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搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 says that all illusion may briefly be described as perception in which a thing appears to be different from what it is (anyasya anyath膩va产丑腻蝉补岣�). It is unreasonable to imagine that the illusory content of perception must be due to no cause, or is something wholly unperceived or wholly unknown (补迟测补苍迟腻-辫补谤颈诲峁涐梗峁���-办腻谤补峁嘺办补-vastu-办补濒辫补苍腻-测辞驳腻迟). If such a wholly chimerical thing is imagined to be the content of illusory perception, then it must be inexpressible or indescribable (补苍颈谤惫补肠补苍墨测补); but no illusory object appears as indescribable; it appears as real. If it appeared as an inexpressible entity, there would be neither illusion nor its correction. So it has to be admitted that in all illusions (e.g. in conch-shell-silver illusion) one thing (e.g. the conch-shell) appears in another form (e.g. silver). In all theories of illusion, whatever may be the extent of their error, they have ultimately to admit that in all illusions one thing appears in the form of another.

Speaking against the 艢a峁卥arites, it may be asked, he urges, how is their inexpressible (1 补苍颈谤惫补肠补苍墨测补) silver produced ? The illusory perception cannot be the cause; for the perception follows only the production of the indescribable silver and cannot precede it to be its cause. It cannot be due to the defects in our sense-organs; for such defects are subjective and therefore cannot affect the nature of objective reality or object. Moreover, if it is inexpressible and indescribable, why should it appear under certain circumstances in the specific form of a particular kind of appearance, silver ? If it is urged that this is due to the fact of there being a similarity between silver and conch-shell, it may again be asked whether this similarity is real or unreal. It cannot be real, since the content is illusory; it cannot be unreal since it has reference to real objects (e.g. the real silver in a shop). So such a theory of illusion is open to many criticisms.

搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 seems to have himself favoured the 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 theory of illusion, and says that there will be no explanations of contradiction of knowledge involved in illusory knowledge, or of consequent failure of behaviour as suggested by such knowledge, unless error is ultimately explained as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another. He also says that all the other theories of illusion (except possibly the yath膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈 view, as suggested in the 艢谤耻迟补-辫谤补办腻艣颈办腻 肠辞尘尘别苍迟补谤测鈥� yath膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈-vyatirikta-pak峁�e峁�u 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈-辫补办峁�a岣� 辫谤补产补濒补岣�) would ultimately have to accept the analysis of error as the wrongful appearance of one thing as another (khy膩ty-antar膩峁嚹佱箖 tu sud奴ram api gatv膩 anyath膩va-产丑腻蝉补岣� 腻艣谤补测补峁嚹珁补岣� 鈥� 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补bh膩峁�ya). 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 further points out that even the 膩办丑测腻迟颈 theory of illusion (i.e. illusion considered as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the presentation of the 鈥渢his鈥� of the conch-shell and the memory of silver) is a form of 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈; for ultimately here also one has to accept the false identification of two characters or two ideas.

痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补, commenting on this point in his 狈测腻测补-辫补谤颈艣耻诲诲丑颈, says that the appearance of one thing as another is the indispensable condition of all errors, but the non-apprehension of difference must always be granted as an indispensable condition which must exist in all cases of false identification and has therefore the advantage of a superior simplicity (濒腻驳丑补惫补); yet the 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 theory gives the proper and true representation of the nature of illusion, and no theory of illusion can do away with the need of admitting it as a correct representation of the phenomenon of illusion. So 痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补 says that 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补, while he agrees with the 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 view as a theory of illusion, yet appreciates the superior simplicity of the 膩办丑测腻迟颈 view as giving us the indispensable condition of all forms of illusion.

