Nyayakusumanjali of Udayana (study)
by Sri Ramen Bhadra | 2014 | 37,777 words
This page relates ‘Defence of cause-effect relation� of the study on the Nyayakusumanjali of Udayana, who belonged to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika School of Indian philosophy and lived in the 10th century. The Nyaya-Kusumanjali is primarily concerned with proving the existence of God but also deals with various other important philosophical problems. The book is presented as an encyclopedia of Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrines.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Defence of cause-effect relation
We have already noted that Udayana has spoken of five contradictory notions about God. We have also very briefly pointed out the implication of each such notion. In the first stavaka Udayana has taken up the first contradictory notion for critical examination. Although his main purpose would be to establish the existence of ²¹»åṛṣá¹a, at the beginning he takes up the problem of causality in general. He starts by examining the question: Is there really a cause-effect relation?
Commentators generally argue that the °äÄå°ù±¹Äå°ì²¹²õ do not accept the cause-effect relation. Udayana has refuted their view in the ±·²âÄå²â²¹°ì³Ü²õ³Ü³¾ÄåñÂá²¹±ô¾± But we find that in the Indian philosophical tradition speculations about causality are found quite early. Even in one ±«±è²¹²Ô¾±á¹£a»å at least we find an enquiry about the nature of the first cause of the world. While giving the answer, the ±«±è²¹²Ô¾±á¹£a»å records a number of views stating that the first cause has been variously conceived as time (°ìÄå±ô²¹), inherent nature (²õ±¹²¹²ú³óÄå±¹²¹), fate (niyati), chance (²â²¹»åá¹›c³¦³óÄå), the material element (²ú³óÅ«³Ù²¹) and the male principal (±è³Ü°ù³Üá¹£a).[1]
Thus so many alternatives have been suggested regarding the first cause of the world. But two theories that were considered important as going against the admission of the principle of causality and were much discussed are the theories of inherent nature and chance. It is found that some commentators think that both are identical, because both simply deny the causal law. But there are others also who think that there is a difference between the two. Thus, for example, it has been pointed out that by ²õ±¹²¹²ú³óÄå±¹²¹ is meant the inherent nature of the respective objects, i.e. their unique causal efficacy, e.g. burning in the case of fire or flowing downwards in the case of water. On the other hand, the term ²â²¹»åá¹›c³¦³óÄå means random occurrence without any fixed rule, such as the flight of a crow and the subsequent falling down of a fruit from a tree. It appears that Udayana refutes both the views after describing them in his own way.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
Åš±¹±ð³ÙÄåÅ›±¹²¹³Ù²¹°ù²¹ 1.1-2