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The Advaitins hold that difference is empirical and not fail to absolutely real. But at the same time they/explain this empirical difference convincingly. They cannot say that it is sublated by the cognition of Brahman, And it is evident that it is not sublated by any other knowledge. It shows that the very usage emperical is baseless. Further, difference is not sublated by this cognition of Brahman. But, it is the Brahmaikya that gets sublated. rience or knowledge as 'I am not Omniscient,' 'I am not the overlord of all' is evident. This experience is the perception. And the knowledge of this perception controverts the idea of the identity fancied by the Advaitins. The expeAccording to the Advaita, the experience or knowledge that is sublated by the empirical experience, is called real in appearance. If that is true their Brahmaikya since being sublated as explained above by the experience of 877 empirical perception would become real in appearance. E.g. the experience of the snake gets sublated by the experience of the rope. Here the experience of the snake is illusory whereas the experience of rope is empirical according to the Advaitins. According to this, in the Advaita, perception of difference is empirical. knowledge of identity gets sublated by this perception of And as

} 300 empirical difference that would become Pratibhasika. So the Advaitins cannot treat difference between soul and Brahman as empirical. Vadiraja says that the efforts of the Advaitins is like a person running out of fear of the scorpion but 878 rushing into the hole of venomous snakes. The contention of the Advaitins is that the passages ** like Dva suparna..o + and others that declare Jivesvarabheda which is only Vyavaharika, become Atatvavedaka or conveying false information. But Vadiraja opines that a true follower of the scriptures will not accept this view. Because, really speaking, it is as good as disregarding the scripture as the Buddhists do. A true and rigid follower of the scriptures will rather try his best to prove both difference and identity conveying passages, as Tatvavedaka. That means all scriptural passages convey valid information 879 when interpreted properly. In the Advaita, as cognition of Brahman is Nirvikalpaka (without distinction), it can neither establish something 880 nor can it sublate anything. It can also not sublate the difference. Hence, difference is real. Vadicaja If it is 881 asks: "What is this sublation of difference?" taken to mean Bhedanasa, then it is not a sualation at all. Because, when something is destroyed nobody says that it is

301 the sublation of that. Destruction of a jar is not the sublation of that jar. So the sublation of difference is not Bhedanasa. The Advaitins also hold that the ignorance that causes illusion is going to be removed by the sublating knowledge. The ignorance that causes the illusory experience of the snake, will be removed by subsequent sublating knowledge of the rope. But in the case of difference it is not at all caused by any ignorance. difference is beginningless in time, it will never get 882 sublated. As The Advaitins contend that the empiricality is nothing but Arthakriyakaritva (effectiveness causing some activity). But it is not correct. Because, as already pointed out that the Vyavaharikatva is not a reality according to them. Hence its Arthakriyakaritva does not arise. Otherwise the hare's horn will have to be treated as Paramarthika (absolutely real) as it is not Arthakriyakari, a view that is absurd. 883 Vadiraja taunts at Advaitins that their Brahman should be treated as Vyavaharika since being Arthakriyakari in the form of being Upadana, Nimitta and Bhramadisthana. And It would not become Paramarthika. So Vyavaharikatva cannot be defined as Arthakriyakaritva. Vadiraja also opines that whatever is Pratibhasika in the Advaita will become Vyavaharika if the above definition of Vyavaharikatva

302 is taken into account. The illusory knowledge, related to the substratum (Adhisthana), is Pratibhasika. And this Pratibhasika, since being Arthakriyakari, as shown above, can also be considered as Vyavaharika. As the experience of the snake superimposed on the rope causes fear and the like,.it should be treated as Vyavaharika because it is But in reality, no one admits this view. Arthakriyakari. Generally when an experience leads to fulfilment of some purpose then it is treated as valid experience and if it does not lead to any fulfilment then that experience is considered to be invalid. In the above case, defining Vyavaharikatva as Arthakriyakaritva and considering Vyavaharikatva, that will not real or invalid, has made the very discussion invalid. Even if Vyavaharikatva is defined as Avidyakaryatva, that will not fulfil the intention of 884 the Advaitins in establishing identity. difference of soul and God is considered as one of the six 885 Anadis by the Advaitins, Further, this When it is Anadi or beginningless it cannot be Avidyakarya or the effect of nescience. And as it is not the product of nescience it cannot be empirical. Thus, the very definition of the Advaitins proves that the difference is not empirical. When it is 886 not empirical, it must be absolutely real. Vadiraja quotes some other passages that support and

303 declare difference. 887 The passages Brahmana saha.. Paramjyotih... clearly state the distinction of the soul from Brahman. The former passage states that there is distinction between the soul and Brahman in the liberated state. The term saha indicates this. And the second mentions that soul attains only proximity with Brahman and not 888 identity with Him. Thus, difference of soul from Brahman is absolutely real. The Brahmasutras, cited already' also declare difference and not the identity. 889