But, though 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 himself prefers the 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 view of illusion, he could not very well pass over the yath膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈 view, as advocated by the senior adherents and founders of the school of thought which he interpreted, viz. Bodh膩yana, 狈腻迟丑补尘耻苍颈 and Varada 痴颈峁ａ箛耻 惭颈艣谤补. 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 is thus faced with two different theories, one that he himself advocated and the other that was advocated by his seniors. Fortunately for him, while his own theory of 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 was psychological in character, the other theory of yath膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈 was of an ontological character, so that it was possible for one to hold the one view psychologically and the other view ontologically. 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补, therefore, offers the yath膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈 view as an alternative. 痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补 says that this yath膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈 view can only be put forward as a theory based on scriptural evidence, but cannot be supported as a philosophical theory which can be experienced and therefore as a scientific theory of illusion. We have to make up our minds between the two plausible alternative theories of 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 and a办丑测腻迟颈.

搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补, to distinguish the y膩th膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈 theory of his seniors, whom he refers to by the term 鈥淰edic school鈥� (veda-vid膩峁� matam), develops this view in a number of verses and says that he understands on the strength of the scriptural texts that the material world was created by the intermingling of the three elements, fire, water and earth, so that in each object there are all the three elements. When a particular element predominates in any material object, it is found tc possess more qualities of that element and is designated by its character, though it still holds the qualities of other elements in it. Thus it may in some sense be said that all things are in all things. A conch-shell possesses also the qualities of tejas, or silver, and it is on that account that it may be said to resemble silver in some sense. What happens in the case of illusion is that through defects of organs, etc., the qualities or characters in a conch-shell representing other elements are not noticed and hence the perception can only grasp the qualities or characters of silver existing in the conch-shell, and the conch-shell is perceived as silver. So the knowledge of silver in a conch-shell is neither false, nor unreal, but is real, and refers to a real object, the silver element existing in the conch-shell^[1].

In this view of illusion all knowledge is regarded as referring to a real object (yath膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈)^[2]. The difference between this view and that of 笔谤补产丑腻办补谤补 is this, that, while 笔谤补产丑腻办补谤补 was content with the negative condition of nonapprehension of the difference between the present perception of a glittering conch-shell and the memory of silver in the shop as the cause of the illusion, and urges that knowledge is real either as perception or as the memory, and that illusion has been the result of non-apprehension of the distinction of the two, 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 is more radical, since he points out that the perception of silver in a conch-shell is due to the real perception of the element of silver in a conch-shell and the non-apprehension owing to defects (诲辞峁�a) of the other elements present in it which would have shown its difference from silver. So what is called the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell has a real objective basis to which it refers.

Dreams are explained by 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 as being creations of God, intended to produce corresponding perceptions in the minds of the dreamers. The case of the appearance of a conch-shell as yellow to a person with jaundiced eyes is explained by him as due to the fact that yellow colour emanates from the bile of his eyes, and is carried to the conch-shell through the rays of the eyes which turn the white shell yellow. The appearance of the conch-shell as yellow is therefore a real transformation of the conch-shell, noticed by the eye of a jaundiced person, though this transformation can be noticed only by him and not by other persons, the yellow being very near his eyes^[3].

The 膩办丑测腻迟颈 and the yath膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈 views agree in holding that the imposed idea has a real basis as its object. But, while the former holds that this real basis is a past presentation, the latter holds that it is given as a presentation along with the object, i.e. the silver element, being mixed up with the conch-shell element, is also presented to the senses, but owing to some defects of circumstances, organs of sight, etc., the conch-shell, which ought to be the main part, is not perceived. Thus, it is only the silver part that forms the presentation, and hence the error. So non-perception of the conch-shell part is common to both the views; but, while the 膩办丑测腻迟颈 view holds that the silver part is only a reproduced image of past experience, the yath膩rtha-办丑测腻迟颈 view grounds itself on the 迟谤颈惫峁泃-办补谤补峁嘺 texts of the 鲍辫补苍颈峁�a诲蝉 and holds that the silver part is perceived at the time.

