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The view of 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 and his followers is that the souls and the inanimate world are associated with God as His qualities. The function of qualities (惫颈艣别峁�a苍补) is that by their presence they distinguish an object from other similar objects. Thus, when one says 鈥湼槟宄静箃hesonof 顿补艣补谤补迟丑补,鈥� the adjective 鈥渟on of 顿补艣补谤补迟丑补鈥� distinguishes this 搁腻尘补 from the other two 搁腻尘补s, 叠补濒补谤腻尘补 and 笔补谤补艣耻谤腻尘补. But no such purpose is served by styling the individual souls and the inanimate nature as being qualities of Brahman, for they do not distinguish Him from any other similar persons; for the 搁腻尘腻nujists also do not admit any other category than the conscious souls, the unconscious world and God the controller of them both. Since there is nothing to differentiate, the concept of the souls and matter as quality or differentia also fails. Another function of qualities is that they help the substance to which they belong to become better known. The knowledge of souls and matter as qualities of God does not help us to know or comprehend Him better.

Again, if God be associated with matter and souls, He is found to be associated with their defects also. It may be argued whether the Brahman in which the souls and matter are held to abide is itself unqualified or qualified. In the former alternative the 搁腻尘腻-nujas like the 艢a峁卥arites have to admit the existence of an unqualified entity and a part in Brahman has to be admitted which exists in itself as an unqualified entity. If the Brahman be in part qualityless and in part associated with qualities, then it would in part be omniscient only in certain parts of itself. Again, if the pure unassociated Brahman be regarded as omniscient, then there would be one Brahman associated with omniscience and other qualities and another Brahman associated with matter and soul, and the doctrine of qualified monism would thus break down.

The pure Brahman being outside the souls and matter, these two would be without a controller inside them and would thus be independent of God. Moreover, God in this view would be in certain parts associated with the highest and purest qualities and in other parts with the defiled characters of the material world and the imperfect souls. In the other alternative, i.e. if Brahman as associated with matter and souls be the ultimate substance which is qualified with matter and souls, then there would be two composite entities and not one, and God will as before be associated with two opposite sets of pure and impure qualities. Again, if God be admitted to be a composite unity and if matter and souls which are regarded as mutually distinct and different are admitted to be constituents of Him though He is different in nature from them, it is difficult to imagine how under the circumstances those constituents can be at once one with God and yet different from Him^[1].

In the 狈颈尘产腻谤办补 view 艢r墨 Iv峁涐梗峁嘺 is the Lord, the ultimate Brahman and He is the support of the universe consisting of the souls and matter which are derivative parts of Him and are absolutely under His control and thus have a dependent existence only (para-tantra-sattva). Entities that have dependent existence are of two kinds, the souls which, though they pass through apparent birth and death, are yet eternal in their nature and the substance of the corporeal structure that supports them, the matter. The scriptural texts that speak of duality refer to this duality that subsists between the ultimate substance, the Brahman, which alone has the independent existence, and souls and matter which have only a dependent existence. The scriptural texts that deny duality refer to the ultimate entity which has independent existence which forms the common ground and basis of all kinds of existence. The texts that try to refer to Brahman by negations (neti, neti) signify how Brahman is different from all other things, or, in other words, how Brahman is different from matter and the souls which are limited by material conditions^[2].

Brahman is thus the absolute Being, the abode of all good and noble qualities, which is different from all entities having only dependent existence. The monistic texts refer to the fact, as has already been noted, that the world of matter and the infinite number of souls having but dependent existence cannot exist independent of God (迟补诲-补辫峁泃丑补办-siddha) and are, in that sense, one with Him. They also have the essence of their being in Brahman (产谤补丑尘腻-tmatva), are pervaded through and through by it (tad - 惫测腻辫测补迟惫补), are supported in it and held in it and are always being completely controlled and dominated by it^[3]. Just as all individual objects, a jug, a stone, etc., may be said to have substantiality (dravyatva) permeating through them by virtue of their being substances, so the souls and the matter may be called God by virtue of the fact that God permeates through them as their inner essence. But just as none of these individual objects can be regarded as substance per se, so the souls and matter cannot also be identified with God as being one with Him^[4].

