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We have already noted that Udayana wrote not only commentaries but also a few independent works. Both as a commentator and independent author he surpasses many of the Indian philosophers. He belonged to the 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 school. In fact the tendency of 狈测腻测补 and 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 combining into a single system starts from him and reaches a great height. His commentary in the series of commentaries on Gautama鈥檚 狈测腻测补s奴tra is the last most important contribution. The 狈测腻测补s奴tra of Gautama and its commentary are the basic works of the 狈测腻测补 system which may be said to have developed almost solely on the series of commentaries on them by Uddyotakara, 痴腻肠补蝉辫补迟颈 and Udayana. After Udayana we have practically no original thinker and commentator of the 狈测腻测补 system. Navya 狈测腻测补 belongs rather to a different category and moreover it concerns itself exclusively with epistemology. Udayana is perhaps the last notable commentator on 狈测腻测补 as a whole.

His contribution to the interpretation of the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 is also no less important. Works on the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 are somewhat lesser in number than those on 狈测腻测补. No early authentic commentary on 碍补峁嚹乨补鈥檚 厂奴迟谤补蝉 has come down us. The only notable commentary on it written by 艢补峁僰补谤补 惭颈艣谤补 belongs to a much later period. At that time the tradition of 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 is already lost. Moreover, at that time Navya 狈测腻测补 has already attained its great height. 艢补峁僰补谤补 惭颈艣谤补 was also a great scholar of Navya 狈测腻测补 and his commentary though masterly only shows how the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 position can be defended by adopting Navya 狈测腻测补 terminology. Even accepting its quality as a commentary and philosophical work it is difficult to say how far the ancient 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 is represented by it.

Pra艣astap膩da鈥檚 work on the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 may be a commentary or may be an independent work. It is almost equal in authenticity and importance to the 厂奴迟谤补蝉 of 碍补峁嚹乨补. Among the commentaries on this most systematic work of the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补, Udayana鈥檚 碍颈谤补峁嚹乿补濒墨 stands out prominently. Udayana examines, expresses and defends the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 position in an elaborate way. He notes and refutes the objections raised later against the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 doctrines. In his defence of the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 position he even does not spare the 狈测腻测补 views, in spite of the fact that the 狈测腻测补 is considered to be a sam膩natantra system. As we have noted, comparison and verbal testimony are not accepted as separate sources of knowledge by the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补, though they are so by the 狈测腻测补. In the third stavaka of the 狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali he has defended the 狈测腻测补 position by offering some specific arguments. But in the 碍颈谤补峁嚹乿补濒墨 the same arguments are rejected from the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 standpoint. Thus in the role of 狈补颈测腻测颈办补 he tries to bring out the actual implication of 狈测腻测补 and again in the role of 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 he makes an effort to present the actual implication of the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补. His two monumental independent works are the 膧迟尘补迟补迟迟惫补惫颈惫别办补 and the 狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali They cannot be characterized specifically as 狈测腻测补 works or 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 works. They can at best be called 狈测腻测补-痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 works. The former is actually a strong criticism of Buddhist philosophy. Some basic and vital doctrines of the Buddhist are taken up for discussion. The position of the opponent is presented in great detail and with great faithfulness. Often the views of the Buddhist are presented in original language of their text and then subjected to very strong criticism. The 狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali also is a masterly work but the opponent here is not exclusively represented by the Buddhist. The particular topic discussed is also exclusively a 狈测腻测补 topic.

It is generally said that the 狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali is concerned with proving the existence of God. In the opening verse of the 狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali which represents both a 尘补峁単补濒腻肠补谤补峁嘺 and a declaration of the subjectmatter of the work, it has been clearly stated that Udayana is going to offer inferential proofs for the existence of God which are totally free from logical fallacies. But as we have seen the positive arguments for proving the existence of God have been given only in the last stavaka of 狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali He has mentioned no less than eight grounds and has also provided alternative interpretation of each. He has also noted the criticism of these particular grounds by the opponent and has refuted them. Thus, in a sense the actual subject-matter has been presented only in one stavaka.

However following the Indian tradition of philosophical discussion he did not consider this enough. It is not sufficient to present one鈥檚 own view logically, it is also equally necessary to reject the arguments of the opponent. Udayana has done this in a grand style in the first four stavakas. In this he has also followed the 狈测腻测补 tradition faithfully. According to 狈测腻测补 methodology there can be no debate or critical examination without a doubt. Doubt is the precondition for any logical enquiry. If it is known for certain that a thing exists or that a thing does not exist there can be no discussion on the point. But if two contradictory views are found regarding the same object there can be a critical discussion about its nature. Thus, a critical discussion of the existence of God becomes justified only if it can be shown that there is doubt regarding the existence of God. In fact, just as God is admitted by the 狈测腻测补, so also God is denied by many other systems. Udayana points out that the existence of God has been challenged on many grounds from many viewpoints. It is not possible to note and examine each one of them. He therefore selects some basic objections the refutation of which will be sufficient to silence any sort of opposition to God. He formulates five counter-positions or contradictory statements which go against the admission of God and refutes them in the five stavakas.

