Philosophy of Charaka-samhita
by Asokan. G | 2008 | 88,742 words
Ayurveda, represented by Charaka and Sushruta, stands first among the sciences of Indian intellectual tradition. The Charaka-samhita, ascribed to the great celebrity Charaka, has got three strata. (1) The first stratum is the original work composed by Agnivesha, the foremost of the six disciples of Punarvasu Atreya. He accomplished the work by coll...
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Attribute (驳耻峁嘺) [in Charaka philosophy]
The third among the categories enumerated in 颁补谤补办补蝉补峁僪颈迟腻 is designated by the Sanskrit term 驳耻峁嘺. Its categorial sense is attribute. Even though attribute is the preferred expression, the word quality is also intermittently employed, for it is in common usage.[1]
The word 驳耻峁嘺 is mainly used in two senses: (1) strand and (2) attribute. One of the earliest books in which the word 驳耻峁嘺 appears in a clear sense is the 罢补颈迟迟颈谤墨测补sa峁僪it膩 of 碍峁涐梗峁嘺-Yajurveda. There it means a strand.[2] The 厂腻峁僰丑测补 system of philosophy has almost retained the same sense.[3] Y膩sk膩 is the earliest known author to use the word 驳耻峁嘺 in the sense of attribute, quality, and property. He says that sound is the 驳耻峁嘺 of 腻办腻艣补, and compared to 腻办腻艣补, air posseses two 驳耻峁嘺s including touch and so on.[4] 笔腻峁噄苍颈 has also used the word 驳耻峁嘺 in the sense of attribute.[5] 笔补迟补帽箩补濒颈, who gives a detailed account of the various meanings of the term 驳耻峁嘺, enumerates attributes even if it is not in a systematic order.[6]
Definition of Attribute (驳耻峁嘺):
In the grammatical literature, it was 笔补迟补帽箩补濒颈 to define 驳耻峁嘺 first in the sense of attribute. He says that attribute is that which resides in substance, perishes, is found in different classes, is a super stratum, is not produced by action, and is distinct from substance.[7] At the same time, as a category, it was 碍补峁嚹乨补 who was the first to give a comprehensive explanation of the characteristic features of attribute. He says that it subsists in substance; it is not endowed with a further quality, and it does not become an independent cause in conjunction and disjunction.[8] Further, it is stated that one attribute originates another attribute.[9] Different commentators interpret this 蝉奴迟谤补 in different ways. Candr膩nanda is of opinion that the attribute like colour of the yarn produces colour of the cloth, for attributes of the yarn and the cloth are not the same. 艢ankarami艣ra opines that the attribute of the final aggregates (补苍迟测腻惫补测补惫颈驳耻峁嚹乻), duality (dvitva), the separateness of duals (诲惫颈辫峁泃丑补办迟惫补), priority, and postriority should be excluded from this characteristic of being originators.[10] Some others argue that this specification refers to those attributes that belong to the cause which produce attributes homogeneous to them, and it does not refer to all attributes. But, Sr墨dhara, who rejects this says that if a single attribute could not produce an attribute, conjunction produced by conjunction would become absurd.[11]
Caraka defines attribute as that which exists in substance by the relation of inherence (蝉补尘补惫腻测颈), which is devoid of action (苍颈艣肠别峁ａ弓补) and which becomes a cause (办腻谤补峁嘺).[12] According to 颁补办谤补辫腻峁噄, the expression (蝉补尘补惫腻测颈) has been included in the definition to exclude the all-pervading motionless substances like 腻办腻艣补, for they never exist anywhere by the relation of inherence. The term 苍颈艣肠别峁ａ弓补 denotes one without motion as well as the one different from motion. So it serves to exclude motion as well as the finite substances (尘奴谤迟补诲谤补惫测补蝉) which become the substrate of motion.[13]
