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Injunctions are also classified into three categories according to their obligatory force. The previous classification was presented according to the nature of injunctions. This later classification focuses on the functions of injunctions.

This classification includes three kinds of injunctions. These are:

1. Ap奴rvavidhi [补辫奴谤惫补-vidhi] (new or original injunction),
2. Niyamavidhi [niyama-vidhi] (injunction of restriction) and
3. Parisa峁僰hy膩vidhi [辫补谤颈蝉补峁僰丑测腻-vidhi] (injunction of exclusion).

Out of these injunctions, the 补辫奴谤惫补vidhi enjoins something which is not obtained by any other testimony. It lays down a thing, which is absolutely or totally non-established i.e. a thing which is not established by any other means of proof.

碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补 叠丑补峁�峁�补 wrote in his 鈥�罢补苍迟谤补惫腻谤迟颈办补鈥� on the 惭墨尘腻峁僺腻蝉奴迟谤补 鈥�辫补谤颈蝉补峁僰丑测腻鈥�^[1]鈥�

鈥�vidhir atyantam apr膩ptau 苍颈测补尘补岣� 辫腻办峁�i办别 sati |
tatra c膩nyatra ca pr膩ptau parisa峁僰hyeti g墨yate 触鈥浆骋尝冲狈翱罢贰::皑

It means,

鈥渁 (new) injunction (takes effect) in (the case of something) absolutely non-established. An injunction of restriction is found when a matter is not established as an alternative. When the establishment is there and elsewhere simultaneously, it is sung as (i.e. declared to be) an injunction of exclusion.鈥�

Here the first quarter of the above 艣濒辞办补 (verse) tells about the 补辫奴谤惫补vidhi, the second quarter expresses the nature of the niyamavidhi and the second part of the verse introduces the 辫补谤颈蝉补峁僰丑测腻vidhi.

尝补耻驳腻办峁�i 叠丑腻蝉办补谤补 gives the meaning of the first quarter of the verse鈥�

鈥�pram膩峁嚹乶-tare峁嚹乸r膩ptasya pr膩pako vidhir 补辫奴谤惫补惫颈诲丑颈岣�.鈥�

It means,

鈥淭he injunction, which establishes (a matter which is) not established by any other means of proof is a new or original injunction.鈥�

This injunction causes to get the unobtained matter. So, it is called 补辫奴谤惫补vidhi. Here 鈥�补辫奴谤惫补鈥� means a matter which was not obtained or was not in our hand before.

笔补峁�峁�腻产丑颈谤腻尘补 艢膩strin explains this injunction in 鈥�础谤迟丑腻濒辞办补鈥�,

鈥�pram膩峁嚹乶tare峁嚹乼yantam apr膩ptam 补谤迟丑补峁� ya岣� pr膩payati so鈥檖r膩ptapr膩pakatv膩t 补辫奴谤惫补vidhir 颈迟测补谤迟丑补岣�.鈥�

For example,

鈥�yajeta svarga办腻尘补岣�鈥�

(A person desiring heaven should sacrifice.)

This vedic sentence lays down a sacrifice for the purpose of attaining heaven. Here the sacrifice for attaining heaven is such a matter which is not known from any other source of knowledge other than this vedic sentence. If there was the absence of this sentence in the Veda, then it would have been impossible for us to know sacrifice as the producer of heaven from any other knowledge. A person can not know this causality between sacrifice and heaven through perception. No one has seen heaven. So, one can not make any inference also. Because for having an inference one needs the knowledge of co-relation and this knowledge of co-relation between hetu and 蝉腻诲丑测补 also depends on the repeated perception (产丑奴测辞诲补谤艣补苍补) of the inferrer (补苍耻尘腻迟峁�). It is also impossible because of the same reason i.e. none has seen heaven. Analogy is also impossible because it depends on perception. Therefore, only vedic sentence (verbal knowledge) is the only means to know the causality between a sacrifice and its result heaven. Only the Veda decrees that there is a casual relationship between a sacrifice and heaven. The above vedic sentence is that declaration.

This view is explained in lucid Sanskrit language in the commentary 鈥�础谤迟丑腻濒辞办补鈥� by 笔补峁�峁�腻产丑颈谤腻尘补 艢膩strin,

鈥�etadv膩ky膩prav峁泃tida艣膩y膩峁� svargaphalajanakatva峁� y膩gasya pram膩峁嚹乶tare峁嘺 na viditam, anenaiva tadvidh膩n膩t samanvaya 颈迟测补谤迟丑补岣�鈥�

(In case of non-application of this sentence [鈥�yajeta svarga办腻尘补岣�鈥橾 the state of being the producer of heaven of sacrifice can not be known by any other proof of knowledge. Only by this sentence it has been laid down. So, there is connection [causal relationship between sacrifice and heaven]. This is the purport here).

