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We have already given an account of the views of the different schools of Indian philosophy with regard to smrti or memory. It may be recalled here that with the exception of the Jaina, the Vaisesika and the Advaita Vedanta system, all the schools are definitely opposed to smrti being regarded as a form of valid knowledge. All these schools agree in holding that smrti is knowledge which is solely due to the impressions of past experiences. In it there is a revival of the impressions of some old experience and consequently a repetition of the

experience itself in the form of images. Smrti as a revival of past experiences has been excluded from the forms of valid knowledge on two main grounds. First, it has been urged by the Mimamsakas that smriti does not give us any new knowledge but is only the revival of some old knowledge. In it we do not know anything new, but only remember that we knew something before. Then the Naiyayikas, who do not accept this as a conclusive reason, argue that smrti is not prama or valid knowledge because it is not anubhava or presentative knowledge. In it we have the knowledge of what was once given in our experience, but has now ceased to be given and presented to us. It is not the presentation of any objective fact but the representation of what was once presented. The object as remembered is different from the presented object, since the object as presented before has now ceased to exist. Hence we cannot speak of a true correspondence between memory and its object (yatharthya). The Jainas who accept smrti or memory as a source of valid knowledge refute the above grounds urged against it. According to them, smriti is not merely a revival of the impressions of past experience. While the origin of memory is conditioned by the revival of impressions of past experiences, its essence lies in the knowledge of something as 'that,' i.e. as past (tadityakara).' It is the knowledge of a previously experienced object as past. To put it in the words of Hobhouse, memory is an assertion of the past as past.' That memory refers to a previously experienced object, or that it is an assertion of the past, is known from memory itself. Such knowledge of the past by means of memory is valid, since. like perception, it leads to successful activity. We cannot deny the validity of the knowledge by memory simply on the ground that it refers to a previously known object. If memory becomes invalid because its object is previously known, then the Tadityakaranubhutarthavisaya kamalamartanda, p. 96. hi pratitih smrtirityucyate, Prameya-

perception of the fire which is already known by inference would become invalid. Lastly, if memory be invalid, then all inferences which are based on the remembrance of vyapti between the major and the middle term would become invalid.' How can any knowledge be valid when it has its basis in memory which is invalid? The validity of memory is presupposed in the validity of inference as a source of knowledge. Some Vaisesika writers also are in favour of accepting smrti as a source of our knowledge of the past. Laugaksi Bhaskara recognises both memory and presentative cognition (smrtyanubhava) as forms of valid knowledge and their instrumental or special causes as sources of knowledge. According to him, smrti or memory arises out of the impressions of past experience and is the knowledge of an individual object as ' that' or as something previously experienced, e.g. 'that bathing ghat,' 'that city of Benares. " Vallabhacarya proves on strong grounds that sprti or memory also is an independent source of knowledge. Smrti is a separate pramana because it gives us a true knowledge of certain facts (arthaniscayahetutvat). The fact that it depends on previous experience is no reason for denying its independence, for that is something common to all the pramanas or sources of knowledge. It cannot be said that it is merely the repitition of some previous experience. It is something more than the faint repetition of a past experience. If it were not so, we could not at all know that the experience is past. In smurti or memory we know an object as that which is past. The awareness of its 'pastness is no part of our previous experience of it. It is memory that gives a knowledge of this new element, namely, the 'thatness or the 'pastness' of an object, and is, therefore, an independent source of knowledge. Hence the Mimamsaka contention that memory does not give us any new knowledge falls to the , , smrtipurvakamanumanaNa casavapramanam samvadakatvat...ko hi mabhyupagamya punastam nirakuryat, etc., ibid., pp. 96-97. 2 Samskaramatrajanyam jnanam smrtih, yatha sa manikarnika.......sinrtyanubhavasadharanam pramakaranam pramanam, Tarkakaumudi, p. 6.

