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Introduction:

It was really a new attempt when 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 introduced 蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 [heto?] 产ā诲丑补-办补辫谤补尘ā?补 (hereafter VBP) as a methodological device with reference to 蝉惫补产丑ā惫补丑别迟耻, especially with respect to the proof of momentariness of all existence, in his logico-epistemological system.^[1] 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈’s followers discussed the role and logical content of VBP in the 辫谤补尘ā?补 system mainly in the context of the proof of k?a?abha?ga.

With reference to the theory, several studies have brought into focus its impact on the whole logico-epistemological theory of later Buddhist logicians.^[2] Above all Tani, in his great work, focuses on the relation between VBP and prasa?ga/prasa?gaviparyaya and their roles, and discusses how 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈’s followers evaluate them in their proof of momentariness.^[3] This theory, in fact, raised new complications with respect to the structure of the means of valid cognition and its logical and epistemic base.^[4]

One of these complications is the relation between VBP and establishing anvaya(?惫测ā辫迟颈) as well as vyatireka(?惫测ā辫迟颈). It seems unclear in both traditional and contemporary inter-pretations whether VBP is valid for establishing either affirmative concomitance (anvaya) or negative concomitance (vyatireka), or whether it is valid for both at the same time. It is of course not easy to find a direct answer to this question by an Indian logician. But in an effort to do so, this paper will begin by focusing on 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 descriptions of VBP, especially in the vyatireka section of the K?a?abha?ga chapter of the 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补苍颈产补苍诲丑ā惫补濒颈 (JNA). At the beginning of this chapter, an opponent called viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补vā-din appears, whose claims are criticized by 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra. By analyzing the relevant texts, we may be able to discern where 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra stands on the issue.

As a preliminary observation, it may help us to keep in mind that 补苍惫补测补-惫测ā辫迟颈 and 惫测补迟颈谤别办补-惫测ā辫迟颈 are accepted as logically equivalent, at least by the thinkers after 顿丑补谤尘补-办ī谤迟颈. In the epistemic process, however, we cannot simply presume their equivalence, since it depends on what kind of independent 辫谤补尘ā?补 or other subsidiary means of cognition the determination of anvaya or vyatireka is related to or based upon, as will be discussed in the following. We can suppose this is one of the reasons 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra and 搁补迟苍补办ī谤迟颈 treat them separately in their discussion on the proof of momentariness.

闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 碍?补?补产丑补?驳ā诲丑测ā测补 consists of three 辫ā诲补蝉. In the first 辫ā诲补, pak?a-诲丑补谤尘ā诲丑颈办ā谤补, the theme is that in the formula “yat sat tat k?a?ika? 测补迟丑ā jaladhara?, santas tu 产丑ā惫ā ime” (Whatever is existent is momentary, for instance a rain cloud. And these things are existent. [Therefore, these things are momentary.]), the reason sat/sattva is not “unestablished” (asiddha). In the second 辫ā诲补, 补苍惫补测ā诲丑颈办ā谤补, it is not incompatible (viruddha). And in the third 辫ā诲补, 惫测补迟颈谤别办ā诲丑颈办ā谤补, which I take up in the following, it is not inconclusive (补苍补颈办ā苍迟颈办补).

1. The relation between two kinds of pervasion, anvaya and vyatireka

The critique of the viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补惫ā诲颈苍 in 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 惫测补迟颈谤别办ā诲丑颈办ā谤补 begins with the following argument:

(A) There is also no suspicion that [the reason “being existent” might be] inconclusive, because the proof is given based on the pervasion that comprises all [individual instances] (蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vatyā vyāpte?).

〈Opponent, i.e., viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补惫ā诲颈苍〉 The pervasion is es-tablished by virtue of “the means of valid cognition that annuls [the reason] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven]” (viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补). Therefore, we do not find any additional information (惫ā谤迟ā) by introducing it (i.e. the pervasion that comprises all individual instances). Then, why do you say that the pervasion is [already] established?

…

〈Opponent〉 In this way, there must only be an affirmative concomitance (补苍惫补测补尘ā迟谤补尘). Then, how can we obtain the conclusive exclusion [of the reason] from the dissimilar domain?

〈闯?ā苍补?rīmitra〉 It is because the pervasion is exactly established.

〈Opponent〉 How is the pervasion of the negative exclusion itself estab-lished?^[5]

From the description above, we first notice that 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra evaluates 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā-谤补惫测ā辫迟颈 in the anvya-vyatireka context of their symmetrical roles, while the opponent, viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补惫ā诲颈苍, does not.^[6] This is one of the crucial points dividing 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 position from that of the viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补惫ā诲颈苍.

I will come back to this point again in a later section. 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra then formally differentiates and defines the two pervasions, 补苍惫补测补谤ū辫ā and 惫测补迟颈谤别办补谤ū辫ā.

(b)〈闯?ā苍补?rīmitra〉 No, the pervasion is in fact of two kinds. One is that which has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (补苍惫补测补谤ū辫ā) and is a property of the subjective element (kart?dharma). It is the inevitable presence of that which is to be proven in the property-possessor that has the proving [property]. And the other is that which has negative concomitance as its essential characteristic (惫测补迟颈谤别办补谤ū辫ā) and is a property of the objective element (karmadharma). It is the inevitable absence of the proving [property] when that which is to be proven is absent. This is because the following is a sound logic: The pervasion is such that the pervader presents there (i.e., in the pervaded) without fail, or else the pervaded presents only there (i.e., in the pervader).^[7]

We do not find any original element in 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 definition of 补苍惫补测补-惫测ā辫迟颈 and 惫测补迟颈谤别办补-惫测ā辫迟颈 except the introduction of the expressions kart?dharma and karmadharma. As to these terms, taking the 蝉ā诲丑补苍补-蝉ā诲丑测补 relation into consideration, I tentatively interpret kart? and karman as corresponding to 蝉ā诲丑补苍补 and 蝉ā诲丑测补, respectively.^[8] If my understanding is correct, then it follows that 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra regards a proof as a 办谤颈测ā, of which 蝉ā诲丑补苍补 and 蝉ā诲丑测补 are constituent elements.