The expression 鈥渂eing a cause鈥� serves to exclude universal, particularity, and inherence, since they cannot become causes. Here it may be argued that the definition is unconvincing as it does not pervade all attributes like the dimension of the ubiquitous substances, and colour of the final aggregate substances for they cannot be causes.[14] So 鈥渂eing a cause鈥� is partly unproved. Therefore its meaning should be to have universal which is invariable in the causes (产丑腻惫补谤奴辫补办腻谤补峁嚹乿测产丑颈肠腻谤颈 蝉腻尘腻苍测腻峁�) as it is a positive entity. This type of causality pervades all attributes and also excludes universal as they cannot have any further universal.[15]
Another explanation given by 颁补办谤补辫腻峁噄 for being a cause (办腻谤补峁嘺) is that all attributes other than the dimension of the ubiquitous substance and colour of the final aggregate substances are cognized. Hence the efficiency of being causes in the unseen cases is also to be admitted. Moreover the dimension of the ubiquitous substances can be the cause of the yogic perception, and so causality cannot be negated. Therefore, there is no chance of being partly unproved of the causality of quality. Even though such causality exists in universal, they are excluded by the expression 蝉补尘补惫腻测颈. 厂补尘补惫腻测颈 means a substratum (腻诲丑腻谤补) in which something exists by the relation of inherence and also means the contained (腻诲丑别测补) that resides in somewhere by the relation of inherence. So the ubiquitous substances that can only be the substrate in relation to inherence and the universal that can only be the 鈥渃ontained鈥� of the same relation are excluded as attributes.[16]
The M墨ma峁僺ak膩s are of the opinion that one attribute can exist in another attribute.[17] But, both Caraka and 痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 reject this. It is true that on certain occasions attributes are further ascribed to attributes like taste.[18] But, it should be understood that attributes are free of further attributes.[19] The attributes like conjunction which are often assigned to taste actually belong to their substrates.The 痴补颈艣别峁办补蝉 also express the same opinion in this matter.[20]
From the above description, it can be concluded that the definition of attribute given by Caraka is akin to that of 碍补峁嚹乨补. Even though the term which means that, it does not become an independent cause in conjunction and disjunction is not found in the definition of Caraka, the expression 苍颈艣肠别峁ａ弓补 serves the very same purpose with more perfection.[21]
Later on, Pra艣astap膩da defines attribute thus: qualities like colour are those which are endowed with the universal attributeness (驳耻峁嘺tva), exists in substances, and are devoid of further attributes and motion.[22] For Siv膩ditya, attribute is that which possesses attributeness.[23] Again, it is said that being endowed with the universal it is devoid of motion and is not a substantial cause.[24] Ke艣avami艣ra who expresses more or less the same idea, makes it clear that 驳耻峁嘺 is only an efficient cause (a蝉补尘补惫腻测颈办腻谤补峁嘺).[25] Annabha峁僢ha峁弓a defines it thus: attribute is that which possesses universal and at the same time different from substances and motion, or it is that which possesses attributeness.[26] From the point of view of the M墨m膩峁僺akas, attribute is that which is distinct from motion, has subgenises and is excluded from the substantial causes (up膩d膩na办腻谤补峁嘺).[27]
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
Attribute, quality, characteristics, and property are synonyms, See Webster鈥�s Encyclpedic Unabridged Dictionay of the English Language, New York, p. 96, 1175. The term quality narrows down the scope of 驳耻峁嘺. 鈥淎 quality denotes what a thing really is in some one respect; an attribute is what we conceive a thing to be in one respect; while attribute may, quality must express something of the real nature of that to which it is ascribed鈥�. Standard Comprehensive International Dictionary, Illinois, 1973, p. 94. See also EIPK, Vol. II, p. 112; ENVC, pp. 132-133.
