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碍腻谤颈办腻蝉 61-62 of the 补濒腻迟补艣腻苍迟颈 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺 correlate perfectly with 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 29 -30 of the advaita 辫谤补办补谤补峁嘺, except for small substitutions. 碍腻谤颈办腻 61 is the same as 3: 29, with the difference that 鈥�肠颈迟迟补峁僣alati, m膩yay膩鈥�, is substituted for 鈥�spandante m膩yay膩尘补苍补岣�鈥�. It twice substitutes calati for the corresponding 鈥�spandate鈥�; 碍腻谤颈办腻 62 is also the same as 3:30, only substituting 鈥�肠颈迟迟补峁�鈥� for 鈥�尘补苍补岣�鈥�.

碍腻谤颈办腻蝉 61-62 are extremely significant from the philosophical point of view because they unambiguously establish the oneness of wakeful and dream states.

These 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 read:

鈥楢s in dream, the mind through illusion (尘腻测腻) presents the appearance of duality (i.e. perceiver and perceived), so also in the waking state, the mind through illusion presents the appearance of duality (i.e. perceiver and perceived)鈥�.

There is no doubt that in dream, the mind (though non-dual) has the appearance of duality. Similarly there is no doubt that in the waking state, the non-dual mind has the appearance of duality.

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 the meaning of these two 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 is the same as that of the two (3:29-30) 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 of the chapter on non-duality. He says that the pure Consciousness, which is non-dual from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality, is described by words due to the activity of the mind (citta spandana) through ignorance. But from the absolute standpoint, 腻迟尘补苍 is beyond such description.

The duality in the form of subject-object relationship (驳谤腻丑测补-驳谤腻丑补办补-产丑腻惫补) is due to ignorance. It is not the 腻迟尘补苍, which is described by words but the vibration of the mind (citta spandana) which is the experience of the phenomenal world is due to ignorance. This subject-object division and thereby the relation are common to both the wakeful and dream states. The 办腻谤颈办腻 62 asserts the truth that the mind (citta) is fundamentally not characterized by the dual structure of subject (perceiver) and object (perceived) division (advayam), and that the non-dual nature of mind persists in the wakeful and dream states regardless of the appearance of duality (i.e. subject and object).

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 63 says,

鈥楾he dreamer while moving in about (in his dream) in all the ten directions sees various 箩墨惫补蝉, born of eggs, moisture etc. (But these creatures/ 箩墨惫补蝉 have no existence apart from the mind of the dreamer)鈥�.

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补, for this further reason, duality describable by words, does not really exist. The dreamer moves about in all the ten directions in dreams, and perceives therein the variety of 箩墨惫补蝉, whatever born of eggs, born of moisture etc. Thus, while moving in the dream, everything that the dreamer perceives has no separate existence apart from the mind of the dreamer.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 64 says,

鈥楾hese (beings) which are objects of the mind of the dreamer have no existence apart from his mind. Similarly, this mind of the dreamer is admitted to be the object of perception of the dreamer only. (Therefore the mind of the dreamer is not separate from the dreamer himself)鈥�.

As 艢补峁卥补谤补 explains these beings have no existence apart from the mind of the dreamer. The mind itself is imagined as taking diverse forms of a variety of beings/ 箩墨惫补蝉. And that mind of the dreamer also is the object of perception of that dreamer alone. Therefore, apart from the dreamer there is no such distinct thing called the mind. In the dream, the dream objects are nothing but the mind of the dreamer. And the mind seeing the dream objects, has also no separate existence from the dreamer. Thus, the dreamer, his mind and the objects perceived in dream are all one and the same.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 65-66 maintain that the condition in the wakeful state is exactly the same as in the dream state. The dreamer moves about in dream in various directions and perceives beings of many varieties which are really non-different from the dreamer鈥檚 mind. So also, in the wakeful state, the different things that are experienced are non-different from the waking mind. The variety that is seen in these two states is illusory, as it is conditioned by illusion.

The non-dual 腻迟尘补苍 is the only reality. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 says:

鈥楾he wakeful perceiver goes about in the waking state in all the ten directions and always perceives the variety of beings, like those born of eggs, born of moisture etc. These beings etc. are the objects of perception of the waking mind. These beings have no existence apart from that waking mind. Similarly, the mind exists only for the perceiver in the wakeful state. Therefore the perceiver, the object seen by that perceiver and the instrument (his waking mind) are all one and the same鈥�.

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补, the 箩墨惫补蝉, perceived in the wakeful state do not exist apart from the mind of the perceiver, as these beings/箩墨惫补蝉 appear to the mind in the same way that they appear to the mind of the dreamer. The mind that engaged in the perception of 箩墨惫补蝉, does not exist independent of the perceiver. This is also similar to the case in the dream, where the seer and the seen are one.