Then, he refers to the relation between 补苍惫补测补-惫测ā辫迟颈 and 惫测补迟颈谤别办补-惫测ā辫迟颈 as follows:

(C) And the establishment of one of these two inevitably (niyamena) hints at the understanding of the second (i.e., the other). This is because otherwise even one of them cannot be established. The practical activity of the valid means of cog-nition is carried out only directly (蝉ā办?ā迟) with reference to one [of them], and one can gain an understanding of the other as [logically] immediate (苍ā苍迟补谤ī-测补办补迟补测ā). The expression “one [of the two]” is employed just as far as they are [related to each other in this way]. And in such a case, even if suspicion about one of these two arises before a valid means of cognition of the other functions, the suspicion will be expelled by it afterwards. Just as for those who advocate “the means of valid cognition that annuls [the reason] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven] (viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补惫ā诲颈苍),” affirmative concomitance, even though it is suspected, since the suspicion is expelled by virtue of the conclusive exclusion [of the property] from the dissimilar domain (惫颈辫补办?ā诲 别办ā苍迟别苍补 惫测ā惫?迟迟颈产补濒ā迟), concludes that the “being existent,” which never happens at all in [the things] that are not momentary, is really restricted by [the property of] momentary perishing.

…

Accordingly, there is no difference in content (na ka?cid arthato bheda?) between them; viz., the conclusive exclusion of the proving [property] in the absence of [the property] to be proven, and the inevitable concomitance of [the property] to be proven when the proving [property] is present [in the subject of the thesis].^[9]

Here 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra stresses the incorporation of the understanding of anvaya and vyatireka into the epistemic process. In the last part of the passage cited above, he says that there is no difference in content between them. Here, we must draw attention to the underlined portion. According to 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 description, the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 claims that the suspicion of anvaya can be expelled by the exclusion [of the property] from dissimilar domain. That is, VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 prioritizes vyatireka over anvaya.

闯?ā苍补?rīmitra then adds:

(D) As to the function (惫测ā辫ā谤补) of the means of valid cognition, however, its practical activity (惫测补惫补丑ā谤补) is of two kinds, principally (mukhyato) and implicatively (arthata?).^[10]

On the level of daily performance, however, we find two kinds of practical activities of the valid means of cognition, principally (mukhyato), or directly (蝉ā办?ā迟), and implicatively (arthata?), which follows direct cognition as [logically] immediate (苍ā苍迟补谤ī测补办补迟补测ā). For 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra, the difference between anvaya and vyatireka lies only in the level of practical activity (惫测补惫补丑ā谤补). In 顿颈驳苍ā驳补’s system as well as 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈’s, the relation between anvaya and vyatireka is sometimes expressed as 补谤迟丑ā辫补迟迟测ā.^[11] If one is proven, the other is automatically understood by 补谤迟丑ā辫补迟迟颈. That is, either of these two is logically implied in the other. 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 expression arthata? accords with this idea.

2. 蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补 and viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补

Then 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra presents an argument of 蝉ā诲丑补办补- and viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘ā?补.

(E) Precisely therefore, in every reasoning, if one seeks “the means of valid cognition that annuls the reverse of that which is to be proven” [and if there is such a means of valid cognition], there is an affirmative concomitance [of the reason] with that which is to be proven, in the case where the proving [property] (i.e., the reason) is present [in the subject of the thesis]. One should know that seeking “the means of valid cognition that establishes [that which is to be proven] (蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补),” is implied (upalak?ita) by that (i.e., seeking VBP). Furthermore, [when one introduces VBP,] both [of these two 辫谤补尘ā?补s, namely, 蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补 and 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补,] are really integrated (ubha-yasa?graha eva) by the term “annulling the reverse” (viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka).^[12]

If we try to prove the pervasion by VBP, we should know that 蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补 is implied in VBP, and accordingly, we should know that both 辫谤补尘ā?补s are integrated in the concept 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补. The ubhaya of ubhayasa?graha can also be interpreted as anvaya and vyatireka, but it seems more likely that 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra regards 蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补 as corresponding to anvaya and 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补 to vyatireka. The above-quoted passage, however, throws into question any simple opposition between adopting 蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补 and adopting 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补. Though the two positions are ostensibly opposed, his argument makes little distinction between them. Rather, he seems to take an integrative or synthetic stance toward 蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补(惫ā诲颈苍) and viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补(惫ā诲颈苍), even if he thinks one of them is prior to the other in a particular case. Then, the question arises what kind of 辫谤补尘ā?补 is intended by the term 蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补? We can surmise that 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 answer is given in the subsequent discussion, so let us examine what follows.

3. Two kinds of viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补^[13]

闯?ā苍补?rīmitra continues by explaining the latter position:

(F) In fact, with reference to the pervasion that has negative concomitance as its essential characteristic, [there is a means of valid cognition which] annuls the proving [property] in the reverse of that which is to be proven. (In the proof of momentariness, it annuls “being existent” in those that are not momentary.) With reference to [the pervasion] that has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic, on the other hand, it annuls “the reverse of that which is to be proven” [in the proving property] in the case where the proving property is present [in the subject of the thesis]. (补苍惫补测补谤ū辫āyā? tu 蝉ā诲丑测补viparyayasya 产ā诲丑补ka? 蝉ā诲丑补苍别 satīti) (It annuls “not being momentary” in those that are existent.) If these two [kinds of VBP] are absent (耻产丑补测ā产丑ā惫别), the inevitable connection of the proving [property] with that which is to be proven would be impossible. The above is intended.^[14]

According to 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 understanding, VBP proves not only vyatireka but anvaya as well, that is, it can be introduced in two ways. Furthermore, for anvaya, VBP annuls “the reverse of that which is to be proven” in the proving [property]. This is a new interpretation of the viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补.

