Philosophy of Charaka-samhita
by Asokan. G | 2008 | 88,742 words
Ayurveda, represented by Charaka and Sushruta, stands first among the sciences of Indian intellectual tradition. The Charaka-samhita, ascribed to the great celebrity Charaka, has got three strata. (1) The first stratum is the original work composed by Agnivesha, the foremost of the six disciples of Punarvasu Atreya. He accomplished the work by coll...
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Verbal Testimony (艣补产诲补) [in Charaka philosophy]
In the theory on the source of knowledge, perception occupies the undisputed place because it is immediate cognition. Moreover, it is the foundation on which all other 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺蝉 operate. So perception is discussed first in all most all philosophical systems. Quite contrary to that, Caraka places primacy on verbal testimony (艣补产诲补) because in 膧测耻谤惫别诲补 scriptural knowledge is an essential prerequisite for a physician. It is only after attaining competency in scriptural testimony that a physician becomes proficient in making use of the other sources of knowledge for diagnosis. In Indian tradition, it is a conventional belief that truth reveals itself to a man with pure heart and chaste mind when he engages in sincere and deep meditation, with a view to providing social welfare and without the slightest trace of selfish interest. Such is the belief in the ultimate revelatory nature of knowledge.[1]
Caraka defines verbal testimony as the authoritative instructions of reliable persons (腻辫迟补).[2] Trustworthy persons (腻辫迟补s) are authoritative and enlightened persons who are freed from rajas and tamas by spiritual endeavour and knowledge. Such persons have a clear and untainted vision of things belonging to the present, the past, and the future. The teachings of such trustworthy persons are regarded as authentic.[3] Their words are regarded as authentic because they have an unimpaired memory and complete knowledge free from doubts, attachment, and affliction.[4] Further 艣补产诲补 is seen to be included in the table of logical terms. There it is said that a word (艣补产诲补) is a collection of letters and that it is of four kinds, namely perceived purport (诲谤峁ａ弓腻谤迟丑补), unperceived purport (a诲谤峁ａ弓腻谤迟丑补), truth (satya) and untruth (补苍峁泃补).[5] According to this definition and division, 艣补产诲补 refers to articulations of all types without considering whether they are authoritative or not. It brings about some ambiguity due to the inclusion of untruth as one of its divisions. It may mislead to the conclusion that statements of any person can be treated as a source of valid cognition. But according to the 颁补谤补办补蝉补峁僪颈迟腻 itself, all sentences, particularly of untruth, in no way, can be treated as the source of valid cognition. Caraka has not only explained in clear terms the specific qualities essential for a man to be recognized as a trustworthy person, but he has also cautioned that the intoxicated, mad, the illiterate persons and persons having attachment should not be treated as bonafide.[6]
Caraka primarily accepts Vedas as authoritative scriptures (腻辫迟腻驳补尘补). He includes the knowledge of moral rule, spiritual goals, and practices derived from the Vedic scriptures in verbal testimony. At the same time, the duly verified and established doctrines by critical thinkers in other secular disciplines which do not contradict the objects of Veda and are aimed at the well-being of the universe were also treated with greater importance.[7] This shows his unbiased synthesizing attitude. Referring to this, P.V. Sarma points out that Caraka was a 诲补颈峁ａ弓颈办补 who accepted both 腻蝉迟颈办补 and n腻蝉迟颈办补 views as logic permitted. He says that 诲颈峁补 is a term which 笔腻峁噄苍颈 puts in between asti and 苍腻蝉迟颈. The last two are at opposite poles while the first one (诲颈峁ａ弓补) balances the two. The 诲补颈峁ａ弓颈办补s, choose one of the two after critically examining the facts and circumstances.[8] However we cannot deny the fact that Caraka was an 腻蝉迟颈办补 even though he adopted a neutral approach.
