Tattvabindu of Vachaspati Mishra (study)
by Kishor Deka | 2024 | 49,069 words
This page relates ‘concept of Akanksha (mutual expectancy)� of the English study of the Tattvabindu by Vachaspati Mishra (study)—a significant text in the Mimamsa philosophy which addresses the concept of verbal knowledge (shabdabodha) and identifies the efficient cause behind it, examining five traditional perspectives. These are Sphota-Vada, Varna-Vada, Varnamala-Vada, and Anvitabhidhana-Vada and Abhihitanvaya-Vada, with the Tattvabindu primarily endorsing the Abhihitanvayavada view.
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Part 2.1 - The concept of Āṅkṣ� (mutual expectancy)
[Full title: The causes of verbal knowledge in īṃs (1) Āṅkṣ�]
Amongst all the three conditions, the greatest linguistic importance has to be given to ṅkṣ�. According to the īṃs첹, it is ṅkṣ� on the basis of which one can understand the syntactic unity of a sentence. Āṅkṣ� is the most important and well-comprehensive of all the factors.
The factor or condition about ṅkṣ� or the mutual expectancy, among words in a sentence is generally believed to have been promulgated first by the īṃs첹; but the necessity for interdependence of words to give a unified sense, as in a compound word or a sentence, was recognized even earlier by the grammarians. ṇiԾ himself says[1] that words can form a compound word only if they have 峾ٳⲹ or capacity; this term 峾ٳⲹ has been variously interpreted by different commentators. According to some it is ⲹṣ� or mutual connection pertaining to the meaning,[2] in which sense it is similar to the condition of ṅkṣ� given by the īṃs첹. According to some others 峾ٳⲹ is to be explained as ٳī屹, or unification of meaning;[3] that is to say, the different words with different meanings are made to signify a unified sense. This latter view may be compared to the condition of arthaikatva given by Jaimini, when he explained it as a unity of sense. ṇiԾ discusses compounds words, whereas Jaimini deals with the sentence, still the conditions referred to seem to be simililar. It is strictly speaking, 峾ٳⲹ is the capacity of the words for mutual association, ⲹṣ� is their interdependence, and ṅkṣ� is the need one has for the other for completing the sense. ʲٲñᲹ explains these two views as mutually exclusive, and accepts the ٳī屹 point of view as the correct one. According to Haradatta[4] both ⲹṣ� and ٳī屹 are necessary in a compound word, since in the absence of mutual connection of meanings, words are not allowed to form a compound. But others like ⲹṭa give[5] these two as the conditions for a sentence and a compound word respectively.
The word ṅkṣ� is derived from the root ṅk�, which means ‘to expect�, ‘to desire� (for something to follow) and ‘to thirst ڳٱ�. Āṅkṣ� can accordingly be rendered as: expectation to learn more–the anxiety, in other words, that is roused in one through what is already known but not known sufficiently or adequately, or through what has just come to the attention of the audience, but not in any coherent form. It consists in a word not being able to convey a complete sense in the absence of another word; literally ṅkṣ� is the desire on the part of the listeners to know the other words or their meanings to complete the sense. A word is said to have ṅkṣ� for another, if it cannot, without the latter, produce knowledge of its interconnection in an utterance. In every language certain words necessarily require certain other words to complete the sense. Thus a noun in the nominative case requires a verb to convey a complete meaning; a verb like ‘bring� has expectancy for a word denoting some object.[6] A string of words such as ‘cow, horse, man, elephant�[7] does not convey a complete sense, as there is no connection between them owing to lack of ṅkṣ�.