As is well known, in his Hetubindu, 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 first refers to ‘蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 heto? 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补’ as follows:

补苍惫补测补苍颈?肠补测辞’辫颈 sva产丑ā惫补hetau 蝉ā诲丑测补dharmasya vastutas tad产丑ā惫补迟补测ā 蝉ā诲丑补苍补dharma产丑ā惫补mātrānubandhasiddhi?. sā 蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 hetor bā-dhaka辫谤补尘ā?补v?tti?. 测补迟丑ā yat sat tat k?a?ikam eva, ak?a?ikatve’rtha办谤颈测āvi-rodhāt tallak?a?a? vastutva? hīyate.^[15]

From the description, it is ambiguous whether or not 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 was conscious of the relation between ‘蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 hetor 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补’ and the proof of 补苍惫补测补-惫测ā辫迟颈 or 惫测补迟颈谤别办补-惫测ā辫迟颈. It seems that 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 introduced ‘蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 hetor 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补’ as a subsidiary method for supporting the establishment of the inevitable connection of anvaya, stated as 补苍惫补测补苍颈?肠补测辞’辫颈, but remained strongly conscious of the logical equality of anvaya and vyatireka, an equality that is presupposed by the relation of the contradiction (virodha) between 蝉ā诲丑测补 and 蝉ā诲丑测补-viparyaya. Logically, it is clear that ‘蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 hetor (i.e., 蝉ā诲丑补苍补sya) 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补’ can be understood as expressing vyatireka, since it proves that where 蝉ā诲丑测补viparyaya is present, that is, where 蝉ā诲丑测补 is absent, hetu is absent.

According to 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 understanding, however, VBP also annuls “the reverse of that which is to be proven” in the proving [property] (蝉ā诲丑补苍别 蝉ā诲丑测补viparyayasya 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补).^[16] This is a new interpretation of VBP, based on the interpretation of the compound (viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补) as a genitive tatpuru?a (hereafter VBP2), which is in contrast to the original interpretation of the compound as a locative tatpuru?a (hereafter VBP1). According to 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra, at least, VBP1 annuls the reason “being existent” (i.e., hetos) in “those that are not momentary” (i.e., 蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别). That is, VBP1 principally or directly proves that if something is not momentary, it is non-existent, namely, vyatireka. It also proves that if a subject of a thesis is existent, it is momentary; that is, it proves anvaya indirectly, because being momentary and not being momentary are contradictory (virodha). In the second new interpretation, however, VBP2 annuls “being not momentary” (i.e., “the reverse of that which is to be proven”) in that which “is existent” (i.e., the proving property). It proves principally or directly that if a subject of a thesis is existent, it is momentary, that is, anvaya. Therefore, according to his understanding, not only vyatireka but also anvaya can and should be proven by VBP (VBP1/VBP2). In the descriptions above, however, we do not concretely find both of these 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补s, such as 惫测ā辫补办ā苍耻辫补濒补产诲丑颈 introduced by 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 and other logicians.^[17] Moreover, in the above passage, 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra emphasizes not only the logical equivalence of anvaya and vyatireka, but the methodological equivalence of 蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补 and 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补 as well. By 耻产丑补测ā产丑ā惫别 does he indicate that both of these VBPs are necessary? In the next paragraph, he states, “Those who present a proof should seek for both of these (i.e., anvaya and vyatireka) alternatively (vikalpena).” In other words, if one wants to prove a pervasion by VBP, one should introduce not only VBP1 but also VBP2, which principally establishes the anvaya relation. It is likely that what he really wants to emphasize is the latter, VBP2.

He continues:

(G) Otherwise, even though one cannot directly (蝉ā办?ā迟) obtain the means of valid cognition that determines negative concomitance, if one shows a means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance (anvayaniyama) of the proving [property] with that which is to be proven, then what is its (=the proving property’s) inevitable connection with reference to the establishment of that which is to be proven? It is be-cause [the means of valid cognition that establishes the inevitability of the affirmative concomitance] hints at the ability of negative concomitance as well (that is, there is no inevitable connection of affirmative concomitance that is independent from the ability of negative concomitance.)^[18]

Otherwise [that is, if the means of valid cognition that establishes the in-evitability of the affirmative concomitance is only able to establish affirmative concomitance, irrespective of the inevitability of negative concomitance], it would ensue that the proof formulation of similarity should not really be pre-sented, since the proof does not directly express [the inevitability of] negative concomitance.

Accordingly, even though [an inevitable connection], the ability of which one can understand, does not have negative concomitance as its essential characteristic, exactly insofar as “wherever the proving [property is present], that which is to be proven [is also present]” [is the essence of pervasion], if there is the proving [property in the subject of the thesis], a wise person who is provided with the expectation of that which is to be proven [being established] achieves his purpose.

This is because, in fact, when the proving [property] is present [in the subject of the thesis], even if [a property that is to be proven] is absent when it (i.e., the proving property) is absent, if the [property] that is to be proven is inevitably present when it (i.e., the proving property) is present, then it is fruitful to accept the proof. Hence, a proponent who presents a proof should seek even for both of these (i.e., anvaya and vyatireka) alternatively (vikalpena), and even in either of these styles [a proof] which is established by a means of valid cognition must be shown by a proponent. In the proofs of the opponent, however, even an affirmative concomitance as having inevitability, is really difficult to be obtained, as a negative concomitance is. We should know in this way.^[19]

From the above description, the position of the opponent, the viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补-惫ā诲颈苍, seems to be that VBP should be introduced for the proof of vyatireka and it is the only way to prove the pervasion, while 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra equates VBP of vyatireka with that of anvaya, which is the substance of his new interpretation. Here, 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra claims that it is needless to state both of the means of valid cognition that prove anvaya and vyatireka; that the statement of either one is enough because they are logically connected to each other. Therefore, if the pervasion of anvaya is proven, it is unnecessary to state the proof of vyatireka.