The main purport of these two 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 is to prove that the experiences of the waker are in no way different from the experiences of the dreamer. Only duality is describable by words. The phrase 鈥�箩墨惫补蝉 seen in the dream鈥� in these 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 mean objects having subject-object relation. It has already been stated in 办腻谤颈办腻 28 that the mind (citta) is not originated really into external objects. Objects seen have no separate existence from the mind and the mind has no separate existence from the Self/ 腻迟尘补苍. When the 腻迟尘补苍 is characterised by the perception of the subject-object ideas through ignorance it is called the mind. And when it remains free from any such idea, it is called 腻迟尘补苍. When there is vibration of the mind (citta spandana), there is duality which does not really exist. When there is no vibration of the mind, it is all 腻迟尘补苍. From the absolute standpoint both the wakeful and dream state are unreal.

Continuing with the interdependence of the mind and the objects perceived by the mind, 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 67 proceeds to show that it is not possible to establish their independent existence. This is because there is no epistemological means to establish the independent existence of the mind and the objects of perception because they are dependent on one another.

He explicates this 办腻谤颈办腻 thus:

鈥楾hey both (the mind and the 箩墨惫补) are the objects of perception to each other. Which of the two exists independently of the other? The wise reply of this question and say 鈥渘one of them鈥�. Both of them are devoid of characteristics which are the means to correct knowledge. The reason is that the one is cognised only through the other. They are seen as thought of by the citta itself (肠颈迟迟补迟补测腻别惫补)鈥�.

艢补峁卥补谤补 explains that the mind (citta) and the objects perceived by the mind (caitya) are mutually dependent on and in relation to each other. Neither has an independent existence. Each one of them is perceived through the other. It is therefore said that neither of them exists really. The decision of the wise is that in dream neither the external objects like an elephant etc. nor the mind that perceives them really exists. The same is the case with the waking state.

He says that the word 濒补办峁�a峁嚹� in this 办腻谤颈办腻 means 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺, 鈥渕eans of valid knowledge鈥�. Both the mind and object are devoid of characteristics which are the means to the correct knowledge. The meaning is that they have no proof of their real independent existence.

Both the mind and the 箩墨惫补蝉 are objects of perception for each other. For no object is perceived without the thought of the object, nor is the thought of an object possible without the existence of the object. For instance one cannot have the cognition of the jar without the thought of the jar nor can he have the thought of the jar without the cognition of the jar. So in this respect they are interdependent on one another. Owing to this interdependence neither of them is established as a real thing. It means that it is not possible to distinguish between them as to which is the means of knowledge (辫谤补尘腻峁嘺) and which is the object of knowledge (prameya).

Both the mind and the objects are interdependent. They are correlatives. No object can be perceived without the cognition of the object; and there cannot be the cognition of an object without the existence of the object. Both are 诲峁浥泍补颈. e. what are cognized. There is no 辫谤补尘腻峁嘺 which can validate their cognition. There is no proof that they exist. They are perceived only when they are both together. If there are no objects, there is no mind. So also, if there is no mind, there are no objects: They exist only when they are together. They have no independent existence. The men of discrimination therefore say that they are not real. They say, nothing really exists if it does not exist independently. 鈥楾he knower鈥� and 鈥榯he known鈥� do not exist separately. According to Advaita Ved膩nta 鈥榯he knower鈥�, 鈥榯he known鈥� and 鈥榯he knowledge鈥� are not separate entities. They are one and the same. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 holds the view that the mind which perceives the object is not the highest reality. The Vij帽膩nav膩dins seem to regard the mind as capable of producing (dharmas), giving them with some sort of reality.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 68-70 compares the passing into and passing out of living beings to the birth and death of a dream being (蝉惫补辫苍补尘补测辞箩墨惫辞), a being conjured by the illusion of magic (尘腻测腻mayo j墨vo), and a being created by supernatural power (nirmitako j墨vo).

The objector asks if both the mind and its object have no independent existence, then what exists? The reply is nothing dependent exists. The objector again may question, how can the object seen by the mind (citta-诲峁浥泍补) be unreal and seen (诲峁浥泍补) at the same time? The reply is given by three illustrations of 箩墨惫补蝉. According to 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 the object in the dream, the object created by the magician, the object created by a yogin possessed of supernatural powers鈥揳ll these are manifestly unreal as the common man understands the expression. But do these not undergo the process of origination and annihilation before us? Therefore, there is nothing surprising if the unreal citta诲峁浥泍补 comes into being and dies.

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in the following 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 (68-70) declares thus:

鈥楯ust as a 箩墨惫补 seen in a dream is born and also dies, so also all 箩墨惫补蝉 (perceived in the wakeful state) appear (born) and then disappear (cease to be)鈥�.

