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The 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 is so much associated with 狈测腻测补 by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻, older than that represented in the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 蝉奴迟谤补蝉. But a closer inspection of the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补. An examination of Caraka鈥檚 厂奴迟谤补蝉迟丑腻苍补 (1. 35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 such as that of the 叠丑腻峁Ｄ乸补谤颈肠肠丑别诲补 before him. Caraka 蝉奴迟谤补 or 办腻谤颈办腻 (i. i. 36) says that the 驳耻峁嘺蝉 are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc., cognition, and those which begin with the 驳耻峁嘺 鈥减补谤补鈥� (universality) and end with 鈥�prayatna鈥� (effort) together with the sense-qualities (蝉腻谤迟丑腻). It seems that this is a reference to some well-known enumeration.

But this enumeration is not to be found in the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补 (I. i. 6) which leaves out the six 驳耻峁嘺蝉,

1. heaviness (gurutva),
2. liquidity (dravatva),
3. oiliness (sneha),
4. elasticity (蝉补峁僺办腻谤补),
5. merit (dharma)
6. and demerit (adharma);

in one part of the 蝉奴迟谤补 the enumeration begins with 鈥减补谤补鈥� (universality) and ends in 鈥減rayatna,鈥� but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka鈥檚 蝉奴迟谤补 was written at a time when the six 驳耻峁嘺蝉 left out in the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 enumeration had come to be counted as 驳耻峁嘺蝉, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated.

叠丑腻峁Ｄ乸补谤颈肠肠丑别诲补 (a later 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 compendium), is a compilation from some very old 办腻谤颈办腻s which are referred to by 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 as being collected from 鈥�补迟颈蝉补峁僰峁�i辫迟补肠颈谤补苍迟补苍辞办迟颈产丑颈岣�鈥濃��(from very ancient aphorisms^[1]); Caraka鈥檚 definition of 蝉腻尘腻苍测补 and 惫颈艣别峁�a shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补 that 蝉腻尘腻苍测补 (generality) and 惫颈艣别峁�a are relative to each other^[2]. Caraka鈥檚 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 were therefore probably written at a time when the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.

The 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of 鈥淚.鈥� There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 doctrines and occasionally to 厂腻峁僰丑测补. There is no reason to suppose that the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 doctrines referred to allude to the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 of Jaimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the 狈测腻测补 phraseology of 鈥�辫奴谤惫补惫补迟鈥� and 鈥溑沞蝉补惫补迟" was not known. 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate cause^[3]. We know that the 艢vet膩艣vatara 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 refers to those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient view^[4]. These considerations as well as the general style of the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability are pre-Buddhistic.

The 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补 begins with the statement that its object is to explain virtue, 鈥渄harma.鈥� This is we know the manifest duty of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini begins his 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 by defining 鈥渄harma.鈥� This at first seems irrelevant to the main purpose of 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补, viz., the description of the nature of 辫补诲腻谤迟丑补^[5]. He then defines dharma as that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (苍颈丑艣谤别测补蝉补) and says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions (of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts^[6].

The fact that the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also the 补诲峁涐梗峁璦 (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce any direct effect, will produce prosperity through 补诲峁涐梗峁璦, shows that 碍补峁嚹乨补鈥檚 method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption of 补诲峁涐梗峁璦 (unseen virtue) produced by dharma.

The description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of 补诲峁涐梗峁璦 proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In V. i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, v. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to 补诲峁涐梗峁璦. In v. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in 鲍辫肠颈蝉办腻谤补) are said to be due to 补诲峁涐梗峁璦.

Salvation (尘辞办峁�a) is said to be produced by the annihilation of 补诲峁涐梗峁璦 leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non-production of rebirths. 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 marks the distinction between the d峁涐梗峁璦 (experienced) and the 补诲峁涐梗峁璦. All the categories that he describes are founded on d峁涐梗峁璦 (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to 补诲峁涐梗峁璦.

These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (vi. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. 碍补峁嚹乨补鈥檚 philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to 补诲峁涐梗峁璦. But what leads to 补诲峁涐梗峁璦?

In answer to this, 碍补峁嚹乨补 does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as
holy ablutions (蝉苍腻苍补),
fasting,
holy student life (brahmacarya),
remaining at the house of the teacher (驳耻谤耻办耻濒补惫腻蝉补),
retired forest life (惫腻苍补辫谤补蝉迟丑补),
sacrifice (测补箩帽补),
gifts (诲腻苍补),
certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars,
the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2).

He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure; and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through 补诲峁涐梗峁璦. He also described how feelings of attachment to things are also generated by 补诲峁涐梗峁璦. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i 碍补峁嚹乨补 is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 will show that the later 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 writers agreed with the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc.

Some of the main points in which 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 differs from 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 are

1. selfvalidity of the Vedas,
2. the eternality of the Vedas,
3. disbelief in any creator or god,
4. eternality of sound (艣补产诲补),
5. (according to 碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego.

Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补. But as no 莫艣惫补谤补 is mentioned, and as all 补诲峁涐梗峁璦 depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 had no dispute with 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补蝉. It is probable that 碍补峁嚹乨补 believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 , the view was probably what is represented in the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补蝉.

As there is no reference to 莫艣惫补谤补 and as 补诲峁涐梗峁璦 proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 and the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, 碍补峁嚹乨补 gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 view as we know from the later 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 writers^[7]. Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional 狈测腻测补 view is that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc.

Traditionally this is regarded as the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 view as well. But in 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6-7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (腻驳补尘补). To this the final 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as 鈥淚鈥� (ahavi), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as 鈥淚鈥� (aham) (ill. ii. 10-18, also IX. i. 11).

These considerations lead me to think that the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 represented a school of 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 thought which supplemented a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Professor Vanam膩l墨 Ved膩ntat墨rtha鈥檚 article in J. A.S.B., 1908.

[2]:

Caraka (1. 1. 33) says that 蝉腻尘腻苍测补 is that which produces unity and vi艣esa is that which separates. V. S. 11. ii. 7. S膩m膩nya and vi艣esa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).

[3]:

痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补 (11. ii. 9 and V. ii. 26).

[4]:

艢vet膩艣vatara I. i. 2.

[5]:

I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the Kal膩pa Vy膩kara峁嘺 , in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Kan膩da in his 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 , after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Ilimavat (Him膩laya).

鈥�Dharma峁� vy膩khy膩tuk膩masya 峁�a峁璸ad膩rthopavar峁嘺na峁� Himavadgantuk膩masya s膩garagavi a nopamam.鈥�

[6]:

The 蝉奴迟谤补 鈥�Tadvacan奴d 膩nni膩yasya pr膩m膩tiyam (1. i. 3 and X. ii. 9) has been explained by 鲍辫补蝉办腻谤补 as meaning 鈥淭he Veda being the word of 墨艣vara (God) must be regarded as valid,鈥� but since there is no mention of 鈥溎�艣惫补谤补鈥� anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later 狈测腻测补 ideas into the Vai艣esika. S奴tra X. ii. 8 is only a repetition of vi. ii. 1.

[7]:

The last two concluding 蝉奴迟谤补蝉 n. ii- 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by 艢a峁卥ara Mi艣ra in his 鲍辫补蝉办腻谤补 (11. ii. 36 by adding an 鈥�api鈥� to the 蝉奴迟谤补 and thereby changing the issue, and 11. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination 鈥渟amkhy膩bh膩va鈥� as 厂腻峁僰丑测补 and bh膩va instead of 厂腻峁僰丑测补 and abh膩va, which in my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later 狈测腻测补-Vai艣esika view.