The final statement above is particularly noteworthy. 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra points out a disad-vantage in the opponent’s view: according to the opponent’s proof by VBP, the relation between anvaya and vyatireka is not clear. The point of his criticism lies not in VBP1 itself as a methodical device, but in the opponent’s position whereby the proof of vyatireka by VBP1 is the one and only way to prove a pervasion.

According to 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 understanding, the difference between his position and that of the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 is as follows:

	viparyaya-产ā诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘ā?补惫ā诲颈苍	闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 interpretation of viparyaya-产ā诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘ā?补
anvaya		蝉ā诲丑补苍别 蝉ā诲丑测补viparyayasya 产ā诲丑补kapra-尘ā?补 (VBP2) or
vyatireka	蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 heto? 产ā诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘ā?补 (VBP1)	蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 heto? 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补 (VBP1)

We can say that the position of the opponent, viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补惫ā诲颈苍, is a propounder who claims VBP1 has the exclusive ability to establish pervasion only through proving the 惫测补迟颈谤别办补-惫测ā辫迟颈 by VBP1. Meanwhile, 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra regards VBP (VBP1/ VBP2) as having the synthetic ability to prove pervasion.

3. Priority of prasa?ga and prasa?gaviparyaya

闯?ā苍补?rīmitra continues:

(H) However, for us, with reference to the discussed proof, affirmative concomi-tance with inevitability (苍颈测补尘补惫ā苍 anvaya?) is really shown by prasa?ga and prasa?gaviparyaya prior [to other means of valid cognition] (paura-蝉迟测ā产丑测ā?). And even if both are applied to the cloud presented as a similar example, if one thing (A1) has the essential property of creating another (B1), the former (A1) inevitably produces the latter (B1), and one thing (A2) does not produce another (B2), then the former (A2) does not have the essential property of creating the latter (B2). Thus, [anvaya and vyatireka], which are functioning in this way, show that all [entities], indeed, that are endowed with the ability of activity (办谤颈测ā?aktiyukta?) are restricted to being momentary. Therefore, comprising all cases (蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤辞) is the ground for hinting at negative pervasion (惫测补迟颈谤别办ā办?别辫补产ī箩补?),^[20] such as smoke and the like.^[21]

Against the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍, 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra argues for the inevitability of the affirmative con-comitance (anvayaniyama) first and foremost through prasa?ga and prasa?gaviparyaya. In the above statement, the first point to note is the expression 辫补耻谤补蝉迟测ā产丑测ā?; the second is that the statement is not concerned with pervasion in general, including vyatireka(-niyama), but only with anvayaniyama. As to the first point, the term paurastya means “prior to,” “first,” or “preceding,” which suggests that he does not necessarily exclude the logic of VBP, but insists only that prasa?ga and prasa?gaviparyaya should be introduced before introducing VBP. That is, for 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra, prasa?ga and prasa?gaviparyaya are enough for establishing affirmative concomitance with reference to the proof of momentariness, whereas the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 considers VBP to be the sole means for establishing the pervasion. Moreover, the “comprising [of] all [individual instances] (蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤辞)” as a concept having a connecting function between anvaya and vyatireka is highly esteemed by 闯?ā苍补-?rīmitra. According to him, “if anvaya is established by prasa?ga and prasa?gaviparyaya,” 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补 is regarded as “the grounds for hinting at negative pervasion (惫测补迟颈谤别办ā-办?别辫补产ī箩补?),” whereas the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 does not make much of this. The VBP-惫ā诲颈苍’s low evaluation of 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补 suggests that, according to his/their view, vyatireka can be proven independently (concerning each subject of the thesis) as having inevitability and is sufficient for establishing a pervasion.

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the basic difference between 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra and the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 is the evaluation of efficacy of the proof based on the pervasion that comprises all [individual instances] (蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vyāpti). The opponent, the VBP- 惫ā诲颈苍, apparently takes a negative stance toward 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vyāpti. On this point it is likely that the opponent, the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍, is not 搁补迟苍ā办补谤补?ā苍迟颈, because 搁补迟苍ā办补谤补?ā苍迟颈 takes a positive stance toward the significant role of the 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vyāpti for the proof of momentariness and his 补苍迟补谤惫测ā辫迟颈-迟丑别辞谤测. He says, for instance, “as this pervasion comprises all [individual instances], it depends upon the universal,”^[22] and, “for pervasion comprising all [individual instances] is in fact an indispensable constituent (a?ga) of the establishment of that which is to be proven.”^[23]

4. Priority of anvaya over vyatireka

Furthermore 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra argues:

(I) Then, in this way, [the essence of] the pervasion [is that] “the pervading [property] is inevitably present in those which have the [property of being] pervaded.” And the establishment of momentary perishing cannot be repudi-ated on account of the efficacy itself of the reason “being existent” brought about by such a pervasion as that which has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (补苍惫补测补谤ū辫ā) and which is a property of the subjective element. Thus, it is considered “what is the use of introducing the means of valid cognition that annuls [the proving property] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven] in this case? (kim atra viparyaye 产ā诲丑补kapramā?opanyāse-neti)” Precisely for this reason, even the impossibility of introducing this (=the means of valid cognition that annuls [the proving property] in the reverse [of that which is to be proven]) does not hurt [the inference].

This is because that which is to be proven is established by [the means of valid cognition] that annuls nothing but [the existence of ] the reverse [of that which is to be proven in the proving property] (viparyayasyaiva 产ā诲丑补kena). Even in the texts of our tenets, …, the pervasion that has affirmative concomitance as its essential characteristic (补苍惫补测补谤ū辫ā) is established in detail, appearing as excluding the inconclusiveness [of the proving property], as with seeds and the like…^[24]

Here we see 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 efforts to defend the affirmative relation, namely, anvaya.

