Anumana in Indian Philosophy
by Sangita Chakravarty | 2016 | 48,195 words
This page relates ‘Fallacies in Anumana (in Samkhya-Yoga Philosophy)� of the study on the concept of Anumana (inference) in the Vedic schools of Indian Philosophy. Anumana usually represents the most authentic means of valid knowledge. This paper discusses the traditional philosophical systems such as Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta.
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(C). Fallacies in Anumāna (in ṃkⲹ-Yoga Philosophy)
No extant text of the ṃkⲹ-Yoga discusses the fallacies in ԳܳԲ. The ṻṛtپ makes reference to them without making any explicit explanation on them. It states that there are thirty three fallacies of ԳܳԲ. Out of them nine like contradiction by perception, etc, refer to the fallacies of 貹ṣa; fourteen like unproved (asiddha), non-conclusive (ԱԳپ첹) and contradictory (viruddha) etc. are the fallacies of probans, and ten are the fallacies of example.[1] The subject of fallacies in ԳܳԲ might have been referred to in the earlier texts of the ṃkⲹ-Yoga system but their unavailability has rendered the matter hazy. Again, the extant texts of the ṃkⲹ-Yoga system are silent over the important issue of fallacies in ԳܳԲ. The statement of ṻṛtپ that ԳܳԲ has thirty three fallacies, is without explanation and therefore bears little significance.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
Ibid.,p. 168