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Internal perception is due to the internal sense or manas. Hence it is called munasa or anlara pratyaksa. It is the knowledge of mental facts brought about by their contact (sannikarsa) with the inner sense or manas. Thus manasa or internal perception is, like introspection, the source of our direct knowledge about mental or subjective facts. But while modern introspectionists take introspection to consist in the mind's knowledge of its own contents, the Naiyayikas treat internal perception as knowledge of certain subjective facts other than, but due to, the mind as a sense. Generally speaking, the self and its contents are the objects of internal perception. These are perceived when they come in contact with manas or the mind. In introspection the mind or self turns back on itself and perceives what is going on there without requiring any sense. The Naiyayikas, however, like the older introspectionists, believe that the self requires an inner sense to perceive psychical facts, just as it requires the external senses to perceive external objects. " " Among the objects of manasa or internal perception the 1 The Analysis of Mind, p. 276.

hasapariccheda mentions the feelings of pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, cognition or knowledge and all kinds of mental effort or volition.' To these we may add the universal of each of these attributes, their non-existence and inherence in the self, and the self itself. All of these are perceived when there is contact (sannikarsa), in some form or other, between them and the internal sense of manas. Let us now consider the process involved in the perception of these objects. 2 According to the Nyaya, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, cognition and volition are attributes of the self. Their relation to the self is one of inherence (samavaya). They are perceived when the mind as a sense comes in contact with them. This sense-object contact is not one of direct conjunction (samyoga). It is an indirect contact called samyuktasamavaya. Pleasure, pain and the rest as particular facts, come in contact with the mind through their inherence (samavaya) in the self which is conjoined (samyukta) with the mind. Similarly, the universals of pleasure, pain, etc., are perceived through that kind of indirect sense-contact which is called samyukta-samaveta-samavaya. The universals of pleasure and pain (sukhatvaduhkhatva) subsist in particular pleasures and pains by way of inherence (samavaya). The particular pleasures and pains exist in the soul as its inherent attributes (samavetagunah). Hence the mind comes in contact with the universals of pleasure and pain through their inherence in what inhere in the soul which is conjoined to the mind. In perceiving any particular pleasure or pain we do perceive its pleasureableness or painfulness quite as directly, although the process of perception is more mediated and complicated." So also, we perceive that pleasure, pain, etc., inhere in the self so long as they exist or are present. And just as we perceive their existence so also we perceive their non-existence or absence. That 'I am unhappy,' or 'I have ceased to be angry' is as much a 1 Manograhyam sukham duhkhamiccha dveso matih krtih, Bhasapariccheda, 57. 2 Tarkakaumudi, p. 9. 3 Vide Siddhanta-muktavali, 57; Tarkabhasa, P. 6.

鈫� matter of direct perception as that 'I am happy' or 'I am angry.' The process The process of perception is, however, somewhat different. The perception of the inherence (samavaya) of pleasure and pain, as also of their non-existence (abhava) in the self is mediated by the indirect sense-object contact called visesanata. Both the inherence of a present pleasure and the non-existence of a past one are determinations (visesana) of the self. They are perceived when the mind as sense comes in contact with them through its conjunction with the self which has those determinations.' It is only in the perception of the self that there is a direct sense-object contact. The self as a substance comes in actual contact (samyoga) with manas or the mind as another substance, and thereby becomes an object of internal perception. It cannot be perceived by the external senses, since it possesses neither a limited dimension (mahattva) nor any manifest (udbhuta) colour or touch.³ According to some Naiyayikas, the pure self cannot be an object of perception. The self is perceived only as related to some perceptible attribute like cognition, pleasure, etc. We do not perceive the self as such but as feeling or knowing or doing something. Hence the self is perceived through the perception of this or that state of consciousness. While one's own self can be perceived, other selves can only be inferred from their bodily actions or behaviours." According to the Vedanta, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are perceived, but their perception requires no sense organ like manas or the mind. They are the different parts or aspects of the antahkarana. As such, there is a natural identification between these and the antahkarana or the mind. This identification means a perception of all that is identified with the antahkarana. In short, 1 Tarkabhasa, p. 6. 2 Manasantarenendriyena yadatmavisayakam jnanam janyate 'hamiti tada mana indriyamatmarthah, ibid. 3 Bhasapariccheda & Siddhanta-muktavali, 49-50. 鈥� Ibid.

mental states are perceived facts because they are mental, and so do not require any sense to perceive them." " As to the question how cognition or knowledge is known, there is a sharp difference of opinion among philosophers. Some thinkers who deny the possibility of introspection would say that knowledge can never be known. This is the position taken up by Comte, Dunlap and others. Comte thought that knowing cannot be known, since it involves a division of the mind into two parts, which is impossible. So too, Dunlap, in his article "The case against Introspection," urges that there is a dualism of subject and object, that the subject can never become object, and therefore there can be no awareness of an awareness. He says: Knowing there certainly is ; known, the knowing certainly is not." Again he says: "I am never aware of an awareness. But if this is so, how do we know that there is any knowledge or awareness at all? Dunlap says that it is by being aware of something?' This means that when I am aware of something I am aware of being aware of it. To know something is thus to know that something is known. Hence it cannot be denied that knowledge is somehow known, be it by introspection or not. As Russell³ has pointed out, 'the statement "I am aware of a colour" is assumed by Dunlap to be known to be true, but he does not explain how it comes to be known.' " Hence the next question is: How is it that knowledge is known? According to the Sankhya, the Prabhakara Mimamsa and the Advaita Vedanta, knowledge is known by itself. Cognition or knowledge is a conscious fact and it is the very nature of consciousness to be aware of itself. The point has been elaborated by the Prabhakaras in their theory of triputisamvit or triune manifestation. According to it, every knowledge manifests itself at the same time that it manifests 24 (O.P. 103) 1 Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. I. 4 2 Psychological Review, Sept., 1912. 3 The Analysis of Mind, p. 115. * Vide Prakaranapancika, p. 59.