ground. Then the Naiyayikas' objection that smriti or memory does not correspond to its object is also untenable. It is true that in memory an object is thought of as being present at some time in the past (purvavartamanakalavacchinna) and that its once present condition has now been extinct (nivrttapurvavastha). But this is no good ground for denying the correspondence between memory and its object. When we remember an object, we are aware of representing it as no longer present or with its old conditions as now extinct. The object is therefore faithfully represented in memory. It follows from this that memory is the true knowledge of an object.' We may add also that memory is a presentative knowledge (anubhava), since it is based on an objective order of things in the world. As we have already seen, anubhava or presentative knowledge is the cognition of what is objective (tattva) as distinguished from the false or the subjective (aropita). In presentative knowledge the object need not be directly given as in perception, for that will exclude inference, comparison and testimony from the field of anubhava or presentative knowledge. All these, however, are recognised by the Naiyayikas as forms of presentative knowledge. What is common to all these recognised forms of presentative knowledge is not that they give us an immediate knowledge of some object, but that they refer, either directly or indirectly, to an objective fact or an objective order of facts. In this sense smrti or memory is as good a presentative knowledge as any other recognised by the Nyaya or any other school of Indian philosophy. The fact that an object is past is as objective as the present existence of another. Hence memory as the knowledge of the past as past is a true presentative knowledge (yatharthanubhava). * Smrtirapi manantarameva, arthaniscayahetutvat, anubhavaparatantryannaivam iti cet, na, utpattiparatantryasya pramanantarasamyat. Adhikaparicchede ca pramanatvat, anyatha tadvyavasthanupapatteh tatravacchinnam hi smrtirarthamakalayati, sa ca yadi purvanubhavasyapi gocarah, tada tatrapi tadityullekhah syat...na cet, smrtireva tatranapekseti manam, Nyayalilavati, pp. 67-68. 2 Cf. H. H. Price, Perception, p. 11: "The past is as much a part of the real world as the present, and quite as interesting."

o explain such knowledge of the past we have to accept smriti or memory as a separate source of knowledge (pramana). Among Western thinkers Russell, Hobhouse and others recognise memory as the primary source of all our knowledge concerning the past. They agree in holding that we may know the past in other ways too, for example, by reading history or by inference. But these cannot give us any knowledge of the past unless we have already a direct knowledge of it through memory. Thus Russell says: "It is obvious that we often remember what we have seen or heard or had otherwise present to our senses, and that in such cases we are still immediately aware of what we remember, in spite of the fact that it appears as past and not as present. This immediate knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past; without it, there could be no knowledge of the past by inference, since we should never know that there was anything past to be inferred."'* In another place Russell observes that memory resembles perception in point of immediacy and differs from it mainly by being referred to the past. 2 Similarly, Hobhouse " shows that memory is neither the retention of past experience, nor a mere image of past experience, but an assertion of the past as past on the basis of such retention and images. Without a direct knowledge of the past by memory we cannot understand retention as an effect of past experience nor an image as an image of the past. It cannot be said that we may know the past by inference from the retention or impression of past experience or from its revival as an image. For, as both Prabhacandra and Hobhouse point out, inference in its turn involves memory. Further, we cannot understand anything as a sign or mark from which to infer the past unless we first know that past as signified or marked by such and such things. Hence Hobhouse takes memory as a fresh postulate of knowledge ... 4 | The Problems of Philosophy, p. 76. The Analysis of Mind, p. 173. The Theory of Knowledge, Pt. 1, Ch. IV. 鈥� Vide Prameyakamalamartanda, ibid.

"It is," he says, "a direct or immediate belief about the past, not a belief based on some other truth." A. C. Ewing also thinks that 'the direct view of memory is clearly true if we have any knowledge of the past at all. If we know the past, it is the past we know and not our present ideas.' It is a mistake to suppose, as the Naiyayikas do, that if we are directly aware of the past, the past must be, so to speak, bodily present to our mind or occupy the same position as our present objects of perception. Thus according to these Western thinkers, memory gives us an immediate knowledge of the past just as perception gives us an immediate knowledge of the present. Hence there can be no objection to memory being regarded as true presentative knowledge (yaiharthanubhava). This view of the matter removes the last vestige of the difficulties in the way of taking smrti or memory as a pramana or source of valid knowledge. In fact, it stands next to perception in the order of priority among the sources of valid knowledge. All sources of knowledge other than perception involve memory of some kind as one of their conditions. Inference cannot take place without the memory of a universal relation between two things (vyapti). Upamana or comparison depends on memory of the knowledge communicated by a reliable person. In sabda or testimony we depend on memory in order to understand the meanings of words and to synthesise the meanings of the separate words into the construed meaning of the sentence. Arthapatti or postulation involves a conflict between the order of our past experience as remembered and that of our present experience. Anupalabdhi or nonperception also implies a contrast between the memory of something and the absence of perception with regard to it. Hence, finally, we have to accept seven separate sources of knowledge which may be arranged in order of priority as follows: perception, memory, non-perception, inference, comparison, testimony and postulation. 1 Hobhouse, op. cit, p. 76. 鈮� Mind, April, 1930, p. 142.