But 厂耻诲补谤艣补苍补 厂奴谤颈 refers to the views of other teachers (kecid 膩c膩ry膩岣�) and says that the 迟谤颈惫峁泃-办补谤补峁嘺 view may well explain the misapprehension of one element (产丑奴迟补) for another; but in the cases of misapprehension due to similarity 迟谤颈惫峁泃-办补谤补峁嘺 is not of much use, for 迟谤颈惫峁泃-办补谤补峁嘺 and pa帽c墨-办补谤补峁嘺 can explain the intermixture of 产丑奴迟补s, but not of the bhautikas, or the later modifications of the five elements into the varied substances such as conch-shell and silver, which are mutually misapprehended for each other on account of their similarity. It has, therefore, to be maintained that in these Mwta-modifications also the 迟谤颈惫峁泃-办补谤补峁嘺 principle applies to a certain extent; for here also the molecules or atoms of things or substances are made up of large parts of some Mwta-rnodification and smaller parts of one or more of other Mwta-modifications. The conch-shell molecules are thus made up of large parts of conch-shell material and smaller parts of the silver material, and this explains the similarity of the one element to the other. The similarity is due to the real presence of one element in the other, and is called the 辫谤补迟颈苍颈诲丑颈-苍测腻测补, or the maxim of determining similarity by real representation.

So in all cases of misapprehension of one thing as another through similarity there is no misapprehension in the strict sense, but a right apprehension of a counterpart in the other object constituting the basis of the similarity, and the non-apprehension of the bigger and the larger part which held the counterpart coeval with it. It is because the conch-shell contains a major part of conch-shell element (艣耻办迟测-补谤谤迟艣诲) and only a minor part of silver that it passes as conch-shell and not as silver. Conch-shell cannot serve the purpose of silver, despite the silver element in it, on account of the obstruction of the major part of the conch-shell element; and it is also on account of this that under normal circumstances the silver element in it is hidden by the conch-shell element, and we say that we perceive conch-shell and not silver. When it is said that this is conch-shell and not silver (苍别诲补峁� 谤补箩补迟补峁�), the 鈥渘ot silver鈥� has no other meaning than that of the conch-shell, the apprehension of which dispelled the idea of silver. It is the conch-shell that is designated in its negative aspect as 鈥渘ot silver鈥� and in its positive aspect as conch-shell.    .

搁腻尘腻苍耻箩腻肠腻谤测补, alias V膩dihams膩mbuv膩h膩c膩rya, the maternal uncle of 痴别峁卥补峁璦苍腻迟丑补, seems to support the 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 method of sat-办丑测腻迟颈 by showing that all the other three rival theories of illusion, such as that of 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈, a办丑测腻迟颈, and the anirva-camya-办丑测腻迟颈, cross each other and are therefore incompatible. But he takes great pains to show that the sat-办丑测腻迟颈 theory may be supported on the basis of the logical implications involved in both the 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 and the 膩办丑测腻迟颈 types of realism. He starts the discussion by taking for granted the 膩办丑测腻迟颈 type of realism and its logical implications. He holds that it also would ultimately lead to 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈, and that therefore (excepting the sat-办丑测腻迟颈), of all the 办丑测腻迟颈s, 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 is perhaps the best. He says in his 狈测腻测补-办耻濒颈艣补 that, since the way of knowledge requires that the sense-organs should reach their objects, even in illusory perception there must be some objects which they reach; for they could not convey any knowledge about an object with which they were not in contact^[4]. The defect (诲辞峁�a) cannot account for the production of new knowledge, for it only serves to obstruct anything from being perceived or known.

Defects only obstruct the course of the natural sequence of cause and effect^[5], just as fire would destroy the natural shooting powers of seeds^[4]. Moreover, taking the old example of the conch-shell-silver, it may be asked how, if there was no silver at all objectively present, there could be any knowledge of such an absolutely non-existing thing? Since our awareness cannot refer to non-existing entities, all forms of awareness must guarantee the existence of corresponding objects. What happens in the case of the illusion of conch-shell-silver is that there is memory of silver previously experienced and the 鈥渢his,鈥� which is experienced at the time of the illusion; and it is on account of the defects (诲辞峁�a) that it is not grasped that the silver is only a memory of past experience, while it is only the 鈥渢his鈥� in front of us that is experienced at the time (do峁Ｄ乼 pramu峁�ita-tadavamar艣a岣�)^[6].

