otherwise known (补-驳峁沨测补尘腻苍补-bala-t膩ratamya-viruddh膩-neka-j帽膩pako-pasth膩panam iha-vipratipatti岣�).

So, whenever there are two or more possibilities, none of which can be ruled out without further verification, there is doubt^[1]. Thus, doubt arises between a true and a false perception as when I perceive a face in the mirror, but do not know whether it is a real face or not until it is decided by an attempt to feel it by touch. So, between valid and invalid inference, when I judge from smoke that the hill is on fire, and yet through not perceiving any light doubt that it is on fire; between opposition of scriptural texts, 鈥�箩墨惫补 has been said to be different from Brahman and to be one with it,鈥� whether then the 箩墨惫补 is different from Brahman or one with it; between conflicting authorities (e.g. the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 philosophers and the Upani峁�adic doctrines) such as 鈥渁re the senses material or are they the products of the ego ?鈥� Between perception and inference (e.g. in the case of the illusory perception of yellow conch-shell, the perceiving of it as yellow and the inferring that it could not be yellow because it is a conch-shell and hence the doubt, whether the conch-shell is white or yellow, and so forth).

In referring to the view of Varadan膩r膩ya峁嘺 in his 笔谤补箩帽腻-辫补谤颈迟谤腻峁嘺, 痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补 says that the threefold division of doubt that he made, due to perception of common characteristics, apprehension of different alternatives, and the opposition of scholars and authorities, is in imitation of the 狈测腻测补 ways of looking at doubt^[2], for the last two forms were essentially the same. 痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补 further refutes the 狈测腻测补 view of doubt in which 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补, in explaining 狈测腻测补-s奴tra, i. n. 23, says that there can be doubt even from special distinguishing qualities. Thus, earth has smell as a distinctive characteristic which is not possessed either by eternal substances, such as self, or by non-eternal substances, such as water, etc.; and there can naturally be a doubt whether earth, being different from eternal substances, is non-eternal, or whether, being different from non-eternal substances, it is eternal.

痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补 points out that here doubt does not take place owing to the fact that earth possesses this distinguishing quality. It is simply because the possession of smell is quite irrelevant to the determination of eternity or non-eternity, as it is shared by both eternal and non-eternal substances. Doubt would continue until a distinguishing characteristic, such as is possessed by eternal or non-eternal substances alone, is found in earth (惫测补迟颈谤别办颈-苍颈谤奴辫补峁嘺-惫颈濒补尘产腻迟), on the strength of which it could be determined whether it is eternal or not. 痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补, in various illustrations, shows that doubt consists essentially of an oscillation of the mind, due to indecision between two possible alternatives. He would admit even such inquiries as 鈥淲hat may be the name of this tree?鈥� as doubt, and not mere indecision or want of knowledge (an-补诲丑测补惫补蝉腻测补). Such inquiries can rightly be admitted as doubts; for they involve doubt regarding two or more alternative names, which are vaguely wavering in the mind and which are followed by a desire to settle or decide in favour of one or the other.

So here also there is a want of settlement between two alternatives, due to a failure to find the determining factor (avacchedak膩-dar艣an膩t an-avacchinna-koti-惫颈艣别峁�a岣�). Such a state of oscillation might naturally end in a mental reckoning in favour of or against the possible or probable alternatives, which is called 奴丑补 (but which must be distinguished from 奴丑补 as tarka in connection with inference), which leads to the resolution of doubt into probability^[3]. However, Anant膩rya, a later writer of the 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 school, further described doubt as being a state of mind in which one perceived only that something lay before him, but did not notice any of its specific features, qualities or characters (puro-惫峁泃迟颈-m膩tram a-g峁沨墨ta-vi艣e峁�a峁嘺m anubh奴yate). Only the two alternatives (e.g. 鈥渁 tree stump or a man鈥濃�� 蝉迟丑腻峁嘘-辫耻谤耻峁�a耻) are remembered. According to the 厂补谤惫腻谤迟丑补-蝉颈诲诲丑颈, the imperfect observation of something before us rouses its corresponding subconscious impression (蝉补峁僺办腻谤补), which, in its turn, rouses the subconscious impressions leading to the simultaneous revival in one sweep of memory of the two possible alternatives of which neither could be decided upon^[4].

The point disputed in this connection is between a minority party of interpreters, who think that the perception of something in front of us rouses an impression which in its turn rouses two different subconscious impressions leading to one memory joining up the two alternative entities (e.g. tree-stump and man), and a majority party, who think that the perception of something in front of us leads directly to the memory of two different alternatives, which is interpreted as doubt. 'The former view, by linking up the two memories in one act of knowledge, supposes the oscillating movement to be one act of judgment and so holds the opinion that in doubt also there is the false substitution of one judgment for another, which is in accordance with the 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 (illegitimate substitution of judgments) theory of illusion. The latter view, which holds that there are two separate memories of the two possible alternatives, interprets 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 as an upholder of realism of knowledge (箩帽腻苍补-测腻迟丑腻谤迟丑虫补-惫腻诲补), or the view that whatever is known or perceived has an objective and a real basis.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

The 狈测腻测补 analysis of doubt, as found in 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补's bh膩峁�ya, I. 11. 23, is as follows: When the common characteristics of two possible things are noticed, but not the specific quality which would decide for the one or the other, the anguish of the mind in determining or deciding in favour of the one or the other is called doubt. Doubt may also arise from conflicting opinions (惫颈辫谤补迟颈辫补迟迟别岣�), e.g., some say that there is a soul, while others hold that there is no soul. Doubt may also arise from the perception of determining qualities (production through division, 惫颈产丑腻驳补箩补迟惫补) which a thing (e.g. sound) has in common with other things (e.g. substance, attributes, and actions). Doubt may arise from perception of things which may be illusorily perceived even when non-existent (e.g. water in mirage), out of a desire for certainty and also from a non-perception of things (which may yet be there, though non-evident), out of a desire to discover some traits by which one could be certain whether the thing was there or not. The special contribution of 痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补 consists in giving a general analysis of doubt as a state of the mind instead of the specification of the five specific forms of doubt. 痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补 points out that doubt need not be of five kinds only but can be of many kinds which, however, all agree in this, that in all states of doubt there is an oscillation of the mind from one alternative to another, due to the indetermination of the relative strength of the different possible alternatives on account of the perception of merely certain common characteristics without their specific determining and decisive features.

[2]:

s膩dh膩ra峁嚹�-k峁泃er d峁涐梗峁瓂膩'nek膩-k膩ra-grah膩t tath膩
vipa艣cit膩峁� viv奴d膩c ca tridh膩 sa峁兣沘ya i峁�yate.
     笔谤补箩帽腻-辫补谤颈迟谤腻峁嘺, quoted in 狈测腻测补-pari艣uddhi, p. 62.

[3]:

奴丑补s tu pr膩ya岣� puru峁�e峁嚹�'nena bhavitavyam ity-膩di-r奴pa eka-ko峁璱-saha-carita-bh奴yo-dharma-dar艣an膩d anudbh奴t膩-nya-ko峁璱ka岣� sa eva.
     狈测腻测补-pari艣uddhi, p. 68. Chowkhamba.

[4]:

puro-v峁泃ty-anubhava-janita-sa峁僺k膩re峁嘺 ko峁璱-dvayo-past岣�iti-hetu-sa峁僺k膩r膩-bhy膩峁� ca yugapad-eka-smara峁嘺峁� sa峁兣沘ya-sthale sv墨kriyata iti sarv膩-rtha-siddhau uktam.
     Anant膩rya鈥檚 J帽膩na-y膩th膩rthya-惫腻诲补.
     Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4884.