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Criticism of other Schools of Indian Philosophy about the Conception of Moksa鈥擳丑别 Nyaya-Vaisesika criticizes the theories of liberation accepted by other systems and shows that they admit the truth of the Nyaya view. The Carvaka holds that independence is liberation and dependence is bondage. The Naiyayika urges that the Carvaka view 1. Sridhara, Nyaya-Kandli, Pages 283-86. 2. Udayana, Kirnavali, Pages 12-13. 3. Sarva Darsan Sangraha, Page 209.

442 contains an element of truth; independence involves cessation of pain. But independence, in the sense of lordship, cannot be the highest good, since there are different degrees of lordship, higher or lower, and there is rivalry among lords of equal power. Hence the Carvaka view of moksa is wrong. 1 The Madhyamika Bauddha holds that the extinction of the soul is liberation. The Naiyayika urges that this view contains an element of truth; the extinction of the soul involves the extinction of pain. But it is wrong to hold that the soul, like the body, is the cause of pain, and should therefore be extinguished. Is the soul a series of cognitions or something beyond them? If it is nothing but a series of cognitions, the Naiyayika also holds that liberation consists in the extinction of all qualities of the soul such as cognition, pleasure, pain and the like. If it is an entity beyond the series of cognitions, it is eternal and therefore cannot be destroyed. Moreover, everything is dear for the sake of the soul. No one can strive for the extinction of the soul which is the dearest of all. 2 The Yogacara Bauddha holds that emergence of pure IM 1. Ibid., Page 209. 2. Ibid., Page 207.

1 443 cognition is exaltation or liberation. The Naiyayika urges that there can be no cognition in liberation, since its causal conditions do not exist at the time. Moreover, the soul being impermanent, meditation on the four noble truths cannot bring about any perfection in it and cause pure cognition. Further, the soul being impermanent, the same soul cannot be in bondage at first, and then attain liberation. So liberation cannot consist in pure cognition free from error and illusion. The Jaina holds that liberation consists in the soul's transportation to a supra-mundane sphere on the removal of the veil from it. The Naiyayika urges that the Jaina view is right if the veil that covers the soul consists in merit and demerit. The Naiyayika admits that merit and demerits are destroyed in liberation. But the Jaina holds that the soul is transported to a supramundane region, when its crust of subtle karma-matter is destroyed. The Naiyayika urges that the soul is either corporeal or incorporeal. If it is corporeal, it is either with or without parts. If it consists of parts, it is non-sternal. If it is destroyed, it is not rewarded for its righteous actions, and punished for its unrighteous 1. Page 208. 20 3.

444 actions. If it is devoid of parts it would be like an atom which is corporeal and partless, and hence its qualities would be imperceptible like those of an atom. If the soul is incorporeal, it would be incapable of movement, since a corporeal substance only is capable of movement. Hence the Jaina view is also wrong. 2 The Samkhya holds that the existence of the self in its intrinsic condition due to its isolation from Prakrti constitutes its liberation. Its erroneous identification of itself with Buddhi, an evolute of Prakrti, constitutes its bondage. When the self discriminates itself from Prakrti and its evolutes, the activity of Prakrti ceases for it, and it realizes its liberation. The Naiyayika urges that consciousness of difference between Prakrti and Purusa resides either in the Purusa or in Prakrti. It cannot reside in the former, since it is unchangeable. Nor can it reside in the latter, sime it is unconscious. Moreover, Prakrti is either active or inactive by its nature. If it is ever active by nature its activity can never cease, and the soul cannot be liberated. If it is inactive by nature, the soul cannot be in bondage, since Prakrti the evolution of Prakrti accounts for the experience and bondage of the self. 1. Ibid., Pages 208-09. 2 Thi Page 209. 3. Ibid., Page 209. Ham

445 The Vedentists hold that liberation consists in eternal happiness and this is not achieved from some where outside, but is simply manifested, which was, till then, lying unmanifested. It is rejected by Naiyayika, because there is no proof in support of it. No one perceives eternal happiness. We always perceive pleasure mixed with pain. Eternal happiness cannot be inferred from any trace of a sign or mark. Though certain scriptural passages can be quoted in support of the Vedanta view, but these passages, according to NyayaVaisesika, use the word pleasure in the negative sense of absolute cessation of pains. It does not mean any positive experience of pleasure. In our everyday life also, we use the word pleasure to denote the absence of pains. Further, if the state of liberation is a state of eternal happiness, then one will naturally have a constant desire to attain it; but there can be no liberation so long as one has not extinguished all his desires including the desire for liberation. For this 1 reason also the Vedanta view cannot be accepted. Uddyotakara urges that if the released soul is to have everlasting pleasure, it must also have an everlasting body, since experiencing is not possible without the bodily mechanism. The Vedantist holds that eternal happiness of 2 1. Vatsyayona, Nyaya-Bhasya, 1.1.22. 2. Uddyotakara, Nyaya Vartika, 1.1.22.

446 the self, which is self manifest, is veiled by individual nescience (avidya) in empirical life. The Naiyayika urges that individual nescience is insignificant and cannot veil the self-luminous eternal happiness of the self. Hence the self is not of the nature of eternal happiness. He Tutata Bhatta holds that eternal bliss becomes manifested in the Atmen during the state of liberation. But Vatsyayana shows that this view is not temable for 1 want of sufficient proofs, and hence he rejects it. says--what is the cause of the manifestation of eternal bliss? It also cannot be eternal, for, if it were so, then why should it not be felt during the state of bondage. If both were eternal, then it will also have to be assumed that together with the eternal manifestation of the eternal bliss, even during the state of bondage, there are the simultaneous experiences of pleasure and pain due to the merits and demerits, which, of course, is against the reality. In order to remove this difficulty, if it be held non-sternal, then, again, the cause of it must be found out. Besides the contact of the Manes with the Atman, there must 1. Nyaya-Bhasya, 1.1.22.

447 be some auxiliary cause also. Merit cannot be this auxiliary cause, for, in that case, it is necessary to find out the cause of this merit also, Nor can it be held that the merit produced by the yogic smadhi is the necessary cause, for every merit, after producing its requisite result, is destroyed; so that, the yogic dharma also will come to an end at some particular tim, and together with it the effect of it, namely, the experience of eternal bliss, will also disappear. Nor can it be held that although the bliss is eternal, and as such, is equally present both in the state of liberation and that of bondage, yet it is not experienced during the latter state owing to the presence of an organism; for, the pleasure of organism, which is exclusively helpful to the experience of pleasure and pain, cannot be en obstacle in the way of the experience of eternal bliss. Therefore, Vatsyayana thinks that the view is unsound and rejects it.