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1. PROBANS (HETU, LINGA, OR SADHANA) AND PROBANDUM (SADHYA) "Inference is an instrument of inferential cognition. The inferential cognition is a knowledge which is produced by a confirmatory cognition. The confirmatory cognition is a knowledge of the state of being a property of a subject which is qualified 1 by pervasion". This phrase communicates the structure of inference well to us. same etc. When we see smoke on the mountain, we can infer fire on the mountain. And we know that, where there is smoke there is fire, not only on the mountain but also in the kitchen and in many other places, on the basis of our experiences. It is true that, where there is smoke there is fire, but it is not true that where there is fire there is no smoke, because in a hot iron ball there is no smoke. The relation of extension is that fire includes smoke but smoke does not include all the fire. Therefore, smoke and fire are called probans and probandum respectively. The probans means hetu, linga, and sadhana. The hetu is a cause of inferential cognition. The linga is a mark of inferential cognition. The sadhana is an establisher of inferential cognition. And the probandum means sadhya which is established by sadhana. The hetu, linga, and sadhana are smoke and sadhya is fire in the above instance. 1. anumitikaranam anumanam. paramarsajanyam jnanam anumitih. nitih, vyaptivisistapaksadharmatajnanam paramarsah. (Annambhatta: 34)

13 2. CONFIRMATORY COGNITION (PARAMARSA) The instance of smoke and fire on the mountain, seeing a smoke on the mountain is an experience or a perception of a mark (lingadarsana). After one moment, we recollect where there is a smoke there is a fire. That is the remembrance of pervasion (vyaptismarana). After two moments from the first knowledge i. e. the perception of mark, we confirm that the pervaded is on the mountain. This knowledge is a confirmatory cognition (paramarsa). After three moments from the first, we get a knowledge that fire the mountain and that is called inferential cognition (anumiti). Navyanaiyayika is of the opinion that knowledge continues for three moments. Before perceiving the mark, we must experience the pervasion. That is, before we see the smoke on the mountain, we must experience fire with smoke in the kitchen or is on some other place, otherwise, the remembrance of pervasion will not take place. The confirmatory cognition is a knowledge which connects the pervaded and the locus of inference. Therefore, the confirmatory cognition is called an intermediate operation (vyapara). But the Mimamsa school does not believe in confirmatory cognition because of the logical economy. 1 2 1. vyaparas tu paramarsah... (Nyayasiddhanta-muktavali: 218). Cf. (Wada 1990: 29). 2. nanu cen na (Bhasapariccheda: 223). tatra visistajnanakalpane gauravac ceti

14 3. PERVASION (VYAPTI) The knowledge of pervasion is the producer (anukula) of inferential cognition (karya). 1 The pervasion is an relation between probans and probandum. invariable If there is a smoke, there is inevitably a fire on the same locus. This relationship between smoke and fire is pervasion. The fire is a pervader (vyapaka), because the fire pervades smoke. And the smoke is a pervaded (vyapya) because the smoke is pervaded by fire. In other words, pervasion is a relationship through which probans and probandum are collocated (samanadhikaranya)? Gangesa mentioned twenty two definitions of pervasion. He criticized twenty one of them. One of the criticized definition by Gangesa was quoted in the Nyayasiddhantamuktavali. 4 3 1. Gangesa says in the beginning of Tattvacintamani that tatra vyaptivisistapaksadharmatajnanajanyam jnanam anumitih, (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 5). And cf. text-1 of Tattvacintamani-didhiti(part two, chapter B). 2. With regard of the detail study of Gahgesa's conclusive definition of pervasion, vide (Wada 1990: 126 ff.). 3. Cf. (Wada 1990: 114 f.). .V sadhyavatanyavrttitvam. (Gadadhari: 113). vyaptih sadhyavadanyasminn asambandha udahrtah. (Nyayasiddhanta-muktavali: 226).

15 4. SUBJECTNESS (PAKSATA) The state of being a property of the subject (paksadharmata) is another cause of inferential cognition. And paksadharmata means 1 paksata in Navyanyaya. Subject is a locus of inferential cognition i. e. the mountain in the above instance. The probans and the probandum exist in the subject. Subjectness is an absence of the combinations of established cognition of probandum (siddhi) and an absence of desire to the probandum (sisadhayisaviraha). After the perception of mark even if there is a cognition of probandum, if there is a desire to infer we can infer that probandum. But the Mimamsa school opposes this theory, for it is impossible to estabish an already established thing again. Buddhist logicians also had the same view as the Mimamsa school. But Gangesa thought that, if there is a desire to establish, it is possible to estabish the established thing. Therefore, paksata is said to be the psychological ground of inference, for human desire is argued in the definition of subjectness. The concept of paksa 'means a locus of inference, but paksata means absence which exists in the locus in the Navyanyaya concept. And according to Gangesa, this absence is a qualified absence (visistabhava). 2 1. Vide text-1 of part two, chapter A (Tattvacintamani). 2. Vide ibid. text-6.

16 5. NAIYAYIKA SYLLOGISM (PANCAVAYAVA) The inference for other's sake (pararthanumana) or syllogism of Nyaya school has five members i. e: Proposition (pratijna): The mountain has fire Reason (hetu): Example (udaharana): because of smoke for example, in the kitchen. Application (upanaya): The mountain has such a smoke. Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore, the mountain has fire. The above ideas were unchanged through the years, and endorsed by Gautama, Gangesa, Gadadhara, and many others. Logic needs to be simplified. Therefore, Buddhist logic consisted of a syllogism of three members i. e: Proposition (pratijna): The mountain has fire Reason (he tu): Example (drstanta): because of smoke. Where there is smoke there is fire, for example in the kitchen. And at last it became the two membered syllogism i. e: State of being a property of subject (paksadharmata): The mountain which has smoke has fire. Remembrance of pervasion (vyaptismarana): Where there is smoke there is fire. But Nyaya school has had the five membered syllogism because Nyaya school's inference is not only purely logical but also the validity of the Veda and gives a proof or an

1 argumentation which has a psychological aspect. Here lies the speciality of Indian logic. 1. (Kajiyama 1983: 178 ff.). 17