	Viparyaya-产ā诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘ā?补惫ā诲颈苍	闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 interpretation of viparyaya-产ā诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘ā?补	闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 position
anvaya		蝉ā诲丑补苍别 蝉ā诲丑测补viparyayasya 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补 (VBP2) or	prasa?ga and prasa?gavi-paryaya (=?)
			蝉ā诲丑补苍别 蝉ā诲丑测补viparya-yasya 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补 (VBP2)
vyatireka	蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 heto? 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补 (VBP1) (independent)	蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 heto? 产ā诲丑补-办补辫谤补尘ā?补 (VBP1)

Concluding remarks

A cursory glance at the passages cited above seems to suggest that 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra criticizes the VBP maintained by the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍. A detailed examination of the passage as a whole, however, leads us to the conclusion that the difference between his position and that of the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 lies, in fact, above all in their evaluation of 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vyāpti rather than of VBP itself. Both of these issues are, of course, closely related to each other, at least in 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 theory. The VBP-惫ā诲颈苍’s low evaluation of 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vyāpti suggests that the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 is not 搁补迟苍ā办补谤补?ā苍迟颈, because 搁补迟苍ā办补谤补?ā苍迟颈 takes a positive stance toward the significance of the 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vyāpti. Secondly, with reference to VBP itself, 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra claims the priority of prasa?ga and prasa?gaviparyaya over VBP, whereas for the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 VBP1 is the only way to establish pervasion. Here 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra tries to interpret VBP as a more synthetic and interrelated theory by expanding his interpretation of VBP (such that VBP is not only used for the proof of vyatireka but for that of anvaya as well). So it would seem that in all of his argumentation on VBP examined above, 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra seeks to establish the superiority of anvaya over vyatireka.

By this interpretation, we can easily understand and accept his positive statement concerning VBP in other contexts. For instance, in his 痴测ā辫迟颈肠补谤肠ā, after criticizing the 产丑ū测辞诲补谤?补苍补 of the Naiyāyikas, he says:

However, nothing but the viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补, an inference, should be inducted (unneyam). If it (i.e., viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补) is absent, it would be impossible to negate the occurrence (v?tti) [of reason] in the dissimilar domain (vipak?a).^[25]

In the above statement, where the determination of causal relations is discussed, 闯?ā苍补?rī-mitra really evaluates VBP. In the ??vara discussion as well, he states:

The means of valid cognition that establishes a pervasion is of only two kinds: perception and non-cognition or viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka, because both of these have perception and inference as their essential characteristics.^[26]

In these passages 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra accepts the role of VBP, even if he regards it as a having a limited secondary function.

As to the relation between VBP and prasa?ga and prasa?gaviparyaya, 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra gives priority to the latter over the former in the proof of the affirmative concomitance of momentariness. Is VBP2, as a genitive tatpuru?a, different from prasa?ga or prasa?gavipa-ryaya? If so, in which aspects is it different? And if the VBP-惫ā诲颈苍 is not 搁补迟苍ā办补谤补?ā苍迟颈, who might he be? These issues require further investigation.

References and abbreviations

Primary literature

AVS Antarvyāptisamarthana (搁补迟苍ā办补谤补?ā苍迟颈): See Kajiyama 1999.

HB 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈’s Hetubindu?, Teil I: Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text. Teil II: ?bersetzung und Anmerkungen, ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Vienna 1967.

HB? Hetubindu?īkā of Bha??a Arca?a, with the sub-commentary entitled ?loka of Durveka Mi?ra, ed. Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Muni Shri Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.

JNA 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补苍颈产补苍诲丑ā惫补濒颈?, ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna 1959,^[27] 1987.

NMu 狈测ā测补尘耻办丑补 (因明正理門論). Taisho 1628.

PS? Pra尘ā?补samuccaya?īkā.

PVin2 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈’s Pra尘ā?补vini?caya: Chapters 1 and 2, critically edited by Ernst Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2007. Kyo Kano 189

PVSV Pra尘ā?补vārttikasvav?tti (顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈): The Pra尘ā?补vārttikam of 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈, the first chapter with the autocommentary, text and critical notes, ed. Raniero Gnoli. Roma 1960.

RNA 搁补迟苍补办ī谤迟颈nibandhāvali?, ed. Anantalal Thakur. Patna^[28] 1975.

TBh(M) Tarkabhā?ā and Vādasthāna of Mok?ākaragupta and Jitāri辫ā诲补, ed. H.R. Ran-gaswami Iyengar. Mysore 1952.

VC 闯?ā苍补?rīmitras 痴测ā辫迟颈肠补谤肠ā, Sanskrittext, ?bersetzung, Analyse, ed. Horst Lasic. Vienna 2000.

VN? 痴ā诲补苍测ā测补prakara?a of Acharya 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 with the commentary Vipanchitārthā of Acharya ?ā苍迟补谤补办?颈迟补 and Sambandhaparīk?ā with the Commentary of Acharya Prabhachandra, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi 1972.

Secondary literature

Kajiyama 1966 Yūichi Kajiyama, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhā?ā of Mok?ākaragupta. Kyoto 1966.

Kajiyama 1999 Yūichi Kajiyama, The Antarvyāptisamarthana of 搁补迟苍ā办补谤补?ā苍迟颈. Tokyo 1999.

Katsura 1981 Shoryu Katsura, Inmyo-Shorimonron-Kenkyu (4) [A study of 狈测ā测补尘耻办丑补 (4)]. Hiroshimadaigaku-Bungakubu-Kiyo [A Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters, Hi-roshima University] (1981) 62–82.

Sakai 2014 Masamichi Sakai, Dharmottara on the viparyaye 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补 and trai-谤ū辫测补 in 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈’s 蝉补迟迟惫ā苍耻尘ā苍补. Draft only, paper presented at the Fifth Inter-national 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 Conference, Heidelberg 2014.

Shiraishi 2005 Tatsuhiko Shiraishi, 闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 two interpretations of 产ā诲丑补kapra-尘ā?补. Draft only, paper presented at the Fourth International 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 Conference Vienna, 24 August 2005.