[2]:
yadh膩 gu峁噊 驳耻峁嘺manvasyati, evameva talloke lokamanvasyati, dh峁泃y膩, a艣ithila峁僢h膩v膩ya. 罢补颈迟迟颈谤墨测补- K峁浥涐箛a-驰补箩耻岣�-厂补峁僪颈迟腻, with M膩dhava's Ved膩rthaprak膩艣a, Bibliolitheca Indica, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Culcutta, 1899, VII, ii. 4. 2, Vol. VI, p. 247. 笔补迟补帽箩补濒颈 also refer to the meaning of strand for 驳耻峁嘺.
[3]:
Loc, cit., F. Note, 59.
[4]:
鈥�腻办腻艣补驳耻峁嘺岣� 艣补产诲补岣� 膩k膩艣膩dv膩yurdvi驳耻峁嘺岣� spar艣ena v膩yorjyotistri驳耻峁嘺峁� 谤奴辫别峁嘺 箩测辞迟颈峁 膩pa艣aturgu峁嚹� rasen膩dbhya岣� 辫峁泃丑颈惫墨 辫补帽肠补驳耻峁嚹� gandhena p峁泃hivy膩岣� bh奴tagr膩masth膩vara-ja峁噂am膩岣�...鈥� 鈥�笔补谤颈艣颈峁ａ弓补鈥�, 2, Nirukta, p. 148.
[5]:
鈥�voto 驳耻峁嘺vacan膩t, A峁ａ弓膩dhy膩y墨-蝉奴迟谤补p膩峁環a of 笔腻峁噄苍颈., IV. i. 44; 蝉补迟迟惫补峁� drav测补峁� 蝉补尘补惫腻测颈办腻谤补峁嘺峁� tatraiva nive艣ite samavaiti ya岣� sa 驳耻峁嘺 ityanvaya岣�鈥�. 叠腻濒补尘补苍辞谤补尘腻 on ibid., 厂迟谤墨辫谤补迟测补测补辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺, Vaiy膩kara峁嘺siddh膩ntakaumud墨 of Bha峁弓ojid墨k峁ta.,Vol. I, p. 559.
[6]:
驳耻峁嘺艣abdo'测补峁� 产补丑惫补谤迟丑补岣�. Astyeva same峁avayave峁 vartate. tadyatha-dvigu峁嚹� 谤补箩箩耻岣�, trigu峁嚹� rajjuriti........... asti sa峁僺k膩ro vartate. tadyath膩 - sa峁僺k峁泃amanna峁� 驳耻峁嘺vadityucyate. Vy膩kara峁嘺mah膩bh膩峁a of 笔补迟补帽箩补濒颈., Vol. IV, V. i. 2, p. 299; 鈥�ke punargu峁嚹佱弗? 艣abdaspar艣ar奴parasagandh膩 gu峁嚹�鈥�, see also Ibid., p. 297. Ibid., Vol. II, I. ii. 3, pp. 98-99.
[7]:
satve nive艣ite'paiti p峁泃hagj膩ti峁 d峁浥泍ate 腻诲丑别测补艣c膩kriya艣ca so'sattvaprak峁泃ir驳耻峁嘺岣�. Vy膩kara峁嘺mah膩bh膩峁a of 笔补迟补帽箩补濒颈., Vol. IV, IV. i. 2, p. 62.
[8]:
dravy膩艣rayya驳耻峁嘺v膩n sa峁儁ogavibh膩ge峁a办腻谤补峁嘺manapek峁 iti 驳耻峁嘺lak艣a峁嘺峁�. Vai艣e峁kadar艣ana., I. i. 16.
[9]:
鈥�.....gu峁嚹伵沜a gu峁嚹乶tara峁�鈥�, Ibid., I. i. 10.
[10]:
See 艢a峁卥arami艣ra on ibid., Vai艣e峁kopask膩ra of 艢a峁卥arami艣ra., p. 47.
[11]:
sa峁儁ogasyaikasya sa峁儁ogajanakatve gu峁嚹伵沜a gu峁嚹乶taram膩rabhanta iti 蝉奴迟谤补virodha岣�? na s奴tr膩rth膩parij帽膩n膩t gu峁嚹乶膩mapi.... tada艣rutavy膩khy膩t峁涐箛膩峁� prak峁涐梗峁璦dh墨y膩meva nirvahati n膩sm膩ka峁�, Ny膩yakandali, Pra艣astap膩dabh膩峁a., p. 352.
