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The Advaitins hold that the causes or reasons viz. Drsyatva or being seen, Jadatva or insentiency and Paricchinnatva or limitedness establish the unreality of the world. Really speaking, these causes do not prove unreality of the world. Vadiraja critically examines and proves that on the other hand these causes or reasons establish the reality of the world. Drsyatva is the fact of being the object of experience. It cannot prove Mithyatva since it The Nirupakhya is that object which is not Nirupakhya. f has no form of expression of its own. Therefore, it is nothing but non-existent. in anyway. Further it cannot be described But if an object is Priya, then it cannot be of formless nature. The Drsyatva ascertains the respective form of the object and it is quite opposite So Dryatvahetu, since ascertains the of formlessness. form of the object, does not prove unreality of that object, but proves reality of the same. Thus, Dryatva does not help to prove unreality of the world. Similarly, the second reason, insentiency also proves not the unreality of the world. But is proves that the world is not sentient. It is only the negation of sentiency

and not of the reality of the world. And the third reason Paricchinnatva deals with the proves the nature of limit in respect of space, time and the like but not unreality } of the world. Thus, all these reasons do not establish the unreality of the world. As there is no difference ultimately in the Wyavaharikasatyatva and the Mithyatva according to the Advaitins, the world cannot also be considered as Vyavaharikasatya. And moreover, neither of these reasons prove this Vyavaharikasatyatva. Therefore, the world is as real as Brahman. 1092 373 As Vadiraja asserts that the Visvapratyaksa or perception of the world cannot be erroneous. Because, there must be some or other defect for an erroneous perception. there is no any defect in Visvapratyaksa, it cannot be And Avidya of the Advaita can also not be a defect in this respect. If this Avidya is taken to be a defect then what would be the nature of Avidya, the defect. Vadiraja explains this Avidya in three ways: erroneous. (1) It is a defect without having any definite role; (2) It is a defect that prevents true knowledge; (3) And it is a defect that produces erroneous knowledge. In the first case, the Avidya is a defect but as there is no any particular role to be played, even merits will become demerits in some cases. In the second alternative, 1

374 Avidya, being a defect, may prevent Brahmajnana which is true knowledge but not the Visvapratyaksa. So Avidya cannot be a defect for Visvapratyaksa and as it is not a defect it cannot' held to its illusion. In the third case, as Avidya or nescience is untenable, the view that Avidya produces erroneous knowledge is not correct. Because, the knowledge of pot and the like does not consist of any erroneous element. It is not experienced by perception. i So there is no scope for Avidya, making something erroneous. And further when something is mistaken for something else then, only there arises erroneous knowledge. But in the knowledge of a pot it is not mistaken for something else, So nescience being unreal, cannot be a defect in the knowledge of the things of the world. Hence, there is no change for any erroneous experience due to this. E 1 And further, in the Advaita, the Avidya belongs to Brahman and not to any other since Brahman alone is Sat. When it is said that the Avidya belongs to Brahman it may produce erroneous experience in Brahman but not in souls, the matter and means of knowledge like Pramanas, perception and others. So Avidya, since being not connected with the world, cannot prove unreality of the world. In the Advaita, Brahman is declared to be the Adhisthana for pot and other objects. And for attributes potness and the like, the very 1

( 1 I 375 1093 If objects become Adhisthana or locus. So the fact that Brahman is the locus is given up. And these potness and the like, cannot be the erroneous projections of Brahman. Brahman is taken to be the locus for potness then very idea would be a endless one. I The Advaitins hold that the world is unreal because, the nescience is the material cause for the world. But it is not correct because nescience cannot be the material cause 'for the world. Because, it is our stock, experience that the objects in the world have respective material causes. E.g. a pot has the earth as its material cause therefore, nescience need not be fabricated and taken to be as material cause. According to the Advaita also, nescience is withdrawn at the time of perception of objects pot and others. That means the nescience in the form of material cause is not present at the time of perception. It amounts to saying that mud is not present when a pot is perceived. That means effect remains without a cause, which is absurd. Hence, nescience can never be the material cause for the 1094 world. And world is not the illusory projection. It is proved that the objects of the world are real. As the objects are real, the attributes of these objects are also real. The Advaitins hold that the attributes

