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What is the primary meaning of a word? Does a word mean an individual (vyakti), or a particular form (akrti) or a universal (jati)? There are different views about the import of words. These have been explained and examined by Vatsyayana in the Nyaya-bhasya. According to some thinkers, including the Sankhyas, a word denotes an individual object (vyakti)." By an individual is meant a composite material body possessing specific properties. It is a substance which has a limited dimension and inay have such qualities as smell, taste, colour, touch, etc. It is manifested and open to sense perception. It follows from this that the principle of individuation is materia signata or quantitatively determined matter and the individual must have a manifest body (murti). " That such individual objects are 3 1 Vide Siddhanta-muktavali, pp. 381-85. 2 Vide Nyaya-sutra & Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. 2. 57; Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, p. 181. Vyaktirgunavisesasrayo murtih, Nyaya-sutra, 2. 2. 64. Fide also Nyaya-Bhasya, ibid.

denoted by words is evident from the established usage of mankind. When we use such expressions as 'that cow stands,' ' a herd of cows,' 'he gives a cow to the Brahmin,' etc., we evidently mean the individuals called cows. Such expressions cannot refer to the genus or the universal 'cowness,' since the universal is one and eternal, and so cannot be specified as this or that, or spoken of as a collection of many objects. Further, if words do not by themselves mean individuals, we cannot explain their reference to individual objects by any process of transference of meaning. The Naiyayikas reject the above view of the import of words. If a word mean an individual as such, then any word could mean any and every individual. A word, however, does not mean any individuals, but the individuals of a certain class. In such expressions as 'that cow stands,' etc., what is meant by the word core is not the mere individual by itself but the individual as distinguished by the generality of cowness. Hence it is not true to say that words denote individuals only. Although words do not, by themselves, mean individuals, yet they may refer to individual objects by reason of the individuals' association or connection with the primary meaning.' The second view about the import of words, which is accepted by the Jainas and others, is that a word denotes the particular form or configuration of individuals. The form (akrti) of a thing consists in the particular arrangement of its component parts and the constituent particles of those parts. "The form of a thing is that which indicates the generality and its characteristics." Things are distinguished from one another by their peculiar forms. The cow is differentiated from all other animals by its form which consists in the collocation of the dewlap, etc. Words denote objects only as they express their forms or configurations in space, by which their nature is determined. Hence a word must primarily mean 1 Vide Nyaya-sutra & Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. 2. 58-59. 2 Vide Vivaranaprameyasamgraha, p. 181. 42-(0.P. 103)

the form or the structure which determines the individuality of an object. The Naiyayikas reject this view also on the ground that the form by itself is not sufficient to constitute the nature of a thing. The clay model of a cow is not what we mean by a cow, although it possesses the form of a COW. Hence a word should not be taken to mean only the form or the physical shape of an individual apart from its generality or class-essence. . I In view of the above difficulties in the theories, , individualistic and the configuration theories, the Mimamsakas and Vedantists propose a third theory, according to which a word means the genus or the class-character of individuals. The genus is the basis of similar cognitions with regard to different individuals. It gives us a comprehensive knowledge of many things as similar in essential points. Words primarily mean such universals or genera as distinguish the particulars of experience. If a word were to mean the individual, then it must have as many meanings as there are individuals meant by it. This, however, goes against the law of parsimony which requires that a word should have one primary meaning. Although words primarily mean universals, there is nothing to prevent them from referring to the individuals. We know the individual at the same time that we know the universal, because these are inseparable in respect of both knowledge and existence. Or, it may be said that while the universal is the primary meaning of a word, the individual is its secondary meaning (laksana). Thus the word blue primarily means ' blueness' as a universal, but in the phrase 'the blue pot' it means, by implication, the individual with the attribute of blue colour. In the same way, although the word cow means cowness,' yet by implication it means the individual possessed of the generic attribute of cowness. * 3 1 Vide Nyaya-sutra & Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. 2. 60-61; 2. 2. 65. "Vide Nyaya-sutra & Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. 2. 61 ; 2. 2. 66. Vide Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. IV; Sastradipika, Ch. I.

ccording to the Naiyayikas, words do not mean universals only, since these cannot be understood apart from the individuals and their particular forms. A genus can be recognised only through the individuals that constitute it and their peculiar configurations. Hence the true view is that a word means all the three, namely, the individual, the configuration, and the generality. ' It cannot be said that a word directly means the universal and indirectly the individual, for it has only one primary meaning. The universal, the individual and the form enter into the full meaning of a word which does not exclusively mean any of them. All the three factors are present in the meaning of a word in the same way, though with different degrees of prominence. Hence if in actual usage we do find only one factor to be evident, that is not because the other two are absent but because we are not interested in them for the nonce. When we are interested in the difference or distinction of one thing from others, what we do is to emphasise its individuality in the meaning of the word used for it, c.g. when we say that cow is standing.' But when we want to stress the unity or similarity of things, we give prominence to the generality as a factor in the meaning of the word used, e.g. when we say 'the cow is eternal.' Thus the old Naiyayikas conclude that every word means the universal, the individual and some particular form, and that one of these is predominant, while the rest are subservient factors in the meaning of a word. " Among the modern Naiyayikas, however, some hold that a word means an individual as characterised by the universal (jativisistavyakti)," while others maintain that it means an individual as qualified by both the universal and the configuration (jatyakrtivisistavyakti). * It 1 Vide Nyaya-sutra & NE., 2. 2. 62-63. 2 Vide Nyaya-Bhasya, 2. 2. 63. * Vide Dinakari on Siddhantamuktavali, 81. 4 4 Vide Siddhanta-muktavali, 81 ;Sabdasakti-prakasika, 19. Cf. L. S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 500: "The demonstrative symbol means its denotation, i.e., it stands for the object denoted; whereas the descriptive phrase means the properties and not the objects (if any) denoted."

follows from this that there are three aspects in the meaning of a word, namely, a pictorial, a denotative and a connotative. A word calls up the form, denotes the individual, and connotes the genus or the universal. Every word will therefore be connotative in so far as it means the generic properties of the individuals denoted by it. Indian logic thus leaves no room for the so-called non-connotative terms of Formal Logic in the West.