Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 185 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
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External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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166
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
the individuals. On the other hand, it is constituted by the
essential common attributes of the individuals. Hence the
universal is not separate from the individuals, but is identical
with them in point of existence. The two are related by way of
identity. The universal has existence, not in our minds only,
but in the particular objects of experience. It does not, how-
ever, come to them from outside, but is just their common
nature. On this view, "individuals have," as Mill says, no
essences.
'' 1
"
"
"
The NyÄya-VaiÅ›eá¹£ikas accept the realistic view of the
universal. According to them, universals are eternal entities
which are distinct from, but inhere in many individuals
(nilyatve satyanekasamavetatvam)." The universal is the basis
of the notion of sameness that we have with regard to all the
individuals of a certain class. It is because there is one single
essence present in different individuals that they are brought
under a class and thought of as essentially the same. Like
Plato's ideas," or essences of the mediaeval realists,
samanya or the universal is a real entity which corresponds to
a general term or class-concept in our mind. Some of the
modern realists also hold that a 'universal is an eternal time-
less entity which may be shared by many particulars.' The
NaiyÄyikas agree further with the modern realists in holding
that universals do not come under existence (sattÄ). These do
not exist in time and space, but have being and subsist in subs-
tance, attribute and action. There is no universal subsisting in
another universal (sÄmÄnyÄnadhikaraṇatvam), nor is there any
universal for particularity (viseá¹£a), inherence (samavÄya) and
non-existence (abhÄva). Modern realists, however, do not
sensible objects are capable of being perceived by the senses.
admit with the NaiyÄyikas that all universals pertaining to
According to the former, we can perceive only such universals
1 J. S. Mill, A System of Logic, p. 73.
2 SM., 8.
3 TB., p. 28; PS., p. 164.
4 BP. & SM., 14, 15.