鈥楯ust as a 箩墨惫补 created by a magician (or imagined to exist through 尘腻测腻/illusion) is born and dies, so also 箩墨惫补蝉 (perceived in the wakeful state) become born (appear) and cease to be/disappear鈥�.

鈥楯ust as a 箩墨惫补 created through medicines and charms is born and also dies, so also all the 箩墨惫补蝉 (perceived in the wakeful state) become born and cease to be i.e. appear and then disappear鈥�.

Here 艢补峁卥补谤补 explains that 尘腻测腻maya 箩墨惫补 is a 箩墨惫补 created by a magician through the feat of magic. Nirmitaka 箩墨惫补 is a 箩墨惫补 created with the aid of incantations, medicines herbs etc. This is an artificial creation. All creatures like those born of eggs etc. and such as those seen in a dream or created by a magician or created by the power of mantras, herbs etc. are born and die. Similarly the 箩墨惫补蝉 such as human beings etc. (experienced in the wakeful state) have no real existence and are mere imagination of the mind. The creatures seen in dream originating from eggs etc., the creatures created through magical feat and artificial creatures generated by incantation etc. have a birth and death. They are actually unsubstantial having no real existence. 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 daringly compares the creatures seen in the wakeful state to the above mentioned beings seen in dream etc., saying that they lack any independent existence. They too appear and disappear like dream objects etc. They are all mere fanciful thought of the mind.

It is a well-known fact that even though there is no real existence of mind and its object in dream, we find births and deaths there. The three 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 show that from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality, births and deaths etc. have no real existence. It is mere outward manifestations of the mind, perceiving imaginary projected appearances. The mind (citta) also is not anything apart from the 腻迟尘补苍 (Cit).

骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补 in 办腻谤颈办腻 71 concludes the above 办腻谤颈办腻蝉 by asserting that no 箩墨惫补 of any kind takes birth. This 办腻谤颈办腻 is similar to the 办腻谤颈办腻 48 of the chapter on non-duality.

The 办腻谤颈办腻 reads as follows:

鈥楴辞 箩墨惫补 (living being) is ever born, no origination (of any 箩墨惫补) ever takes place. There is no source for any such creation. This is the highest truth where nothing whatsoever is born鈥�.

艢补峁卥补谤补 says that in the realm of empirical reality, births and deaths of 箩墨惫补蝉 are like the births and deaths of 箩墨惫补蝉 in dream etc. But the highest truth is that no 箩墨惫补 is ever

born. The doctrine of 补箩腻迟颈惫腻诲补 is the most significant teaching propounded by 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补. This 办腻谤颈办腻 clearly states that in actuality nothing comes into being or nothing perishes. A person may see many objects in dream taking birth and also undergoing destruction. But on waking a person realises that the objects he perceived in the dream were just his own thought, appearing as external and tangible objects. Nothing was created or there is no distinct cause鈥揺ffect relation operating here. Hence the declaration that ultimately nothing comes into being is made.

According to 骋补耻岣峚辫腻诲补, the world of duality consisting of minds and objects is but a projection of mind. The mind is never in contact with any object.

In itself the mind is without object, as it is of the nature of 腻迟尘补苍. In 办腻谤颈办腻 72 he say:

鈥楾he duality consisting of the perceived and the perceiver, is due to the activity (vibration) of the mind. The mind, again, (from the ultimate point of view) is unrelated to any object and is therefore declared to be eternal and unattached鈥�.

According to 艢补峁卥补谤补 from the standpoint of Reality, the mind is 腻迟尘补苍, devoid of relations with objects (苍颈谤惫颈峁�a测补尘) and is consequently described as eternal (nityam) and unattached, unrelated (补蝉补峁単补). The scripture says 鈥樷�檛his person is not attached to anything鈥� (B峁沨ad膩ra峁噛aka 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲 IV.3.15-16.)^[1] When there are objects external to oneself, there may be attachment to them. In other words when there are no external objects, the mind will be unattached i.e. free from all relations.

Bhattacharya mentions in this context the 补蝉补峁�galak峁�a峁嘺 惫颈箩帽腻苍补尘 of the 尝补峁�办腻惫补迟腻谤补蝉奴迟谤补: 鈥�Vi峁�ayavaicitry补蝉补峁�ga -濒补办峁�a峁嘺峁� 惫颈箩帽腻苍补尘鈥�.^[2]

Concerning the technical use of the term dvayam we read in the 尝补峁�办腻惫补迟腻谤补蝉奴迟谤补 III.121:

cittam膩tram ida峁� 蝉补谤惫补峁� dvidh膩肠颈迟迟补峁� pravartate 驳谤腻丑测补驳谤腻丑补办补bh膩vena膩tm膩tmiya峁� na vidyate.^[3]

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲, 260.

[2]:

Bhattacharya, 膧gama 艣膩stra, 172.

[3]:

Ibid.