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THE FALLACIES OF INFERENCE 287 lates the pratij帽膩 or the proposition which it is employed to
prove and establish. Thus if one argues 'sound is eternal,
because it is caused,' we have a fallacy of viruddha or the
contradictory middle. The middle term 'caused' does not
prove the eternality of sound, but its non-eternality, because
all that is caused is non-eternal. Hence the distinction
between the fallacies of the savyabhic膩ra and the
viruddha is that while in the former the middle term is uni-
versally related neither to the existence of the major nor to its
non-existence, in the latter the middle term is universally re-
lated to the non-existence of the major term. As a conse-
quence of this, the savyabhic膩ra or the irregular middle only
fails to prove the conclusion, whereas the viruddha or the con-
tradictory middle disproves it or proves the contradictory
proposition.
4. The fallacy of prakara峁嘺sama or the counteracted middle
The third inferential fallacy is called the prakara峁嘺sama.
Literally, it means a reason which is similar to the point at
issue (prakara峁嘺). We have a point at issue when there are
two opposite views with regard to the same subject, both of
which are equally possible, so that they only give rise to a
state of mental vacillation as to the truth of the matter. Now
when a middle term does not go further than producing a state
of mental oscillation between two opposite views we have a
case of the prakara峁嘺sama middle. This happens when one
reason seeks to prove the existence of the major in the minor,
but there appears some other reason to prove the non-existence
of the major, and both of them are found to be equally strong.
Here the opposed reasons counteract each other, but neither
can sublate the other. They may indeed be employed as the
middle terms of an inference, but each being neutralised or
counterbalanced by the other (satpratipak峁�ita) fails to establish