According to Śālikanātha Ѿś, the staunch follower of the ʰ첹 īṃs, ṅkṣ� being the curiosity on the part of the listener is the enquiry into another meaning and that enquiry arises due to the non-completion of the entire denotation or sometimes only of a denotable.[8] It is because of the fact that when only one pada (word) like 屹 (door) is used, there will be no denotation at all.[9] Āṅkṣ� consists in a word not being able to convey a complete sense in the absence of an another word. A word is said to have ṅkṣ� for another, if it cannot, without the latter, produce knowledge of its inter-relation in an utterance. In a language, certain words necessarily require certain other words to complete the sense. For example, a verb like ‘bring� has expectancy for a word denoting some object.[10] This ṅkṣ� according to Śālikanātha Ѿś, is admitted as an auxiliary cause (ܱ貹ṣaԲ) in respect of the knowledge of the sentence-meaning.[11] He also solves the objection as to why ṅkṣ� is admitted as an auxiliary cause of understanding the sentence-meaning, while sannidhi (contiguity) and Dzⲹ (compatibility) can also be accepted as such. In his reply to this objection, Śālikanātha contends that there can be no syntactic unity without ṅkṣ� even if sannidhi and Dzⲹ are present. In order to explain it clearly, he cites an example viz. ayameti putro rājña�, ܰṣoⲹ貹īⲹ峾 (here comes the son of the king, let this person be removed), wherein the word Ჹ (king) being unexpectant because of its relation with the word putra (son), is not syntactically related to the word ܰṣa (person).
It may be noted here that the īṃs첹 explain ṅkṣ� not only on the basis of the syntactic incompleteness of the sentence, but also on the basis of the psychological incompleteness of the idea.[12] They are concerned with the interpretation of the Vedic injunctions.
Āṅkṣ� does not arise at once in respect of all the counter correlatives (pratiyogi), but it arises according to the peculiar order in which the causes occur.[13] In this context, Śālikanātha refers to three essential psychological ṅkṣ� which are towards-(i) ṣaⲹ or the act enjoined; (ii) 첹ṇa or the means of doing the act and (iii) niyojya[14] or the person who is enjoined to do it. Thus in the passage like śᾱā yajeta (the śᾱ sacrifice is to be performed), as there is no mention of the niyojya, the expression i.e. the sentence is incomplete and as such there arises expectancy towards a word conveying the niyojya i.e., a person like Devadatta and so on, who is desirous of attaining heaven (峾�), without whom, the act cannot be performed.[15] As rightly observed by K.K. Raja, the well-known line in the Śīٲ denouncing the expection of the results of one’s duties (karmaṇyevādhikāraste mā phaleṣukadācana) seems to imply this view of the ʰ첹s.[16]
But according to the ṭṭ school of īṃs, the content of a Vedic injunction is the realization that the act enjoined is productive of some beneficial result. Kūmārila states that not even a fool will act without a purpose.[17] The ṅkṣ� of the Vedic injunction is for the پ첹ٲⲹ or the act enjoined, for the Բ or 첹ṇa or the means, and for the phala or the result of the act. There is no special ṅkṣ� for the niyojya or the person who is to do it; anyone interested in the phala or the result will do it. Thus in the sentence viśvajitā yajeta the additional word 峾� is to satisfy the ṅkṣ� regarding the result of action. In this way the two schools of īṃs give two different sets of ṅkṣ� according to the difference in the interpretation of the psychological factors involved in an injunction. According to K.K. Raja, the ṅkṣ� that holds between words in a sentence is not merely psychological but a grammatical one. It is only the need for the syntactic completeness of the sentence.[18]
The ṅkṣ� or the expectancy that holds between words in a sentence is a grammatical one, and not merely psychological. It is only the need for the syntactic completeness of the sentence. The ⾱첹 later made a clear distinction between the psychological ṅkṣ� and the grammatical ṅkṣ�. They have defined ṅkṣ� as a kind of syntactic need which one word has for another in a sentence in order to convey the interrelation of the words.[19] It is the ṅkṣ� that brings the knowledge of the syntactic relation of the words in a sentence. The ⾱첹 consider that even in the case of a word, there should be mutual expectancy between the root or the stem on the one hand and the verbal or nominal suffix on the other.
