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The second type of extraordinary perception is called jnanalaksana. It is the perception of an object which is in contact with sense through a previous knowledge of itself.¹ When on seeing something a man says: 'I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood,' he has an immediate knowledge or

1 Visayi yasya tasyaiva vyaparo jnanalaksanah, Bhasapariccheda, 65.

perception of its fragrance. This cannot be explained without the help of jnanalaksana. How can he perceive the fragrant sandalwood, seen at a distance? Its fragrance is not then smelt by him and so does not come in contact with the sense of smell. Nor can there be any ordinary contact between smell and the sense of sight. Still he perceives it as fragrant sandalwood lying at a distance. Hence we are to say that there is some extraordinary contact between fragrance and the sense of sight. Here our past experience of fragrance in the sandalwood does the work of contact between sense and object. Our past knowledge of fragrance (saurabhajnana) brings about the present perception of it, although it is not actually smelt by us. It cannot be said that the present perception of fragrance as a particular is brought about by samanyalaksana cognition of the class of fragrants. The latter cognition supposes an ordinary perception of the genus of fragrance through sense-contact which is not to be found in the present case.' Thus we see that in both samanyalaksana and jnanalaksana perceptions sense-object contact is mediated by some kind of knowledge. In the former, the knowledge of a universal and, in the latter, some past experience is the medium of contact between sense and the perceived objects. But the distinction between them is this. While in samanyalaksana the knowledge of the universal leads to the perception of the individuals in which it inheres (asraya), in jnanalaksana, a past knowledge leads to the present perception of its own object (yadvisayakam jnanam tasyaiva pratyasattih).², 1 The Naiyayikas explain illusions by the help of the theory of jnanalaksana perception. The illusory silver is perceived because it is presented through our previous knowledge of silver as seen at some other time and place. But the Vedanta objects to the Nyaya theory of jnanalaksana. It argues that to recognise jnanalaksana as a type of genuine perception is to reduce ordinary inference to perception. If the fragrance of sandalSM., 65. 2 Ibid.

wood be perceived because we have a previous knowledge of it as connected with sandalwood, then in the inference of fire from smoke, the fire may be said to be perceived since we have also a previous knowledge of it as related to smoke. There is nothing to distinguish between the two cases. In the one we have a perception of sandalwood and a previous knowledge of its relation to fragrance. In the other, we have a perception of smoke and a similar knowledge of its relation to fire. Hence if the fragrance be in extraordinary contact with sense and so perceived, there may be such an extraordinary perception of fire and, for the matter of that, of all objects of inference. So the Vedanta holds that our knowledge of the fragrance of sandalwood, seen at a distance, is due to inference and not any extraordinary perception like the Naiyayika's jnanalaksana.¹ " Now let us consider whether the knowledge of the fragrant sandal that is involved in the judgment "I see a fragrant sandalwood is really a case of perception as held by the Naiyayikas, or a case of inference as urged by the Vedantins. Students of Western philosophy will readily recognise that such knowledge is of the same kind as what is called "complication" by some psychologists. The judgment "I see a fragrant sandalwood is in fact equivalent to the judgment "The sandalwood looks fragrant." And this is really another instance of what Stout, Ward and Wundt call "complication" and illustrate by such judgments as Ice looks cold,' The armour looks hard, smooth and cold." that the Naiyayika's jnanalaksana is similar to the visual perception of distance, since the eyes have "no independent means of apprehending those relations of surfaces and lines which presuppose the third dimension." If there can be a visual perception of distance, coldness, hardness, etc., there can also be a visual perception of fragrance. Hence the fundamental question to be discussed here is this: Can there be, and is there 1 Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. I. 3) (6 We may go further and say 2 Vide Stout, A Manual of Psychology, p. 102; Wundt, Human and Animal Psychology, pp. 285-86.

in fact, a visual perception (i) of distance, (ii) of coldness, hardness, etc., and (iii) of fragrance. With regard to the first case (i), J. S. Mill' was strongly of opinion that 'the perception of distance by the eye is, in reality, an inference grounded on experience; though in familiar cases it takes place so rapidly as to appear exactly on a par with those perceptions of sight which are really intuitive, our perceptions of colour.' Modern psychology, however, has outgrown this view and finds no difficulty in admitting that there is a visual perception of distance. With regard to the other cases, however, there is much difference of opinion among philosophers, both Indian and Western. While the Advaitins would bring all such cases under inference, the Naiyayikas are in favour of treating them as genuine perceptions. Among modern thinkers some psychologists like Stout, Ward and Wundt take at least the second group of cases (ii) as a form of perception, although, to distinguish it from ordinary perception, they give it the name of "complication." Many other psychologists, however, would reduce them to some kind of rapid or implicit inference. As for the third As for case (iii), the Naiyayikas are perhaps the only realists who would say that we have a visual perception of fragrance. How are we to deal with the second and the third case? We have to raise two questions, viz. (i) how are we to distinguish between perception and inference, and (ii) where are we to draw the line between perception and inference? Perception may be defined as an immediate knowledge of objects or a knowledge of objects which is not brought about by any other knowledge. On the other hand, inference is the indirect knowledge of an object through the mediation of some sign which is known to be always related to it. In both perception and inference there is an interpretation of some datum. In both we may distinguish between a given and a suggested 1 A System of Logic, p. 4.

