Reverberations of Dharmakirti鈥檚 Philosophy
by Birgit Kellner | 2020 | 264,305 words
This page relates 鈥楧harmottara on the viparyaye badhaka-pramana and Trairupya鈥� of the study on the philosophy of Dharmakirti (6th century) and his predecessor Dignaga (5th century). This collection of articles reflects philosophical currents in India, China and Tibet during their time and investigates the Buddhist theories of Pramana (鈥渋nstruments of trustworthy awareness鈥�).
Go directly to: Footnotes.
[Full title: Dharmottara on the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 and 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 in 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 by Masamichi Sakai]
I am very grateful to Mr. Tyler Neill (PhD candidate, Leipzig University) for correcting and improving my English. Through the conversation with him, I could also improve this essay as a whole. With my deepest gratitude, I dedicate this article to my beloved Teacher Dr. Helmut Krasser, who privileged me to be a member of his project of editing the codex unicus of Dharmottara鈥檚 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补峁玨腻.
Introduction
It goes without saying that 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 new approach of inferring momentariness (办峁-苍颈办补迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补)鈥搃.e., the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补, the inference of momentariness based on the inferential reason property 鈥渆xistence鈥� (sattva)鈥揾ad a decisive impact on the later de-velopment of this kind of Buddhist inference. At the same time, it is also true that the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 generated a number of interpretative tasks for 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 successors.
The problem is that the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 seems to contain many aspects that threaten to shake the foundation of the traditional Buddhist logic in place since 顿颈驳苍腻驳补.[1] Prof. Katsumi Mimaki gives a clear synopsis of the problems confronting later Buddhist logicians, basing himself mainly on the works of J帽膩na艣r墨mitra, 搁补迟苍补办墨谤迟颈, 搁补迟苍腻办补谤补艣腻苍迟颈, and Mok峁Ｄ乲aragupta, who constitute the last phase of Buddhist philosophers.[2] I agree with Prof. Mimaki鈥檚 contention that the problems they dealt with did not arise suddenly at that time, but rather had been developing gradually over the course of history.[3] I have shown for example that one of the most crucial problems of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补鈥搉amely that the 鈥渆xample鈥� (henceforth: 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补) is of no use, which seemingly forces the Buddhist to discard the second 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 condition (sa辫补办峁 eva sattvam; henceforth T2)鈥搘as argued by Arca峁璦 with a keen awareness.[4]
Arca峁璦鈥檚 pupil, Dharmottara, shares his teacher鈥檚 awareness of the problem. In line with Arca峁璦鈥檚 argument, he also asks whether or not the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 in the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 is necessary. However, Dharmottara goes even further, contesting the necessity of the inferential reason property 鈥渆xistence鈥� itself, thereby deepening the problem and developing the argument.
The aim of this article is to introduce and clarify Dharmottara鈥檚 arguments for solving the problematic nature of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补,[5] by shedding light on what the exact problem is that Dharmottara inherits from his teacher, and how he addresses and develops it. In doing so, I attempt to properly locate Dharmottara鈥檚 contribution within the larger interpretative history of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补.
1. Arca峁璦 and Dharmottara
[Sharing the problem of the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 and the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺]
1.1 Arca峁璦鈥檚 argument: the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 is useless and redundant
Arca峁璦鈥檚 greatest concern, as well as his pupil鈥檚, is the relation between the threefold characteristic of a good reason property, i.e., 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补, and the so-called viparyaye 产腻诲丑补-办补辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 in the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补.
In 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈an logic, the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 in the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 plays the critical role of demonstrating the essential connection (蝉惫补产丑腻惫补辫谤补迟颈产补苍诲丑补) or the pervasion (惫测腻辫迟颈) between the inferential reason property (henceforth: hetu) 鈥渆xistence鈥� and the target property (henceforth: 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补) 鈥渕omentariness.鈥�[6]
In the 贬别迟耻产颈苍诲耻峁玨腻 (贬叠峁�), Arca峁璦 argues[7] that, in the case of 办峁峁噄办补迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补, since its 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 鈥渕omentariness鈥� is imperceptible by nature, it is therefore impossible to find and show a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 via perception (辫谤补迟测补办峁). Generally speaking, in Dign膩gean inference, in order to say that a hetu satisfies T2, one must exhibit at least one thing that possesses the hetu as well as the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 and that is ontologically different from the site of inference (蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘颈苍; henceforth: 辫补办峁). However, in the 办峁峁噄办补迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补, it is in fact impossible to find any momentary thing at all via perception. How then can one find a momentary thing to serve as 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补? Concerning this problem, Arca峁璦 is of the opinion that, since the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 can prove the essential connection, it can also prove that whatever possesses the hetu has the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补. Thus, if one applies the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 to something possessing the hetu and ontologically different from the 辫补办峁, one can show that the hetu satisfies T2. In the final analysis, however, Arca峁璦 sees this activity of finding a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 as nonsensical, given the natural objection in favor of directly applying the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 to the 辫补办峁. That is, the logical method used to find something momentary as a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 can also be used to prove that the 辫补办峁 is momentary. With this in mind, Arca峁璦 views the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 as being redundant and of no use in the case of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补.[8] He asserts that T2 in the case of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 should be understood to be fictitious (办腻濒辫补苍颈办补).
1.2 Dharmottara鈥檚 treatment of the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补
Dharmottara takes the same position as Arca峁璦, namely that what proves the momentariness of a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 is the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 and not any other source of knowledge, and that the same viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 can also be used to prove that the 辫补办峁 is momentary.[9] Given this position, the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 seems to be of no use, according to Arca峁璦. However, in the 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补峁玨腻 (PVin峁�), Dharmottara elucidates a positive significance of, and role for, the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 in the case of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补.[10]
The following series of arguments in the PVin峁� is strongly influenced by Arca峁璦鈥檚 position, and it seems here that Dharmottara, in an attempt to preserve some kind of raison d鈥�锚迟谤别 for the 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补, tries to overturn Arca峁璦鈥檚 conclusion.
1.2.1 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补鈥檚 role and significance
In the PVin峁�, Dharmottara states:
If impermanence [i.e., momentariness,] is to be proved, what is a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补, where the relation between that which is to be pervaded and that which pervades [it] should be demonstrated? And he [i.e., 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈] will declare [later, in PVin 3 128,1鈥�131,5] that, 鈥淥ne should not take up a hetu, relying on scriptural doctrine (samaya/gzhung 笔痴颈苍峁瑃).鈥� And, when an opponent who does not adhere to [any] settled doctrine (蝉颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补) objects to momentariness, in that case, he should be forced to provisionally accept the momentariness of a certain thing even by receiving bribes (utkoca). This is because, otherwise, owing to the lack of a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补, there would be no hetu. Therefore, there is no [诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补] at all whose 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 has already been well established [for such an opponent].[11]
First, in asking himself what to make of the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 in the inference of momentariness, Dharmottara refers to 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 discourse on the antinomic reasons (惫颈谤耻诲诲丑腻惫测补-产丑颈肠腻谤颈丑别迟耻) in the third chapter of the 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补. There 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 argues that his three kinds of hetu 鈥揺ssential feature (蝉惫补产丑腻惫补), effect (办腻谤测补), and non-perception (anupalabdhi)鈥揷an never be antinomic. This is because they are all based on real things (vastu). According to him, any hetus based on scriptures (腻驳补尘补) are antinomic, since they do not issue from the force of seeing real things (补惫补蝉迟耻诲补谤艣补苍补产补濒补辫谤补惫峁泃迟补).[12] With respect to this position of 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈, Dharmottara sees a role for a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补. Namely, Dharmottara regards a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 as a place where it is guaranteed that a relevant hetu is based on a real thing and not on scripture.[13]
Then, Dharmottara imagines a certain situation in which a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 is needed: Suppose there is an opponent who is open-minded, i.e., free from any dogmas, but who never accepts momentariness. In that case, an advocate of momentariness must force that opponent into provisionally accepting (abhi-upa-鈭�gam) the momentariness of a certain thing鈥搕his 鈥榗ertain thing鈥� is a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补. Otherwise, not only could he not present the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 to him, but he could not present even the hetu. That is, for such an opponent a certain thing serving as 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 would be the first place where both the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 and the hetu coexist. Therefore, with this 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 the proponent can first establish both for that opponent. So, the proponent must employ the following procedure: first, force the opponent into provisionally accepting the momentariness of a certain thing, and second, make it known to him that the hetu is also there. After that, he can eventually move on to a proof of the momentariness of the 辫补办峁. However, at this point, the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 of that 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 has not yet been proved.
