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By the self (atma) we are to understand the individual soul (jivatma) in connection with perception. The self, in this sense, has been conceived in different ways by different schools of philosophy. We find four main views of the self in Indian philosophy. According to the Carvakas, the self is either the body with the attribute of intelligence or the aggregate of the senses of sight, hearing, etc. This is the materialistic conception of the self. The Buddhists reduce the self to the mind as a stream of thought or a series of cognitions. Like the empiricists and the sensationalists, they admit only the empirical self or the 'me.' Among the Vedantists, some, the Advaitavadins, take the self as an unchanging, self-shining intelligence (svaprakasa caitanya) which is neither subject nor object, neither the 'I' nor the 'me.' Other Vedantists, the Visistadvaitavadins, however, hold that the self is not pure intelligence as such, but an intelligent subject called the ego or the 'I' (jnatahamartha evatma).' 2 The Nyaya-Vaisesikas adopt the realistic view of the self. According to them, the self is a unique substance, to which all cognitions, feelings and conations belong as its qualities or attributes. Desire, aversion and volition, pleasure, pain and cognition are all qualities of the self. These qualities cannot belong to the physical substances, since they are mental. Hence we must admit that they are the peculiar properties of some substance other than the physical substances. The self is different in different bodies, because their experiences do not 1 Vide Sribhasya, I. I. I. 2 Nyaya-sutra, I. 1. 10; Padarthadharina-samgraha, pp. 30 f.

overlap but are kept distinct. The self is indestructible and eternal (nitya). It is ubiquitous or infinite (vibhu), since it is not limited in its activities by time and space.' The body or the external senses cannot be called self because intelligence or consciousness cannot be their attribute. The body, by itself, is unconscious and unintelligent. The senses cannot explain all mental functions. Imagination, memory, ideation, and the like are independent of the senses of sight, hearing, etc. The mind too cannot take the place of the self. If the mind be, as the Nyaya-Vaisesikas hold, an atomic substance, then the qualities of pleasure, pain, etc., in it must be as imperceptible as the mind itself. If, on the other hand, the mind be a series of cognitions, cach manifesting itself, then memory becomes inexplicable. No member of a mere series of cognitions can know what has preceded it or what will succeed it (vasanayah samkramasambhavat). 'A succession of ideas is not an idea. of succession.' The Advaita Vedantin's idea of the self as eternal, self-shining intelligence is no more acceptable to the Naiyayikas than that of the Buddhists. There is no such thing as pure intelligence unrelated to some subject and object. Intelligence cannot subsist without a certain locus. Hence the self is not intelligence as such, but a substantial principle owning intelligence as its attribute. The self is not mere knowledge, but a knower, an ego or the 'I' (ahamkarasraya)." Still knowledge or intelligence is not an essential and inseparable attribute of the soul. The soul is, in itself, neither material nor mental, but a neutral substance which comes to have the attribute of intelligence or consciousness in its relation to the body.³ According to the Nyaya, the self is the fundamental ground of all mental functions. It is involved in all cognitions, affections and volitions. All the experiences of an individual, whether cognitive or otherwise, must inhere in the self and cannot be 1 Bhasapariccheda, 51. 2 Bhasapariccheda and Siddhanta-muktavali, 48-50. 3 Nyaya-varttika, 1. J. 22; Nyayamanjari, p. 432.

separated from it. What are known as innate faculties of the mind, the reflexes, instincts and inborn feelings of fear, hatred, etc., are all conditioned by the past experiences of a self in this or a previous life.' Even the body and the senses cannot function unless they are connected with the self. Hence the self is called the guiding principle of the body and the senses (indriyadyadhasthata). In the case of external perception the self comes in contact with the object through the medium of the mind and the external senses. 'When we have the perception of an external object, the self is in contact with the mind, the mind with the external sense concerned, and the external sense with the object of perception." In the case of internal perception the mediation of external sense is unnecessary. Here the object is in contact only with the internal sense, called manas. We shall consider internal perception later on. Like the older school of Western realism, the NyayaVaisesika system accepts the substantialist theory of the self. But their view of the self differs from that of the realists in two important respects. For the realists consciousness or intelligence is an essential and inseparable atttribute of the soul. The soul cannot exist without the attribute of consciousness. For the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, however, the soul is in itself an unconscious substance. Consciousness is an accidental property of the soul, due only to its temporary connection with the body. Then, while the realists conceive the individual soul at least to be a limited substance, the Nyaya-Vaisesikas take all souls as unlimited and all-pervading substances (vibhu). But the Nyaya view of the self is untenable. If the soul be a substance we do not understand how it can exist without its distinctive attribute of consciousness and still be called the self. Without consciousness the soul is indistinguishable from matter. Again, to say that the soul is in itself pure substance is to say that it is a substance without attributes, which, however, is a contraNS., 3. 1. 19 ff. 2 Bhasapariccheda, 47. 3 Tarkabhasa, p. 5.

' I 5 I diction. Further, if the soul be an independent entity of the realistic type we cannot explain its relation to consciousness or mind or body. The soul-substance is not in its own essence related to anything else. Hence it can only be externally related to other things through the medium of a third thing. In perception it is said to be related to the object through the medium of the senses. But how are we to explain its relation to the mind or other senses? That must be by some other medium. Again, that medium must require another and so on indefinitely. So we are to give up the idea of the self as a neutral substance externally related to consciousness. In truth, the self is a self-conscious reality. We may call it a substance in the sense of an existing continuant,' but that continuant is psychical and not physical. It is not a metaphysical surface on which consciousness is accidentally reflected. Rather consciousness or intelligence is the intrinsic character of its existence, the core of its being. It is not indeed the passing thought, which James proposes to call the self. The Naiyayika is right in insisting that fleeting ideas or cognitions cannot take the place of the permanent self. So also an unconscious substance cannot be the conscious self. We should say that the self is the intelligent reality or being which is the ground of all thought and experience. It is the eternal selfmanifesting real which witnesses, but is not involved in, the flow of events.