V膩dihams膩mbuv膩ha, weighing the various arguments of the rival theories of 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 and 膩办丑测腻迟颈, deals w ith the arguments of the 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 view which holds that it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. As against the objections raised by such a view in opposition to the 膩办丑测腻迟颈 view', viz., if each thing is different from every other thing, how can an illusion be explained as being due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the silver remembered and the 鈥渢his鈥� perceived directly in experience? Arguing in its favour, he says that the difference which is not apprehended here consists of that characteristic which exists in things by virtue of which one thing is not confused with or misapprehended as another thing, and it is the non-apprehension of this differentiating characteristic that causes the misapprehension of the conch-shell as silver (蝉补峁僺补谤驳补-惫颈谤辞诲丑颈-惫补颈诲丑补谤尘测补-惫颈艣别峁�a-谤奴辫补-产丑别诲腻-驳谤补丑补墨颈 辫谤补惫峁泃迟颈-hetuh)^[7]. But the real objections to holding this a办丑测腻迟颈 view of illusion to be ultimately sufficient consists in the fact that it cannot do away with the necessity of the synthetic operation (蝉补峁僺补谤驳补-惫测腻辫腻谤补) consisting of a thing being regarded as such-and-such, as found in all discussions of disputants, in all our behaviours and concepts of error and illusion. This forces us to accept the 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 view as an unavoidable and ultimate explanation^[8].

V膩dihams膩mbuv膩ha urges that, since the silver is felt to be in that which is only a piece of conch-shell, this must imply the imposition of the one on the other (which is the essential part of 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈). Just as in the real perception of a piece of silver the object before us is experienced as silver, so in the conch-shell-silver illusion, the object before us is experienced as silver, and here also it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. When the illusion is dispelled, we say that 鈥渢his is not silver鈥�; this cannot mean the mere presence of the conch-shell, but it must mean the denial of the imposition that was made previously. For, if negations could be treated as positive entities, then there would be no difference between positives and negatives (产腻诲丑测补蝉测补 vidhi-谤奴辫补tve vidhi-苍颈峁�e诲丑补-vyaty膩sa峁� ca ni峁�edhe b膩dha iti tuly膩rthatv膩t)^[9]. The a办丑测腻迟颈 view speaks of non-apprehension of absence of association (e.g. of conch-shell-silver, 补蝉补峁僺补谤驳腻驳谤补丑补) to be the cause of illusion. It may well be asked, What is this absence of association? It cannot be the mere thing itself; for, had it been so, we should expect that the thing itself (say the conch-shell) is not perceived and this alone constitutes error, w'hich is impossible.

Moreover, the silver is felt to be in front of us as the object we perceive and not as something which we remember. We know that, when we perceive illusorily that 鈥渢his is silver,鈥� there is the perception of a false association (产腻诲丑补办补-蝉补峁僺补谤驳补-驳谤补丑补峁嘺尘); but the concept of non-apprehension of difference (产丑别诲腻驳谤补丑补) never seems to be practically realized in experience. If we inquire into the nature of w hat constitutes falsity or contradiction (e.g. in conch-shell-silver), we find that it is not the fact that a conch-shell when burnt becomes ash while silver, when burnt, may be made into a finger-ring that constitutes error, but the fact that what was believed to be capable of being rendered into a finger-ring by being put into fire cannot be so done (yadi tv-a峁単ul墨yak膩di-hetutay膩bhimatasya vyavah膩rasya bhasma-hetutvako hy atra 惫颈艣别峁�a岣�). If this is what is really meant by falsehood, it is nothing but the apprehension of the cause of one kind of action as being another cause (anya-hetu-vyavah膩ro 鈥檔ya-hetutay膩vagata岣�). This will be 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈; for, if even here it is urged to be non-apprehension of difference, then the experience in such cases of the belief of one thing as another is not explained^[10]. In all such cases the final appeal must be made to experience, which attests all cases of illusion as being the appearance of one thing as another^[11].