1.2.2 Definition of the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 in the case of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补
In this line of argumentation, Dharmottara defines the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 in the inference of momen-tariness as follows:
Moreover, with regard to this 鈥済rasping/holding of a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 [in a proof],鈥� mentioned here and there, the following is the meaning: It is by depending on the fact that the hetu exists in a thing that is different from the 辫补办峁 that one can make the defeating source of knowledge function, not in a different manner. Therefore, the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 is an object 1) which is a sphere (惫颈峁测补) where hetu is established and 2) which is a place where the defeating source of knowledge is shown. For an opponent in turn, however, [诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补] is not [yet] proved as being caused to be bound to the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补, [i.e., momentariness], [until the defeating source of knowledge is made to function there].[14]
One aspect of this is that Dharmottara confirms that the hetu should be established on the basis of reality and that it is in the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 that this takes place. Another aspect is that the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 is a place where the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 should be shown, since otherwise, the proponent cannot prove the 诲峁涐梗迟腻苍迟补鈥檚 momentariness, which has been only forcibly and provisionally accepted by the opponent.[15]
2. The crucial problem of the hetu sattva:
[Sharing the problem of the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 and the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺]
However, the position that the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 establishes as proved the provi-sionally accepted momentariness of a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 evokes the very crucial problem, which, to the best of my knowledge, was first propounded by Arca峁璦, and which equally confronted later Buddhist logicians.
Dharmottara introduces the following, seemingly rhetorical p奴rva辫补办峁:
[Objection 1:] If the defeating source of knowledge does not require [a 诲峁涐梗峁�-nta] of which the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 is already admitted, then, in this manner, when the defeating source of knowledge shows the pervasion of [a property] 鈥渂eing produced鈥� by [a property] 鈥渂eing impermanent鈥� in a property posses-sor as 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补, this very same defeating source of knowledge will prove the impermanence in the 辫补办峁 too. Thus, it is in every case the defeating source of knowledge that is capable of proving the 蝉腻诲丑测补[dharma]. For this reason, there is the undesirable consequence that the hetu, which is of the essential feature type, is not a real hetu (补丑别迟耻迟惫补辫谤补蝉补峁単补). [Objection 2:] Moreover, even if the following is the case: 鈥淒efeating (产腻诲丑补ka) itself does not occur without depending upon [the hetus] 鈥榖eing existent鈥� and 鈥榖eing produced,鈥� therefore, [the hetu] 鈥榖eing existent鈥� should be needed,鈥� it is nevertheless only on the basis of 辫补办峁dharmatva [i.e., the fact that the hetu is a property of the 辫补办峁], which is accompanied by the defeating source of knowledge, that the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 is proved. Thus, there is the undesirable consequence that there is not a threefold condition [as a whole, namely because only the first condition is needed].[16]
The points of this objection are:
1) Given that the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 can in fact prove the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补鈥檚 momen-tariness, it can prove the 辫补办峁鈥檚 momentariness too. It follows then that the hetu sattva in the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 is not a real hetu that can in fact prove 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 鈥搕he real hetu, i.e., reasoning, is the very viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 instead.
2) It may be the case that defeating does not occur without this hetu 鈥搒ince what is defeated by the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 is this sattva in the case where non-momentariness is supposed[17] 鈥揳nd so, in this sense, the hetu seems to be needed.[18] Nevertheless, it should actually be the case that only the 辫补办峁dharmatva 鈥搕he fact that the hetu is a property of the 辫补办峁 鈥搃s needed. This is because the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 can function in the 辫补办峁 if and only if that 辫补办峁 possesses sattva, so that its possession of the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 can be proved by it. In this case, what is needed for a sound inference is only the first 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 condition (henceforth: T1). Thus, the 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 condition considered as a whole would be useless.
It is this same second point of this objection on the basis of which Arca峁璦 discards the necessity of T2.
2.1 Counterexample and the second 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 condition
To respond to these undesired consequences on behalf of the 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 theory, Dharmottara appeals to the concept of a 鈥榗ounterexample鈥� in a possible debate with opponents:
[Answer:] [To this objection,] we say (ucyate): What has been said, namely that, 鈥淸It is sufficient that] there is pervasion only in the 辫补办峁, and so what can be gained by grasping other property possessors [other than the 辫补办峁]?鈥� is not tenable. This is because it is not possible to show the defeating source of knowledge in a single locus [i.e., in the 辫补办峁], after setting aside visible objects that are different from the 辫补办峁. Suppose the defeating source of knowledge should be shown in the following manner: 鈥淚f there were not the momentariness of a sound, there would not be even [its] existence.鈥� If an opponent were to say, 鈥淛ust as a visible thing, such as a pot etc., though not momentary, achieves purpose fulfillment, this sound too must be so,鈥� [then] those visible [things], such as pots, should also in the same manner [i.e., like in the case of a sound] be brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge. And, with regards to those [visible things such as a pot and the like] that have [already] been brought into the scope [of the defeating source of knowledge], he [i.e., the opponent] may respond: 鈥淎 certain invisible thing, though it achieves purpose [fulfillment], should be (产丑补惫颈峁补迟颈) non-momentary, and these visible [things, the pot and so on] are like this.鈥� Therefore, [this] invisible thing that has in turn been put forth as a [counter]example by the opponent should be brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge. Therefore, why is it the case that the defeating source of knowledge is shown only in the specific and single 辫补办峁?[19]
Dharmottara鈥檚 point is this: Even though the proponent applies the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 directly to the 辫补办峁 and thereby completes the proof of its momentariness, his opponent might bring other existing things as 鈥榗ounterexamples鈥� which are thought to be non-momentary but capable of purpose fulfillment. Theoretically speaking, for any existent things including even invisible things (补诲峁浥泍补), it is not until the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补kapra-尘腻峁嘺 functions that their momentariness is proved, since only it is capable of proving momentariness. In this sense, the opponent has the right to present counterexamples to which the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 has not yet been applied, so as to invalidate the 辫补办峁鈥檚 momentariness. Dharmottara insists that, in order to rebut such counterexamples, the proponent must show the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 in counterexamples. This activity amounts to the fact that the opponent needs to hold T2, in that such counterexamples will be ontologically different things from the 辫补办峁. In this regard, it is not the case that the 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 condition in its totality is useless. Rather, it is an indispensable condition for a sound inference of the 辫补办峁鈥檚 momentariness. In this way, Dharmottara, although basically inheriting Arca峁璦鈥檚 view, asserts the significance of T2.
2.1.1 Omni-applicability of the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺
In theory, the opponent can pose an infinite number of counterexamples including even invisible things. Therefore, the proponent must apply the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 to each and every case according to the situation.
In other words, the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补-办补辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 must be such a source of knowledge as should and in fact can be applied to all counterexamples brought forth by the opponent. In this regard, Dharmottara calls 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 鈥渢hat whose scope is a collection of all things鈥� (sarvapad膩rthopasa峁僪膩ra惫颈峁测补m).
And for this very reason, for the Teacher [i.e., 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈], that which demon-strates the relation between that which is to be pervaded and that which per-vades [it, i.e., the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺,] is intended to have the scope of a collection of all things, as [he] has said [in the PVin 2 76,3鈥�4]: 鈥渨hatsoever is produced is impermanent.鈥� And he does not accept the pervasion which is subject to distinctions among the 辫补办峁 and the like. Therefore, the logical mark, whose scope is in fact all things, is ascertained to be pervaded by its own target [property], which is proved by the defeating source of knowledge.[20]
As the reason for the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺鈥檚 omni-applicability, Dharmottara refers to an essential feature of the hetu 鈥渆xistence鈥� (sattva), which is a part of the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺: namely, that it pertains to all things.[21] Thus, the pervasion ascertained by the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 functioning with this special property is not subject to distinctions between 辫补办峁 and non-辫补办峁. In short, the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 proves that all things are momentary.