The Bh膩skarites are wrong in asserting that the individuals are false inasmuch as they have only a false appearance through the limitations (耻辫腻诲丑颈) imposed upon the pure Brahman. The nature of the imposition of Brahman by the so-called conditions is unintelligible. It may mean that the atomic individual is the iesult of the imposition of the conditions on Brahman by which the Brahman as a whole appears as the individual soul or by which the Brahman is split asunder, and being thus split appears as the individual self or the Brahman as qualified by the conditions or that the conditions themselves appear as the individuals. The Brahman being homogeneous and unchangeable cannot be split asunder. Even if it can be split asunder, the individual selves being the products of such a splitting would have a beginning in time and would not thus be eternal; and it has to be admitted that on such a view Brahman has to be split up into as many infinite parts as there are selves. If it is held that the parts of Brahman as limited by the conditions appear as individual souls, then Brahman would be subject to all the defects of the conditions which could so modify it as to resolve it into parts for the production of the individual selves. Moreover, owing to the shifting nature of the conditions the nature of the selves would vary and they might have in this way spontaneous bondage and salvation^[5]. If with the shifting of the conditions Brahman also shifts, then Brahman would not be partless and all-pervasive.

If it is held that Brahman in its entirety becomes envisaged by the conditions, then, on the one hand, there will be no transcendent pure Brahman and, on the other, there will be one self in all the different bodies. Again, if the individuals are regarded as entirely different from Brahman, then the assertion that they are but the product of the conditioning of Brahman has to be given up. If it is held that the conditions themselves are the individuals, then it becomes a materialistic view like that of the 颁腻谤惫腻办补蝉. Again, it cannot be held that the conditions only cover up the natural qualities of Brahman such as omniscience, etc., for these being natural qualities of Brahman cannot be removed.

Further questions may arise as to whether these natural qualities of Brahman are different from Brahman or not, or whether this is a case of difference-in-identity. They cannot be absolutely different, for that would be an admission of duality. They cannot be identical with Brahman, for then they could not be regarded as qualities of Brahman. If it be its own essence, then it cannot be covered up, for in that case Brahman would lose all its omniscience. If it is held that it is a case of dif-ference-in-identity, then it comes to an acceptance of the 狈颈尘产腻谤办补 creed.

Again, if it is held that the so-called natural qualities of omniscience, etc., are also due to conditions, it may be asked whether such conditions are different from or identical with Brahman. In the latter alternative they would have no capacity to produce any plurality in Brahman. In the former alternative, it may be asked whether they are moved by themselves into operation or by some other entity or by Brahman. The first view would be open to the criticism of self-dynamism, the second to that of a vicious infinite, and the third to a vicious circle. Moreover, in this view, Brahman being eternal, its dynamism would also be eternal; at no time would the conditions cease to operate, and thus there would be no emancipation. The conditions cannot be regarded as false, unreal or non-existent, for then that would be an acceptance of the 狈颈尘产腻谤办补 creed^[6].

It may further be asked whether the conditions are imposed by certain causes or whether they are without any cause. In the former alternative we have a vicious infinite and in the latter even emancipated beings may have further bondage. Again, it may be asked whether the qualities, e.g. omniscience, that belong to Brahman pervade the whole of Brahman or whether they belong only to particular parts of Brahman. In the former view, if there is entire veiling of the qualities of Brahman there cannot be any emancipation and the whole field of consciousness being veiled by ignorance there is absolute blindness or darkness (箩补驳补诲-腻苍诲丑测补-辫谤补蝉补峁単补). In the second view the omniscience of Brahman being only a quality or a part of it the importance of Brahman as a whole fails.

Following the 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 line it may be asked whether the emancipated beings have separate existence or not. If the former alternative be admitted, and if after destruction of the conditions the individuals still retain their separate existence then the view that differences are created by the conditions has to be given up (a耻辫腻诲丑颈ka-bheda-惫腻诲辞 datta-jal膩帽jali岣� sy膩t). If the distinctness of the souls is not preserved in their emancipation, then their very essence is destroyed, and this would almost be the same as the 尘腻测腻 doctrine of the 艢a峁卥arites, who hold that the essential nature of both God and souls is destructible.

It is wrong to suppose that individuals are but parts of which a structural Brahman is constituted, for in that case, being made up of parts, the Brahman would be itself destructible. When the scriptures speak of the universe and the souls as being but a part of Brahman, the main emphasis is on the fact that Brahman is infinite and the universe is but too small in comparison with it. It is also difficult to imagine how the minds or the 补苍迟补岣�k补谤补峁嘺蝉 can operate as conditions for limiting the nature of the Brahman. How should Brahman allow these so-called conditions to mutilate its nature? It could not have created these conditions for the production of individual souls, for these souls were not in existence before the conditions were in existence. Thus the 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 doctrine that the concept of distinction and unity of Brahman is due to the operation of conditions (a耻辫腻诲丑颈ka-产丑别诲腻产丑别诲补-惫腻诲补) is entirely false.