But though V膩dihams膩mbuv膩h膩c膩rya thus tries to support the 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 view of illusion, yet he does not dismiss the 膩办丑测腻迟颈 view of error curtly, but admits that it may also properly explain facts of illusion, when looked at from another point of view. For, if there was not the non-apprehension of difference between silver and conch-shell, the conch-shell could not be mistaken as silver. So, even in 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈, there is one element of 膩办丑测腻迟颈 involved ; for in order that one may behave towards a piece of conch-shell in the same way as one would do to a piece of silver, it is necessary that one should not be able to distinguish between what one sees before one and what one remembers. But, though the negative fact of 膩办丑测腻迟颈, i.e., non-apprehension of difference, may be regarded in many cases as a necessary stage, yet the positive fact of association (蝉补峁僺补谤驳补) or synthesis has to be admitted as an indispensable process, connecting the different elements constituting a concrete perception.

The root-cause of all our behaviour and action, being of the nature of synthetic association, it would be wrong to suppose that non-apprehension of difference could by itself be made a real cause of our actions

(na ca 尘奴濒补-bh奴te 蝉补峁僺补谤驳补-j帽膩ne 辫谤补惫峁泃迟颈-k膩ra峁噀 siddhe tad-upaj墨vino nirantara-j帽膩nasya 辫谤补惫峁泃迟颈hetutvam iti 测耻办迟补峁� 惫补办迟耻峁�)^[12].

Although V膩dihams膩mbuv膩ha spends all his discussions on the relative strength of 膩办丑测腻迟颈 and 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 as probable theories of illusion, yet he refers to the view of illusion mentioned by 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 that all things are present in all things and that therefore no knowledge is illusory. He considers this view as the real and ultimately correct view. But, if this were so, all his discussions on the 膩办丑测腻迟颈 and anyath膩办丑测腻迟颈 theories of illusion would be futile. V膩dihams膩mbuv膩ha does not, however, attempt to show how, if this theory be admitted, the other theories of 膩办丑测腻迟颈 or 补苍测补迟丑腻-办丑测腻迟颈 could be supported^[13]. He further criticizes the 补苍颈谤惫补肠补苍墨测补-办丑测腻迟颈 (illusion as the indescribable creation of, say, the appearance of silver in the conch-shell-silver illusion), a view of illusion as held by the 艢a峁卥arites, in the stereotyped form with which we are already familiar.

Anant膩c膩rya, a writer of the nineteenth century, laid stress on the view of illusion which held that all things were contained in all things, and hence the perception of conch-shell as silver was neither false knowledge nor non-apprehension of the difference between what is perceived and what is remembered; for the perception 鈥渢his is silver鈥� is a complex of two perceptions, 鈥渢his鈥漚nd 鈥渟ilver.鈥� Had not this been a case of actual perception, we should not have felt as if we perceived the 鈥渢his鈥� before us as 鈥渟ilver.鈥� The function of 诲辞峁�a (defect) was only to hide the conch-shell part (mixed up with the silver part) from perception. To say that all perceptions have objective entities corresponding to them (测补迟丑-腻谤迟丑补) does not mean that things are as they are perceived, but it means that it is not true that what is perceived has not an objective basis corresponding to it^[14].