3. Problem of the first 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 condition
However, the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺鈥檚 omni-applicability prompts a further crucial problem for the advocate of 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补, namely that T1 (= 辫补办峁dharmat膩) is useless. Given that the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 proves that all things are momentary, then, since the 辫补办峁 is already included in the sphere of everything, its momentariness is proved solely by the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. Thus, it is useless to particularly point out, in an inference, the 辫补办峁鈥檚 possession of the hetu 鈥渆xistence.鈥� Arca峁璦 does not discuss any problem of this kind in his 贬叠峁�.[22]
The relevant objection in the PVin峁� reads:
[Objection:] But, given that the pervasion is shown [by the defeating source of knowledge] as encompassing all things, a sound [as the 辫补办峁] too, which is included in all [things], is proved to be momentary. Thus, there is no benefit to including a property of the 辫补办峁 [in the arguments].[23]
Dharmottara rebuts this by strictly distinguishing the ascertainment of pervasion from that of whether or not the relevant 辫补办峁 actually exists, i.e., in reality. That is, the ascertainment of pervasion by the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 that everything, including the 辫补办峁, is momentary belongs to a theoretical level; on the other hand, the ascertainment of whether the 辫补办峁 actually exists belongs to an actual, epistemological level.
He says:
[Dharmottara:] Well then, is it the case that a hare鈥檚 horn is known to be existent to a person who has already ascertained that 鈥淲hatever is existent is momentary?鈥� [Objector:] Since a hare鈥檚 horn does not exist, it is not known [to him]. But a sound does exist. [Dharmottara:] Then, this [i.e., the existence of a sound] should be known by means of another source of knowledge, [since], if this is known, it can be understood that a sound is not like a hare鈥檚 horn. Therefore, though a sound is generally [i.e., without its individuality,] included in [all things] when pervasion is [demonstrated by the defeating source of knowledge], its [i.e., a sound鈥檚] existence should be individually known by means of another source of knowledge in order to ascertain [its own] momentariness.[24]
The ascertainment of pervasion and that of the 辫补办峁鈥檚 actual existence are totally different and independent issues. Knowledge of the former does not imply the latter. Otherwise, once pervasion is demonstrated, it would be proved that not only a sound, but also a hare鈥檚 horn is momentary. But this is not the case, since a hare鈥檚 horn does not exist in reality. According to Dharmottara, the 辫补办峁鈥檚 actual existence must be ascertained by another source of knowledge other than the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. Showing T1 in an inference amounts to the fact that the actual existence of the 辫补办峁 is epistemologically ascertained by another source of the knowledge.[25] In this way, Dharmottara insists on the indispensability of T1.
4. Concluding remarks
In short, while absolutely relying on the logical universality of the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补kapra-尘腻峁嘺, Dharmottara strives not for a formal, but rather for a substantial raison d鈥�锚迟谤别 of 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补. Furthermore, this reliance is well founded, given that he is basing himself on 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 position as expressed in his Hetubindu and 痴腻诲补苍测腻测补.[26] For the discussions of the 办峁峁噄办补迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 in these works, 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 depends exclusively on the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. At the same time, however, his formulation includes T1 and T2.[27] It appears that under this logically ambiguous circumstance, Arca峁璦 steers his course of interpretation toward stressing the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺, judging 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 retention of the 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 to be a mere formality, and Dharmottara, in turn, makes efforts toward harmonizing the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 with 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补.
To the best of my knowledge, in the larger interpretative history of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补, Dharmottara鈥檚 argument examined above is the first systematic defense of the significance of 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 taken as a whole, which well represents the Buddhist logical standpoint of being neither antar惫测腻辫迟颈 nor bahir惫测腻辫迟颈.[28] What鈥檚 more, this seems to remain the only way for traditional Buddhists to maintain their argumentative identity until the innovation by J帽膩na艣r墨mitra and 搁补迟苍补办墨谤迟颈 of proving the momentariness of a 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 via the combination of 辫谤补蝉补峁単补 and 辫谤补蝉补峁単补viparyaya,[29] itself a strategy that avoids exclusive reliance on the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺.[30]
References and abbreviations
Acharya 2006 D. Acharya, V膩caspatimi艣ra鈥檚 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补尘墨办峁Ｄ�. The Earliest Commentary on Ma峁囜笉anami艣ra鈥檚 Brahmasiddhi. Stuttgart 2006.
Frauwallner 1935 E. Frauwallner, Dharmottaras 碍峁峁嘺产丑补峁単补蝉颈诲诲丑颈岣�: Text und 脺berset-zung. Wiener Zeitschrift f眉r die Kunde des Morgenlandes 42 (1935) 217鈥�258.
HB Hetubindu (顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈), ed. E. Steinkellner. Beijing/Wien 2016.
贬叠峁� 贬别迟耻产颈苍诲耻峁玨腻 (Arca峁璦), ed. S. Sanghavi and Muni 艢r墨 Jinavijayaji. Baroda 1949.
贬叠峁� 贬别迟耻产颈苍诲耻峁玨腻loka (Durvekami艣ra): see 贬叠峁�.
KBhSF 碍峁峁嘺产丑补峁単补蝉颈诲诲丑颈 (Dharmottara) (Tibetan), ed. E. Frauwallner: In: Frauwallner 1935.
KBhSP 碍峁峁嘺产丑补峁単补蝉颈诲诲丑颈 (Dharmottara) (Tibetan): Peking No. 5751.
Mimaki 1976 K. Mimaki, La r茅futation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (Sthira-蝉颈诲诲丑颈诲奴峁苍补) et la preuve de la momentan茅it茅 des choses (碍峁峁嘺产丑补峁単补蝉颈诲诲丑颈). Paris 1976.
Mimaki 1984 K. Mimaki, Proof of Momentariness. K艒za Daij艒bukky艒 9 (1984) 219鈥�254 (in Japanese).
Muroya 2011 Y. Muroya, Bh膩sarvaj帽a鈥檚 interpretation of 产丑腻惫补 eva 苍腻艣补岣� and a related chronological problem. In: Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis. Proceedings of the Fourth International 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 Conference. Vienna, August 23鈥�27, 2005, ed. H. Krasser, H. Lasic, E. Franco, and B. Kellner. Vienna 2011, 341鈥�365.
狈叠峁� 狈测腻测补产颈苍诲耻峁玨腻 (Dharmottara), ed. D. Malvania. Patna 1955.
狈碍补峁� 狈测腻测补办补峁噄办腻 (V膩caspatimi艣ra): E. Stern, 鈥�痴颈诲丑颈惫颈惫别办补岣�鈥� of Ma峁囜笉anami艣ra with Commentary, 鈥�狈测腻测补办补峁噄办腻,鈥� of V膩caspatimi艣ra, and Supercommentaries, 鈥�闯耻峁-诲丑惫补峁卥补谤补峁嚹� 鈥� and 鈥�厂惫补诲颈迟补峁卥补谤补峁嚹� ,鈥� of 笔补谤补尘别艣惫补谤补岣�, Critical and Annotated Edition: the P奴rva辫补办峁岣�. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania 1988.
狈痴罢峁� 狈测腻测补惫腻谤迟迟颈办补迟腻迟辫补谤测补峁玨腻 (V膩caspatimi艣ra), ed. A. Thakur. New Delhi 1996.
Ono 2004 M. Ono, 鈥�Antar惫测腻辫迟颈鈥� and 鈥�bahir惫测腻辫迟颈鈥� in the Buddhist logic. Indotetsugaku Bukky艒shis艒 Ronsh奴 (2004) 457鈥�492 (in Japanese).
Ono 2010 M. Ono, On 痴颈谤耻诲诲丑补惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤颈苍. Indo Ronrigaku Kenky奴 1 (2010) 125鈥�143 (in Japanese).