Steinkellner 1967 See HB.

Steinkellner 1982 Ernst Steinkellner, Remarks on viparyaye 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补m –Dhar-makīrti’s Development of a Theorem. Draft only, paper presented at the First Inter-national 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 conference, Kyoto 1982.

Steinkellner 1991 Ernst Steinkellner, The logic of the 蝉惫补产丑ā惫补丑别迟耻 in 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈’s 痴ā诲补苍测ā测补. In: Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition. Proceedings of the Second International 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 Conference Vienna, June 11–16, 1989, ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Vienna 1991, 311–324.

Tani 1999 Tani Tadashi, Setsunametsu no Kenkyu [A Study of the Momentary Perishing of Existence]. Tokyo 1999.

Woo 1999 Woo Jeson, The K?a?abha?gasiddhi-anvayātmika: An eleventh-century Bud-dhist work on existence and causal theory. Diss., University of Pennsylvania. Penn-sylvania 1999.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Cf. Steinkellner 1982, 1991.

[2]:

Cf. Tani 1999, Woo 1999, Shiraishi 2005, Sakai 2014.

[3]:

Tani’s understanding of the VBP’s interpretations by 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈’s followers, such as Dharmottara and 笔谤补箩?ā办补谤补驳耻辫迟补, are scattered throughout his work (1999), but are found in chapter 3 in particular.

[4]:

For instance: First, VBP is sometimes identified with or regarded as being based on 惫测ā辫补办补[dharma]-anupalabdhi, at least by 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 and some logicians after him. Is VBP an inference based on 惫测ā辫补办ā苍耻辫补濒补产诲丑颈 or it cannot necessarily be identified with such an inference? Second, how is VBP related to prasa?ga and prasa?gaviparyaya? If VBP is different from these, what is the difference between prasa?ga/prasa?gaviparyaya and VBP formally, logically, and content-wise? Or is the latter the same as the former, especially prasa?gaviparyaya, since both of them have the same style of proof formulation. The late Prof. Kajiyama assessed the matter as follows: “I think that 碍补尘补濒补?ī濒补 was quite right when he identified viparyaye 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补m with a prasa?ga. … With 碍补尘补濒补?ī濒补, I also regard 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补 as prasa?ga in essence” (Kajiyama 1999: 37). He did not, however, mention the passage upon which his estimation depends.

[5]:

JNA p. 60, 3–10: nāpy 补苍补颈办ā苍迟颈办补?a?kā, 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vatyā vyāpte? prasādhanāt. nanu viparya-ya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补va?ād 惫测ā辫迟颈蝉颈诲诲丑颈?, tasya ca nopanyāsa惫ā谤迟ā. tat katha? vyāpti? prasādhitety ucyate? …nanv evam 补苍惫补测补尘ā迟谤补尘 astu, vipak?āt punar 别办ā苍迟别苍补 vyatireka iti katha? labhyam iti cet. vyāptisiddher eva. vyatireke vyāptisiddhir eva katham it cet. (Ci’ RNA p. 70, 9–11 and 15–16: na 肠ā测补尘 补苍补颈办ā苍迟颈办补?, atraiva sādharmyavati d???ānte 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vatyā vyāpte? prasādhanāt. nanu viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补产补濒ā诲 惫测ā辫迟颈蝉颈诲诲丑颈?, tasya copanyāsavārtā辫颈 nā蝉迟颈. tat katha? vyāpti? prasādhiteti cet. … nanv evam 补苍惫补测补尘ā迟谤补尘 astu. vipak?āt punar 别办ā苍迟别苍补 惫测ā惫?迟迟颈谤 iti kuto labhyata iti cet. vyāptisiddher eva. vyatirekasandehe vyāptisiddhir eva katham iti cet.) [Different readings are in bold font.]

[6]:

The relation between VBP and 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补 has been studied recently by Sakai (2014).

[7]:

JNA p. 60, 10–13: a→na, dvividhā hi vyāpti?, 补苍惫补测补谤ū辫ā ca kart?dharma? 蝉ā诲丑补苍补vati dharmi?i 蝉ā诲丑测补syāva?yambhāvo ya?, 惫测补迟颈谤别办补谤ū辫ā ca karmadharma? sādhyābhāve 蝉ā诲丑补苍补syāva?yamabhāvo ya?,←a vyāptir 惫测ā辫补办补sya tatra 产丑ā惫补 eva 惫测ā辫测补sya vā tatraiva 产丑ā惫补 iti nyāyāt. (a: Ci’ RNA p. 70, 17–20: na. dvividhā hi 惫测ā辫迟颈蝉颈诲诲丑颈?. 补苍惫补测补谤ū辫ā ca kart?dharma? 蝉ā诲丑补苍补dharmavati dharmi?i 蝉ā诲丑测补dharmasyāva?yambhāvo ya?, 惫测补迟颈谤别办补谤ū辫ā ca karmadharma? sādhyābhāve 蝉ā诲丑补苍补syāva-?yamabhāvo* ya?.) [Different readings are in bold font.] (*Emendation. RNA p. 70, 19: 蝉ā诲丑补苍补syāva-?yambhāvo.)

[8]:

Another interpretation is as follows: Taking the context of the 惫测ā辫补办补-惫测ā辫测补 relation into consideration, kart? and karman can correspond to 惫测ā辫补办补 (i.e., 蝉ā诲丑测补) and 惫测ā辫测补 (i.e., 蝉ā诲丑补苍补), respectively.

