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Invalid knowledge (aprama) is the wrong apprehension of an object. It 54 53 is the manifestation of an object which is actually not so. It is what apprehends an object as different from it.** Valid knowledge is a true and definite knowledge of some new facts. If any knowledge lacks definiteness or certitude or doesnot convey any new information or doesnot represent things as they really are, it is invalid. Invalid knowledge includes remembrance. (smrti), doubt (samsaya), error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka). Remembrance is not valid because it is not presentative cognition but a representative one. The object remembered is not directly presented but recalled indirectly. Doubt is not a certainty in cognition. Error is misapprehention as it doesnot correspond to the real object. Hypothetical reasoning is not true knowledge. It is like this "if there were no fire, there can be no smoke." 53. 54. tadabhavavati tatprakarakanubhavo' yatharthah. saivaprametyucyate. Tarkasamgraha 38. tattvanubhavah prama, atattvajnanam aprama. Saptapadarthi p.59.

80 According to Kumarila there are three kinds of invalid knowledge, viz. error or illusion (mithyajnana), non-cognition or ignorance (ajnana) and doubt (samsaya). 55 Error or illusion represents an object in a form which does not belong to it. Illusion in Indian philosophy is discussed in different theories known as the khyativadas. There are five theories of illusion namely atmakhyati, asatkhyati, akhyati, anyathakhyati and anirvacaniyakhyati.5 Doubt is invalid not because it is false but because it doesnot have certainty. Neither it makes a definite assertion nor a denial. According to Vaisesika philosophy invalid knowledge is of four kinds: (1) doubt (samsaya), (2) illusion (viparyaya), (3) indefinite perception (anadhyavasaya) and (4) dream (svapna).57 Nyaya includes doubt (samsaya), with its varities of conjecture (uha) and indefinite cognition (anadhyavasaya) as well as error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning.58 Kesava Misra accepts invalid experience (ayathartha jnana) as that which does not conform to the real nature of the object 55. Slokavartika 2.54. 56. 57. 58. atmakhyatirasatkhyatirakhyatih khyatiranyatha/ tathanirvacaniyakhyatirityetat khyatipancakam// FN.1 under Vedanta-darsana p.11. The Epistemology of the Prabhakara school of Purva Mimamsa p.26. ayatharthanubhavastrividhah samsayaviparyayatarka bhedat. Tarkasamgraha 70.

81 apprehended and it is caused by invalid insruments of cognition. It is of three kinds doubt,ratiocination and misapprehention.59 Lakk Doubt 60 The invalid knowledge, doubt is an indefinite knowledge which characterizes an object in mutually conflicting ways. As for example, some tall thing is perceived, but one can not ascertain whether it is a man or a post. Gautama defines samsaya as the knowledge of conflicting notions with regard to the same object. 61 Vatsyayana explains five forms of doubt. The first form of doubt is the contradictory knowledge (vimarsa) about the same object due to the apprehention of common characteristics (samana-dharma) and which depends on the remembrance of the special characteristic of each (visesapeksa). 62 For instance it is a piller or a man? The second form of doubt is due to the apprehension of the unique characteristics of many objects. By 'many' is meant objects of similar as well as dissimilar nature. Doubt is due to the apprehension of characteristics of such manifold objects, the unique characteristics being perceived in both types of objects. 63 The third form of doubt is due to the contradictory statements about the same object (vipratipatti). The word 'vipratipatti' means contradictory assertion about the same object. The word 'contradictory' means opposition (virodha) i.e. the 59. Tarkabhasa p. 219. 60. 61. nanakonyavalambyekam jnanam samsayah yatha sthanurva puruso veti Nyayasiddhi on Prakarana-pancika 3.2. p. 43. samananekadharmopapattervipratipatterupalabdhyanupalabdhya vyavasthatasca visesapekso vimarsah samsayah. Nyayasutra 1.1.23. 62. Vatsyayana-bhashya Under Ibid. 63. Ibid.

82 impossibility of co-existence (asahabhava). For instance, there is an assertion that the self exists. And there is the other the self does not exist. The coexistence of existence and non-existence is impossible in the same locus. Nor is there any ground proving either of the alternatives. In such a circumstance, the failure to assertain the truth comes to be the form of doubt. The fourth 65 64 form of doubt may be due to the irregularity of apprehension. One apprehends water in the tank etc. where it does not actually exist. Therefore, after apprehending an object somewhere and in default of any proof determining the existence or non-existence of the object, one doubt whether the object apprehended is actually existent or non-existent. The fifth form of doubt may be also due to the irregularity of non-apprehension. Though actually existing under the root, the peg (kilaka) and water are not perceived Again, though actually non-existing, the object which has not come into being or which is destroyed is not perceived So, after non-apprehending somewhere, one doubts whether the object non-apprehended is actually existent or non-existent. These are the five forms of doubt as stated by Vatsyayana. 66 The Vartikakara is definite in saying that the first three kinds of doubt are the only three varieties of doubt and that the portion 'upala......sthatasca" in the sutra is only a qualification for the first part. Doubt is defined by Kesava Misra in this way, when in one and the same object there arises the apprehention of two or more conflicting 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid.

83 notions, that become doubt. 67 It is of three kinds. The first variety is that caused by the observation of certain common attributes of two things while not noticing any differentiating features between the two; e.g. whether the object ahead is a tree stump or a person. In this case on seeing an object at a distance the observer does not notice any curvedness or crevices that would enable the object being recognized as a tree stump; nor does he see any clear definition of head, hands, ect. which would enable the object being recognized as a person. At the same time he observes some features common to both the stump and a person such as tallness, shortness, etc. Then he gets a doubt in the form 'Is this a stump or a person?'. The second variety of doubt is that arising from the difference of opinion about one and the same thing when there is no special reason to ignore or accept either; e.g.whether sound is eternal or not. It happens like this. When one says that sound is eternal another that it is not, the hearer who sees no special grounds either way, doubts whether sound is eternal or not. The third variety is that caused by abserving some peculiar attitude or characteristic, without noticing anything special, in an object. For example when one apprehends smell which is the special quality of earth, but which does not indicate whether it subsists in eternal or non-eternal things and when he does not see any special reason (to decide either way), the doubt arises 67. ekasmin dharmini viruddhananarthavamarsa samsayah. Tarkabhasa p.223.

84 whether earth is eternal or not. Because it will be non-eternal if smell is not present in eternal things and it will be eternal if smell is not present in nonetenal things. 68 Kesava Misra has follwed the Vartikakara and has summerised his views as above mentioned way. The modern Naiyayikas would limit samsaya to two varieties, the first arising from the grasp of sadharanadharma and the second arising from that of asadharanadharma. 69