content. In perception there is a synthesis of some sensuous elements and some non-sensuous presentations. But in perception these two elements are not kept distinct. They fuse into one whole or form parts of one complex object. There is no transition of consciousness from the one to the other. We do not think of the one apart from and independently of the other. The one immediately suggests the other and gives rise to the cognition of an object as one whole, of which they are the parts. Thus in an adult's visual perception of a rose, the sensory element, namely, its colour, immediately presents its other qualities, namely, its touch and smell, and the sensed and the presented elements blend into the perception of the rose. Inference is distinguished from perception by the fact that it gives us a knowledge of some fact through the mediation of some other fact on the basis of a uniform relation between them. Of these two facts the second suggests the first through a knowledge of their uniform connection with each other. But the suggestive fact and the suggested fact remain distinct and we are conscious of a transition of thought from the one to the other. These do not fuse into one whole as they do in perception. Rather, they stand out as two wholes or two distinct facts, either of which is thought of independently of the other. Thus in the inference of fire from smoke my mind passes from one thing to another which is distinct from it and is thought of independently of it. Hence the distinction between perception and inference is briefly this: Perception is the integral immediate consciousness of an object. Inference is a multiple mediated consciousness of an object which may be expressed as a this-therefore-that consciousness. In view of the above distinction between perception and inference we cannot admit the Advaitin's contention that to recognise jnanalaksana as a form of perception is to obliterate the distinction between perception and inference. When we pass such judgments as 'the rose looks soft,' 'the stone looks hard,' we do not pass from the colour of the rose or the stone to its

tactual quality. Likewise, when we say 'ice looks cold,' or ' the sandal looks fragrant,' there is no transition of thought from ice to coldness, or from the sandal to its fragrance. We do not say "because ice, therefore cold," or "because sandal, therefore fragrant." On the other hand, coldness or fragrance is a part of the presentation of the ice or the sandal. What we say is: "I see the cold ice or the fragrant sandal," just as we say we see the distant hill." In the inference of fire from smoke, however, there is a transition of our thought from smoke to fire as two distinct objects. We never say "1 see the fiery smoke." In fact, the fire is here only thought of by us and not presented to us. To recognise jnanalaksana, therefore, as a form of perception is not to ignore the fundamental distinction between perception and inference. It may indeed be contended here that while in the visual perception of a rose or a stone or a block of ice, there is a presentation of some tactual quality, there is no such presentation of fragrance in the visual perception of sandalwood. To this we are to say that if the eye can present a tactual quality like softness or hardness or coldness which it is not fitted, by nature, to perceive, there is no inherent impossibility in the eye being made competent to perceive smell. We are, therefore, to consider under what condition or conditions perception takes place. When we have discovered these conditions, we shall see that, although logically perception and inference are two fundamentally distinct ways of knowing, yet from the psychological standpoint, it is not possible to draw the line between them. As we have already said, perception is constituted by the union of certain sensuous elements with certain non-sensuous presentations into one whole. The sensuous elements are the given and the non-sensuous elements are presented by the given. As a general rule, perception occurs when there is either a natural or a habitual association between the sensuous and the non-sensuous elements of perception, so that the one immediately calls up the other and the two are fused into one whole

of presentation of some object. By 'natural association' I mean an association, in our minds, of one sense quality with such other sense qualities as are, by nature, connected with it. It follows naturally from this that such associations will be most frequently experienced by us and therefore ingrained in our minds. The question as to how many senses and sense qualities there are, is not relevant for our present purpose. We adopt here the universally accepted view that there are five senses and five corresponding sense qualities, namely, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. Taking these sense qualities in the order in which they have been mentioned here, we may say that there is a natural connection of that which precedes to those which succeed it, but not vice versa. Thus a smelling object has generally some taste, colour, touch and sound. But a sounding object like space or air has no colour, taste and smell. So also, to smell a thing is generally to see and touch it. But to see a thing is not to taste or smell it so generally. Hence it is that a smell or taste sensation naturally calls up the colour and touch of an object. On the other hand, a 'habitual association' is the association, in our minds, of one sense quality with those which are not, by nature, connected with it. Hence it is less frequently experienced by us and is, in many cases, looser than a natural association." Still when a habitual association between them is once formed in our minds, one sense quality immediately calls up others and all of them are combined into the perception of an object. Thus sound is not naturally connected with touch as there is sound in space but no touch. So also, touch has no natural relation to colour, as there is touch in the air but no colour. Similarly, there is no natural 1 This is also admitted by some Western thinkers, Cf. Stout, A Manual of Psychology, pp. 102-03: 'In the qualification of actual touch experience by revived visual experience we find the union of the constituents of the complex much looser.' Cf. also Bosanquet, The Essentials of Logic, p. 31: "The judgment of sight perception, "That (which I see) is a cab," though its terms are more inextricably interwoven, has just the same elements in it as the judgment of sound perception, "That (which I hear) is a cab."