PVin 2 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补 (顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈) Chapter 2, ed. E. Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2007.
PVin 3 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补 (顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈) Chapter 3, ed. P. Hugon and T. Tomabechi. Bei-jing/Vienna 2011.
PVin峁� 2 Ms Sanskrit Manuscript of the second chapter of the 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补峁玨腻 of Dharmottara: see PVin 2: Introduction xxx鈥搙xxi.
PVin峁琒 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补峁玨腻 (Dharmottara), ed. M. Sakai: In: Sakai 2010.
笔痴颈苍峁瑃 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补峁玨腻 (Dharmottara) (Tibetan): Peking No. 5727, Derge No. 4227. Sakai 2010 M. Sakai, Dharmottaras Erkl盲rung von 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈s 办峁峁噄办补迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补: 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补峁玨腻 zu 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补 2 vv. 53鈥�55 mit Prosa. Dissertation, University of Vienna. Vienna 2010. http://othes.univie.ac.at/9623/, last visited
Sakai 2013 M. Sakai, A Study of Dharmottara鈥檚 Theory of Momentariness: The Problem of the Inferential Reason鈥揈xistence (sattva)鈥搃n the Sattv膩num膩na. Indotetsugaku Bukky艒gaku Kenky奴 20 (2013) 77鈥�93 (in Japanese).
Sakai 2014 M. Sakai, 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 Proof that 鈥淎ll That Is Produced Is Impermanent:鈥� 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 Second Answer in the 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补. Indogaku Bukky艒gaku Kenky奴 62(2) (2014) 978鈥�971 (in Japanese).
Sakai 2015 M. Sakai, Arca峁璦 on 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补, 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补, and viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 in 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补. South Asian Classical Studies 10 (2015) 281鈥�296.
Sakai 2019 M. Sakai, Antar惫测腻辫迟颈 and Antar惫测腻辫迟颈v膩ditva: Arca峁璦 on the Buddhist Infer-ence of Momentariness and Durvekami艣ra鈥檚 Comparison of him with Dharmottara. Journal of Indological Studies 30 & 31 (2019) 99鈥�128.
Steinkellner 1967 E. Steinkellner, 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥�s Hetubindu岣�: Teil II. 脺bersetzung und Anmerkungen. Wien 1967.
Steinkellner 2004 E. Steinkellner, The Early 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 on the Purpose of Examples. In: The Role of the Example (诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补) in Classical Indian Logic, ed. Sh. Katsura and E. Steinkellner. Wien 2004, 225鈥�250.
Tani 1997 T. Tani, Problems of Interpretation on Dharmottara鈥檚 碍峁峁嘺产丑补峁単补蝉颈诲诲丑颈 (1)鈥�(3). K艒chik艒gy艒k艒t艒senmongakk艒 Gakujyutsukiy艒 41 (1997) 19鈥�37(1); 39鈥�57(2); 59鈥�77(3) (in Japanese).
Tani 2000 T. Tani, Study of Momentariness. Tokyo 2000 (in Japanese).
TBh Tarkabh膩峁Ｄ� (Mok峁Ｄ乲aragupta), ed. H.R. Rangaswami Iyengar. Mysore 1944.
TSam 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补尘墨办峁Ｄ� (V膩caspatimi艣ra), ed. D. Acharya. Stuttgart 2006.
VN 痴腻诲补苍测腻测补 (顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈), ed. M. T. Much. Wien 1991.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
It is interesting that 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 himself presents the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 as if there were no conflict between the logic underlying the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 and the traditional Buddhist logic in place since 顿颈驳苍腻驳补. For now I cannot make any judgments about whether 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 himself thinks that the logic of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 does not deviate from the traditional Dign膩gean logic, but his followers鈥� activities make me think this is unlikely.
[2]:
Cf. Mimaki 1976 and Mimaki 1984.
[3]:
Cf. Mimaki 1984: 238.
[4]:
I read a paper on this topic at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vienna 2014; see Sakai 2015. In Arca峁璦鈥檚 argument, we can see a direct link with the antar惫测腻辫迟颈 theory advocated by 搁补迟苍腻办补谤补艣腻苍迟颈 and reported by Mok峁Ｄ乲aragupta in comparison with the bahir惫测腻辫迟颈 theory (cf. TBh 47,1鈥�6).
[5]:
Perceiving the importance of Dharmottara鈥檚 arguments, Prof. Tadashi Tani was early in exploring them as they appear both in Dharmottara鈥檚 碍峁峁嘺产丑补峁単补蝉颈诲诲丑颈 (KBhS) and 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补峁玨腻, second chapter (PVin峁� 2). See Tani 1997 and Tani 2000. At that time, however, the Sanskrit manuscript of the latter was unavailable. But now, the situation has changed, and I am luckily in a position to consult the codex unicus of the PVin峁� 2 (for the project of editing the codex unicus of the PVin峁�, see https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forschung/buddhismuskunde-sinologie/schwerpunkte/pramanaviniscayatika/), which covers the entirety of the important portion in which Dharmottara discusses the problem of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 most intensively. The Sanskrit original surely enables us to grasp Dharmottara鈥檚 arguments with more clarity.
[6]:
顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈鈥檚 first use of this defeating source of knowledge (产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺) for the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 is in the 笔谤补尘腻峁嘺惫颈苍颈艣肠补测补, second chapter (cf. PVin 2 80,1鈥�8), and also in his later works, the Hetubindu and the 痴腻诲补苍测腻测补 (cf. HB 4,9鈥�12, VN 2,1鈥�4, respectively). He puts forward the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 as the method of proving the essential connection for the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补. Its basic and simple form can be demonstrated as follows: 鈥淕iven that there is non-momentariness, since there is the inconsistency with purpose fulfillmenta, the being-real which is characterized as that [i.e., purpose fulfillment,] is abandoned鈥� (HB 4,11-12: 补办峁峁噄办补迟惫别鈥檙迟丑补办谤颈测腻惫颈谤辞诲丑腻迟 迟补濒濒补办峁峁嘺峁� vastutva峁� h墨yata iti.). For a German translation, cf. Steinkellner 1967: 37. aMy understanding of the word 补谤迟丑补办谤颈测腻 is based on Dharmottara鈥檚 elucidation in his PVin峁� and the 狈测腻测补产颈苍诲耻峁玨腻. Cf. PVin峁� 2 Ms 89a2鈥�3 (PVin峁琒 17,11): artha岣� prayojanam, tasya 办谤颈测腻 苍颈峁补迟迟颈岣�; 狈叠峁� 76,3鈥�4: arthasya prayojanasya 办谤颈测腻 苍颈峁补迟迟颈岣�.
[7]:
This paragraph is a summary of Sakai 2015: 284鈥�289 (sections 3.1.鈥�3.2.).
[8]:
In other words, the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 never contributes in any way to a proof that the 辫补办峁 has the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补. This is so in the sense that the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 cannot play even the 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈an role of conveying the essential connection (蝉惫补产丑腻惫补辫谤补迟颈产补苍诲丑补) to those who do not remember or do not know it, since without the functioning of the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补kapram膩na, one can never know that the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 possesses the 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 鈥渕omentariness.鈥� Given that momentariness itself can never be perceived, there is no difference between the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 and the 辫补办峁. For the difference between the 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈an and the Dign膩gean role of 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补, see Steinkellner 2004.