The 狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali is really encyclopedic in nature. The sole purpose of the work is said to be proving the existence of God no doubt, but Udayana has also utilized the opportunity of incidentally establishing the 狈测腻测补 views on almost all the major issues discussed in the 狈测腻测补 system. The law of causation is a fundamental problem of philosophy. Taking the 颁腻谤惫腻办补 as an opponent, Udayana has noted the objection against it and then defended it by refuting the opponent. He has critically analyzed the views of the opponent, stating his arguments in detail and in great depth. May be some of the arguments were not actually offered by the opponent. But Udayana makes note of even possibilities. He gives some probable objections and also provides answers to them. Even if some of the problems are not directly relevant to the problem of God, he focuses attention on them and discusses them from his own 狈测腻测补 standpoint. For example, he discusses the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 theory of 艣补办迟颈 as a separate category. After a thorough discussion of both sahaja-艣补办迟颈 and 腻诲丑别测补-艣补办迟颈, he shows that there is no necessity of admitting any of them. The 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 think that 补产丑腻惫补 cannot be a cause. But Udayana has shown that the position is not logical. He has also criticized the basic views of many other systems. The 厂腻峁僰丑测补 theory of 辫谤补办峁泃颈 and pusru峁�a has been refuted by him. As it is well well-known, in the Indian philosophical tradition the 颁腻谤惫腻办补s are unique in holding that the body itself is the self and there is no distinct self other than the body as is admitted by all the other systems both orthodox and heterodox. In fact, the main argument given by Udayana is accepted by all the systems as authoritative. One of the basic and most important theories of the Buddhist is the doctrine of momentariness. There is a lot of literature of the Buddhist thoroughly propounding and defending this doctrine. Udayana has taken it up for discussion and shown that it cannot be logically defended. However, Udayana has actually made a detailed study of the major Buddhist views in the 膧迟尘补迟补迟迟惫补惫颈惫别办补 In the 狈测腻测补kusum膩帽jali he has made only a brief discussion, though giving the main arguments which make the Buddhist claim illogical.

Udayana has also paid great attention to some of the controversies between the Nyaya and the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻. The 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补蝉 admit 蝉惫补迟补岣�-辫谤腻尘腻峁噛补 in both 箩帽补辫迟颈 and utpatti, whereas the 狈测腻测补 admits 辫补谤补迟补岣�-辫谤腻尘腻峁噛补 in both 箩帽补辫迟颈 and utpatti. Udayana has defended the 狈测腻测补 position in great detail. This is because if the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 position is accepted there remains no relevance for admitting God. According to 狈测腻测补, the Veda is valid because it represents the words of God. But if the words are valid by their own nature there will be no necessity to admit God. That the doctrine of eternality of words is also not logically tenable has been shown by Udayana. There is also a refutation of the 厂腻峁僰丑测补 position that the seers can be accepted as the speakers of the Veda which may thus be regarded as valid and admission of God becomes unnecessary. The 狈测腻测补 theory of God as the speaker of the Veda cannot be logically defended if pralaya or cosmic dissolution is not admitted. In fact, so many arguments against the admission of pralaya are given by the 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补. So Udayana takes up each of the arguments one by one and shows that all of them are fallacious. Finally he records some positive arguments which go to prove that pralaya is to be admitted as a fact.

A conclusion can be established only with the help of a 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 in favour of it. If there are 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺s negating the existence of God then the 狈测腻测补 position naturally becomes illogical. So it has to be shown that not any form of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 can establish the nonexistence of God. Udayana shows that there is no 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 disproving God. But in this context he also finds an opportunity to examine the nature of 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺s not only admitted by the 狈测腻测补 but also of those admitted by other systems. In this respect he strongly defends the 狈测腻测补 position that 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺s are only four, neither more nor less. He even refers to the 痴补颈艣别峁�i办补 view which brings verbal testimony and comparison under inference. He gives the arguments of the

痴补颈艣别峁�i办补, but finally rejects them in favour of the 狈测腻测补 view. Comparison is accepted by the 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补 also. But the 惭墨尘腻峁僺补办补 conception of comparison is totally different from that of the 狈测腻测补. 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 admits similarity as a separate category and comparison is admitted only as a source of knowledge for it. But 狈测腻测补 does not accept similarity as a separate category and argues that the purpose served by comparison is totally different. Udayana further shows that there is really no justification for admitting 补谤迟丑腻辫补迟迟颈 as a separate source of knowledge because it can be easily included in inference. There is also no need for admitting a separate source of knowledge for cognizing absence. 叠丑腻峁�峁�补蝉 also admit absence as a separate category but contends that no accepted 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 can produce a cognition of it. So an additional source of knowledge called anupalabdhi has to be admitted. But Udayana rejects this view by showing that it is possible to cognize an absence very well by perception.

In the Indian tradition there are different views regarding the nature of 辫谤补尘腻 and its essential characteristics. Udayana specially refutes the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻 view in this regard. He also rejects the 叠丑腻峁�峁�补 theory of j帽膩tat膩.

In the final stavaka Udayana mentions the positive arguments for the existence of God. He explains each argument refuting the objections raised against them by the opponents. He offers alternative interpretation of the arguments. Incidentally he also examines what should actually be the significance of a vidhi or injunction.

Udayana has rightly been acclaimed as one of the greatest philosophers in the Indian tradition. In fact, he is not simply looked upon as the propounder of a particular system of Indian philosophy only. Many of his conclusions are accepted as general principles in the field of philosophy in general. His examination of a problem is very thorough. He takes into consideration each and every aspect of a problem, examines the logicality from every standpoint and then gives his final verdict. His analysis is very deep and subtle. In fact, according to some scholars his method of critical analysis contributed to the advent of Navya狈测腻测补. 骋补峁単别艣补 has referred to many of his views, although he has also criticized some of them. In any case the excellence of Udayana鈥檚 critical method can hardly by overlooked and he is justifiably one of the outstanding figures in the whole range of Indian philosophy.