础办峁辫腻诲补 describes verbal testimony as the assertion of a worthy person (腻辫迟补) which is further followed by the later thinkers.[9] With regard to the question as to who an 腻辫迟补 is, 痴腻迟蝉测腻测补苍补 says that he is one who operates through the direct and intuitive knowledge of things. Quite different from the M墨m膩峁僺akas, the 狈补颈测腻测颈办补蝉 consider that the knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, since they are the utterances of 墨艣惫补谤补. He adds that 腻辫迟补s need not be sages. Even foreigners (mlecchas) can be 腻辫迟补s.[10] It is relevant to note that the 狈测腻测补-蝉奴迟谤补 refers to two divisions of verbal testimony, namely 诲峁涐梗峁乺迟丑补 and a诲峁涐梗峁乺迟丑补.[11]
The 叠丑腻峁弓补 M墨m膩峁僺akas describe verbal testimony in the following way: When the words of a sentence are heard there arises the recollection of the meaning of the words. The recollection gives rise to sense of the sentence, which is not in contact.[12] They give a different division of verbal testimony namely human (辫补耻谤耻峁测补) and superhuman (a辫补耻谤耻峁测补). The first is the words of reliable persons and the second is the Vedic scriptures.[13] The 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补 M墨m膩峁僺akas, at the same time, recognize only the Vedic scriptures as verbal cognition.[14] The reason is that though the words of a man lead to the inference of the intention of the speaker they do not convey themselves the meaning of the sentence because their capacity is made blunt by doubt.[15] 碍补峁嚹乨补 asserts that the cognition derived from verbal testimony is a variety of inference and it is attested by his followers. In classical 厂腻峁僰丑测补, reliable authority (腻辫迟腻驳补尘补) is verbal testimony (艣补产诲补).[16] The Ved膩ntins, similar to that of the 笔谤腻产丑腻办补谤补 M墨m膩峁僺akas, consider only the Vedic scriptures as authority. At the same time, Caraka, in coherence with the 厂腻峁僰丑测补, 狈测腻测补, and some other systems, consider the articulations of trustworthy persons as authority.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
CSG, Vol. 1, p. 459.
[2]:
tatr膩ptopade艣o n膩m腻辫迟补vacana峁�, CS, Vim膩na - sth膩na, IV. 4.
[3]:
[4]:
apt膩 hyavitarkasm峁泃ivibh膩g膩vido ni峁r墨tyupat膩padar艣ina艣ca.
te峁Ｄ乵eva峁僩u峁嘺yog膩dyadvacana峁� tat pram膩峁嘺峁�, CS, Vim膩na-sth膩na, IV. 4.
[5]:
Ibid., VIII. 38.
[6]:
apram膩峁嘺峁� punarmattonmatt膩murkharaktadu峁ａ弓膩dus峁璦vacanamiti, Ibid., IV. 4.
[7]:
tatr腻辫迟腻驳补尘补st膩vadveda岣�, ya艣c膩nyo'pi ka艣cidved膩rth膩davipar墨ta岣� par墨k峁kai岣� 辫谤补峁嚹玹补岣� 艣i峁ａ弓膩numato lok膩nugrahaprav峁泃ta岣� 艣膩strav膩da岣�, sa c腻辫迟腻驳补尘补岣�; CS, Su, XI. 27.
[8]:
PVS, p.164; asti nasti 诲颈蝉迟补峁� 尘补迟颈岣�, 础峁ａ弓腻诲丑测腻测墨-蝉奴迟谤补辫腻峁环补 of 笔腻峁噄苍颈., IV. iv. 60; pram膩峁嘺nupatin墨 yasya 尘补迟颈岣� sa 诲补颈峁ａ弓颈办补岣�, KV, Part鈥擨, p. 399. Vai艣e峁kadar艣ana.. Agarwala says that 诲补颈峁ａ弓颈办补 mentioned by 笔腻峁噄苍颈 refers to the followers of the determinist philosophy preached by Makkali 骋辞艣腻濒补 who repudiated the efficacy of karma as means for the lot of human beings. Vai艣e峁kadar艣ana.. Agarwala, India as Known to 笔腻峁噄苍颈, Varanasi, 1963, pp. 384-85.
[9]:
膩ptopade艣a岣� 艣补产诲补岣�, 狈测腻测补s奴tra., I. i. 7; 狈测腻测补-痴腻谤迟迟颈办补 of Udyotak膩ra., p.61; Tarkabh膩峁 of Ke艣avami艣ra., p.108, TSA, p. 50.
[11]:
sa 诲惫颈惫颈诲丑补岣� - d峁涐梗峁伝遽箾峁ａ弓膩r迟丑补tv膩t, 狈测腻测补s奴tra., 1. i. 8.
[12]:
M膩nameyodaya of N膩r膩ya峁嘺., p. 93.
[13]:
tacca 艣补产诲补峁� 诲惫颈惫颈诲丑补峁� 辫补耻谤耻峁测补mapaoru艣eya帽ca. tatr腻辫迟补vaca岣� 辫补耻谤耻峁测补峁� vedavaco apuru峁ya峁�, Ibid., p. 105.
[14]:
gurustv膩岣�. vaidikameva 艣补产诲补masti, Ibid.
[15]:
Ibid.
[16]:
厂腻峁僰丑测补k膩rik膩, 6.