[9]:
In the KBhS, Dharmottara asserts that even if there can be 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补s, namely things whose momentariness is accepted, it cannot thereby be proved that the 辫补办峁 too is of that nature, and this is because a mere similarity with such 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补s cannot conclusively prove that the other thing is also momentary. Thus, Dharmottara requires, in order to prove the momentariness of the 辫补办峁, the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 to be applied to the 辫补办峁. Cf. KBhSF 223,15鈥�17, 21鈥�23: 鈥�di la dpe ni yod kyang chos mthun pa tsam鈥檅a鈥� zhig gis (鈥�ba鈥� zhig gis KBhSF: 鈥�ba鈥� zhig gi KBhSP) dngos po gzhan dag de鈥檌 rang bzhin du鈥檊yur ba rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin no // 鈥� gal te yang dpe la skad cig mar鈥檍ig pa yod na (鈥�jig pa yod na KBhSF: 鈥�jig pa KBhSP) / de lta na yang khyab pa rab tu sgrub pa鈥檌 (rab tu sgrub pa鈥檌 KBhSF: rab tu bsgrubs pa鈥檌 KBhSP) tshad mar rab tu bstan pa 帽id las skad cig mar鈥檍ig par grub bo // 鈥淚n this case [i.e., when momentariness is to be proved], even if there are 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补s, it is not tenable that other things are [also] of that nature [i.e., = of the nature of momentariness] due to a mere similarity [with 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补s]. 鈥ven if there can be perishing within a moment in 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补s, nevertheless it is only on the basis of showing the source of knowledge which in fact demonstrates pervasion (i.e., the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺) that perishing within a moment is proved.鈥� For Frauwallner鈥檚 German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 241.
[10]:
In both the KBhS and the PVin峁�, Dharmottara discusses various logical problems with the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补, and although many of these discussions are common to both works, it is only in the PVin峁� that Dharmottara cares about the positive aspect of the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补.
[11]:
PVin峁� 2 Ms 99a3鈥�6: ath膩nityatve s膩dhye ko 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补岣�, yatra vy膩pyavy膩paka产丑腻惫补岣� sidhyeta. ana ca samayam 腻艣谤颈迟测补 hetur up膩deyaa iti vak峁ati. an膩艣rita蝉颈诲诲丑腻苍迟补ka艣 ca paro 测补诲腻 办峁峁噄办补迟惫补峁� (办峁峁噄办补迟惫补峁� emended [cf. skad cig ma nyid 笔痴颈苍峁瑃]: 办峁峁噄办补峁� Ms) prati 辫谤补迟测补惫补迟颈峁ａ弓丑补迟别, tad膩s膩v utkoc膩d膩nen膩pi kasyacit pad膩rthasya 办峁峁噄办补tv膩bhyupagama峁� (pad膩rthasya 办峁峁噄办补tv膩掳 emended: 辫补诲腻谤迟丑补办峁峁噄办补迟惫腻掳 Ms) 办腻谤补测颈迟补惫测补岣�. bitarath膩 hi 诲峁涐梗峁乶t膩bh膩v膩d dhetur na sy膩t. tasm膩n na prasi-ddha蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补岣� ka艣citb. For Tani鈥檚 Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000:167. 补鈥揳 To my understanding, the bold part is Dharmottara鈥檚 short summary of PVin 3 128,1鈥�131,5, where 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 details antinomic reasons (惫颈谤耻诲诲丑腻惫测补产丑颈肠腻谤补). I have not yet been able to find an exact passage in the PVin. For the Tibetan translation corresponding to PVin 3 128,1鈥�131,5, which has been translated into Japanese with a clear analysis, see Ono 2010: 136鈥�139. 产鈥揵 For this part, the Tibetan version reads as follows: 笔痴颈苍峁瑃 P305b3;D253a3: de lta ma yin na dpe med pas gtan tshigs ma yin par鈥檊yur ro // de鈥檌 phyir bsgrub par bya ba鈥檌 chos ma grub pa la ni dpe鈥檊a鈥� yang med do // 鈥淥therwise, because there is no 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补, [a relevant reason property] would not indeed be a reason property. Therefore, with regard to [a reason property] whose 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补 is not well established (*aprasiddha蝉腻诲丑测补dharme/*asiddha蝉腻诲丑测补dharme), there is no 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 at all (*na ka艣cid 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补岣�).鈥� For me, the content of this Tibetan translation is difficult.
[12]:
Cf. PVin 3 128,2鈥�5: na hi sambhavo鈥檚ti 办腻谤测补蝉惫补产丑腻惫补yor uktalak峁峁嘺yor anupalambhasya v膩 viru-ddh膩vyabhic膩rit膩y膩m. na c膩nyo鈥檝yabhic膩r墨 . tasm膩d 补惫补蝉迟耻诲补谤艣补苍补产补濒补辫谤补惫峁泃迟补m 膩gam膩艣rayam a-num膩nam 腻艣谤颈迟测补 tadarthavic膩re峁 viruddh膩vyabhic膩r墨 s膩dhanado峁 ukta岣�, 艣膩strak膩r膩峁嚹乵 arthe峁 bhr膩nty膩 vipar墨tasvabh膩vopasa峁僪膩rasambhav膩t. na hy asti sambhavo 测补迟丑腻vasthitavastusthiti峁 腻迟尘补-办腻谤测腻苍耻辫补濒补尘产丑别峁.
[13]:
In the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补, the hetu as 鈥渆xistence鈥� refers to 鈥減urpose fulfillment,鈥� and this is of course established on the basis of seeing real things鈥揻or example, in the case of a pot as the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补, its purpose fulfillment, holding water etc., is established by observation.
[14]:
PVin峁� 2 Ms 99a6鈥�7: 测补岣� punas tatra tatra 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补parigraha ukta岣�, 迟补迟谤腻测补尘 abhipr膩测补岣� (abhipr膩测补岣� emended [cf. dgongs pa 笔痴颈苍峁瑃]: a{pra}y调腻皑a测补岣� 惭蝉)鈥�蝉腻诲丑测补dharmivyatirikte vastuni heto岣� sattvam 腻艣谤颈迟测补 产腻诲丑补ka峁� 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺峁� vy膩p膩rayitu峁� 艣akyam, 苍腻苍测补迟丑腻. tasm膩d dhetor vidhivi峁yo 产腻诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘腻峁嘺辫谤补诲补谤艣补苍补gocaro (掳辫谤补诲补谤艣补苍补掳 emended [cf. rab tu ston pa鈥檌 笔痴颈苍峁瑃]: 掳诲补谤艣补苍补掳) 鈥�rtho 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补岣�. na tu prativ膩dina岣� 蝉腻诲丑测补诲丑补谤尘补sambandhita岣� 蝉颈诲诲丑补岣�. For Tani鈥檚 Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 168.
[15]:
It should be noted here that in the KBhS Dharmottara does not mention the role and significance of 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补 in the case of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补 that he discusses in the PVin峁� (cf. the text portions of the PVin峁� 2 cited in nn. 11 and 14 above).
[16]:
PVin峁� 2 Ms 99a7鈥�99b3: ayadi 产补诲丑补办补峁� 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺峁� na siddha蝉腻诲丑测补dharm膩pek峁m, 别惫补峁� tarhi yenaiva 产腻诲丑补kena pram膩峁噀na 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补dharmi峁噄 办峁泃补办补迟惫补sy膩nityatvena 惫测腻辫迟颈r upadar艣yate, tenaiva pram膩峁噀na 蝉腻诲丑测补dharmi峁噛 apy anityatva峁� setsyat墨ti sarvatra 产腻诲丑补kam eva 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺峁� 蝉腻诲丑测补-s膩dhanasamartham. ata岣� 蝉惫补产丑腻惫补hetor 补丑别迟耻迟惫补辫谤补蝉补峁単补岣�.a 补迟丑腻辫颈 蝉补迟迟惫补峁� 办峁泃补办补迟惫补峁� c膩n腻艣谤颈迟测补 产腻诲丑补kam eva na pravartata iti sattvam 膩艣raya峁嚹珁a峁�, evam api 辫补办峁dharmatv膩d eva 产腻诲丑补kapra-尘腻峁嘺sah膩y膩t 蝉腻诲丑测补siddhir iti trair奴py膩产丑腻惫补辫谤补蝉补峁単补岣�. For Tani鈥檚 Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 168鈥�169. 补鈥揳 For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhSF 223,23鈥�25: gal te de ltar na bsgrub par bya ba鈥檌 chos can nyid la khyab pa (khyab pa KBhSF: khyab pa鈥檌 KBhSP) sgrub pa鈥檌 tshad mas skad cig ma nyid du sgrub na yod pa zhes bya ba鈥檌 gtan tshigs nye bar blangs pa don med par鈥檊yur ro zhe na / 鈥淸Objection:] If, in this way [i.e., as it is in the 诲峁涐梗峁乶迟补], the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion proves momentariness just in the 辫补办峁 itself, it should be useless to take/employ the hetu called sattva [in an inference].鈥� For Frauwallner鈥檚 German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 241鈥�242.
