The Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata (Study)
by Kazuhiko Yamamoto | 1991 | 35,898 words
This essay studies the Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata within Indian logic by exploring the Paksataprakarana on the Tattvacintamani of Gangesa Upadhyaya and the Didhiti of Raghunata Siromani. The term 鈥減aksa鈥� originally meant a subject or proposition but evolved to signify a key logical term, representing the subject of an inference or the locus of i...
Text 2 (of the Paksata-prakarana on Tattvachintamani)
TEXT-2: tatra na tavat sandigdhasadhyadharmavattvam Data paksatvam, sandeho hi na visesanam. paramarsapurvam lingadarsanavyaptismaranadina tasya nasat. VARIANT: 1. All the texts read -dharmatvam for -dharmavattvam. Cf. (Tattvacintamani-didhiti-prakasa: 875). n 1 TRANSLATION: There, however, "the state of having the property namely, a doubtful probandum" is not the subjectness because a doubt cannot be a qualifier, for before a confirmatory cognition it (i. e. sandeha) disappears through a perception of
probans, a remembrance of pervasion, and so on. NOTES: The proponent criticizes the definition of subjectness (paksatva) "sandigdhasadhyadharmavattvam paksatvam" This definition is of Kesava Misra i. e. "sandigdhasadhyadharma dharmi paksah" (Tarkabhasa: 44). Sivaditya has also this definition i. e. sandigdhasadhyatveno patatvam paksatvam" (Saptapadarthi: 71). The sandigdha is "possesses of doubt" (sandehavat). Proponent says doubt (sandeha) cannot be a qualifier (visesana), for the doubt (sandeha) is a kind of knowledge and it cannot exist more than three moments i. e. the moment doubt arises, the second moment is a perception of probans (lingadarsana), the third moment is is a remembrance of pervasion (vyaptismarana), and the fourth moment is a confirmatory cognition (paramarsa). Naturally, after the remembrance of pervasion, the doubt disappears. 嘟夃紞 The proponent says: "before a confirmatory cognition (it disappears) through a perception of probans, a remembrance of pervasion, and so on. (paramarsapurvam lingadarsanavyaptismaranadina). But there are only the perception of probans (lingadarsana) and the remembrance of pervasion (vyaptismarana) before the confirmatory cognition (paramarsa). So, "and so on" (adina) is just a stylistic expression. The Nyaya school thinks the inferential process is of four stages, i. e. (1) perception of probans (lingadarsana-pratyaksa), remembrance of pervasion (vyaptismarana), (3) confirmatory (2) :
1 and (4) inferential cognition (anumiti). cognition (paramarsa), (paramarsa), and (4) A knowledge is kept for three moments, then an inferential cognition is established. With regard to the process of inferential cognition, cf. the part one chapter B. "The Process of Inferential Cognition".