[12]:
samav膩y墨 tu n艣ce艣峁璦岣� 办腻谤补峁嘺峁� 驳耻峁嘺岣�. CS, Su, I. 51.
[14]:
This interpretation is in consonance with the Ny膩ya - Vai艣e峁ka. 痴颈艣惫补苍腻迟丑补 has pointed out that dimension of 辫补谤补尘腻峁嘘蝉 and ubiquitous substances, unperceivable universal and particularity as entities devoid of causality. (鈥�a峁噓parim膩峁嘺峁僼u na kasy膩pi 办腻谤补峁嘺峁�.... eva峁� paramamahatparim膩峁嘺mat墨ndriyas膩m膩n测补峁� vi艣e艣膩ca bodhy膩岣�鈥�.) NSMK, pp. 74 - 76. It has been pointed out by 艢a峁卥arami艣ra that attributes of final aggregates are not causes. See Vai艣e峁kopask膩ra of 艢a峁卥arami艣ra., p. 47.
[15]:
See 颁补办谤补辫腻峁噄 on CS, Su, I. 51.
[16]:
Ibid.
[18]:
For instance see CS, Su, XXVI. 73-79.
[19]:
gu峁嚹� gua艣ray膩 nokt膩stasm膩drasagu峁嚹乶 产丑颈峁办 vidy膩dravyagu峁嚹乶 karturabhipr膩y膩岣� p峁泃hagvidh膩岣�. CS, Su, XXVI. 36.
[20]:
鈥�产丑谤腻苍迟补峁� tat鈥�, Vai艣e峁kadar艣ana., VII, ii. 4. 5. see also 艢a峁卥arami艣ra on ibid., Vai艣e峁kopask膩ra of 艢a峁卥arami艣ra., pp. 400 - 401 ek膩rthasamav膩y膩deva t膩d峁浥沘vyavah膩ropapattau gu峁噀 gu峁吥乶a峁単墨k膩r膩t. TSA, p. 4. Thus, the idea implied in Caraka鈥檚 articulation recalls the expression "a驳耻峁嘺峁�' in 碍补峁嚹乨补s definition.
[21]:
碍补峁嚹乨补 had set the condition 鈥�sa峁儁ogavibh膩ge峁a-办腻谤补峁嘺manapek峁鈥� to exclude motion which becomes an independent cause to conjunction and disjunction. For details see HSPCIC, Vol. II, 4, p.30. Similarly Carak has set the condition 鈥渙ne without motion鈥� (苍颈艣肠别艣峁璦) to exclude motion. See supra, p. 39.
[22]:
r奴p膩d墨n膩峁� gu峁嚹乶膩峁� sarve峁Ｄ佱箖 gu峁噒v膩bhisa峁僢andho dravy膩艣ritatva峁� nir驳耻峁嘺tva峁� ni峁riyatva峁�. Pra艣astap膩dabh膩峁a., p. 227.
[23]:
驳耻峁嘺tvaj膩tiyog墨 驳耻峁嘺岣�, Saptapad膩rthi of 艢iv膩ditya., p. 48.
[25]:
蝉腻尘腻苍测补惫腻苍 a蝉补尘补惫腻测颈办腻谤补峁嘺峁� a蝉辫补苍诲腻迟尘腻 驳耻峁嘺岣�, Tarkabh膩峁 of Ke艣avami艣ra.., p. 191. In the text, instead of a蝉辫补苍诲腻迟尘腻 it is printed 蝉辫补苍诲腻迟尘腻. However it is a discrepancy.
[26]:
dravyakarmabhinnatve sati 蝉腻尘腻苍测补惫腻苍 驳耻峁嘺岣� 驳耻峁嘺tvaj膩tim膩n v膩. TSA, p. 5.