Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 284 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
284 (of 404)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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CLASSIFICATION OF INFERENCE 267 There are different views with regard to the nature of these
inferences. According to one view, a p奴rvavat inference is that
in which we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause.
Here the linga or the middle term is related to the sadhya or
the major term as its cause and is, therefore, antecedent to it. In
this inference we pass from the knowledge of the antecedent cause
to that of the consequent effect. This is illustrated when from
the presence of dark heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there
will be rainfall. A se峁vat inference is that in which we infer
the unperceived cause from a perceived effect. Here the middle
term is related as an effect to the major term and is, therefore,
consequent to it. In this inference we pass from the knowledge
of the effect-phenomenon to that of the antecedent causal
phenomenon. This is illustrated in the inference of previous
rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift muddy
current. It will be observed here that in both purvavat and
se峁vat inferences the vy膩pti or the universal relation between
the major and middle terins is a uniform relation of causality
between them. These inferences thus depend on scientific
inductions. In s膩m膩nyator峁涐梗峁璦 inference, however, the vy膩pti
or the universal relation between the major and middle terms
does not depend on a causal uniformity. The middle term of
the inference is related to the major term neither as a cause
nor as an effect. We infer the one from the other, not because
they are causally connected, but because they are uniformly
related to each other in our experience. This is illustrated
when one infers that the sun moves because, like other moving
objects, its position changes, or, when we argue that a thing
must have some attributes because it is like a substance. Here
the inference depends not on a causal connection, but on certain
observed points of similarity between different objects of
experience. So it is more akin to an analogical argument than
to syllogistic inference.
According to a second interpretation, a p奴rvavat inference
is that which is based on previous experience. If two things
have always been found to be related in the past, then from the
