Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 224 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
224 (of 404)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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THREE MODE艢 OF ORDINARY PERCEPTION 205 savikalpaka perception of an object as a particular kind of
thing that is liable to error, since our judgment here may not
conform to the real nature of the object.'
2. Recognition (pratyabhij帽膩) as a mode of perception
Recognition may be understood in two senses. In a wide
sense, recognition means understanding the nature or character
of a thing. In this sense, to recognise a thing is to know it as
such-and-such, as when I know that the animal before me is
a cow. It is generally admitted that recognition in this sense
is an ordinary mode of perception, which is called savikalpaka
and which relates a thing and its qualities by way of predica-
tion. In a narrow sense, however, recognition means knowing a
thing as that which was known before. To recognise thus
means to cognise once again that which we are aware of having
cognised before. Pratyabhij帽膩 is recognition in this sense.
consists in knowing not only that a thing is such-and-such but
that it is the same thing that we saw before. According to the
Naiy膩yikas, pratyabhij帽膩 is the conscious reference of past and
a present cognition to the same object. I see a jar, recognise
it as something that was perceived before, and say 'this is the
same jar that I saw.
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It
With regard to the nature of pratyabhij帽膩 or recognition
the question is: Is it a simple or a complex cognition? Is
it a case of pure perception or menory? According to the
Buddhists, recognition is a mechanical compound of percep-
tion and memory. It cannot be called perception, because it
relates to a past object with which there cannot be any sense-
contact. It cannot be called pure memory which refers only
to the past, while recognition refers to a present object as the
1 Jayanta Bha峁弓a, however, maintains that liability to error is common
to both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions. The illusions of sense.
like the perception of two moons, are instanced by him as cases of nirvikalpaka
perception which are erroneous. (Vide Ny膩yama帽jari, p. 97.)
陋 P奴rv膩parayorvij帽膩nayorekavi峁ye pratisandhij帽膩na峁� pratyabhij帽膩nam, etc.,
NB., 3. 1. 7., 3. 2. 2.
