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TEXT-1: TEXT-2: TEXT-3: TEXT-4 a: PAKSATA PURVAPAKSA Paksadharmata is a producer (anukula) of inferential congition (anumiti) which is an effect. Supportive evidence (sadhakamana) means the cognition of probandum (siddhi) and rejective evidence (badhakamana) means the cognition of the absence of probandum (badha). Two Possibilities of the postulate of "desire to establish" (sisadhayisa): Another confirmatory cogniton arises from another desire to infer. Or, another inferential cognition arises from a desire to infer. Raghunatha criticizes Jayadeva's view: (1) Only a desire (iccha) is not a producer (janika) of inferential cognition. TEXT-4 b: (2) It is not true that God's desire is not a producer of inferential cognition. TEXT-4 c: (3) The state of being a producer (janakatva) is not indicator (upadhana). of the causal factors TEXT-4 d: (4) The proximity (samavadhana) of TEXT-5: (samagri) of inferential cognition is also not state of being the producer. PAKSATA-SIDDHANTA Three explanations of Gangesa's sisadhayisa: (1) At first, there there is is a cognition of probandum, thereafter, a desire to infer arises, thereafter, a

62 TEXT-6: TEXT-7: TEXT-8: TEXT-9: TEXT-10: confirmatory cognition which from a remembrance of pervasion arises, and then an inferential cognition arises. (2) There ia a cognition of probandum, thereafter a confirmatory cognition which, from a remembrance of pervasion, arises, thereafter, a desire to infer arises, and then an inferential cognition arises. (3) There is a cognition of probandum, thereafter a confirmatory cognition which from the causal factors of perception arises, thereafter, a desire to infer arises, and then an inferential cognition arises. The sahakrta is a qualifier of the supportive evidence (sadhakamana). Object of a desire to establish is a particular probandum and a particular subject. After a particular desire, an inferential cognition is seen to arise even after the cognition of probandum (siddhi). Desire of inferential cognition on the ground of another probans is an independent obstructing factor, like a desire to know a woman (kaminijijnasa). Desire of inferential cognition on the basis of particular probans or other than the particular probans is an obstructing factor. Desire of inferential cognition on the basis of another probans associated with an absence of a desire of

63 TEXT-11: inferential cognition on the basis of the probans is an obstructing factor. Supportive evidence means a definite cognition of the state of having a probandum. TEXT-12: Even after the cognition of probandum collocated on one mountain, one can infer without any desire to infer on the another mountain. TEXT-13: (1) Cognition of one probandum (siddhi) TEXT-14: obstructing factor (virodhin) of an (virodhin) of an inferential cognition (anumiti) on one subject (paksa). (2) Cognition of all the probanda is the probanda is an obstructing factor of an inferential cognition on all the subjects. (3) Cognition of all the probanda is an obstructing inferential cognition on one subject. Difference of probans results into difference of factor of an subjectness. TEXT-15: Cognition of probandum in a form of "mountain TEXT-16: possesses fire" (parvato vahniman) is an obstructing factor for an inferential cognition of fire in the form of "mountain possesses fire" (parvato vahniman). Inferential cognition in a form of "fire is on the mountain" (parvate vahnih) arises even after a cognition of probandum in a form of "mountain possesses fire" (parvato vahniman). TEXT-17: With reference to an inferential cognition in the form of "fire is on the mountain" (parvate vahnih), a

64 TEXT-18: cognition of probandum in general or establishment of probandum alone is an obstructing factor. Yajnapati's view: Inferential cognition arises, even when a desire to infer is destroyed and there is a cognition of probandum, by another desire to infer. TEXT-19: Jayadeva's view: The reason of that an inferential cognition arises in spite of time gap after a desire to establish, is the desire to establish is indicated a compatibility (yogyata). TEXT-20 a: Raghunatha's criticism for Jayadeva's yogyata in three points. (1) But a confirmatory cognition arises after a desire to infer by an order of perception etc. basis of result. on the TEXT-20 b : (2) If an inferential cognition arises during whatever a desire to infer is a compatibility time gap, (yogyata). TEXT-20 c: (3) But if a compatibility is postulated to a desire to infer, it is possible to postulate a compatibility to a cognition of probandum. Then an an inferential cognition does not arise. TEXT-21: In a case that a compatibility is intended, is intended, the state of not being associated with the object of inferential cognition's desire should be a qualification of desire. TEXT-22: The cause and effect relationship should be mentioned separately. TEXT-23: Vasudeva's definition of paksata: Absence of that a

65 cognition of probandum which is qualified by the absence of desire to establish and which is different from the inferential cognition arising in the moment immediately after its own moment qualified by an absence of a desire to establish is subjectness. TEXT-24 a: Raghunatha's question: why should the first qualification of the cognition of probanudm be pertaining to its own moment ? TEXT-24 b Opponent: In order In order to get paksata in the third moment, in the sequence of that sisadhayisa/siddhi/paramarsa anumiti. TEXT-24 c: In the order that anumitsa/siddhi/paramarsa/anumiti, subjectness does not arise, because there is no desire to infer at the time of confirmatory cognition. TEXT-24 d: The locus of the destroyed cognition of probandum in the thrid moment is following immediately after the locus of the cognition of probandum in the second moment. TEXT-24 e: In the order that siddhi/sisadhayisa/anumiti, subjectness arises in the second moment. TEXT-25 a: Opponent: Absence of cognition of probandum is subjectness. TEXT-25 c: Both of them are not a cause of subjectness that (1) an absence of the cognition of all the probanda nor TEXT-25 d: (2) such absence with qualifications. TEXT-26: Four kinds of causality (karanata): (1) Having as its