connection of colour with taste and smell. Thus there is colour in light but no taste and smell. Hence it is that an association of colour with smell is looser than that of smell with colour, with which it is naturally connected. While the mere smell of kerosene immediately suggests its colour, the latter by itself hardly suggests the former. But by repeated experiences of their uniform connection with one another a habitual association between them may be established in our minds, and one sense quality may present another which is not naturally connected with it. It is in this way that the sound of a bell presents its tactual and visual qualities and we have the auditory perception of a bell, just as the sight of the bell presents its tactual and auditory qualities and we have a visual perception of it. Thus we say "I hear the bell," just as we say "I see the bell." The two alternative conditions of perception, viz. a natural and a habitual association between its two elements, are realised in the life of an individual through repeated experiences of the objects of the world. When we speak of a natural association between them we do not mean that it is congenital, so that the association is formed in the mind of every individual from his or her birth. If it were so, every baby should have as good perceptions as any grown-up person. All that we mean by a natural association is that it has a basis in the constitution of things and that it is most frequently met with in the experiences of an individual. If, therefore, both natural and habitual associations are produced by repeated experiences, two important consequences would follow: (1) It follows that the knowledge of the same object may, under the same objective conditions, be a matter of perception or inference for different individuals, according as there is or is not a natural or a habitual association as the basis of their knowledge. (2) It follows that, under the same objective conditions, the knowledge of the same object may at first be a matter of inference and subsequently of perception, and vice versa, for one and the same individual. The knowledge of a rose from its sight is a perception for the 29-(0.P. 103)

person in whom the repeated experiences of roses have established a natural or a habitual association between its colour and touch and smell. The knowledge of the same rose, under the same external conditions, will be an inference for another person when, for want of repeated experiences, its colour does not immediately call up its touch and smell, but suggests them as distinct ideas or images on the ground of its similarity to the colour of roses. For illustration we may refer to the difference between our knowledge of a new variety of the rose and that of the gardener who presents it to us. An armour may look hard, smooth and cold to an adult who is familiar with it. A child may just imagine it to have these or very different tactual qualities. The fragrance of sandalwood may be directly known from its sight by those who are closely acquainted with it, but for others its visual appearance may only be a sign from which to infer its fragrance. When I go to a foreign country I can barely infer the distance and size of an object from its visual appearance, but a native of the country who is familiar with the environment has a perception of these from the same position, which is essentially visual. If, however, I stay there for some months and become familiar with the environment, I may have a visual perception of the same facts under the same objective conditions. For the illustration of the converse case, i.e. the relapse of perception into inference, we may refer to (i) any case of senility in which a person has but a doubtful inferential knowledge of things and persons under the same objective conditions under which he or she once used to perceive them, and (ii) the common though curious instance of forgetfulness in which we fail to recognise an old acquaintance whom we have not seen for many years and try to infer his identity by putting certain questions to him and judging their answers. The foregoing discussion leads us to the conclusion that there cannot be an absolute line of demarcation between perception and inference. We cannot say that under the same objective conditions the knowledge of an object must always be a perception for every individual and that it can never be other-

wise. Nor can we aver that such knowledge must always be an inference for all individuals and that it can never be a perception for any. On the contrary, we are to admit that it may be either, for different individuals, or for the same individual at different stages of his or her life, according to his or her or their mental equipment. In view of the answers which we have given to the two questions stated above we are justified in saying that, under certain conditions, it is quite possible that there may be a presentation of fragrance in relation to the activity of the visual sense. When these conditions are fulfilled, there is nothing to prevent the eye from giving us an immediate knowledge of fragrance. And that is why of all people the Vedantins must admit that there may be a visual perception of fragrance, since, according to them, perception is just immediate knowledge and not any cognition produced by sense stimulation. Hence we admit that there may be a visual perception of fragrance, just as some psychologists believe that there is a visual perception of hardness, coldness and the like. Since, however, such perceptions are brought about by senses which are not ordinarily capable of perceiving their objects, it is better to call them extraordinary and put them in a separate class as jnanalaksana perception or complication.