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The body in early Hatha Yoga

by Ruth Westoby | 2024 | 112,229 words

This page relates ‘Paradox: dead and alive� of study dealing with the body in Hatha Yoga Sanskrit texts.—This essay highlights how these texts describe physical practices for achieving liberation and bodily sovereignty with limited metaphysical understanding. Three bodily models are focused on: the ascetic model of ‘baking� in Yoga, conception and embryology, and Kundalini’s affective processes.

Go directly to: Footnotes.

Paradox: dead and alive

After the key statement on the mighty body of yoga comes a paradoxical statement on the status of the body in relation to life and death:

O goddess who’s face is like the moon, you ask what is death to him: he does not die again because of the power of yoga (۴DzīᲹ 51). He has already died, so of one who has died what death can there be? Where there is death for all, there the yogi lives happily (۴DzīᲹ 52). Where the ignorant live, there he is always dead; there is nothing that he must do and he is not stained by what he does, he is always liberated while alive, established in himself, and free of all faults (۴DzīᲹ 53). Other ascetics and gnostics are always conquered by their bodies. How are they equal to yogis? They are lumps of flesh with miserable bodies (۴DzīᲹ 54).

Whether the ۴DzīᲹ’s conception of īԳܰپ implies embodied liberation, as I have understood the term elsewhere, will be considered below. Birch states, ‘bodiless liberation (videhamukti) is rejected explicitly� in keeping with the view that the yogi does not die (Birch 2000b:219). I would temper this statement somewhat and point to the paradoxical status of the liberated body in the ۴DzīᲹ. Videhamukti is not mentioned in the text. The liberated body is not a dead body, but there is a transcendence of the laws of the body in ṃs such that the concepts of life and death appear paradoxical.

As we saw in chapter one, in the ۴DzīᲹ liberation is bodily (īԳܰپ) (۴DzīᲹ 53, 127, 137 and 139). Bodily death is not liberation but liberation of the body is when it has the nature of brahman (۴DzīᲹ 140-142). Bodily liberation is sovereignty over the body, expressed as the opposite of ḍy: upon liberation the yogi can play in the three worlds, is omniscient, may assume any shape and move as swiftly as the wind, is a god, creator of all and autonomous (۴DzīᲹ 125, 127).

Thus īԳܰپ is not saṃsāric embodiment but fractures the constraints of ṃs. We have seen the text use paradoxical statements in the characterisation of the cooked body (purer than ś, the most pure of substances, more subtle than the subtle, more gross than the gross, more material than matter (۴DzīᲹ 48)). The layered, apparently mutually exclusive paradoxes suggest that the liberated yogi is beyond mundane ontology and conventional comprehension. Brereton in a 1990 book chapter examines paradigms by which the 貹Ծṣa construct totality out of multiplicity, and I think we can see at play here the strategies he identifies as hierarchy and paradox (1990:124-133). In this text these paradigms suggest the yogi encompasses and exceeds known ontologies. Just as on the nature of the body, we have seen paradoxical statements on life and death despite the insistence that death is not liberation: he has already died so what death can there be for him? The yogi lives where others die (۴DzīᲹ 52) and where the ignorant live he is always dead (۴DzīᲹ 53ab). The text is neither confused nor unsystematic, but points to a state beyond saṃsāric embodiment or bodiless liberation using on the one hand paradox and riddle and on the other a two-levels-oftruth approach contrasting a saṃsāric conception of life and death with an ultimate conception of the embodied liberated yogi beyond the constraints of ṃs.

۴DzīᲹ 39 is likely the destruction of the body but could refer to the disappearance of the body. Here the destruction of the I-maker (ṃkṛt) facilitates the destruction/disappearance (Բṣṭ) of the body (deha) and diseases (۴DzīᲹ 39). It appears to be saying that the body is destroyed upon liberation. However, it can be taken as disappearance or invisibility of the body as Բś, usually intransitive, is not in the causative, and thus refers to the destruction of the conception of the body rather than the body itself.[1] In another verse Բś does mean the death of the body: when the body is destroyed (Բśyate) due to lack of success in yoga and ignorance, one bound by former impressions obtains another body (۴DzīᲹ 116). The ۴DzīᲹ however belongs to the group of texts that understand the liberated body as capable of invisibility, as discussed below in the intra-corpus analysis. The prima facie reading is that the body is destroyed and so diseases must be destroyed too.

On the basis of this discussion we can refine the definition of īԳܰپ. Though īԳܰپ is bodily, the body is free of the constraints of ṃs such that it is only enigmatically construed as body.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Birch personal communication, 25 May 2022.

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