Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 225 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
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NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
'this.' Nor can we say that recognition is a synthesis or
unitary product of perception and memory. Perception and
memory arise respectively out of sensation and imagination,
and are incapable of fusing into a single effect. Admitting that
recognition is a unitary product, what is the nature of its object?
If the object be past, then recognition is not different from
memory. If it be in the future recognition becomes a form of
imagination (saṃkalpa). The object cannot be a merely present
fact, since in recognition the object is identified with something
of our past experience. To say that the object of recognition
exists in the past, present and future is a contradiction in terms.
Hence the Buddhists conclude that pratyabhijÃ±Ä is a dual
cognition including both perception and memory which refer
respectively to the two aspects of an object as 'this' and 'that,'
or as present and past.'
The Jainas take pratyabhijÃ±Ä to mean recognition in the
sense of both understanding the nature of an object and
knowing that it was perceived before. To recognise a thing
is to know that it has this or that property, or that it is the same
as what was seen before. It is not true to say that pratya-
bhijÃ±Ä is a dual cognition consisting of perception and memory.
Although conditioned by perception and memory, it is a new
kind of knowledge which cannot be resolved into them. The
testimony of introspection clearly tells us that pratyabhijÃ±Ä is
a unitary cognition and a distinct type of knowledge. What
the NaiyÄkas call upamÄna or comparison is, according to the
Jainas, a form of pratyabhijÃ±Ä as understood by them.2
According to the NaiyÄyikas, pratyabhijÃ±Ä consists in
knowing that a thing now perceived is the same as what was
perceived before." That pratyabhijÃ±Ä or recognition, in the
second sense, is a single psychosis appears clearly from the
fact that it refers to one and the same object. The cognitions
1 NM., pp. 448-49-
2 Vide PrameyakamalamÄrtaṇá¸a, pp. 97-100.
3 So'yamá¹� Devadatta ityatÄ«tavartamÄnakÄlaviÅ›iá¹£á¹aviá¹£ayakaá¹� jñÄnam pratya-
bhijñÄ, MitabhÄá¹£iṇÄ�, p. 25.