[17]:
Cf. n. 6 above.
[18]:
In other words, this position refers to the view that the hetu sattva and the property 鈥渂eing existent鈥� defeated by the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 are the same.
[19]:
PVin峁� 2 Ms 99b3鈥�7: ucyate鈥搚ad uktam鈥摬跄寤宄蟛獠筪harmi峁噛 eva 惫测腻辫迟颈岣�, tat ki峁� dharmyantaraparigra-he峁噀ti, tad ayuktam, yasm膩d 诲峁涐梗峁乶 蝉腻诲丑测补dharmivyatirikt膩n bh膩v膩n parityajya naikasmin dharmi峁噄 产腻诲丑补ka峁� 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺峁� 艣补办测补峁� 诲补谤艣补测颈迟耻尘. yadi k峁nikatva峁� na sy膩c chabdasya, sattvam eva na sy膩d ity 别惫补峁� 产腻诲丑补ke pram膩峁噀 dar艣ayitavye yadi paro br奴y膩t鈥�测补迟丑腻 gha峁乨ir d峁涐梗峁璷 bh膩vo鈥櫚灬梗a峁噄办补tve鈥檖y 补谤迟丑补办谤颈测腻k膩r墨 , tadvad 补测补峁� 艣abdo鈥檖i sy膩t iti, 别惫补峁� te鈥檖i 诲峁涐梗峁� gha峁乨ayo 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺vi峁y墨ka-rtavy膩岣�. te峁 ca vi峁y墨办峁泃别峁 辫耻苍补谤产谤奴测腻迟 (辫耻苍补谤产谤奴测腻迟 emended: 辫耻苍补产谤奴测腻迟 Ms) 鈥�补诲峁涐梗峁璷 产丑腻惫补岣� ka艣cid arthak膩ry apy ak峁峁噄ko 产丑补惫颈峁补迟颈, tadvac c膩m墨 诲峁涐梗峁� iti 辫耻苍补岣� pare峁嘺 诲峁涐梗峁乶t墨k峁泃o鈥檇峁涐梗to bh膩vo 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺vi峁y墨kartavya iti (掳kartavya iti emended [bya dgos pa鈥檌 phyir 笔痴颈苍峁瑃]: 掳kartta iti Ms) katham ekasminn eva 蝉腻诲丑测补dharmi峁噄 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺辫谤补诲补谤艣补苍补m. For Tani鈥檚 Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 169鈥�170. For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS (the exact literal parallel is the part 补鈥揳). Cf. KBhSF 223,25鈥�224,17: achos can nyid la khyab pa sgrub par byed pa鈥檌 (khyab pa sgrub par byed pa鈥檌 KBhSF: khyab par sgrub par byed pa鈥檌 KBhSP) tshad mar rab tu bstan par ni nus pa ma yin te / 鈥�di ltar khyab pa sgrub pa鈥檌 tshad ma ni鈥檇i ltar bstan par bya ste / gal te sgra rtag par gyur na rim dang cig car dag gis don bya ba la nye bar sbyor bar mi鈥檊yur ro zhes so // 鈥�di la ni pha rol pos kyang ji ltar bum pa skad cig ma ma yin yang rim dang cig car dag gis mngon par鈥檇od pa鈥檌鈥檅ras bu bsgrub par nus pa de bzhin du sgra yang鈥檊yur ro zhes brjod par nus so // 鈥�di la yang lan / bum pa yang ngas gnod par byed pa鈥檌 tshad ma鈥檌 yul du byas pa nyid do zhes brjod dgos so // des na rnam grangs鈥檇is pha rol gyi nye bar bkod pa mthong ba鈥檌 dngos po mtha鈥� dag rgol bas (rgol bas KBhSF: gol bas KBhSP) gnod par byed pa鈥檌 tshad ma鈥檌 yul du bya ba yin no // gal te pha rol po dngos po鈥檊a鈥� zhig skad cig ma ma yin par rim dang cig car gyis (rim dang cig car gyis KBhSF: rim dang cig car gyi KBhSP) don byed par nus pa de bzhin sgra yang yin no zhes ma mthong ba yang dogs par byed na (dogs par byed na KBhSF: dags par byed na KBhSP) de la yang gal te鈥檊a鈥� zhig der gyur na skad cig ma ma yin pa des kyang rim dang cig car dag gis don byed par mi nus so zhes spyir brjod par bya鈥檕 // des na srid par byas pa鈥檌 ma mthong ba de yang gnod par byed pa鈥檌 tshad ma鈥檌 yul nyid du khas blang bar bya ba nyid do //a de lta yin pa dang mthong ba dang ma mthong ba鈥檌 dngos po mtha鈥� dag la (dngos po mtha鈥� dag la KBhSF: dngos po mtha鈥� dag KBhSP) khyab pa sgrub pa鈥檌 tshad ma bstan par rnam par gnas pa na (rnam par gnas pa na KBhSF: rnam par gnas pa dang KBhSP) / gang dag bsgrub par bya ba鈥檌 chos can las (bsgrub par bya ba鈥檌 chos can las KBhSF: bsgrub sgrub par bya ba鈥檌 chos can las KBhSP) tha dad pa鈥檌 dngos po de dag dpe鈥檌 dngos la brten pa鈥檌 phyir bsgrub par bya ba鈥檌 chos can las tha dad pa gang dag la (gang dag la KBhSF: gang la KBhSP) gtan tshigs yod pa de dag ni dpe yin te / bsgrub par bya ba鈥檌 dngos po nges pa ni (nges pa ni KBhSF: nges pa na KBhSP) khyab pa sgrub pa鈥檌 tshad ma la rag las pa鈥檌 phyir ro // 鈥渁[Answer:] It is not possible to show the source of knowledge proving pervasion only in the 辫补办峁 alone. This is because the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion should be shown in the following manner鈥撯�業f a sound [i.e., the 辫补办峁] were permanent, it would be employed in fulfilling a purpose neither in a gradual nor in a simultaneous manner.鈥� [A proponent says] so. Against this, [his] opponent in turn can retort鈥撯�楯ust as a pot, though being non-momentary, can bring about an expected effect in a gradual or simultaneous manner, so too must a sound be.鈥� Against this too, the reply should be stated [as follows]鈥撯�楢 pot too is by all means brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge by me [i.e., the proponent].鈥� Thus, every visible thing proposed (*upanyasta) by the opponent through such an enumeration is brought into the scope of the defeating source of knowledge by the disputant [i.e., the proponent]. If the opponent doubts even an invisible [thing], saying that, 鈥楢 certain thing, being non-momentary, can fulfill a purpose in a gradual or simultaneous manner, and a sound is so too,鈥� [then], against this too, it should be generally stated鈥撯�業f there were to exist a certain [thing, and if it were] not momentary, it also would be incapable of fulfilling a purpose, whether in a gradual or in a simultaneous manner.鈥� Therefore, this invisible [thing] too, which has been hypothetically assumed [by the opponent], is necessarily provisionally accepted as the object of the defeating source of knowledge.a And when in this manner it is established that the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion is shown in [both] all visible and invisible things鈥搒ince [in this case] those things that are different from the 辫补办峁 belong to a subset of example objects鈥揫all] those things which are different from the 辫补办峁 and in which the hetu exists are [all] examples. This is because the ascertainment of [whether] the target [property] exists (*产丑腻惫补) [or does not exist] depends on the source of knowledge that demonstrates pervasion.鈥� For Frauwallner鈥檚 German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 242.