That sort of tejas-substance which forms the material cause of silver certainly exists in the elemental tejas, and, the earth-particles forming the material cause of conch-shells being present in the elemental earth-substances, these substances get mixed in the primitive stage of compounding by 迟谤颈惫峁泃-办补谤补峁嘺, and this explains the presence of the objective substratum of silver in the illusory perception of silver^[15]. It is evident, argues Anant膩c膩rya, that conch-shell cannot appear as silver; for, since conch-shell is not silver, how can it appear as silver? In order properly to accTount for the perceptual experience 鈥渢his is silver,鈥� it is necessary to assume that the two constituents, 鈥渢his鈥� and 鈥渟ilver,鈥� of the complex 鈥渢his is silver鈥� are both perceptually determined; for it is only in this way that one can justify the perception 鈥淚 perceive this silver.鈥�

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

See 艢谤耻迟补-辫谤补办腻艣颈办腻, pp. 183-6.

[2]:

According to 厂耻诲补谤艣补苍补 厂奴谤颈 this view is the traditional view (s膩mpra d膩yika) accepted by Bodh膩yana, 狈腻迟丑补尘耻苍颈, R膩ma 惭颈艣谤补 and others, which 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补, as a faithful follower of that school, had himself followed.

Thus, 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 says:

yath膩-rtho峁� sarva-vij帽膩nam iti veda-vid膩峁� matam
艣ruti-sm峁泃ibhya岣� sarvasya sarv膩-tmatva-prat墨tita岣�.
     Bh膩峁�ya and 艢谤耻迟补-辫谤补办腻艣颈办腻, p. 183.

[3]:

Other types of errors or illusions are similarly explained by 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补 as having a real objective existence, the error being due to the non-apprehension of other elements which are objectively existent and associated with the entity which is the object of illusory perception, but which owing to defects are not perceived. See ibid. pp. 187, 188.

[4]:

indriy膩峁嚹佱箖 pr膩pya-k膩ritvcnn aprapt膩-rtha-pruk膩艣ana mipapatte岣�.
      Sy膩ya-ktdi艣a, Madras Ciovt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

[5]:

do峁Ｄ佱箛膩峁� k膩rya-vigh膩ta-m膩tra-hetutvena k膩ry膩-ntaro-pajanakatv膩-yogat, na hy agni-sa峁僺p峁涐梗峁璦sya kalama-v墨jasya a峁卥uro-tp膩dane s膩marthyam asti.
      Ibid.

[6]:

idam iti purn-vastuni anubhava岣� rajatam iti ca piirv膩-nubhuta-rajata-vi峁�ay膩 sm峁泃i岣�.
     Ibid.

[7]:

Madras Govt. MS. No. 4910.

[8]:

Like the seniors referred to by 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补, 笔谤补产丑腻办补谤补 also considers all knowledge to be valid (yath膩rt岣�a峁� sarvam eve鈥檋a vij帽膩nam iti, Pra办补谤补峁嘺-pa帽cik膩, p. 32), though the former does so on ontological grounds and the latter on psychological and experiential grounds. 艢膩likan膩tha, representing 笔谤补产丑腻办补谤补鈥檚 view, says that, whatever is the content of awareness, that alone is known, and at the time of the conch-shell-silver illusion, what is known is 鈥渢his is silver,鈥� but there is no knowledge of conch-shell, since it is not the content of awareness at the time. Thus it cannot be said that the illusory knowledge consists of knowing the conch-shell as silver, but of the 鈥渢his鈥� as silver; for, when there is the knowledge of illusory silver, there is no knowledge of conch-shell. What happens in illusory perception is that through defects the differentiating characteristics of the conch-shell are not apprehended and the conch-shell is perceived only in its general character as an object.

Then there is memory of silver, and through a defect in the mental process (尘补苍辞-诲辞峁Ｄ乼) the silver is not remembered with its original association of time and place as that silver which was perceived there, but is simply remembered as an image of silver (迟补诲-颈迟测-补峁兣沘-辫补谤腻尘补谤艣补-惫颈惫补谤箩颈迟补尘). Though there is no such definite experience that I remember silver, yet the idea of silver has to be admitted to be due to memory; for it cannot be due either to perception or to inference or to any other source of knowledge. Thus, through the elimination of all other sources of knowledge, silver has to be admitted to be due to memory (ananya-gatita岣� sm峁泃ir atr膩'vagamyate).