potness and the like, are not real, But this contention is not correct. Vadiraja doubts as what is the ground for this negation of attributes? Is it with reference to Brahman? If the denial of the attributes is with reference to the objects then, the attributes of one object may be observed in some other objects as all of them are illusory projections. And if the denial of the attributes is with reference to Brahman then the very denial will not affect the real presence of objects. Thus, it proves the reality of the attributes of the objects. are as real as the very pobjects. So potness and the like As there is no any sublation of the experience, these attributes are not at all simply ephemeral. Hence, all the attributes such as Jati, Guna, Karma and other of the things of the world 1095 are real. In the Advaita, the means of valid knowledge like perception are the products of nescience. And hence, their contention is that they are not true in the ultimate analysis of Truth. But this is wrong. Because, this As nescience is not the material cause for this world. already pointed out earlier, this world stands unsublated to our valid perception, and these means cannot be due to nescience, Otherwise the experience of the world must be sublated. The argument of the Advaita that there is no A 376

377 real world since there are no means to establish it and there are no means since there is nothing to be established, 1096 Not only that, the very involves Anyonyasrayadosa. contention and argument of the Advaita would cause the negation of the very existence of Brahman. So means like perception and the like are not due to nescience. Vadiraja argues that the nescience of the Advaita, since being beginningless, is to be considered as true. As it is beginningless one more nescience need not be envisaged for this nescience. When nescience is true, how then the means of knowledge be false? Though they are taken due to nescience, they are not false. Further, just without taking into consideration the beginninglessX ness of nescience, if it is argued that nescience is unreal then, it cannot be proved by the valid means perception and others that arise out it. Thus, the very concept nescience stands baseless. And this cannot establish the unreality of the world. One more contention of the Advaita that whatever is Arthakriyakari is Mithya. As there is Arthakriyakaritva in the world, it is not real. This contention of the Advaita verily denies the practical utility of the things of the world. So Arthakriyakaritva must be taken to be l

tm 378 the prime-base of reality. If not then, that amounts to saying that thirst can be quenched by mirage. Thirst is satisfied when one drinks water and not by mirage. Otherwise, there should not be any difference between water and 1097 mirage. And acceptance of different degrees of reality does not help the Advaita to prove unreality of any kind. Difference in the degrees of existence is not the criterion for unreality and reality but it is the sublation and non-sublation that ascertains the unreality and reality. for Arthakriyakaritva. Therefore, it is evident that reality is responsible The Advaitins, who accept Arthakriyakaritva of the world, have to admit voluntarily the 1098 Satyatva of the world. The idea of Vyavaharikasatyatva of the Advaita does not contribute Arthakriyakaritva of any kind. Because, the very idea of Vyavaharikasatyatva is nothing but Asattva or non-existence. And an nonexistent cannot be Arthakriyakari. Thus, it is proved that wherever there is Arthakriyakaritva there is Satyatva So the world is real as it is Arthakriyakari. This real world is created by Brahman. He being sentient, is the creator of this world. That which is insentient and material does have the power of creation. Therefore, nescience of the Advaita since being material,

V 379 cannot be the creator. It cannot contribute any Arthakriyakaritva to the world. The Bhagavata and authorities works declare that Brahman is the sole Independent creator of this world. Hence, the Arthakriyakaritva of the world 20 is due to Brahman. So the reality of the world remains unaffected. Vadiraja promises that not only perception and scriptures establish the reality of the world, even inference also establishes the world-reality. The syllogisms pots and the like are real because there is unobstructed contact in between eye and those things. Pillar, pitcher and other objects are real since those are connected with each other; 1099 establish the reality of the world. When defectless sense organs produce the knowledge, the knowledge must be true. And the objects of this knowledge are also true. The verses Nayatva Maya..., Apasca Praminanti and others Apasca make it clear that the Lord does not create anything illusorily. When there is no illusory creation, the knowledge, gained, need not be about illusory objects. Thus, neither scriptures (*nor inference nor even perception supports the unreality view of the Advaitins. All these authorities support the reality of the world,