A History of Indian Philosophy Volume 1
by Surendranath Dasgupta | 1922 | 212,082 words | ISBN-13: 9788120804081
This page describes the philosophy of vedanta and other indian systems: a concept having historical value dating from ancient India. This is the eighteenth part in the series called the “the shankara school of vedanta�, originally composed by Surendranath Dasgupta in the early 20th century.
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Part 18 - ձԳٲ and other Indian Systems
ձԳٲ is distinctly antagonistic to ⲹ, and most of its powerful dialectic criticism is generally directed against it. Śṅk himself had begun it by showing contradictions and inconsistencies in many of the ⲹ conceptions, such as the theory of causation, conception of the atom, the relation of ⲹ, the conception of پ, etc.[1] His followers carried it to still greater lengths as is fully demonstrated by the labours of Śīṣa, Citsukha, Ѳܲū岹Բ, etc. It was opposed to īṃs so far as this admitted the ⲹ-ղśṣi첹 categories, but agreed with it generally as regards the ṇa of ԳܳԲ, upamiti, ٳ貹ٳپ, ś岹, and anupalabdhi.
It also found a great supporter in īṃs with its doctrine of the self-validity and self-manifesting power of knowledge. But it differed from īṃs in the field of practical duties and entered into many elaborate discussions to prove that the duties of the Vedas referred only to ordinary men, whereas men of higher order had no Vedic duties to perform but were to rise above them and attain the highest knowledge, and that a man should perform the Vedic duties only so long as he was not fit for ձԳٲ instruction and studies.
With ṃkⲹ and Yoga the relation of ձԳٲ seems to be very close. We have already seen that ձԳٲ had accepted all the special means of self-purification, meditation, etc., that were advocated by Yoga. The main difference between ձԳٲ and ṃkⲹ was this that ṃkⲹ believed that the stuff of which the world consisted was a reality side by side with the ܰṣa. In later times ձԳٲ had compromised so far with ṃkⲹ that it also sometimes described as being made up of sattva, rajas, and tamas.
ձԳٲ also held that according to these three characteristics were formed diverse modifications of the . Thus Iśvara is believed to possess a mind of pure sattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted in ձԳٲ in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as ṃkⲹ held it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that was believed to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it was indefinable and indefinite, and in its nature different from what we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial nothing, a magic entity which had its being only so long as it appeared.
ʰṛt also was indefinable or rather undemon-strable as regards its own essential nature apart from its manifestation, but even then it was believed to be a combination of positive reals. It was undefinable because so long as the reals composing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged to it with which it could be defined. Māyā however was unde-monstrable, indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a separate category of the indefinite. ṃkⲹ believed in the personal individuality of souls, while for ձԳٲ there was only one soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the transformations.
There was an adhyāsa or illusion in ṃkⲹ as well as in ձԳٲ; but in the former the illusion was due to a mere non-distinction between prakṛti and ܰṣa or mere misattribution of characters or identities, but in ձԳٲ there was not only misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable creation. Causation with ṃkⲹ meant real transformation, but with ձԳٲ all transformation was mere appearance. Though there were so many differences, it is however easy to see that probably at the time of the origin of the two systems during the 貹Ծṣa period each was built up from very similar ideas which differed only in tendencies that gradually manifested themselves into the present divergences of the two systems. Though Śṅk laboured hard to prove that the ṃkⲹ view could not be found in the 貹Ծṣas, we can hardly be convinced by his interpretations and arguments. The more he argues, the more we are led to suspect that the ṃkⲹ thought had its origin in the 貹Ծṣas.
Śṅk and his followers borrowed much of their dialectic form of criticism from the Buddhists. His Brahman was very much like the śūԲⲹ of 岵ܲԲ. It is difficult indeed to distinguish between pure being and pure non-being as a category. The debts of Śṅk to the self-luminosity of the վñԲvāda Buddhism can hardly be overestimated. There seems to be much truth in the accusations against Śṅk by վñԲ ṣu and others that he was a hidden Buddhist himself. I am led to think that Śṅk’s philosophy is largely a compound of վñԲvāda and Śūnyavāda Buddhism with the 貹Ծṣa notion of the permanence of self superadded.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
See ʲñ岹śī.