岵ś, the great grammarian maintains that ṅkṣ� is the desire on the part of the listeners on hearing a word in a sentence to know the idea which can be related to its meaning in order to attain a complete meaning.[20] Thus to him, ṅkṣ� is on the part of the listeners and not on the part of words or their meanings. It is only in a figurative sense that this expectancy is attributed to the words and their meanings.
It may be added here that the ʰ첹s do not deny the existence of individual words and their isolated meanings. According to them, it is not possible to comprehend the isolated meanings of a word apart from its relation in a sentence. The words themselves convey their meanings only as related to one another on the basis of the three well-known factors viz. ṅkṣ�, Dzⲹ and sannidhi. The words convey not only their individual meanings, but also their syntactic relation. Thus according to ʰ첹s, the words themselves convey the sentence-meaning directly.[21] This is because the ʰ첹s advocate the theory of ԱԲ (denotation of the correlated) according to which the padas denote their respective meanings only when they are syntactically related.
It may be pointed out here that most of the modern scholars also accept ṅkṣ�. S.C. վūṣaṇa maintains that ṅkṣ� is the relation of one word to another which produces a connected idea of speech.[22] S. Rādhākṛṣṇan accepts ṅkṣ� as mutual need or interdependence.[23] Thus modern scholars also lay stress on the concept of ṅkṣ� which is, according to the ʰ첹 īṃs첹, the basis of syntactic unity and their views seems to be a preferable one.
Footnotes and references:
[2]:
parasparaⲹṣāṃ 峾ٳⲹm eke / kā punaḥśabdayor ⲹṣ�? na brūmaḥśabdayor iti / ki� tarhi? arthayo� / Ѳṣy , p. 365
[4]:
Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar , p. 293
[5]:
iha ⲹṣāyā� samāso na bhavati, ekārthībhāve ⲹ� neti / Ѳṣypradīpa under ṇiԾsūtra , II. 1.1
[6]:
tatra padārthānā� parasparaᾱñ屹ṣaⲹtvayogyatvam ṅkṣ�, kriyāśravaṇe kārakasya, kārakaśravaṇe kriyāyā�, 첹ṇaśravaṇe پ첹ٲⲹyāśca ᾱñ屹ṣaⲹtvāt / ձԳٲ貹ṣ� , IV.3
[7]:
[8]:
atrocyate-abhidhānāparyavasānam, abhidheyāparyavasānañca jijñāsodaye nibandhanam/ ٳṛk-ṛtپ , p. 386
[9]:
ekapadaprayoge hi 屹ityādabhidhānameva na paryavasyati / Ibid.
[12]:
anvitasyābhidhānārtham uktārthaghaṭanāya vā /
pratiyogini ᾱñ yā sāṅkṣeti gīyate // Pra첹ṇapañcikā , p. 387
[13]:
sā ceyamṅkṣ� pratiyogiṣu sarveṣu na sahasaivopajāyate, kintu karanopānipatakrameṇa / ٳṛk-ṛtپ , p. 388
[15]:
atha pratipanne ṣaⲹsambandhini vidhyarthe /
niyojyamantarena tatsiddyasambhavānniyojyṅkṣ� // ٳṛk-ṛtپ , p. 388
[17]:
prayojanam anuddiśya na mando’pi pravartate / Śǰ첹ٳٰ첹 , p. 653
[18]:
Indian Theories of Meaning , p. 163
[20]:
sā caikapadārthajñāne tadarthānvayayogyārthasya yajjñāna� tadviṣayecchā; 'asyānvayyartha� ka�' ityevaṃrūpā ܰṣaniṣṭhaiva, tathāpi tasyā� svaviṣaye’rthe DZ貹� / ʲܳñṣ� , p. 71
[21]:
ṅkṣ�-sannidhiprāptayogyārthāntarasaṅgatānam /
svārthānāhu� padānīti vyutpattissaṃśrityā yadā // ٳṛk-ṛtپ , p. 384
[22]:
HIL., p. 447
[23]:
IP., Volume II, p. 109