On account of the absence of a feeling that I remember a past experience, the memory of silver cannot be distinguished from a percept; for it is only these facts that distinguish a present percept from a reproduced image; and so we fail to differentiate between this memory and the actual perception of some object before us (the differentiating characteristics of which are entirely lost to us through defects of sense-organs or the like). On account of the non-apprehension of the distinction, these two different kinds of awareness themselves produce the illusion of a direct and immediate perception of silver w hich is not there at the time, and even tempt us to stretch our hands to pick it up, as if there were a real piece of silver before us. (See Pra办补谤补峁嘺-pa帽cik膩, Ch. iv, 狈补测补-惫墨迟丑颈.)

厂耻诲补谤艣补苍补 厂奴谤颈, commenting on the a办丑测腻迟颈 view in his 艢谤耻迟补-辫谤补办腻艣颈办腻 in connection with his commentary on the yath艒rtha-办丑测腻迟颈 view of 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩补鈥檚 seniors, says that the a办丑测腻迟颈 view has the advantage of superior simplicity or the minimum assumption, viz. that in illusion only an indefinite object is seen, and the distinction between this and the image roused in memory by it is not apprehended. This has to be admitted in all theories of illusion, and in addition other assumptions have to be made.

[9]:

狈测腻测补-办耻濒颈艣补 of V膩diharns膩mbuv膩ha 搁腻尘腻苍耻箩腻肠腻谤测补, Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

[10]:

yadi c膩鈥檛ra鈥檖i b岣�ed膩-gra岣�a岣� 艣ara峁嘺峁� sy膩t tato鈥檅him膩na-惫颈艣别峁�a-k峁泃a-b膩dha-vyavast岣ツ� na sid岣�yet.
     Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.

[11]:

katham aya峁� loka-vyava岣ツ乺o v峁泃ta iti, na hi ka帽cid up膩dhim an膩lambya loke 艣abda-prayogo鈥檝akalpyate, tasm膩db膩dhya-b膩dhaka-bh膩v膩-nyath膩-nupapatty膩 any-ath膩-k岣�y膩ti-siddhi岣�.
     Ibid.

[12]:

Ibid.

[13]:

yady api bh奴t膩n膩峁� pa帽c墨办补谤补峁嘺-labdha-paraspara-vy膩pty膩 艣uktik膩y膩m api s膩d峁浥泍膩t rajatai-kade艣o vidyata eva iti siddh膩nta岣� tath膩pi na vidyata iti k峁泃v膩 cintya te v膩dy-ud膩hara峁嘺-prasiddhy-anurodh膩ya.
     Govt. Oriental A 1 SS. No. 4910.

[14]:

tad-vi峁�ayaka-j帽膩na-s膩m膩nya峁� vi艣e峁�y膩v峁泃ti-dharma-prak膩rakatv膩-bh膩vavad iti yath帽rtha峁� san a-vij帽膩natn.
     Jii膩na-y膩th膩rthya-v膩da, MSS. No. 4884.

[15]:

y膩d峁浥沘-dharm膩-vacchitm膩t tejo鈥欋箖艣膩d rajat膩-rambhu岣� t膩d峁浥沘-dharm膩-vacchinn膩n膩m apy a峁兣浤乶膩tti mah膩-bh奴t膩tmake tejasi sattvena 艣ukty-膩rambhakat膩-vacchedaka-dharm膩-vacchinn膩n膩峁� p膩rthiva-bh膩g膩n膩m api mah膩-p峁泃hivy膩峁� sattvena tayo岣� mah膩-产丑奴迟补-迟谤颈惫峁泃-办补谤补峁嘺-da艣膩y膩m eva melan膩-sambhav膩cchukty-膩dau rajat膩-sad-bh膩vo-papatte岣�.
     Ibid.

This is an answer to the already noted objection raised by the 艢谤耻迟补-辫谤补办腻艣颈办腻.