Essay name: Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra (study)
Author:
Nimisha Sarma
Affiliation: Gauhati University / Department of Sanskrit
This is an English study of the Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra: a significant work of the syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika school of Indian philosophy widely used as a beginner's textbook in southern India and has many commentaries. This study includes an extensive overview of the Nyaya and Vaisesika philosophy, epistemology and sources of valid knowledge. It further deals with the contents and commentaries of the Tarkabhasa.
Chapter 2 - A note on Tarkabhasa
15 (of 20)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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44
Kesava Miśra explains the six relations (sannikarṣa) of the sense organs
with the objects; which is known as sense-object- contact.
After perception Kesava Misra explains the second source of valid
knowledge i.e. inference, its various divisions with example and also the
fallacious reasons are explained in detail. According to him inference is
subsumptive reflection (parāmarsa) of the reason (linga).29 Here first he
explains the relation of the reason (linga) or problems with probandum
(sādhya). The relation of probans with the probandum is a natural relation
(svābhāvika-sambandha). Kesava Misra explains the two fold divisions of
inference, i) inference for the sake of one's own self (svārthānumāna) and ii)
inference for the sake of the others (parārthānumāna). It should be noticed
that Kesava Misra used the technical terms without giving general introduction
to them.
Then Kesava Misra explains different types of vyapti with the
definition of paksa, sapakṣa and vipaksa. Paksa or subject is that in which the
presence of the probandum is doubtful. Sapaksa or positive instance is that in
which the probandum is definitely known to exist. Vipakṣa or negative
instance is that in which the probandum is definitely known to be absent. Then
he comes to the explanation of five main forms of fallacies and their sub-
divisions.
Upamāna or comparison which is another independent source of valid
cognition is explained by just like Naiyayikas. According to him comparison is
29. lingaparāmarso 'numāna�. TB. p. 58.
