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Of the other systems of Indian philosophy, the Carvaka, Bauddha and Vaisesika do not recognise sabda or testimony as a distinct pramana or source of knowledge. According to the Carvakas, there is no logical ground or justification for our believing in anything simply on the statement of another person. If it were so, we shall have to believe in many absurd and fictitious objects about which any fool may tell us. If, however, sabda or testimony be constituted by the statement of a trustworthy person, it is only a case of inference from the character of a man to the truth of his assertion. But inference cannot be accepted as a valid source of human knowledge. Hence sabda 1 Vakyam dvividham, vaidikam laukikanca, etc., Tarkasamgraha, p. 73-

or testimony should not be recognised as a pramana or valid method of knowledge.' According to the Buddhist logicians, sabda is not an independent source of knowledge, but a form of perception or inference. If by sabda we mean to prove that the person who makes a certain statement is trustworthy, we reduce it to inference. If, however, we use it to prove that there are actual facts corresponding to a statement, we reduce it to perception. According to the Vaisesikas, sabda as a form of knowledge is to be included in inference, since the ground of our knowledge is the same in both. Just as in inference we know an unperceived object from the perception of something which is related to it, so in sabda from the perception of words we know the objects which are unperceived but related to the words perceived by us. 2 3 In the Jaina system sabda is recognised as a separate pramana or source of knowledge. It consists in the knowledge derived from words which, when properly understood, express real objects and are not inconsistent with the evidence of perception. It is called laukika or secular testimony when the words come from an ordinary reliable person of the world. It is called sastraja or scriptural testimony when it proceeds from a liberated self of extraordinary powers and knowledge, and relates to supersensible realities." Thus while in the Nyaya system scriptural testimony depends on divine revelation, in the Jaina it comes from the perfected and omniscient finite self. In the Sankhya-Yoga system too we find a recognition of sabda or testimony as a valid method of knowledge." But while in the Sankhya, scriptural testimony is regarded as impersonal and therefore possessing self-evident validity, the Nyaya takes it as neither impersonal nor self-evidently valid. It holds that the scriptures have been created by God and 1 Vide Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Chapter. I. 2 Vide S. C. Vidyabhusana's History of Indian Logic; pp. 287-88. 3 Vide Padarthadharina-samgraha pp. 106-8; Vaisesika-Sutra, 9. 2. 3. * Vide Prameyakamala.. pp. 112-13. 5 Vide Tattvakaumudi and Avaranavarini, 5; Yoga-bhasya, I. 7.

require to be proved by reason as much as any other form of knowledge. According to the Mimasa system, sabda as a pramana consists in the true knowledge of objects, derived from the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. It is called pauruscya or personal when constituted by the words. of trustworthy persons, and apauruseya or impersonal when constituted by the words of the Vedas.' The Prabhakara school of the Mimasa, however, takes sabda to mean only vaidika or scriptural testimony about the existence of supersensuous realities." According to the Vedantists, sabda or agama as a source of valid knowledge consists in sentences or propositions which assert a certain relation between things, that is not contradicted in any way." It is a verbal knowledge of objects, which is not validly contradicted by any other knowledge. While this is implied in the Nyaya definition of sabda, there is some difference between the Nyaya and the Vedanta with regard to the nature of vaidika or scriptural testimony. According to the Nyaya, scriptural testimony is personal, since the Vedas have been created by the supreme person or God. For the Vedanta, it is impersonal inasmuch as God does not create but only reveals the contents of the Vedas, which are eternal truths independent of God. So also the Mimansakas look upon the Vedas as a system of necessary truths or eternal verities which are independent of all persons and therefore purely impersonal in character. For the Naiyayikas, the Vedas as a system of truths embody the will of God. They express the eternal reason of the divine being in the order of time. 1 Vide Sastradipika, p. 72. 2 Vide Jha's Prabhakara School of Purva-Mimaisa, p 3 Vide Vedanta-paribhasa, Chapter IV. 41-(O.P. 103)