[20]:
PVin峁� 2 Ms 99b1鈥�100a1: ata eva ca sarvapad膩rthopasa峁僪膩ra惫颈峁测补峁� vy膩pyavy膩paka产丑腻惫补s膩dhakam i峁ａ弓am 膩c膩ryasya, yad 膩ha鈥�yat ki帽cit k峁泃akam, tat sarvam anityam iti (cf. PVin 2 76,3鈥�4: yat ki帽cit k峁泃aka峁� tat sarvam anityam鈥�). pak峁Ｄ乨ipravibh膩g膩pek峁Ｄ佱箖 ca 惫测腻辫迟颈峁� necchati. tasm膩t sarvapad膩-rtha惫颈峁测补m eva 濒颈峁単补峁� 产腻诲丑补kena pram膩峁噀na s膩dhitasva蝉腻诲丑测补惫测腻辫迟颈kam avas膩tavyam. For Tani鈥檚 Japanese translation from the Tibetan version, see Tani 2000: 172.
[21]:
In the PVin峁�, Dharmottara differentiates the logical scope of the inferential reason property 鈥渂eing existent鈥� (sattva) from that of the inferential reason property 鈥渂eing produced鈥� (办峁泃补办补迟惫补). For the Buddhists, their ontological scopes are the same, but it might be the case that there are some opponents for whom this is not the case. According to Dharmottara鈥檚 explanation, 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 is taking such a possibility into account when he introduces this hetu. The scope of the former includes something that has a cause, i.e., is produced, but which is beyond the category of the five aggregates (辫补帽肠补蝉办补苍诲丑补), i.e., invisible, incognizable. Cf. Sakai 2010: 143鈥�144.
[22]:
Cf. Sakai 2015: 291鈥�292 (section 4.2.). Durvekami艣ra elucidates where Arca峁璦 sees the significance of T1 in the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补. He reports (贬叠峁� 261,23鈥�262,2) that Arca峁璦鈥檚 way of recognizing the necessity of T1 is rejected by Dharmottara and the like who have a different view on the same issue. According to Durvekami艣ra, Arca峁璦 requires T1, so that one can indicate the object to which the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 is applied in a relevant inference. On the other hand, Dharmottara鈥檚 reason for needing T1 is so that one can ascertain the 辫补办峁鈥檚 being real (tattva). For this interesting controversy, cf. Sakai 2019.
[23]:
PVin峁� 2 Ms 100a1鈥�2: nanu ca sarvapad膩rthopasa峁僪膩ravati 惫测腻辫迟颈pradar艣ane 艣abdo鈥檖i sarv膩ntarbh奴ta岣� 办峁峁噄办补岣� siddha iti na 辫补办峁dharmopasa峁僪膩rasya phalam. For this part we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhSF 224,18鈥�22: gal te dngos po mtha鈥� dag gi yul la (yul la KBhSF: yul can la KBhSP) khyab pa sgrub pa鈥檌 tshad ma srid na / 鈥�o na ni des na ji ltar dpe dag la bsgrub bya nges pa khyab pa sgrub pa鈥檌 tshad ma dang鈥檅rel pa de bzhin du bsgrub bya鈥檌 chos can la yang rjes su鈥檊ro ldog rab tu grub pa dag las mngon par鈥檇od pa grub pas phyogs kyi chos nye bar bstan pas ci bya zhe na / 鈥淸Objection:] If the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion is applicable to the sphere of all things, then, on the basis of this [fact], with regard to examples, ascertainment of the target [property] is subject to the source of knowledge demonstrating pervasion. In the same manner, with regard to the site too, the desired [property, i.e., momentariness] is proved due to the positive and negative concomitances that are in fact established [by the source of knowledge that demonstrates pervasion]. Thus, what can be gained by pointing out a property of the site?鈥� For Frauwallner鈥檚 German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 242鈥�243.
[24]:
PVin峁� 2 Ms 100a2鈥�4: tat kim 颈诲腻苍墨峁� yat sat, tat sarva峁� 办峁峁噄办补m iti ni艣citavato鈥檖i pu峁僺a岣� 艣补艣补惫颈峁Ｄ佱箛补峁� sad iti j帽膩tam. 艣a艣avi峁Ｄ佱箛asy膩sattv膩d aj帽膩tam. 艣补产诲补sya tu sattvam. tat tarhi pram膩峁嚹乶tar膩j j帽膩tavyam, yasmi峁� j帽膩te na 艣a艣avi峁Ｄ佱箛avac chabda ity avagamyeta. tasm膩t s膩m膩nyen膩ntarbh奴tasy膩pi 艣补产诲补sya 惫测腻辫迟颈k膩le 办峁峁噄办补tvani艣cay膩rtha峁� vi艣e峁峁嘺 蝉补迟迟惫补峁� pram膩峁嚹乶tare峁嘺 j帽膩tavyam. For this part too we have a parallel argument in the KBhS. Cf. KBhSF 224,22鈥�225,2: bden mod kyi鈥檕n kyang dngos po鈥檌 tshogs ni mtha鈥� yas la khyab pa bsgrub pa (khyab pa bsgrub pa KBhSF: khyab pa sgrub pa KBhSP) yang dngos po mtha鈥� dag gi yul can yin pa des na sgra med kyang bsgrub bya sgrub byed dag gi (sgrub byed dag gi KBhSF: sgrub byed dag gis KBhSP) khyab pa ni dngos po gzhan nyid las rab tu grub pa kho na鈥檕 (rab tu grub pa kho na鈥檕 KBhSF: rab tu grub tu grub pa kho na鈥檕 KBhSP) // des na ji ltar ri bong gi rwa med par khyab pa grub pa de bzhin du sgra med par rab tu鈥檊rub pa nyid do // de las khyab pa mi鈥檊rub pa鈥檌 phyir na sgra鈥檌 yod pa ni ji ltar yang phan鈥檇ogs par byed pa nyid ma yin no // de lta yin dang khyab pa鈥檊rub pa la khas ma blangs pa鈥檌 byed pa can sgra鈥檌 yod pa nyid ni tshad ma gzhan kho na las rtogs par bya ba yin no // des na nges pa tshad ma gzhan la rag las pa sgra鈥檌 yod pa nyid ni sgra mi rtag par bsgrub par nus pa鈥檌 phyir phyogs kyi chos nye bar bsdu bar bya ba (nye bar bsdu bar bya ba KBhSF: nye bar bsu bar bya ba KBhSP) kho na鈥檕 // 鈥淸Answer:] This is right. But, a collection of things is infinite, and [the source of knowledge] demonstrating pervasion can be applied to all things (*sakalapad膩rtha惫颈峁测补m). Therefore, even if a sound were not to exist, pervasion between the target property and the reason property would surely be realized on the basis of other things [other than a sound]. Thus, just as pervasion is established without the existence of a hare鈥檚 horn, so [pervasion] is surely established without the existence of a sound. Since pervasion is not established on the basis of that [i.e., a sound], the existence of a sound in no way brings benefits [to the establishment of pervasion]. And it is on the basis of another source of knowledge that the existence of a sound, whose functioning is not accepted in this way when pervasion is proved, has to be understood. Thus, since the existence of a sound, whose ascertainment requires another source of knowledge, is in a position to prove the impermanence of that sound, a property of the site must by all means be included [in the arguments of a proof].鈥� For Frauwallner鈥檚 German translation, cf. Frauwallner 1935: 243.
[25]:
Namely, perception (辫谤补迟测补办峁). In the previous part of the PVin峁� (= PVin峁� 2 Ms 98b1鈥�99a3) Dharmo-ttara already discussed how and by which source of knowledge the inferential reason property 鈥渆xistence鈥� is established (siddha). There is also a parallel argument in the KBhS (= KBhSF 221,7鈥�16 [p奴rva辫补办峁], 231,7鈥�232,13 [uttara辫补办峁]). For a detail of the arguments, see Sakai 2013, where I have translated these texts and analyzed their contents.
[26]:
For now I am uncertain whether 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈, in PVin 2, absolutely relies on the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka-辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 for establishing the pervasion of the reason property 鈥渂eing produced鈥� (办峁泃补办补迟惫补) by the target property 鈥渂eing impermanent鈥� (anityatva), though in this work he introduces the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 in its complete form. This is because 顿丑补谤尘补办墨谤迟颈 also introduces other arguments for establishing pervasion other than the viparyaye 产腻诲丑补ka辫谤补尘腻峁嘺. Cf. Sakai 2014.