[9]:

JNA p. 60, 13–18 and 61, 2–3: a→enayo? caikasiddhir niyamena dvitīyapratītim āk?ipati. an测补迟丑ā ekasyāpy asiddhe?.←补 kevala? sāk?ād ekatra 辫谤补尘ā?补vyāpāro’nyatra 苍ā苍迟补谤ī测补办补迟补测ā pratītir iti 迟ā惫补-taivaikavyapade?a?. 迟补迟丑ā ca saty ekatra 辫谤补尘ā?补prav?tte? pūrvam anyatra sa??aya? pravartamāno’pi pa?cāt [迟补苍测ā?] 迟补测ā nirasyate. 测补迟丑ā viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补惫ā诲颈苍ām anvaya? sandihyamāno’pi 惫颈辫补办?ā诲 别办ā苍迟别苍补 惫测ā惫?迟迟颈产补濒ā迟 nirastasa??aya? paryavasyaty ak?a?ike sarvathā’nupapadyamāneya? 蝉补迟迟ā k?a?abha?ganiyataiveti, …tasmāt sādhyābhāve 蝉ā诲丑补苍补syaikāntiko vyatireka?, 蝉ā诲丑补苍别 sati 蝉ā诲丑测补syāva?yam anvayo veti na ka?cid arthato bheda?. (a: Ci’ RNA p. 70, 19–20: enayo? caika迟补谤补-辫谤补迟ī迟颈谤 niyamena dvitīyapratītim āk?ipati. anyathaikasyā evāsiddhe?.) [Different readings are in bold font.]

[10]:

JNA p. 61, 3–4: 辫谤补尘ā?补惫测ā辫ā谤补s tu mukhyato’rthata? ceti 诲惫颈诲丑ā 惫测补惫补丑ā谤补?.

[11]:

NMu 3a1–3 (Katsura 1981: 71–72): 若有於此一分己成、随説一分亦成能立、若如其聲両義同許、俱不須説、或由義准一能顕二。 PS? (Ms) 178b6 ad PS 4.5: 补谤迟丑ā辫补迟迟测ā 惫别迟测ā诲颈. …; PVSV p. 18, 17 (=PVin2, p. 53, 10): 补谤迟丑ā辫补迟迟测ā vānyatare?obhayapradar?anād iti.

[12]:

JNA p. 61, 4–6: ata eva yatra yatra 蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补parye?a?ā, tatra 蝉ā诲丑补苍别 sati sādhyānvaya?, 蝉ā诲丑补办补辫谤补尘ā?补parye?a?ā辫颈 tayopalak?itā veditavyā. viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka?abdena punar ubhayasa?graha eva.

[13]:

At the last 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈 conference in 2005, Shiraishi drew attention to this passage. Regretfully, his paper, titled “闯?ā苍补?谤ī尘颈迟谤补’蝉 two interpretations of 产ā诲丑补ka辫谤补尘ā?补” was not included in the proceedings of the conference, Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis, 2011.

[14]:

JNA p. 61, 6–8: vyatireka谤ū辫补vyāptau hi 蝉ā诲丑测补惫颈辫补谤测补测别 产ā诲丑补ka? 蝉ā诲丑补苍补sya, 补苍惫补测补谤ū辫āyā? tu 蝉ā诲丑测补viparyayasya 产ā诲丑补ka? 蝉ā诲丑补苍别 satīti. tad耻产丑补测ā产丑ā惫别 蝉ā诲丑补苍补sya 蝉ā诲丑测补pratibandhānupa-pattir ity ayam artha?. Cf. Shiraishi 2005: 6ff.

[15]:

HB p. 4*, 5–7. Skt. is reconstructed by Steinkellner. “Die Feststellung des gemeinsamen Vorkommens (anvaya?) ferner besteht beim Eigenwesen als dem Grund in dem Nachweis, da? die zu beweisende Beschaffenheit sich an das blo?e Vorhandensein der beweisenden Beschaffenheit anschlie?t, weil [die zu beweisende Beschaffenheit] der Sache nach das Eigenwesen (产丑ā惫补?=sva产丑ā惫补?) von etwas ist [das zugleich die beweisende Beschaffenheit zu seinem Eigenwesen hat]. Dieser [Nachweis] besteht im Auftreten eines Erkenntnismittels (辫谤补尘ā?补m), das den Grund im Gegenteil des zu Beweisenden aufhebt. Z.B.: Was seiend ist, das is ausschlie?lich augenblicklich; w?re es nicht augenblicklich, würde es, da [die Nichtaugenblicklichkeit] mit der Wirksamkeit in Widerspruch steht, die Dingheit verlieren, da [die Dingheit eben] durch diese [Wirksamkeit] bestimmt ist.” (Steinkellner 1967: 37)

[16]:

We should also not overlook the expression 蝉ā诲丑补苍别 sati. The expression is presumably intended for those who claim that 辫补办?补诲丑补谤尘补迟ā is not necessarily required, such as 搁补迟苍ā办补谤补?ā苍迟颈. AVS p. 86, 2–4: 产ā诲丑补kāt 蝉ā诲丑测补siddhi? ced vyartho hetvantaragraha?. 产ā诲丑补kāt tadasiddhi? ced vyartho dharmyantaragraha?.

[17]:

Cf. Steinkellner 1982: 2; 1991: 318. After 顿丑补谤尘补办ī谤迟颈, for instance: HB? p. 44, 24: etac ca 产ā诲丑补-ka? 辫谤补尘ā?补? 惫测ā辫补办ā苍耻辫补濒补产诲丑颈谤ū辫补m uttaratrāvasaraprāpta? svayam eva vak?yati. VN? p. 10, 27–28: idam ukta? bhavati. 惫测ā辫补办ā苍耻辫补濒补产诲丑颈r eva saha产丑ā惫补? 产ā诲丑补te heto? sādhyābhāvena. RNA p. 83, 8: na ca viruddhānaikāntikate, vyāpakānupalambhātmanā viparyaye 产ā诲丑补kapramā-?ena vyāpte? prasādhanāt. TBh(M) (Kajiyama 1966: 115, n. 309) … zhes pa khyab byed mi dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid can bzlog pa la gnod pa can gyi tshad mas (… iti 惫测ā辫补办ā苍耻辫补濒补产诲丑颈lak?a?a(/ 谤ū辫补)viparyaya产ā诲丑补kapramā?ena…) [This part is dropped in the Sanskrit text to which we have access. The Sanskrit above has been reconstructed by Kajiyama.]

