Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
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104 4 2
NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
5 8
test of truth.' Of course, some realists differ from this general
position and hold a different view of the matter. Thus
Alexander makes coherence the ground of truth. But in
speaking of coherence as determined by reality, he accepts
indirectly the theory of correspondence. Reid, on the other
hand, treats correspondence to the given only as a test of truth.
Russell defines truth in terms of correspondence and accepts
coherence as a test of some truths, while others are said to be
self-evident. In the philosophy of objective idealism, co-
herence in the sense of the systematic unity of all experiences
is made both the ground and the test of truth. The truth con-
sists in the coherence of all experiences as one self-maintaining
and all-inclusive system. It is in this sense that Bosanquet'
says that 'the truth is the whole and it is its own criterion.
Truth can only be tested by more of itself.' Hence any parti-
cular knowledge is true in so far as it is consistent with the
whole system of experience. On this view, the truth of human
knowledge becomes relative, since coherence as the ideal of the
completed system of experience is humanly unattainable. For
pragmatism, truth is both constituted and known by practical
utility. The truth of knowledge consists in its capacity to
produce practically useful consequences. So also the method
of ascertaining truth is just to follow the practical consequences
of a belief and see if they have any practical value. With this
brief statement of the realistic, the idealistic and the pragmatist
theories of truth, we proceed to examine the Buddhist and the
Ny膩ya theories of extrinsic validity.
7 From what we have said before it is clear that the
Buddhists adopt the pragmatist theory of truth and reality.
1 Vide The New Realism and Essays in Critical Realism.
Space, Time and Deity, Vol. II, pp. 251 f.
3 Knowledge and Truth, Chap. VIII.
A The Problems of Philosophy, Chaps. XII, XIII; Our Knowledge of the
External World, p. 58; The Analysis of Mind, p. 165.
5 Vide Joachim, The Nature of Truth, Chap. III.
6 Logic, Vol. II, pp. 265-67.
* James, Pragmatism, Lect. VI; Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies,
Pts. IV and V.
