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In the Nyaya-sutra³ inference is distinguished into three kinds, namely, namely, purvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta.

3 Vide Nyaya-sutra, 1. 1. 5. P. 9.

here are different views with regard to the nature of these inferences. According to one view, a purvavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. Here the linga or the middle term is related to the sadhya or the major term as its cause and is, therefore, antecedent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the antecedent cause to that of the consequent effect. This is illustrated when from the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there will be rainfall. A sesavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. Here the middle term is related as an effect to the major term and is, therefore, consequent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge of the effect-phenomenon to that of the antecedent causal phenomenon. This is illustrated in the inference of previous rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift muddy current. It will be observed here that in both purvavat and sesavat inferences the vyapti or the universal relation between the major and middle terins is a uniform relation of causality between them. These inferences thus depend on scientific inductions. In samanyatorrsta inference, however, the vyapti or the universal relation between the major and middle terms does not depend on a causal uniformity. The middle term of the inference is related to the major term neither as a cause nor as an effect. We infer the one from the other, not because they are causally connected, but because they are uniformly related to each other in our experience. This is illustrated when one infers that the sun moves because, like other moving objects, its position changes, or, when we argue that a thing must have some attributes because it is like a substance. Here the inference depends not on a causal connection, but on certain observed points of similarity between different objects of experience. So it is more akin to an analogical argument than to syllogistic inference. According to a second interpretation, a purvavat inference is that which is based on previous experience. If two things have always been found to be related in the past, then from the

perception of the one we infer the existence of the other, as when we infer fire from smoke. Similarly, a sesavat inference is taken to mean inference by elimination, in which the inferred character is the residuum of a process of elimination which excludes other characters. This is illustrated when one argues that sound must be a quality because it cannot be a substance or an activity or a relation and so on. So also samanyalodrsta inference is explained as that in which we do not perceive the relation between the major and middle terms, but find the middle to be similar to objects which are related to the major term. This is illustrated when one argues that the soul-substance exists because the quality of consciousness must, like other qualities, inhere in a substance.' According to a third view these three kinds of inferences may be taken to mean kevalanvayi, kevala-vyatireki and anvaya-vyatireki inferences which we are to consider next.