[18]:

JNA p. 61, 8–10: an测补迟丑ā vyatirekani?cāyaka辫谤补尘ā?补sya sāk?ād alābhe’pi yadi 蝉ā诲丑补苍补sya sādhyenānvayaniyamapra蝉ā诲丑补办补? 辫谤补尘ā?补m upadar?ayet, kas tasya 蝉ā诲丑测补siddhau pratibandho vyati-rekasyā辫颈* sāmarthyāk?epāt. [*Corrected with Ms.; JNA: vyatirekasyānvayasyā辫颈.] Concerning the last part, various readings are possible. The difference in the interpretation of the sentence lies in the understanding of “tasya 蝉ā诲丑测补siddhau” [tasya: (a) 蝉ā诲丑补苍补sya, (b) 辫谤补尘ā?补sya; 蝉ā诲丑测补siddhau: (a) when … is proven, (b) with reference to 蝉ā诲丑测补siddhi].

[19]:

JNA p. 61, 11–17: an测补迟丑ā sādharmyaprayogo’nupādeya eva syāt, sāk?ād vyatirekānupadar?anāt. tad yadi sāmarthyagamyo’pi na vyatirekātmā, 迟补诲ā’pi yatra yatra 蝉ā诲丑补苍补? tatra tatra 蝉ā诲丑测补m itīyataiva 蝉ā诲丑补苍别 sati 蝉ā诲丑测补pratyā?āprayukta? 办?迟ī 办?迟ā谤迟丑补?. tadabhāve’bhāviny api hi 蝉ā诲丑补苍别 sati yadi tadbhāve’va?ya?bhāvi 蝉ā诲丑测补? 迟补诲ā phalita? 蝉ā诲丑补苍补svīkāra?. tasmāt 蝉ā诲丑补苍补惫ā诲颈苍ā dvayam api parye?a?īya? vikalpena, 惫ā诲颈苍ā caiko’pi 辫谤补办ā谤补? 辫谤补尘ā?补siddha upadar?ayitavya?, para蝉ā诲丑补苍别?u ca vyatirekavad anvayo’pi 苍颈测补尘补惫ā苍 durlabha eveti veditavyam.

[20]:

As to the usage of ā办?别辫补 in the context of the relation between anvaya and vyatireka, see RNA 67.4: ā办?颈辫迟补vyatirekā yā vyāptir a苍惫补测补谤ū辫颈?ī / sādharmyavati d???ānte sattvahetor ihocyate // [The pervasion that has anvaya as its essential characteristic and by which [its] vyatireka is hinted at …]; 83.4: vyatirekātmikā vyāptir ā办?颈辫迟ā苍惫补测补谤ū辫颈?ī / vaidharmyavati d???ānte sattvahetor ihocyate // [The pervasion that has vyatireka as its essence and has the essential characteristic that [its] anvaya is hinted at … ] It seems that these two verses, which appear at the beginning of each chapter of 搁补迟苍补办ī谤迟颈’s K?a?abha?gasiddhi, in the anvaya and vyatireka chapters, respectively, and have symmetrical construc-tion, were composed by the author (搁补迟苍补办ī谤迟颈 or someone else) (see Woo 1999: 141), being strongly conscious of the discussion of the relation between anvaya and vyatireka, which 闯?ā苍补?rīmitra makes here.

[21]:

JNA p. 61, 18–22: asmābhis tu prak?ta蝉ā诲丑补苍别 苍颈测补尘补惫ā苍 anvaya? prasa?gaviparyayābhyā? 辫补耻谤补蝉迟测ā产丑测ā? dar?ita eva, tau ca yady api sapak?iīk?te jalabh?ti pravartitau, 迟补迟丑ā辫颈 yo yatkara?asva产丑ā惫补? sa taj janayaty eva, yo yan na janayati na sa tatkara?asva产丑ā惫补?, ity eva? pravartamānau sarvam eva 办谤颈测ā?aktiyukta? k?a?ikatve niyata? dar?ayata iti 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤辞 惫测补迟颈谤别办ā办?别辫补产ī箩补? dhūmādivat.

[22]:

AVS p. 64, 4: sā ca sarvopasa?hārāt sāmānyam avalambate /

[23]:

AVS p. 66, 3: 蝉补谤惫辞辫补蝉补?丑ā谤补vatī hi vyāpti? 蝉ā诲丑测补siddher a?gam.

[24]:

JNA p. 63, 10–14: tad eva? vyāptir 惫测ā辫补办补sya 惫测ā辫测补vati 产丑ā惫补 eveti kart?dharmānvaya谤ū辫补vyā-ptisa?pāditasāmarthyād eva sattvaheto? k?a?abha?gasiddhir apratihateti kim atra viparyaye 产ā诲丑补-kapramā?opanyāseneti samarthitam? ata eva tadupanyāsā?akyatā辫颈 na pī?ayati, viparyayasyaiva 产ā诲丑补kena 蝉ā诲丑测补sya siddhatvāt. ?āstre’pi pratha[mani??]yame ca vyāptir 补苍惫补测补谤ū辫ā bījādivad anekāntaparihāravyājena vistarata? prasādhitā. …

[25]:

VC p. 33*, 7–9: viparyaya产ā诲丑补kam eva tu 辫谤补尘ā?补m anumānam unneyam, tadabhāve vipak?av?ttini-?edhasyā?kyatvāt,…

[26]:

JNA p. 293, 1: tac ca 辫谤补尘ā?补? vyāpti蝉ā诲丑补办补? dvividham eva. pratyak?ānupalambha? vā, viparyaya产ā诲丑补ka? vā, anayo? pratyak?ānumānasva产丑ā惫补tvāt,....

[27]:

Cf. Tani 1999, Woo 1999, Shiraishi 2005, Sakai 2014.

[28]:

Cf. Tani 1999, Woo 1999, Shiraishi 2005, Sakai 2014.