Essay name: The Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata (Study)
Author:
Kazuhiko Yamamoto
Affiliation: Savitribai Phule Pune University / Department of Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages
This essay studies the Navya-Nyaya theory of Paksata within Indian logic by exploring the Paksataprakarana on the Tattvacintamani of Gangesa Upadhyaya and the Didhiti of Raghunata Siromani. The term 鈥減aksa鈥� originally meant a subject or proposition but evolved to signify a key logical term, representing the subject of an inference or the locus of inference.
Section 1 - History and Development of the Concept of Paksata
64 (of 69)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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69
TEXT-41:
TEXT-42:
a word badhabhava in the
Gangesa does not use
definition of paksata, because of cumbersomeness.
Although a subjectness exists in the soul, the
subjectness can exist in the mountain by indirect
relation (paramparasambandha).
TEXT-43:
Some
TEXT-44:
TEXT-45:
TEXT-46:
logician's view: When one person has a desire to
infer and other person who has no desire to infer and
who has the causal factors of perception, he does not
have the inferential cognition and so with reference to
the inferential cognition of a particular person, the
absence of particular causal factors of a cognition of
probandum of that person at the time when he does not
have the desire to infer should be the cause because
there is no other way.
Some logician's view: With reference to inferential
cognition after a cognition of probandum,
let a desire
to establish be the cause. It is not the case that with
reference to burning in the case of association of gem,
a
stimulating factors cannot form one class and because
the absence of gem etc. qualified by all the absences
does not have any common factor.
All the desires to establish cannot form one class.
Inferential cognition will arise without desire to
establish at the time of destruction of a cognition of
probandum.
TEXT-47: But the inferential cognition does not arise even if