If 鈥楢鈥� is done then we will get 鈥楤鈥� as a result of doing 鈥楢鈥�. If this kind of knowledge can not be known from perception, inference, analogy, implication (补谤迟丑腻辫补迟迟颈), non-recognition or non-perception (anupalabdhi) etc. and where the 蝉尘峁泃颈-texts and conduct of authentic persons (艣颈峁ａ弓腻肠腻谤补) also can not be treated as proof, then only the Veda enjoins that matter. The vedic sentence expressing that unique subject is called the 补辫奴谤惫补vidhi. It is a vidhi or 补辫奴谤惫补vidhi which enjoins a matter for the first time.

So, 碍耻尘腻谤颈濒补 叠丑补峁�峁�补 says in 罢补苍迟谤补惫腻谤迟颈办补鈥�

鈥溾赌�vidhir atyantam apr膩pte...parisa峁僰hyeti g墨yate |
ityasya padyasy膩rtho鈥檡a峁� yasya m膩n膩ntare峁嘺 na |
pr膩pta yadarthat膩 tasya tadarthatvena yo 惫颈诲丑颈岣� ||
so鈥檖奴rvavidhisa峁僯帽o鈥檚au 鈥榮varge鈥檛y膩dividhir 尘补迟补岣� |
svag膩rthatva峁� hi y膩gasya n膩nyam膩napram膩pitam 触触鈥�

The gist of these verses is that the injunctions like 鈥�yajeta svarga办腻尘补岣�鈥� etc. are 补辫奴谤惫补vidhis ; because their subject can not be testified by any other proof than the Veda as it can not be proved that a sacrifice can produce heaven by any other proof than the Veda.

If a stick is utilized, a pot is made. If the stick is not utilized, then the pot is not made. So, if there is a stick, there is a pot鈥攖his is the form of the method of constant and invariable concomitance (anvayapaddhati). If there is not a stick, there is not a pot鈥攖his is the form of the method of logical discontinuance (vyatirekapaddhati). With the help of these two methods we come to know from worldly uses that a stick is the cause of a pot and a pot is the result of a stick.

But a sacrifice is the cause of heaven鈥攖his kind of knowledge can not be had from worldly uses (濒辞办补惫测补惫补丑腻谤补). Only the injunction 鈥�yajeta svarga办腻尘补岣�鈥� declares that. So, it is an 补辫奴谤惫补vidhi. This is the real nature of Veda.

This nature matches with its definition given by the ancient sage 驰腻箩帽补惫补濒办测补. According to him,

鈥�pratyak峁�e峁嚹乶umity膩 v膩 yast奴p膩yo na vidyate |
ena峁� vidanti vedena tasm膩d vedasya vedat膩 触触鈥�

(The supernatural knowledge which can not be obtained through perception, inference etc., is obtained only from the Veda. So, the Veda is called 鈥�Veda鈥�).

The Veda is a reservoir of consolidated and supernatural knowledge with the help of which the human being can meet his four principal objects (caturvarga) i.e.:

1. dharma (religious and spiritual achievement),
2. artha (money or wealth),
3. 办腻尘补 (lustre) and
4. 尘辞办峁�a (salvation or liberation from bondage).

In the introduction of his commentary on 鈥�罢补颈迟迟颈谤墨测补蝉补峁僪颈迟腻鈥� of 碍峁涐梗峁嘺测补箩耻谤惫别诲补, S膩ya峁嚹乧膩rya also wrote,

鈥�i峁ａ弓apr膩ptya-ni峁ａ弓aparih膩rayo峁� alaukikam 耻辫腻测补峁� yo grantho vedayati sa 惫别诲补岣�鈥�

(The Veda is defined as the book which informs the supernatural means for getting the desired goal and means for eradicating the undesired goal).

These definitions establish the superiority and authenticity of vedic knowledge over other proofs regarding the supernatural matters.

The 补辫奴谤惫补vidhi is the same as vidhi or 辫谤补诲丑腻苍补惫颈诲丑颈 or utpattividhi. It tends to secure what is otherwise at all not available. It is a perfect (imperative) command according to modern law. It supplies an urgent necessity and 鈥榶ou shall do it鈥� is its appropriate form.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

惭墨尘腻峁僺腻诲补谤艣补苍补鈥�1.2.34.

[2]:

罢补苍迟谤补惫腻谤迟颈办补鈥�1.2.4