66 object the inferential cognition being in its own locus and having its production in the moment immediately following its own moment qualified by the time of the production. (2) Having as the object which arose immediately in the previous moment of the inferential cognition which arises in the same own locus. (3) Having as the object different from the inferential cognition which arises in the same own locus and not having production at the moment subsequent to its own moment. (4) Cognition qualified by immediately prior moment of an inferential cognition which arises in the same locus with a cognition of probandum. TEXT-27 a: It is not correct that an inferential cognition does not arise when confirmatory cognition is in the first moment. TEXT-27 b: The reason is that there is no contradictory causal factor at the time of the time of inferential cognition. TEXT-28: Three kinds of obstructing factor (pratibandhakatva): (1) Which is different from that which exists in the immediately prior to the moment of the inferential cognition in its own locus. (2) The form qualified by "being exists in a moment which is not the locus of being immediately prior to the inferential cognition in its own locus". (3) Which is qualified by "being existent in a moment which is immediately prior moment to the inferential cognition which is not the locus in

67 which the inferential cognition is produced and which is in its own locus. TEXT-29 a: It is not correct that every factor of previous inferential cognition is not contradictory of next inferential cognition, TEXT-29 b because of the three reasons that (1) there will be continuous cessation of the individuals, (2) it is possible to postulate in that way on the basis of not arising of the result, and (3) another ground is TEXT-30: TEXT-31: TEXT-32: TEXT-33: cumbersomeness. The relations of particular soul and the particular time are those which are different from that which exists prior to the to the inferential cognition. Causality (karanatva) is in the moment which is immediately prior to the moment in which one gets inferential cognition, or qualified by the existence of that type of moment. Causality will be destroyed as a confirmatory cognition etc. And the state of being an obstructing factor (pratibandhakatva) will be destroyed as a contradictory cognition (badhakatva) etc. Yajapati's view: Absence of either of the two, such as the cognition of probandum and a measure of cognition other than inference, which is qualified by the absence f desire to establish is the cause. 0 TEXT-34 a: Yajnapati's view is not not correct, because of the three

points of the meaning of supportive evidence that: TEXT 34 b: (1) It does not me an cognition of probandum. TEXT-34 c: (2) (2) Absence Absence is is associated with it. 68 TEXT-34 d: (3) It is not its causal factors. TEXT-35: Some logician's view: At the moment of the perception that pervaded by the absence of the state of being an wooden post, in the absence of super-imposition of the counterpositive there will be the absence of the causal factors of perception of absence, and so if there is subjectness there will arise the contingency of inferring absence of that at that at the moment of superimposition of the state of being an wooden post. Raghunatha's refutation: Each one can be an obstructing TEXT-36: factor, because it satisfies an affirmative and a negative concomitance independently, and because it is presented to the mind first and also because of simplicity. TEXT-37: It is not correct that if an absence of a desire to infer is made a qualifier to each one, then it will lead to cumbersomeness. TEXT-38: To postulate two desires will be cumbersomeness. Obstructing factor should be through the same relation TEXT-39: TEXT-40: as cause. Explanation of Gahgesa's "pravrttinimittam uktam": Absence of a cognition of probandum is the simpler ground for the the designation of a subject.

69 TEXT-41: TEXT-42: a word badhabhava in the Gangesa does not use definition of paksata, because of cumbersomeness. Although a subjectness exists in the soul, the subjectness can exist in the mountain by indirect relation (paramparasambandha). TEXT-43: Some TEXT-44: TEXT-45: TEXT-46: logician's view: When one person has a desire to infer and other person who has no desire to infer and who has the causal factors of perception, he does not have the inferential cognition and so with reference to the inferential cognition of a particular person, the absence of particular causal factors of a cognition of probandum of that person at the time when he does not have the desire to infer should be the cause because there is no other way. Some logician's view: With reference to inferential cognition after a cognition of probandum, let a desire to establish be the cause. It is not the case that with reference to burning in the case of association of gem, a stimulating factors cannot form one class and because the absence of gem etc. qualified by all the absences does not have any common factor. All the desires to establish cannot form one class. Inferential cognition will arise without desire to establish at the time of destruction of a cognition of probandum. TEXT-47: But the inferential cognition does not arise even if

70 one person has a cognition of probandum and other person has an absence of desire to establish. TEXT-48: And if causal factors are in general, the inferential cognition also becomes in general. TEXT-49: It is not correct that%;B (1) general factors cannot produce the inferential cognition, (2) another TEXT-50: particular factor can produce can produce the inferential cognition, and (3) (3) the inferential cognition does not arise because there is no cause after the cognition of probandum. The inferential cognition in general arises even if it is prohibited, because of the cause-effect relationship. TEXT-51: Subjectness is a delimitor of causality of confirmatory cognition which is required as a cause as the function of the instrument. TEXT-52: TEXT-53: Opponent: If a cognition of probandum is an inferential cognition, the absence of the cognition of probandum cannot be the cause of the inferential cognition, because when there is the inferential cognition, there is no absence of cognition of probandum. Raghunatha's refutation: It is not correct. The absence of cognition of probandum is the cause but not all the absences. And the material cause cause alone is the cause but not cause in general, that is the relation with cause and effect is not the self linking relation but the

71 inherence relation. TEXT-54: The Prabhakaras' view: The subjetness is not the cause of the inferential cognition, because the inferential cognition can arise in some cases without subjectness. And to establish an already established thing (siddhasadhana) is and to establish non-required thing (arthantara) are the faults.