[27]:
Cf. HB 6,9-10: yat sat, tat sarva峁� 办峁峁噄办补m, 测补迟丑腻 gha峁乨a测补岣�, sa峁兣� ca 艣补产诲补 颈迟颈鈥�, VN 1,13鈥�14: yat sat k峁泃aka峁� v膩, tat sarva峁� anityam, 测补迟丑腻 gha峁乨i岣�, san k峁泃ako v膩 艣补产诲补 iti.
[28]:
Cf. Ono 2004: 481鈥�488.
[29]:
Cf. Mimaki 1984: 239.
[30]:
See, for example, V膩caspatimi艣ra, one of the most renowned representatives of the Brahmanical side, who probably flourished before the time of J帽膩na艣r墨mitra (for the date of V膩caspatimi艣ra, cf. Acharya 2006: xviii鈥搙xii. Dr. Yasutaka Muroya recently suggested a new chronological relationship between V膩caspatimi艣ra and J帽膩na艣r墨mitra in Muroya 2011). In his 狈测腻测补办补峁噄办腻 and 狈测腻测补惫腻谤迟迟颈办补迟腻迟辫补谤测补峁玨腻, he summarizes and then introduces as p奴rva辫补办峁 Dharmottara鈥檚 argument defending the Buddhist 迟谤补颈谤奴辫测补 theory considered as a whole in the case of the 蝉补迟迟惫腻苍耻尘腻苍补. Cf. 狈碍补峁� 509,7鈥�511,9 (=狈痴罢峁� 515,3鈥�13): a苍腻办峁峁噄办补sy膩rtha办谤颈测腻virodh膩d (苍腻办峁峁噄办补掳 conjecture; na 办峁峁噄办补掳 狈碍补峁�; na ca k峁-峁噄办补掳 狈痴罢峁�) as膩dh膩ra峁嘺t膩 heto岣�. na ca 蝉腻诲丑测补dharmi峁噄 d峁浥泍am膩ne 艣abd膩dau 惫测腻辫迟颈辫谤补蝉腻诲丑补苍腻诲 (掳辫谤补蝉腻诲丑补苍腻诲 狈碍补峁�: 掳蝉腻诲丑补苍腻诲 狈痴罢峁�) eva 蝉腻诲丑测补siddher as膩dhan膩峁単a峁� hetuvacanam. na khalu sarvopasa峁僪膩ravat墨 惫测腻辫迟颈r d峁浥泍am膩travi峁y膩 bhavitum arhati. 艣补办测补峁� hi 艣a峁卥itu峁� pare峁嚹乨峁浥泍a-m膩n膩n膩峁� sattvam ak峁峁噄k膩n na vy膩vartita峁� tvayeti sattvam anaik膩ntika峁� 办峁峁噄办补tvas膩dhana iti. tasm膩d yad d峁浥泍am 补诲峁浥泍补峁� v膩, tat sarva峁� 办峁峁噄办补m iti 诲补谤艣补苍墨测腻 惫测腻辫迟颈岣�.a bnanv evam api 艣abd膩der viv膩d膩spad墨bh奴tasya 惫测腻辫迟颈诲补谤艣补苍补bal膩d eva 蝉颈诲诲丑腻 办峁峁噄办补teti tadavastham ev膩s膩dhan膩峁単atva峁� hetuvacanasya. maivam. asaty api 艣a艣avi峁Ｄ佱箛膩dau yat sad d峁浥泍am 补诲峁浥泍补峁� v膩, tat sarva峁� 办峁峁噄办补m iti, 测补迟丑腻 sarvopasa峁僪膩ravat墨 惫测腻辫迟颈岣� sidhyati (惫测腻辫迟颈岣� sidhyati 狈碍补峁�: 惫测腻辫迟颈岣� 狈痴罢峁�). na ca 艣a艣avi峁Ｄ�-峁嚹乨ayo鈥檖i bhavanti 办峁峁噄办腻岣�. 别惫补峁� saty api viv膩d膩spad墨办峁泃别 (掳办峁泃别 狈碍补峁�: 掳产丑奴迟别 狈痴罢峁�) 艣abd膩dau 惫测腻辫迟颈蝉颈诲诲丑腻v api na sidhyati 办峁峁噄办补tety ava艣ya峁� dar艣ayitavyam eva te峁Ｄ佱箖 (dar艣ayitavyam eva te峁Ｄ佱箖 狈碍补峁�: dar艣ayitavyam ete峁Ｄ佱箖 狈痴罢峁�) 办峁峁噄办补tvas膩dhan膩ya sattvam iti n膩s膩dhan膩峁単at膩 hetuvacanasya (掳vacanasya 狈碍补峁�: 掳vacanasyeti 狈痴罢峁�).b 鈥渁It is not the case that, since there is the inconsistency with purpose fulfilment for a non-momentary [thing], the inferential reason property [of being existent] is unique/specific. Nor is it the case that, since the target [property, i.e., momentariness] is proved solely on the basis of the fact that the pervasion is well established with regard to the 辫补办峁, i.e., a sound and the like, which is seen, the statement of the inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof. It is indeed impossible for the pervasion that encompasses all [things] to have as its object seen [things] only. This is because the opponent has the right to doubt [this] in the following manner: 鈥楤y you [i.e., the proponent] the property of being existent belonging to unseen [things] is not excluded from a non-momentary [thing]. Thus, the [inferential reason] property of being existent is indeterminate in the proof of momentariness.鈥� Therefore, [in order to rebut such doubt,] the pervasion should be shown in the following way: 鈥榃hatever a thing is, i.e., whether seen or unseen, it is exclusively momentary.鈥� a b[If one says:] even if this is so, the statement of the inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof, [something that] is the case when a sound and the like about which there is a dispute is proved to be momentary only by virtue of showing the pervasion, [then, we answer:] it should not be like that [for the logical reason sattva]. The pervasion that encompasses all [things] is established in such a way that, even if a hare鈥檚 horn and the like does not exist, that which exists, whether seen or unseen, is all/exclusively momentary. And it is not the case that a hare鈥檚 horn and the like too are momentary. In this way, even if a sound and the like which becomes the subject of dispute exists, [its] momentariness is not proved, even when the pervasion is established. Therefore, in order to prove their momentariness [i.e., that of a sound and the like], their existence must necessarily be shown in full. Thus, it is not the case that the statement of inferential reason property [i.e., the statement of T1] is not a constituent of the proof.b鈥� The part 补鈥揳, in terms of content, corresponds to Dharmottara鈥檚 defense of T2 examined above (cf. section 2.1.), the part 产鈥揵 to the discussion examined in section 3. The part 产鈥揵 has a parallel in the 罢补迟迟惫补蝉补尘墨办峁Ｄ� by the same author. Cf. TSam 36,29鈥�35: na ca sarvopasa峁僪膩ravad惫测腻辫迟颈蝉腻诲丑补苍腻诲 eva pram膩峁嚹乼 sarvamadhyap膩tin膩峁� viv膩d膩spad膩n膩峁� 艣abd膩d墨n膩m api 办峁峁噄办补tvasiddhe(r as膩dhan膩峁単a峁� hetuvacanam iti) 蝉腻峁僷谤补迟补尘. yathaiva hi gagananalin膩d墨n膩m asat膩m asaty api 办峁峁噄办补tve na sarvopasa峁僪膩ravat墨峁� 惫测腻辫迟颈峁� pra蝉腻诲丑测补ta岣� 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺sya vi[ro](诲丑补岣�, tathaiva viv膩d膩spade峁 艣abd膩di峁 kas tasya viro诲丑补岣�, sattvasiddhau tu sy膩d iti tats膩dhan膩ya hetur upanetavyo vacanena, sa峁兣� ca viv膩d膩spad墨bh奴ta岣� 艣abd膩di)[r i](ti 蝉惫补产丑腻惫补hetu岣�).