an object and the knowing subject. It is at once a manifestation of three things, namely, knowledge, the object and the knower. The Jainas also take a similar view with regard to the nature of knowledge. The Advaita Vedanta takes knowledge or consciousness to be the essence of the self, the very stuff of it. As such, knowledge is self-manifest and self-shining (svaprakasa).' It does not require any thing else to manifest or know it. On this view, every cognition is self-cognised, and consciousness is full and complete awareness of something by a self. But that every knowledge is self-conscious knowledge,' or 'to be aware of something is also to be aware of that awareness' is a proposition which is not borne out by psychological facts. Sub-conscious or unconscious experiences of the mind cannot be said to be full and explicit awareness of themselves. Further, as Russell 2 has remarked, it is highly probable that children and the higher animals are aware of objects, but not of their own awareness. According to the Bhatta Mimamsa" knowledge cannot be directly known. We can never know any knowledge immediately by itself or by any introspection called internal perception. That we have an awareness or a knowledge of some object is no doubt a matter of knowledge for us. But this latter knowledge is not at all immediate and perceptual knowledge; it is only mediate and inferential knowledge. When we are aware of something, it comes to have the character of ' being an object of our knowledge' (jnatata). But how can a thing have this character of 'being known,' unless there was previously some knowledge of it? Hence from the character of 'being known' or 'being cognised' in the known object we infer the antecedent existence of knowledge or cognition. Thus knowledge is neither self-manifested nor directly perceived, but inferred from the character of 'knownness' or 'cognisedness' (jnatata) in the object that has been known or cognised. 1 Vide Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. I. 2 The Analysis of Mind, pp. 115-16. 3 Vide Sastradipika, pp. 56-57.

he Naiyayikas reject this view on the ground that 'knownness' cannot be a character of objects, for objects acquire no character from their relation to knowledge. The Naiyayikas, as we have already seen, hold that knowledge is known by introspection or internal perception (manasa pratyaksa). According to them, cognition or knowledge manifests its objects, but not itself. It points beyond itself and can never be directed to itself. Hence cognition or knowledge cannot be self-manifested. It does not, however, follow that knowledge cannot be at all known or manifested. Just as an cbject is manifested by a cognition of it, so one cognition is manifested by another that follows it and makes it an object to itself. First there is the cognition of an object (vyavasaya), and then another cognition coming after it cognises the first i.e. there is an after-cognition (anuvyavasaya) of the first cognition.' It follows that every cognition is not necessarily cognised, that awareness of an object is not always an awareness of itself. It is only when the self or mind attends to, and casts an introspective glance at it, that one cognition or knowledge is known or perceived. This view of the Naiyayikas has the support of many modern introspectionists like Stout, Laird and others. Thus Stout observes: Psychical states as such become objects only when we attend to them in an introspective way. Otherwise they are not themselves objects, but only constituents of the process by which objects are cognised." So too, Laird says: "Certainly, our cognitive processes are, in their usual exercise, processes with which (not at which) we look; and none of them, perhaps, can look at itself. It does not follow, however, that another (introspective) look cannot be directed towards this process of looking..." "12 This means that one cognition is known by another by way of introspection. But for the Naiyayikas, introspection involves a peculiar difficulty. It supposes the simultaneous presence of two ... TR., p. 53; Tattvadipika, p. 32. 2 A Manual of Psychology, p. 134. 3 Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series, p. 227.

cognitions, which is not admitted by the Naiyayikas. Hence we are to say that the cognition, which is cognised by another cognition, is past in relation to the second cognition which is present. This implies that introspection is really memory or retrospection of what is past. But there cannot be any memory without a previous perception corresponding to it. Hence we are committed to the view that every cognition somehow cognises itself. It may not have an explicit awareness of itself but only an implicit or vague feeling of its presence. As Stout has elsewhere said: The stream of consciousness feels its own current. Hence the way in which cognition or knowledge (or for the matter of that, the mind) knows itself is quite different from that in which it knows an object external to itself. This has been very well recognised by Alexander in his distinction between an enjoying and a contemplating consciousness. He says that in any experience the mind enjoys itself and contemplates its object, that the mind is not a contemplated object to itself, and that introspection is not contemplation.³ Hence we conclude that knowledge is known directly by itself. This knowledge of knowledge however is neither an explicit manifestation nor a definite perception of it, but a feeling or an enjoying consciousness of itself.. 1 Analytic Psychology, Vol. I, p. 160. 2 Space, Time and Deity, Vol. I, pp. 12-17.