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Upamana was at first regarded as only of one kind, namely, as the knowledge of a thing as denoted by a word through its similarity to a well-known object of experience. 路 Prameyakamalamartanda, pp. 97-100. 39-(O.P. 103)

ater Naiyayikas, however, distinguished between different kinds of upamana, according as they are based on the knowledge of dissimilarity between things, or on that of their peculiar properties. Thus the Naiyayikas generally recognise three kinds of upamana or knowledge by comparison, namely, sadharmyopamana, vaidharmyopamana and dharmamatropamana. ' In sadharmya-upamana we start from the description of an unknown object given in terms of its similarity to a wellknown object by some authoritative person. It then we find any object or objects that answer to the given description, i.e. are similar to the things they are compared with, we know that they belong to this or that class. Here then we apply a class-concept to certain facts on the basis of some observed similarity between them and other known facts. The concept is given to us and the facts to which it applies are selected by us. This kind of upamana is illustrated in the citizen's application of the name gavaya to the wild oxen because they are found to satisfy the description of the gavaya as an animal similar to the cow. In vaidharmya-upamana the objects denoted by a word are described in terms of their contrast or dissimilarity to some well-known objects of experience. This negative description enables a man to recognise certain objects as denoted by a word or as belonging to a certain class in so far as he finds that they fit in with the given description. This is illustrated when a man recognises certain animals as belonging to the class of horses because, unlike the cow, they have no cloven hoofs. In dharmamatra-upamana the objects denoted by a name are described in terms of their peculiar attributes or any combination of attributes which is peculiar to them. This description enables us to discriminate the things denoted by the name from all other things and consequently apply the name to just that class of things. This is illustrated when from the description ... Vide Tarkikaraksa & Sarasamgraha, pp. 86-88.

of man as a cooking animal or of the karabha as a long- ' necked animal with projecting lips and feeding on thorns, we recognise the animals denoted by these words. It may be observ ed here that these three kinds of upamana are illustrated also by medical students when they collect herbs and plants according to the descriptions given of them in the materia medica. Visvanatha in his Nyaya-sutra-vrtti mentions another kind of upamana which is slightly different from the above three. Here upamana consists, not in the knowledge of the denotation of a word, but in that of some unknown property of an object through its similarity to a known thing. Thus if on hearing that a certain herb resembling the mudgaparni is an antidote and then finding such a herb we conclude that it is an antidote, our knowledge is due to upamana or comparison.' It is sometimes held that the Naiyayika's upamana is an analogical argument. There are two facts that lend colour to this view. First, the Nyaya-sutra defines upamana as the knowledge of an object (sadhya) from some recognised similarity between two things (prasiddhasadharmyat). Secondly, the last kind of upamana mentioned by Visvanatha very closely approximates an analogical reasoning when from the observed resemblances between two things we argue to the presence of some unobserved property in one of them. But from the Nyaya account of upamana as given above it will appear that it does not really correspond to an analogical argument. In analogy we infer one resemblance from other resemblances; e.g. when we say A resembles B in having the properties x and y, therefore it resembles B in having the property z. But in upamana we argue as much from resemblance as from contrast and peculiarity. Further, upamana leads not to the knowledge of resemblance between things, but to that of the denotation of a word, or to the application of a name to a class of objects. Even the special kind of upamana mentioned by Visvanatha is not a knowledge of resemblance, but is the identification of an object from a given description. Vide Nyaya-sutra-vrtti and Nyaya-sutra-vivarana, 1. 1. 6.