According to the 狈颈尘产腻谤办补 view, therefore, the unity and difference that exist between the individuals and Brahman is natural (蝉惫腻产丑腻惫颈办补) and not due to conditions (a耻辫腻诲丑颈ka) as in the case of 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补. The coiling posture (办耻峁囜笉补濒补) of a snake is different from the long snake as it is in itself and is yet identical with it in the sense that the coiling posture is an effect; it is dependent and under the absolute control of the snake as it is and it has no separate existence from the nature of the snake as it is. The coiled state of the snake exists in the elongated state but only in an undifferentiated, unperceivable way; and is nothing but the snake by which it is pervaded through and through and supported in its entirety. So this universe of matter and souls is also in one aspect absolutely identical with God, being supported entirely by Him, pervaded through and through by Him and entirely dependent on Him, and yet in another aspect different from Him in all its visible manifestations and operations^[7].

The other analogy through which the Nim-b膩rkists try to explain the situation is that of the sun and its rays which are at once one with it and are also perceived as different from it. The difference of this view from that of the 搁腻尘腻nujists is that while the latter consider that the souls and the matter qualify the nature of Brahman and are in that sense one with it, the former repudiate the concept of a permanent modification of the nature of Brahman by the souls and matter.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

笔补谤补-辫补办峁�a-驳颈谤颈-惫补箩谤补, p. 342.

[2]:

vastutas tu ne鈥檛i ne鈥檛墨鈥檛i na帽bhy膩峁� prak峁泃a-sth奴la-s奴k峁�matv膩峁�-di-dharmavat ja岣峚-vastu-tad-avacchinna-箩墨惫补-vastu-vilak峁�a峁嘺峁� brahme鈥檛i pratip膩dyate.
     笔补谤补-辫补办峁�a-驳颈谤颈-惫补箩谤补, p. 347.

[3]:

tayo艣 ca 产谤补丑尘腻-tmakatva-tan-niyamyatva-tad-vy膩pyatva-tad-adh墨na-sattva-tad-膩dheyatva-di-yogena 迟补诲-补辫峁泃丑补办-siddhatv膩t abhedo鈥檖i 蝉惫腻产丑腻惫颈办补岣�.
     Ibid. p. 355.

[4]:

yath膩 gha峁璷 drarya峁�, p峁泃hir墨-dravyam ity-膩dau dravyatva-vacchinnena saha gha峁璦tv膩-vacchinna-p峁泃hiv墨tv膩-vacchinnayo岣� s膩m膩n膩dhikara峁噛a峁� mukhyam eva vi艣e峁�asva s膩m膩ny膩-bhinnatva-niyam膩t eva峁� prak峁泃e鈥檖i s膩rvaj帽y膩-dy-anant膩-chintv膩-parimita-vise峁Ｄ�-vacchinnen膩鈥檖aricchinna-艣akti-vibh奴tikena tat-pad膩rthena parn-bhrahma峁嚹� sv膩-tmaka-cetana-cetanatv膩-vacchinyayos tad-膩tma-r奴payos tvam-膩di-pad膩rthayo岣� s膩m膩n膩dhikara峁噛a峁� mukhyam eva.
     Ibid. pp. 355鈥�356.

[5]:

ki帽 ca up膩dhau gacchati sati 耻辫腻诲丑颈n膩 sv膩-vacchinna-brahma-prade艣膩-kar峁�an膩-yog膩t amuk峁�n峁嘺m 耻辫腻诲丑颈-sa峁儁ukta-prade艣a-bhed膩t k峁�ane k峁�ane bandha-mok峁�au sy膩t膩m.
     Para-pak峁�a-giri-vajra, p. 357.

[6]:

笔补谤补-辫补办峁�a-驳颈谤颈-惫补箩谤补, p. 358.

[7]:

yath膩 ku峁囜笉al膩-vosth膩-pannasyo ahe岣� 办耻峁囜笉补濒补峁� vyakt膩-pannatv膩t pratyak峁�a-pram膩峁嘺-gocara峁� tad-bhedasya sr膩bh膩x ikatv膩t lamb膩yam膩n膩-vasth膩y膩峁� tu sarp膩-yut膩-vacchinna-svarupe峁嘺 办耻峁囜笉补濒补sya tatra sattve'pi aryakta-n膩ma-rupat膩-patty膩 pratyak峁Ｄ�-gocaratva峁� sarv膩-tmakatva-tad-膩dheyatva-tad-vy膩pyatv膩-din膩 tad-ap峁泃hak-siddhatv膩d abhedasy膩鈥檖i 蝉惫腻产丑腻惫颈办补tvam.
     Parn-pok峁�a-giri-vajra, p. 361.